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The second half of 1941 has become a major focus in the writing of 
the history of the Nazi-Soviet War in the English-speaking and 
Russian-speaking worlds. For decades, historians outside of the 
Soviet Union tended to view 1941 as more of a German defeat 
brought about by Hitler’s mistakes and the weather rather than a 
Red victory brought about mainly by the resistance of the Soviet 
state, army and people. The reverse was true in the Soviet Union 
where historians explained the German failure to capture Moscow as 
a triumph of Soviet resistance. In more recent years, there is a 
trend among Western historians to reframe the Battle of Moscow as 
a Red victory, while in Russia the whole question of a Red victory 
has been problematised following the collapse of Communism and 
the opening of the Soviet archives. This thesis argues that the 
strongest trend evident in this literature is the repositioning of the 
Soviet state as an active rather than a passive actor in the events 
of 1941. While the history of the war is constantly being revised, a 
trend towards viewing the saving of Moscow as more of a Red 
victory than a German defeat is observable across the sample of 
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND SOURCES 
 
All Russian words have been transliterated using the Library of 
Congress ALA-LC Guide. However, in cases where an alternative 
spelling is in common usage in English (for instance, ‘Joseph Stalin’ 
rather than ‘Iosif Stalin’), the more familiar spelling has been used. 
Spelling used in original quotes has been kept with the form of 
transliteration used in the original text. The same applies for 
American spelling of certain words (‘armor’ instead of ‘armour’ 
etc.). All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.  
 
As this is a historiographical work, lengthy summaries of a 
particular historian’s work are at times required. To avoid 
unnecessary clutter, summaries are referenced with a single 
footnote containing bibliographical details. 
 
On a number of occasions, multiple editions of the same work have 
been employed in the writing of this work. There have been two 
causes of this. Firstly, in some cases there has been a need to 
utilise two different introductions in an edited work, such as those 
by Harrison E. Salisbury and David M. Glantz in different editions of 
Zhukov’s memoirs. Secondly, on some occasions after reading and 
taking notes on a work, that particular edition has become 
unavailable and a new edition has been purchased. For example, 
both the 1971 and 1993 editions of Albert Seaton’s The Battle for 
Moscow have been used in this work. The content is the same, but 
the page numbers differ. To avoid confusion, when the 1993 edition 
is cited the year of that version’s publication has always been 






Reflecting upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid decline of 
the once official version of Soviet history, Richard Overy wrote, in 1998, 
that “[t]he history of the Soviet Union is in turmoil. In twenty years’ time 
it may be possible at last to write something approaching a definitive 
history”.1 Nearly two decades later, it is appropriate to ask whether such 
a definitive history is in prospect. It is not clear what standards Overy 
would set for a ‘definitive’ history, but presumably it would require that 
historical accounts produced in the English-speaking and Russian-
speaking worlds are moving into rough alignment. To explore this issue, 
this thesis will examine trends in the Western and Russian historiography 
around the spectacular initial success and equally spectacular failure of 
the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. 
 
In the West, the issue of whether the Wehrmacht could have captured 
Moscow and perhaps ended the Soviet-German War successfully in Adolf 
Hitler’s favour in 1941 was for decades one of the most vexed questions 
of the entire Soviet period.2 During the Cold War, the answer most often 
encountered in the literature was that the Germans failed to capture 
Moscow because of their own strategic and tactical errors: a “German 
defeat”. With the end of the Cold War and the partial opening of the 
Soviet archives, new military histories have appeared in the West. Writing 
in 2005, the American historian Robert Citino suggested that a new frame 
for viewing the Battle of Moscow was needed, arguing that “rather than 
the Wehrmacht ‘losing’ it, the Soviet army won it”.3 The question asked in 
this thesis is whether viewing 1941 as a “Red victory” is the new, post-
archival orthodoxy.  
                                                 
1 Richard Overy, Russia’s War (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1998), p. xiii. 
2 John Taylor, ‘Hitler and Moscow, 1941’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 26, no. 3 
(2013), p. 490. 
3 Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005), p. 304. 
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In other words, is a paradigm shift under way in which the Soviet state 
and Red Army, once written off as little more than punching bags for a 
superior German war machine, are widely perceived as the agents of a 
major victory in 1941? A second, and related question is whether English-
language and Russian-language histories are moving into broad alignment 
in terms of explaining the events of 1941. Since the collapse of Soviet 
Communism and the demise of the official Soviet view of the war, a multi-
voiced contest over history has emerged in the Russian Federation. This 
thesis will explore the evolution of that contest in order to understand the 
major points of agreement and disagreement between Russian and 
Western versions of this crucial moment in the history of the war and 
whether a historiographical convergence about 1941 is occurring. 
 
During the Cold War, starkly different Western and Soviet accounts of the 
Nazi-Soviet War of 1941-1945 were in play. The war against Nazi 
Germany has always been remembered and even named and dated 
differently. In the West, the Second World War of 1939-1945 began with 
the Nazi invasion – quickly followed by the Soviet invasion – of Poland in 
1939. Accounts of victory over the Nazis in the West focused on 
significant British and American successes: the Battle of Britain, the 
campaigns in North Africa and the Atlantic, and the D-Day landings in 
France became the best-known events of the war. The other side of this 
emphasis on American and British military achievements was that the 
‘Eastern Front’, as the Germans described the fight against the Red Army, 
became the “unknown war”,4 which became the apt title of a 1978 
documentary series. The documentary, a joint British, U.S. and Soviet 
production sympathetic to the Soviet view of the war, was taken off the 
air soon after its first showing following the Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. 
 
                                                 
4 David Stahel, ‘Writing the Nazi-Soviet War’, War in History, vol. 22, no. 2 (2015), p. 236. 
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As Omer Bartov has put it, accounts of the war published in the West 
relegated the Eastern Front to the status of an “unclear and baffling 
sideshow”. This was in stark contrast to the more “chivalrous battles in 
the West and in North Africa, where there had apparently been decent 
chaps on both sides, though unfortunately some were led by rather more 
unpleasant characters than others”.5 This underestimation of the Nazi-
Soviet War was at odds with the scale of the fighting there. The Soviet 
Union suffered 70,000 cities, towns and villages destroyed, along with six 
million houses, 98,000 farms, 32,000 factories, 82,000 schools, 43,000 
libraries, 6,000 hospitals and many thousands of miles of roads and 
railway.6 The most commonly cited figure for total Soviet military and 
civilian deaths presently sits at twenty-seven million.7 The tally of Soviet 
military deaths has been estimated at between 7.8 and 8.7 million, 
roughly a third of the total lives lost by the Soviet Union between 1941 
and 1945.8 In the first six months of the war, Red Army losses stood at 
four and a half million soldiers.9 By comparison, Britain and the United 
States suffered approximately 800,000 dead in the entire war.10 The 
Eastern Front cost more lives than all of the other European theatres 
combined.11 
 
The scale and importance of the Nazi-Soviet War is also reflected in the 
pivotal role played by the Soviet Union in bringing about the Nazi defeat. 
Almost three quarters of German military losses in men and materiel 
                                                 
5 Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-1945, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare 
(Great Britain: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985), p. xi. 
6 Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006), p. 5. 
7 Albert Axell, Russia’s Heroes (London: Constable Publishers, 2001), p. 247; Catherine Merridale, 
Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), p. 
337; Laurence Rees, ‘What Was the Turning Point of World War II?’, World War II, vol. 25, no. 2 
(2010), p. 35; Thomas Earl Porter, ‘Hitler’s Rassenkampf in the East: The Forgotten Genocide of 
Soviet POWs’, Nationalities Papers, vol. 37, no. 6 (2009), p. 839. 
8 Michael Ellman and S. Maksudov, ‘Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A note’, Europe – 
Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 4 (1994), pp. 674-675. 
9 G. F. Krivosheev (ed.), Grif Sekretnosti sniat. Poteri Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR v voĭnakh, boevykh 
deĭstviiakh i voennykh konfliktakh. Statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voennizdat Izdatel’stvo, 
1993), p. 141. 
10 Rees, ‘What Was the Turning Point of World War II?’, p. 35.  
11 Merridale, Ivan’s War, p. 167. 
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occurred on Germany’s Eastern Front.12 By contrast, the British accounted 
for five per cent of German casualties, the United States twenty per 
cent.13  On the eve of the June 1944 D-Day landings in Normandy, some 
seventy per cent of Germany’s military manpower remained tied up on 
the Eastern Front, significantly aiding Allied efforts.14 The Red Army was 
responsible for destroying more than six hundred enemy divisions, 48,000 
enemy tanks, 167,000 guns, and 7,700 enemy aircraft.15  
 
In accounting for the undeserved obscurity of the Soviet war effort in the 
West, historians have noted issues related to Cold War politics, 
imbalances in available sources, and national stereotypes.16 With no 
access to Soviet archives, Western historians of the Cold War period came 
to rely heavily on German sources, especially the memoirs and 
testimonies of former German commanders keen to exculpate the 
Wehrmacht and preserve German military honour against the accusation 
of war crimes in the east.17 German commanders were spared 
prosecution and were recruited by the United States military to provide 
first-hand evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of the Red Army.18 
As Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II have described the rationale 
for employing the former enemy, “who knew better how to kill Russians 
than the men who dispatched 30 million of them?”19  
 
Eventually, around two thousand former German commanders worked for 
                                                 
12 Merridale, Ivan’s War, p. 337; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, p. 11. 
13 Norman Davies, No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Penguin Books 
Ltd, 2006), pp. 25-26. 
14 Michael C.C. Adams, The Best War Ever: America and World War II (Baltimore and London: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 47. 
15 Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, pp. 10-11; enemy divisions destroyed include Italian, Romanian, Finnish, 
Croat, Slovak, Spanish and German divisions. 
16 David M. Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and interpretations’, The Journal of 
Military History, vol. 62, no. 3 (July, 1998), p. 615; Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, The 
Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 47-50. 
17 Citino, German Way of War, p. 292. 
18 Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, pp. 64-65; Gregory Liedtke, Enduring the 
Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943 (England: Helion & Company 
Limited, 2016), pp. xxviii-xxix. 
19 Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, p. 249. 
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the United States military.20 Central to this process was Franz Halder, the 
former German general and chief-of-staff whose diary became an 
indispensable source for all the histories of 1941. Halder was so influential 
within the German Military History Program, conducted by the United 
States Army Historical Division, that it was informally known as the 
‘Halder Group’.21 By 1954, former Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe 
generals and admirals had produced some 2,175 manuscripts for 
consumption by the United States military establishment.22  
 
The agenda of the Wehrmacht memoirists was firstly to erase the memory 
of German war crimes and to recast the invasion of the Soviet Union as a 
flawed but ultimately noble attempt to save Western civilisation from the 
greater evil of Soviet Communism.23 Secondly, the generals defended 
their own role in the war by claiming that Hitler’s blunders snatched 
defeat from the jaws of a certain German victory. Hitler’s incompetence 
and poor decisions caused the otherwise invincible German Army to 
become bogged down before Moscow, first in the mud of October and 
then in the snows of November and December. Or, as Gerd R. Ueberschär 
has put it, the German generals: 
 
emphasized both that Germany was engaged in a preventative war 
and that Hitler was solely responsible for the failure of the Russian 
campaign through his dilettantish interference in the planning and 
execution of military operations … This view dominated most of the 
memoirs that appeared in subsequent years.24   
 
An early example of the German generals telling their story to a Western 
audience was the case made in 1950 for the prestigious American journal 
                                                 
20 Kenneth Macksey, ‘Introduction’, in Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (United States of America: 
Da Capo Press, 2002 [1952]), p. viii. 
21 Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, pp. xxviii-xxix. 
22 Peter G. Tsouras, ‘Introduction’, in Peter G. Tsouras (ed.), Fighting in Hell: The German Ordeal 
on the Eastern Front (New York: Presidio Press, 1995), p. 2. 
23 Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, pp. 3, 39-46. 
24 Gerd R. Ueberschär, ‘The Military Campaign’, in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. Ueberschär, 
Hitler’s War in the East: A Critical Assessment. Second Revised Edition (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2002), p. 74. 
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Foreign Affairs by former Vice Admiral Kurt Assmann.25 Assmann argued 
that Moscow and not Stalingrad was the turning point of the war in 
Europe. Having conducted research among the surviving generals, 
Assmann blamed Hitler’s groundless optimism and the Führer’s incredibly 
foolish decision to weaken the attack on Moscow in August 1941 for the 
eventual failure of blitzkrieg. Assmann noted that a debate over 
objectives existed from at least December 1940, and that the question 
had not been resolved when the invasion of the Soviet Union began. The 
defeat was not the generals’ fault, and it was Hitler’s arrogance that 
prevailed over the views of the military professionals. According to 
Assmann, “if Hitler was of the opinion that the Russian armed forces, 
possibly also the Soviet régime, would collapse under the first heavy 
blows, this was a hypothesis which did not enter the calculations of the 
General Staff”. The German generals knew that they were up against a 
wily Stalin whose “strategic principles” were to use space and time and to 
wear down an opponent gradually “by means of offensive and defensive 
actions”. When Hitler issued a directive on 21 August 1941 rejecting calls 
to focus on the Soviet capital, “the entire eastern campaign was fatally 
determined”. Once the opportunity to occupy Moscow in the late summer 
was lost, the weather became the major determining factor. Assmann 
provided a template for countless subsequent English-language accounts 
when he described how: 
 
Now, however, the weather turned on the Germans and threatened 
to nullify all their gains. A period of rain and mud, unusually heavy 
and protracted for this time of year, made what were bad roads 
impassable … Instead of the expected spirited pursuit of a sorely 
stricken foe, there was now a crawling advance through mud and 
rain against an enemy who was throwing everything he had into the 
defence of his capital.26 
 
                                                 
25 Kurt Assmann, ‘The Battle for Moscow, Turning Point of the War’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 28, no. 2 
(1950), pp. 309-326. 
26 This paragraph is a summary of Assmann, ‘The Battle for Moscow, Turning Point of the War’, 
quotes and information taken from pp. 310-311, 317 (long quote from p. 320). 
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The rains of the rasputitsa (‘time of no roads’) wreaked untold havoc on 
the ability of the Wehrmacht to manoeuvre and supply, and caused 
significant damage to tanks and trucks. It was from this type of reasoning 
that the traditional Western story of the weather and Hitler’s blunders 
saving Moscow emerged and became widely accepted.27  
 
The narrative pushed by the German generals had the advantage of 
simplicity and a clear-cut answer to the question of how this crucial 
moment in world history was decided. It also had the advantage of 
credible primary sources – the German generals themselves. The German 
generals’ version of the Battle of Moscow fitted the already well-ingrained 
assumptions of a Western audience used to negative stereotypes about 
Russia’s endless hordes of servile, brutish, Asiatic manpower. These 
barbarian hordes stood in sharp contrast to the civilised, professional and 
supremely capable Germans. As one admittedly extreme advocate of the 
position of the Halder school put it, “[t]he evidence supports the historical 
generalization that Barbarossa was for the Germans to win or lose. Only a 
German mistake of the highest magnitude could thwart victory”.28 
 
According to Citino, more than any other conflict, the Nazi-Soviet War has 
been dominated by discussions of how the Germans could have won the 
war.29 Thus, “Barbarossa might well be the only war ever in which the 
                                                 
27 Many historians have noted the dominance of the German historiographical school despite some 
dissenting voices. See for example Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and 
interpretations’, p. 597; David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 12-13; Robert Kirchubel, Operation 
Barbarossa: The German Invasion of Soviet Russia (Great Britain: Osprey Publishing, 2013), p. 
354; Citino, The German Way of War, pp. 291-293; Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern 
Front, p. 2; Christer Bergström, Operation Barbarossa: The Largest Campaign in History – Hitler 
Against Stalin (Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2016), p. 24; R. D. Hooker, ‘“The World Will Hold Its 
Breath”: Reinterpreting Operation Barbarossa’, Parameters, vol. 29, no. 1 (1999), p. 150; 
Alexander Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), p. 294;  Bryan Irven Fugate Jr., Thunder on the Dnepr: the End of the Blitzkrieg Era, 
Summer, 1941 (The University of Texas at Austin, Ph.D., 1976 [printed by University Microfilms 
International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A., 1985]), p. 257; Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, p. 
xxxi. 
28 Russel H. S. Stolfi, [Book review] Glantz, David M., ‘Barbarossa: Hitler’s Invasion of Russia 
1941’, The Journal of Military History, vol. 66, no. 3 (July, 2002), p. 888. 
29 Citino, The German Way of War, p. 268. 
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losers wrote the history, rather than the victors”.30 The resistance of the 
Soviet state, army and people was factored into the dominant Western 
Cold War view, but was always qualified by reference to Hitler’s blunders 
and the mud and snow, and was supplemented by gruesome examples of 
the inhumane, callous Russian and Soviet indifference to life.31 Many Cold 
War accounts likened the German defeat to that of Napoleon’s Grande 
Armée,32 an earlier example of a Russian victory whose achievement, 
arguably at least, was usurped by images of the French invaders falling 
victim to the snows of the Russian steppe.33 The popular perception for 
seven decades was, as Gregory Liedtke has put it, that “the military 
forces of Germany were not really defeated by the Soviet Red Army on 
the battlefield at all”.34 Or, as Alexander Hill has noted, the picture of 
“faceless hordes and overwhelming material might overcoming superior 
German tactical and operational capabilities, relied heavily on memoirs of 
senior German commanders such as Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein 
and others”.35 
 
It has to be acknowledged that the Soviet Union was its own worst enemy 
when it came to telling the story of 1941-1945. Western accounts of the 
Red Army written before the fall of Communism routinely complained 
about the lack of Soviet archival sources.36 Soviet accounts varnished the 
                                                 
30 ibid., p. 292.  
31 See, for example, Janusz Piekalkiewicz, Moscow 1941: The Frozen Offensive (Great Britain: 
Arms & Armour Press, 1985), pp. 86, 163, 186-187, 196, 275; Klaus Reinhardt, Moscow – The 
Turning Point: The Failure of Hitler’s Strategy in the Winter of 1941-42 (Oxford: Berg Publishers 
Limited, 1992 [1972]), pp. 86 and 91; Albert Seaton, The Battle for Moscow, 1941-1942 (London: 
Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd, 1971), pp. 124 and 167; John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin’s 
War with Germany. Volume 1 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), p. 239; Alexander Werth, 
Russia at War, 1941-1945 (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1964), p. 232. 
32 See, for example, B. H. Liddell Hart, ‘Why Hitler Invaded Russia – And Failed’, Marine Corps 
Gazette, vol. 40, no. 12 (1956), pp. 22-26; Piekalkiewicz, Moscow 1941, pp. 21, 61, 98, 137; 
Reinhardt, Moscow – The Turning Point, p. 307; Alfred Turney, Disaster at Moscow: Von Bock’s 
Campaigns, 1941-1942 (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1971), p. 28; Assmann, ‘The Battle for 
Moscow, Turning Point of the War’, p. 326. 
33 This theme is explored in Dominic C. B. Lieven, ‘Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812-14)’, 
Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring, 2006), pp. 283-308. 
34 Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, p. xxi. 
35 Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War, p. 1. 
36 See, for example, Jesse D. Clarkson, [Book Review] Werth, Alexander, ‘Russia at War 1941-
1945’, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 38, no. 4 (1966), p. 449; Earl F. Ziemke and Magna 
Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 
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truth, ignored inconvenient facts, and confused the details of names, 
places and situations to suit the official version of events.37 For decades 
after the Second World War, the availability of primary German records 
about the conflict far exceeded what was available on the Soviet side.38 
Western historians were reluctant to trust official Soviet works as credible 
historical sources due to their overt propagandistic agenda and the 
reluctance of Soviet authorities to reveal the archival sources cited in such 
works.39 Summing up the outcome of this secrecy, David M. Glantz, the 
foremost American historian of the Soviet German War since the opening 
of the Soviet archives, noted that “[h]aving emerged victorious on the 
battlefield, the Soviets abandoned the field of historical struggle to their 
former Allies and enemies”.40 Or as Nina Tumarkin has put it: 
 
Deliberate distortions of history for political reasons, especially the 
history of the Soviet Union, were the trademark of Soviet historical 
writing almost since its inception. In particular, the official saga of 
the Great Patriotic War was filled with hyperbole and glaring 
omissions.41 
 
Much has changed since the opening of the Soviet archives in the late 
1980s. Writing in 1998, Glantz summarised the excitement among the 
new post-archival generation of historians when he described how: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
United States Army, 1987), p. 522; John Erickson, ‘The Soviet Union at War (1941-1945): An 
Essay on Sources and Studies’, Soviet Studies, vol. 14, no. 3 (1963), p. 249; Manfred 
Messerschmidt, ‘Introduction’, in Horst Boog, Jürgen Forster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-
Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär, Germany and the Second World War: Volume IV. The Attack on 
the Soviet Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 7; Truman Smith, ‘Foreword’, in General 
Wladyslaw Anders, Hitler’s Defeat in Russia (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. ix; 
Bryan I. Fugate, Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Novato, 
CA: Presidio Press, 1984), p. xix; Reinhardt, Moscow – The Turning Point, pp. xii-xiii. 
37 Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voĭna 1941-1945 godov, osnovnye sobytiia voĭny, tom pervyĭ 
(Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 2011), p. 788; this multi-authored collective work covered in 
significant detail many aspects of the Great Patriotic War. The Chief of the Editorial Committee for 
the whole series was A. Ė. Serdiukov. The Chair of the Editorial Committee responsible for the first 
book, the one studied for this thesis, was V. A.  Zolotarev. For ease of purpose, this work will 
hence be referred to as Zolotarev, VOV (2011) in footnotes.  
38 Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East (Lexington, Kentucky: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2011), p. xix.  
39 Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, pp. xxiii-xxv. 
40 Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and interpretations’, p. 598. 
41 Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia 
(New York: BasicBooks, 1994), pp. 50-51.  
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Already the testing of German materials against Soviet open-source 
accounts and the limited existing quantity of Soviet archival materials 
has produced a strikingly different picture of the war. When that 
comparison and testing can be done in full measure, the results will 
be even more significant. In essence, on the eve of the twenty-first 
century, we stand not at the end of historiography on the war, but 
rather at the threshold of a new beginning.42 
 
Spurred on by this new access to information about the Soviet state and 
Red Army, there has been a significant revival of interest in the Eastern 
Front and the events of 1941 among Western historians specialising in the 
military history of the war.43 To use a military analogy, the accounts of 
the German generals have been caught in a pincer movement; the 
pincers comprise on the one hand a group of historians investigating the 
German side of the war using mainly German archives,44 and another 
group of historians primarily concerned with the Soviet side of war who 
now have access to Soviet archives.45  
 
As we shall see, the thrust of this new historiography is to push forward 
the date at which the Germans lost the war. Instead of an emphasis upon 
Stalingrad and Kursk, or the mud and snow of late 1941 as bringing the 
Wehrmacht undone, historians writing since the opening of the Soviet 
archives are much more likely to argue that the war was lost in the 
summer of 1941 when blitzkrieg failed in large measure due to 
unexpectedly stiff Soviet resistance. One of the conclusions of this thesis 
is that the once dominant voice of the German generals has all but 
disappeared from the literature. The view of the German generals has 
become a phantom, often invoked in the introductions to recent military 
histories of Operation Barbarossa, yet very rarely encountered in the 
military histories themselves. On the other hand, it will be argued here 
                                                 
42 Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and interpretations’, p. 617. 
43 Alexander Hill, ‘The war on the eastern front 1941-1945: Myths and realities’, Historian, no. 75 
(Autumn, 2002), p. 29.  
44 This group includes historians such as Craig Luther, David Stahel, Stephen Fritz and Gerd r. 
Ueberschär (discussed below).  
45 This group includes historians such as David Glantz, Walter Dunn, Alexander Hill, Jack Radey, 
Charles Sharp, and Roger Reese (discussed below).  
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that the German generals were remarkably important in the 
historiography because their account of 1941 – and the critique of their 
account - set the agenda for much of the Western historiography up to 
the present day. In other words, historians writing today continue to 
attack the German generals’ view as an enduring myth that needs to be 
countered, despite the fact that the views under attack have been in the 
minority for decades.  
 
During the Cold War, a very different account of the Soviet-German War 
predominated in the Soviet Union, where Communist rule was 
strengthened and, for some, vindicated by the Red victory. The Great 
Patriotic War was always dated 1941-1945; the period 1939-1941, when 
the Soviet Union assisted Germany in the carving up of Eastern Europe 
and launched an invasion of Finland, was justified as defensive and 
necessary given the West’s refusal to commit to collective action against 
Hitler. The Soviet view of the war represented an official history, which 
was only subject to change if there were a change in leader. According to 
the Soviet view of the war, the Soviet Union was unique among the 
warring states in that its foreign policy had always been aimed at peace, 
and it was only the perfidy of Hitler and of the West that led to the 
outbreak of war and its horrendous consequences for the people of the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet view was an explanation of the Red victory that 
stressed the positive role of the Communist Party, the unity of the Soviet 
people, and the courage, tenacity and skill of the Red Army. Winston 
Churchill declared to the British parliament in 1944 that “the guts of the 
German army have been largely torn out by Russian valour and 
generalship”.46 This was a prescient summary of the Soviet view of the 
war. 
 
                                                 
46 Winston Churchill in Chris Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War (New 
York: Vintage Books, 2008), p. 5. 
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The Soviet view of the war was ‘super patriotic’ in nature.47 The Soviet 
leadership exploited the Great Patriotic War as proof of the validity of the 
Soviet system and closely controlled how its history was recorded.48 The 
Great Patriotic War was a time when the regime made some concessions 
to the people; limited economic freedoms were introduced, participants 
described wartime solidarity between the Communist elite and ordinary 
people, the churches were reopened and the persecuted priests given a 
brief respite.49 This was the peak of the cult that surrounded the image of 
a strong, omniscient leadership embodied in Joseph Stalin. After Stalin’s 
death, the regimes of Khrushchëv and especially Brezhnev used the 
victory over the Nazis as a core justification for the whole Soviet 
system.50 Those growing up in the Soviet Union after the war were told 
that the victory in the war confirmed the superiority of Soviet-style 
socialism.51 It was also a Russian, and not simply a Soviet triumph. The 
wartime experience caused many Russians to identify themselves with the 
Soviet Union as if it were their state.52 According to Geoffrey Hosking, the 
Great Patriotic War was the only part of official Soviet history when there 
truly was substantial recognition of the Russian (Russkiĭ), as distinct from 
the multi-national (Rossiĭskiĭ or Communist), nature of the Soviet state.53  
 
The Soviet version of the war was the reverse mirror image of the 
account offered by Halder or Assmann. The Red Army’s success in saving 
Moscow and turning the tide of the war was not a case of contingency, 
but of inevitability. Once the Soviet state, people, and army recovered 
                                                 
47 N. V. Ilievskiĭ, ‘Problemy i zadachi sovremennoĭ istoriografiĭ velikoĭ otechestvennoĭ voiny’, 
Voenno-istoricheskiĭ zhurnal, no. 5 (2010), p. 4.  
48 R. J. B. Bosworth, ‘Nations Examine Their Past: A Comparative Analysis of the Historiography of 
the “Long” Second World War’, The History Teacher, vol. 29, no. 4 (1996), p. 510; Evan Mawdsley, 
Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945 (Great Britain: Hodder Education, 2005), p. 
xxii. 
49 David Christian, Power & Privilege: The Russian Empire, The Soviet Union and the Challenge of 
Modernity. Second Edition (Melbourne: Pearson Education Australia, 2005), p. 308. 
50 Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead, pp. 110, 132-133. 
51 Geoffrey Hosking, ‘The Second World War and Russian National Consciousness’, Past & Present, 
no. 175 (May, 2002), p. 187. 
52 Yitzhak M. Brudny, Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 7. 
53 Hosking, ‘The Second World War and Russian National Consciousness’, p. 163. 
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from the shock of the cowardly and unprovoked invasion, the superiority 
of the Soviet system inevitably determined the outcome. The victory was 
never out of the hands of the Soviet people even though it took four long 
years to achieve. Soviet resistance, not the weather or Hitler’s errors, was 
the decisive factor. Soviet histories portrayed the Red Army as comprising 
whole units of heroes selflessly devoted to their motherland and the 
Soviet system.  
 
The central tenets of the official Soviet view of the war only came under 
serious attack in the Soviet Union during Mikhail Gorbachëv’s glasnost’ 
era when a ‘revisionist’ critique progressively questioned many of the 
time-honoured pillars of Soviet propaganda.54 The most glaring of the 
omissions from the Soviet account was the lack of serious discussion of 
how the Red Army could have fared so badly in the first five months of 
the war. According to Amir Weiner, 22 June “remained one of the longest 
enduring taboos in Soviet historiography”.55 Questions also arose as to 
whether victory came at too high a price and whether the war was a 
victory for Stalin and his totalitarian system, or a defeat for the people of 
the Soviet Union.56 Many revisionists viewed 1941 not as a “German 
Defeat” or “Red Victory”, but a “Stolen Victory”. In their view, 1941 was a 
victory won by the sacrifice of the people despite the wasteful and 
incompetent Soviet leadership. This heroic sacrifice was then ‘stolen’ from 
the people by the Communist Party, who claimed responsibility for saving 
the capital, and then subjected the Soviet population to a brutal 
dictatorship no better than the Nazi regime they had expelled.   
                                                 
54 Terminology is a difficult issue. Mawdsley uses the term ‘revisionist’ to cover “a broad church in 
terms of opinions, interests, sources and professional competence” to describe the Icebreaker 
thesis. The term ‘revisionist’ in the West refers to completely different group of historians opposed 
to the ‘totalitarian’ school. In this thesis, the term ‘revisionist’ will be used for critics of the Soviet 
view of the war. See, Evan Mawdsley, ‘Crossing the Rubicon: Soviet Plans for Offensive War in 
1940-1941’, The International History Review, vol. 25, no. 4 (2003), pp. 818-819. 
55 Amir Weiner, ‘In the Long Shadow of War: The Second World War and the Soviet and Post-
Soviet World,’ Diplomatic History, vol. 25, no. 3 (2001), p. 453. 
56 There were earlier debates in Soviet historiography, for example, Aleksandr Nekrich’s 
controversial 1941.22 iiunia of 1965. However, it was not until Gorbachëv that the central tenets 
of the Soviet view of the war came under such trenchant and consistent attack. Khrushchëv’s 




More recently, the revisionists have themselves come under attack from 
the Putin administration, from conservative military historians based in 
the Russian Army, and from a phalanx of ‘private historians’, some of 
whom view Stalin as having been the key to the Red victory. Teddy J. 
Uldricks has described this anti-revisionism as the “national-patriotic 
school”; for convenience, this historikerstreit in Russia will be described 
as a battle between revisionists and national-patriots.57 Putin-era 
national-patriotic historians agree with earlier Soviet accounts that the 
war revealed the superior capacity of the Soviet state when it came to 
waging a total war: 1941 was a “Red Victory”. It was the Red Army, not 
Hitler’s mistakes or the weather, which saved Moscow. This new patriotic 
literature has up until now received little scholarly attention in the West 
and one of the aims of this thesis is to enhance knowledge about what is 
arguably the new dominant paradigm in Russia. Given that the earlier 
established orthodoxies are clearly undergoing challenges both in the 
West and in Russia, it is timely to investigate the trajectories of the 
debate over 1941 and whether an intersection of Western and Russian 
accounts is now in prospect.  
 
1941 and its revival 
The importance attached to 1941 has waxed and waned over the years. 
During the war, Western politicians, generals and even cartoonists were 
in no doubt as to the importance of the fact that Moscow did not fall to 
the German invaders.58 Soon after Operation Barbarossa began, there 
was a widespread expectation that the Soviet state would follow the 
example of France and collapse in a matter of weeks.59 The Wehrmacht 
                                                 
57 Teddy J. Uldricks, ‘War, Politics and Memory: Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World 
War II’, History & Memory, vol. 21, no. 2 (2009), p. 60. 
58 Michael Jabara Carley, [Book review] Stahel, David, ‘Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s 
Defeat in the East’, Canadian Journal of History, vol. 46 (December, 2011), pp. 713-715; Rees, 
‘What Was the Turning Point of World War II?’, p. 32. 
59 For examples of Western pessimism about the capacity of the Red Army, see Martin Kahn, 
“‘Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated’: Anglo-American Government Assessments of Soviet War 
Potential before Operation Barbarossa’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 25, no. 2 
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advanced nearly one thousand kilometres into Soviet territory and 
captured an area the size of Britain, France, Spain and Italy combined.60 
For Britain and the United States, the unexpected survival of the Soviet 
state was the ‘miracle’ of Moscow, a reversal of fortunes for the Germans 
that fortuitously opened the door to an Allied victory.  
 
On the other hand, there was no emphatic winner. The Germans failed to 
capture Moscow but lived to fight another day and launch a successful 
summer offensive in summer 1942. The Red Army drove the German 
Army back from Moscow but failed to make further headway, and the 
capital remained under threat for another eighteen months. Thus it was a 
matter of interpretation as to how to rate its importance compared to 
later battles. During the Cold War, English-speaking historians and Soviet 
accounts were mostly in agreement that the turning point came about 
half way through the war: Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943 and 
Kursk in the summer of 1943 were widely acknowledged as the battles 
when the war was won and lost. John Erickson summed up this view 
when he included the Battle of Moscow in a volume entitled The Road to 
Stalingrad. The implication was that the Battle of Moscow was a precursor 
to the major event that was the Battle of Stalingrad, not the major event 
itself. Writing in 2007, Andrew Nagorski expressed his regret that: 
 
The battle of Moscow is now largely forgotten. Historians have paid 
far more attention both to the Battles of Stalingrad and the Kursk 
salient, which represented clear-cut victories over Hitler’s forces, and 
to the searing human drama of the siege of Leningrad.61  
 
Nagorski may well have been correct in asserting that Stalingrad is rated 
more of a turning point than Moscow, but the situation, at least in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2012), pp. 220-240. 
60 Martin Sixsmith, Russia: A 1000 Year Chronicle of the Wild East. As Heard on Radio 4 (United 
Kingdom: United House Group Limited, 2012), p. 337. 
61 Andrew Nagorski, The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow 
that Changed the Course of World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), p. 3.  
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academic Western literature, appears to be changing.62 While his method 
was far from scientific, Laurence Rees recently surveyed twenty leading 
Western historians for their opinion as to the turning point of the Second 
World War. Stalingrad was still the most popular answer with six - Richard 
Overy, Max Hastings, Antony Beevor, Robert Dallek and William Hitchcock 
- nominations. The year 1941 with five nominations came a close second. 
David Reynolds nominated Hitler’s decision to launch Operation 
Barbarossa, Andrew Roberts nominated the mud of October; Richard 
Evans and Ian Kershaw nominated the German defeat at Moscow in 
December; Rees himself nominated Stalin’s decision to remain in Moscow 
on 16 October as having changed the course of the war.63 It is worth 
nothing that, even if they disagreed about the exact date, twelve out of 
twenty of Rees’s experts nominated the turning point as having occurred 
somewhere on the Eastern Front, not in Western Europe or the Pacific. 
Geoffrey Megargee noted what may be a looming sea change among the 
historians when he wrote that:  
 
Stalingrad may have been the emotional turning point of the war, but 
the Germans’ best chance for victory disappeared in the snows in 
front of Moscow, if not earlier.64 
 
As we shall see, the main issue for Western historians has changed from 
how the Germans could have won the war to whether the Germans ever 
stood any realistic chance of victory at all. If the war was indeed lost in 
1941, at what point in the year was it lost, and why? It is now quite 
common to find the claim that the war was already lost for the Germans 
as early as the summer of 1941, only weeks into the invasion.65 How 
widespread is that view? Does that mean that the image of the “snows in 
                                                 
62 ibid., pp. 2-3. 
63 Rees, ‘What Was the Turning Point of World War II?’, p. 35. 
64 Geoffrey P. Megargee, War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941 
(United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2006), p. 153. 
65 See, for example, Evan Mawdsley, Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941-1945. 
Second Edition (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 71; Stahel, Operation 
Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, p. 25; Craig W. H. Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed: 
German Blitzkrieg through Central Russia to the Gates of Moscow. June-December 1941 (Atglen, 
PA: Schiffer Publishing, Ltd, 2013), p. 24.  
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front of Moscow” has now become more a description of the scenery than, 
as it was once for many readers of this literature, a credible explanation 
of Germany’s defeat? If historians – or the “orthodoxy” among the 
historians – are changing their views, why has that change occurred?  
 
From the Soviet perspective too, the Battle for Moscow for many years 
took second place to the battles of Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin. Stalin 
had no incentive to draw attention to the miscalculations of the Soviet 
leadership or to explain the massive losses of 1941. Moscow did not 
become a ‘gorod-geroĭ’ (‘hero city’) until 1965, twelve years after Stalin’s 
death and long after Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa.66 
Post-Stalin Soviet accounts did not dwell on the massive defeats at the 
borders except to claim that they were examples of steadfast resistance 
by the Red Army. Moscow did become more important over the years 
and, in 1967, the Communist Party celebration of the fiftieth anniversary 
of the October Revolution was the occasion for declaring that the Battle of 
Moscow was indeed a “turning point of the war”.67 In the heavily edited 
Soviet-era version of Georgiĭ Zhukov’s memoirs that appeared in the late 
1960s, Zhukov described the Battle for Moscow as his principal memory 
of the war: 
 
When I am asked what I remember most of all of the past war, I 
always answer: The Battle for Moscow. A quarter of a century has 
passed, but these historic events and battles still remain in my 
memory. Under hectic, almost catastrophically complicated and 
difficult conditions our troops were tempered, matured, accumulated 
experience and, once the absolutely essential minimum of arms were 
in their hands, moved from retreat and defensive manoeuver to a 
powerful offensive. Our grateful descendants will never forget the 
difficult and heroic sacrifices of the Soviet people and the military 
achievements of the Soviet armed forces in that period. The Battle 
                                                 
66 Rodric Braithwaite, Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2006), p. 311. 
67 Alexander Vassilevsky, ‘The Turning Point of the War’, in Bryan Bean (ed.), Moscow-Stalingrad, 
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for Moscow laid the firm foundations for the ensuing defeat of Nazi 
Germany.68 
 
Apart from the typical patriotic rhetoric and hyperbole, the message here 
is that Moscow was the ‘firm foundation’. Soviet accounts made it clear 
however that much fighting remained before a final Red victory was 
assured. As we shall see, in the present historical battle in Russia 
between revisionists and national-patriots, Moscow and the events of 
1941 now take pride of place.  
 
Paradigms and paradigm shifts 
The terms ‘paradigm’ and ‘paradigm shift’ were proposed by Thomas 
Kuhn to describe major changes in the state of knowledge about a 
particular object of study. In 1962, Kuhn suggested that the production of 
what is accepted as scientific knowledge is often dominated by a 
paradigm. This paradigm rests upon generally accepted assumptions 
regarding theory, methodology and relevant areas of research: the “entire 
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the 
members of a given community”.69 Kuhn postulated that progress in 
science is typically driven by paradigm shifts – “scientific revolutions” - 
caused not by new discoveries that discredit previous assumptions, but by 
processes within the scientific profession that “generate a shift in 
perspective”.70 Kuhn’s ideas are roughly analogous to Michel Foucault’s 
contention that ‘discourses’ about knowledge are often shaped by political 
and social factors and not simply scholarly debate over the evidence.71  
 
                                                 
68 Georgi K. Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles (London: Sphere Books Limited, 1971), p. 
103. 
69 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Second Edition, Enlarged (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 175.  
70 Sheila Fitzpatrick, ‘Revisionism in Soviet History’, History and Theory, vol. 46 (December, 
2007), p. 78. 
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Kuhn wrote with the sciences in mind, but his insights have often been 
applied to the study of shifting historical perspectives. Sheila Fitzpatrick, 
the leading “revisionist” historian of the Stalin era, has used Kuhn’s model 
to describe and explain the changes that occurred in the historiography of 
the Stalin era from the 1970s to the present. She noted that the term 
‘paradigm shift’ is over-used in the humanities to describe mere changes 
in intellectual fashion. Nonetheless:  
 
Kuhn’s model is still useful, if only for reminding us of the power of 
reigning orthodoxies at any given time in determining what questions 
should be asked, how they should be answered, and what constitutes 
the relevant field of information.72  
 
For Fitzpatrick, a “paradigm shift” occurred in studies of the Soviet Union 
in the 1970s. Dissatisfied with the “top-down” totalitarian model of 
scholarship that had dominated traditional Sovietology, a new generation 
of historians, often with a background in social history, began to revise 
how power structures in the Soviet Union were understood.73 This change 
came as a result of the more broad influence of social history that 
affected history in general in the 1970s and, specific to the case of Soviet 
studies, the influence of the Cold War. The ‘New Left’ movement of the 
early 1970s, driven by increasing opposition to the Vietnam War, began 
to question the traditional view of the Soviet Union as unequivocally ‘bad’ 
and solely responsible for the Cold War.74 In other words, the revisionist 
critique was fuelled by a new generation of historians seeking to 
understand Soviet history through a different lens to those of the ‘Cold 
War warriors’ that had dominated the profession up to that point. Thus, 
the ‘revisionist’ challenge of the 1970s represented a Kuhnian paradigm 
shift: change was driven not by a sudden influx of new source material, 
but a shift in perspective from those within the historical profession.  
 
                                                 
72 Fitzpatrick, ‘Revisionism in Soviet History’, p. 78. 
73 ibid., pp. 80-81.  
74 ibid., p. 82.  
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Paradigms are situated within a broader political and social context that 
shapes the conventional way of looking at issues. Just as the term 
‘totalitarianism’ provided the convenient cover-all for most academics and 
laymen to describe the readily observable features of the Soviet political 
system, the German generals provided a convenient and simple 
explanation of how the Germans lost the Battle of Moscow: the Germans 
were going well until the conspired forces of the weather and Hitler’s 
incompetence sabotaged their seemingly inevitable victory at the very 
gates of the Soviet capital. This part of the paradigm went virtually 
unquestioned for seventy years. Jack Radey and Charles Sharp have 
recently observed that historians did not question the role of the weather 
because it was seemingly so well established in the literature.75 The 
impact of the mud and snow became an assumption that went untested 
by those working within the dominant paradigm laid down by the former 
German generals.  
 
As Kuhn pointed out, paradigms are subject to change, but a change in 
the direction of the historiography cannot be assumed as meaning a 
simple one-directional line towards the ‘truth’. Trends in the literature 
may reflect broader political and social change, fashion in historical 
explanations as well as the availability (or not) of new sources, which in 
any case are always subject to interpretation and reinterpretation. As 
Catherine Merridale has noted:  
 
Archives … are necessary to meet the current challenge, but they are 
not the essence of it. The fundamental issue now is not new 
information, but the possibility of new sets of questions.76  
 
In other words, archival information does not speak for itself but is 
deployed by historians within an interpretative framework. Influencing 
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this interpretative framework might be factors such as changing fashions 
in a historical field and broader societal changes such as those described 
by Fitzpatrick. A change in perspective among historians does not 
necessarily mean that one group of historians have been proved right and 
another group proved wrong. Historians working within a dominant 
paradigm may become prisoners of a “groupthink” that shuts out other 
ideas. Historians who are marginalised within a paradigm at one point in 
time may well find that they are part of the dominant paradigm at 
another point in time. It would be naïve to think that historical questions 
are definitively resolved in the light of new information or that the ‘truth 
with a capital T’ inevitably emerges out of historical debates. The question 
here is not whether 1941 was in fact a Red victory, but the extent to 
which historians writing in the English and Russian languages now 
consider 1941 to be a Red victory. 
 
Whether a paradigm is in place or not depends upon the perspective of a 
presumably significant majority of those working on a particular issue. In 
the case of 1941, different sub groups of historians and writers working 
on the issue can be identified. One division is between historians primarily 
studying the German or Soviet sides of the war. A second division is 
between geographic regions, notably North America, Britain and Ireland, 
Germany and Russia. What will be argued in this thesis is that a new 
historiography about 1941, widely shared by authors working across the 
globe and studying both the German and Soviet wars, has emerged since 
the opening of the Soviet archives.  
 
As for why such an alignment of previously disparate voices has occurred, 
there are several plausible explanations. It might be thought, for example 
that the Russian and Western historiography would gradually converge 
because the end of Communism opened up the Soviet archives and led to 
large-scale collaboration between Western and Russian 
researchers/historians. It will be argued here that while the new sources 
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of information and collaborations are important, they were not the main 
drivers of the new alignment. Rather what mattered most was the fact 
that in both the West and in Russia, distinct historiographies or paradigms 
emerged that dominated for much of the Cold War era: under the 
influence of broader changes in the political and intellectual contexts, 
these paradigms came under challenge. As we shall see, historians in the 
West still see themselves as slaying the beast that was the German 
generals’ view of the war. In Russia, revisionists and national-patriots are 
at war over whether to modify or entirely jettison the Soviet view of the 
war. It is serendipity rather than inevitability that accounts for the 
present alignment around the “Red victory” at Moscow in 1941.  
 
Victories and Pyrrhic victories  
The title of the thesis seeks to contrast the terms “Red Victory” and 
“German Defeat”. But what exactly do those terms mean? It should be 
noted at the outset that the terms ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’ are contested and 
slippery to apply in practice. For military historians, the concept of 
‘victory’ in war has long been a topic of controversy.77 According to 
William Martel, the term ’victory’ is “such an immensely powerful, 
suggestive, and absolute term” that it has to be used “with great 
caution”.78 Martel also cautions that, “all judgements about victory are 
inherently subjective”. Just as importantly, victory “is not and cannot be a 
value-neutral concept, and is not separable from political and ideological 
forces in society”.79 Or as Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney 
have put it, it is open to interpretation as to whether an event is 
perceived as a victory or a defeat.80  
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Victory has been defined as “reducing substantially the enemy’s war-
making potential”, forcing the enemy into “withdrawal, retreat, laying 
down arms or surrender”, achieving this “quickly and efficiently”, and 
doing so “with absolute minimum collateral damage to civilians and their 
infrastructures”.81 In the case of 1941, the Red Army had done much of 
the “withdrawal, retreat, laying down arms, or surrender” but arguably it 
was the German Army that was in greater danger of collapse in December 
1941. Because the Germans won so many battles but ultimately failed to 
achieve their goals and because the Red Army lost so many battles but 
ultimately did achieve its goals, the unexpected outcome has fuelled 
interpretation and reinterpretation of victory and defeat in 1941.  
 
It is in this connection that the term ‘Pyrrhic’, or hollow, victory is much 
used in discussions of both the German Army and the Red Army in 1941. 
To this day, a debate continues around the extent to which the successes 
of the Wehrmacht at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev and Viaz’ma-Briansk in the 
summer and autumn of 1941 were ‘real’ victories that were subsequently 
undone by Hitler’s mistakes, or Pyrrhic victories because the German 
Army needed to win the war quickly or it would not win at all. German 
losses in 1941 were many times lower than the Red Army’s, but their 
capacity to replenish the losses was, according to most but not all 
historians, much less.82 The idea of seeing the German war as a Pyrrhic 
victory is perhaps best summed up in the title of a chapter in Chris 
Bellamy’s Absolute War: ‘Winning oneself to death’.83 
 
Some Western historians have gone so far as to cast doubt on whether, at 
the end of the day, there was any victory achieved in the entire Nazi-
Soviet War. Richard Raack in the 1990s, for example, argued that the war 
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“finished with a hollow Soviet victory”.84 For Earl F. Ziemke, this was “a 
no-holds-barred contest between two totalitarian powers, which both 
sides lost”.85 Similarly, many Russian historians writing after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union saw the war as a missed opportunity to rid Russia of 
Stalin and Communism.86 However, if the war was such a ‘missed 
opportunity’, it is difficult to know what an acceptable level of loss would 
be if this were indeed a war of “annihilation”.87  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that an important military 
outcome did occur in December 1941; the thesis revolves around 
understanding how historians in the West and in Russia have tried to 
explain that outcome. To give greater focus to the question of whether 
the historiography is moving in the direction of describing 1941 as a ‘Red 
victory’ rather than a ‘German defeat’, this thesis will assess historians in 
terms of four outstanding issues identified by Glantz in his classic 
discussion of the historiography.88 The first area of controversy identified 
by Glantz was “the question of wartime leadership and the analogous 
issue of who was responsible for military defeat - Hitler or his generals”.89 
The German generals were of the view that Hitler lost the war by, among 
other poor decisions, delaying the attack on Moscow in August 1941. In 
other words, Operations Barbarossa and Typhoon were brilliant military 
successes brought undone by political interference.  
 
In the early Cold War, many historians in the West came to share the 
view that a consequence of Hitler’s amateurish decision-making was that, 
                                                 
84 R. C. Raack, ‘Stalin’s Role in the Coming of World War II: the International Debate Goes On’, 
World Affairs, vol. 159, vol. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 52. 
85 Earl F. Ziemke, The Red Army 1918-1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to US Ally 
(London: Taylor & Francis Books Ltd, 2004), p. 348. 
86 See R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 113-114. 
87 See, for example, Artem Drabkin and Aleksei Isaev, Barbarossa Through Soviet Eyes: The First 
Twenty-Four Hours (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2012), pp. 174-75; Geoffrey Roberts, 
‘Operation Barbarossa: The 75th Anniversary of the Nazi Invasion of the Soviet Union’, Russia 
Insider, 19 June, 2016. Available at: http://russia-insider.com/en/barbarossa/ri15045 (accessed 
22/6/16). 
88 Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and interpretations’, pp. 595-617. 
89 ibid., p. 615. 
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in the months that followed, the mud, snow and the vastness of Russia’s 
physical and human resources joined forces to defeat the otherwise 
invincible German Army. Such a view of the events of 1941 would not 
qualify as a Red victory if the author considers that Hitler had made a 
poor strategic choice that he did not need to make. However, if the 
historian was of the opinion that Hitler’s decision to slow the advance on 
Moscow was forced upon the German dictator by unexpectedly stiff Soviet 
resistance leaving him with no choice but, for example, to protect his 
exposed flanks, that potentially would qualify as a Red victory.  
 
The second controversy identified by Glantz was “testing and either 
validating or refuting the earlier stereotypical German view of the Red 
Army”.90 While German diarists and memoirists often praised the 
stubborn resistance of the Red Army, the implication of what they wrote 
was that the Soviet military and people were incapable of thwarting the 
invasion of the Wehrmacht.91 In other words, the Germans had to lose 
the war and the Soviet regime could not win it because the Red Army was 
all brawn and no brains. As we shall see, one of the strong trends 
observed here is growing recognition of the capacity of the Soviet state 
and a correspondingly less stereotypic view of the Red Army as a 
primitive horde whose only motivation was fear of its own leaders. In 
other words, historians are increasingly likely to recognise that, at the 
very least, the Soviet state, army, and people were capable of defending 
themselves from the German occupation of their capital. The Soviet 
capacity to act, and recognition of the impact of those actions on the part 
of historians, would suggest an acknowledgement of Soviet agency in the 
events of 1941. 
 
                                                 
90 ibid.  
91 See, for example, Erhard Raus, ‘Russian Combat Methods in World War II’, in Tsouras (ed.), 
Fighting in Hell, p. 17; Günther Blumentritt, ‘Moscow’, in Seymour Freidin and William Richardson 
(eds), The Fatal Decisions (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1956), p. 38; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 
pp. 151, 244, 253. 
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The third controversy identified by Glantz concerned “responsibility for the 
war in the first place and the associated question of the combat readiness 
of the Red Army in June 1941”.92 Here Glantz specifically referred to the 
Icebreaker controversy: the dispute, which has dominated discussion of 
the war in Russia since the 1990s, over whether Stalin was planning to 
attack Hitler. According to Viktor Suvorov (real name Vladimir Rezun), the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union was a pre-emptive strike, just as 
Hitler had claimed in 1941. If it were true, this would make it more 
difficult to claim any sort of Red ‘victory’ in 1941 given that the aim of the 
war was not survival in the face of a surprise attack but territorial 
conquest in Europe. For historians who embraced the Icebreaker thesis, 
1941 could only be described as the mutual defeat of the two contenders 
or even as Hitler’s succesful defence of his Nazi state from Communist 
aggression.  
 
Fourthly, Glantz pointed out that a debate raged “over the human cost 
exacted by the war on the Red Army and the civilian population of the 
Soviet Union”.93 This is an especially contentious issue in Russia. Stalin 
admitted to only seven million losses in the war, a figure that rose to 
twenty million in the Nikita Khrushchëv era and twenty-two million in the 
Leonid Brezhnev era. Gorbachëv put the figure at nearly twenty-seven 
million and some historians in Russia today put the figure at closer to 
forty-six million.94 There is a bitter debate in Russia over whether Hitler’s 
surprise invasion or Stalin’s brutal methods were the cause of the high 
Red Army losses.95 Viewed in these terms, the question arises as to 
whether the German Army was stopped simply by Stalin’s ruthless 
deployment of an inexhaustible supply of cannon fodder, a perspective 
that might sit somewhere between a “Red victory” and “German defeat”. 
                                                 
92 Glantz, ‘The Red Army at War, 1941-1945: Sources and interpretations’, pp. 615-616. 
93 ibid., p. 616.  
94 The high figure is favoured by Boris Sokolov in Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky: The Red Army’s 
Gentleman Commander (England: Helion & Company, 2015), p. 76. 
95 Lev Lopukhovsky, The Viaz’ma Catastrophe, 1941: the Red Army’s Disastrous Stand Against 
Operation Typhoon (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2013), pp. 20-21; and Ellman and Maksudov, 




The following criteria will therefore be used for determining whether the 
historian belongs in the ‘Red victory’ camp even if they make no explicit 
claim of that type. Firstly, the historian would need to be of the view that 
the goal in 1941 was a defensive one, that is, to defeat the German 
invaders. Secondly, the Soviet state, army and people have to be 
described as active forces in the war and not simply as helpless victims in 
the first weeks and months. Thirdly, the measures taken by the Soviet 
state, army and people need to be described as rational and effective and 
not simply as the brutal reaction of a regime willing to expend the lives of 
its enormous population in a futile battle. Fourthly, the historian needs to 
be of the view that there was considerable solidarity in Soviet society and 




Writing in 1977, Martin van Creveld speculated that there were already 
“many thousands” of books written on the topic of “Hitler’s Russian 
adventure”.96 This means that any attempt to explore the changing 
historiography of even a small part of “Hitler’s Russian adventure” is a 
daunting challenge. The aim here is to examine the much smaller 
category of books that might be described as the expert military history 
about 1941 and the Battle for Moscow. Even so, it cannot be claimed that 
the accounts of the war examined here represent an exhaustive list of 
every account of the military history of 1941. However, it is claimed that 
the historians discussed comprise a significant sample of historians who 
are prominent in bibliographies in the era in which they appeared and are 
representative of the dominant trends in the literature. Table I lists the 
historians considered for the Western perspective on 1941. 
 
                                                 
96 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Second Edition 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 2004 [first 
edition 1977]), p. 148.  
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Historian Affiliation Contribution to the 
study 
PRE 1991 AUTHORS 
Basil Liddell Hart (b. 
1895 – d. 1970) 
British military; 
military writer and 
historian 
The German Generals 
Talk (1948); The Other 
Side of the Hill (1948) 
Wlayslaw Anders (b. 
1892 – d. 1970) 
Polish military Hitler’s Defeat in 
Russia (1953) 
E. Lederrey Swiss Army; Federal 
Polytechnic School 
Germany’s defeat in 
the East (1955) 
Ronald Seth (b. 1911 – 
d. 1985) 
Professor of Literature, 




The Battle for Moscow 
(1964) 




Hitler’s War on Russia 
(1964) 
Alexander Werth (b. 
1901 – d. 1969) 
Journalist Russia at War (1964) 
Alan Clark (b. 1928 – 
d. 1999) 
Politician Barbarossa (1965) 
Earl F. Ziemke (b. 
1922- d. 2007) 
U.S. Marines; 
University of Georgia. 
Stalingrad to Berlin 
(1968); Moscow to 
Stalingrad (1987 – co-
authored with Magna 
Bauer); The Red Army 
1918-1941 (2004) 
Magna Bauer (d. 1981) U.S. Army Center of 
Military History 
Moscow to Stalingrad 
(1987 – co-authored 
with Earl F. Ziemke) 
Geoffrey Jukes (b. 
1928) 
Oxford University; UK 
Ministry of Defence; 
Australian National 
University 
The Defense of Moscow 
(1970) 
Alfred Turney U.S. Military Disaster at Moscow 
(1971) 
Albert Seaton (b. 
1921) 
British military The Battle for Moscow, 
1941-42 (1971); The 
Russo-German War 
1941-45 (1971) 
John Keegan (b. 1934 
– d. 2012) 





The Second World War 
(1989) 
Klaus Reinhardt (b. 
1941) 
German military; 
NATO; Ph.D. from 
University of Freiburg 




John Erickson (b. 1929 
– d. 2002)  
Edinburgh University The Road to Stalingrad 
(1975) 




The German Army, 
1933-1945 (1978) 
Horst Boog (b. 1928 – 
d. 2016) 
German Armed Forces 
Military History 
Research Office  
Germany and the 
Second World War 
(1984 – co-authored 
with Gerd R. 
Ueberschär, Jürgen 
Forster, Joachim 
Hoffmann, Ernst Klink 
and Rolf-Dieter Müller) 
Gerd R. Ueberschär (b. 
1943) 
German Federal 
Military Archives and 
University in Freiburg 
Germany and the 
Second World War 
(1984 – co-authored 
with Horst Boog, 
Jürgen Forster, 
Joachim Hoffmann, 
Ernst Klink and Rolf-
Dieter Müller); ‘The 
Military Campaign’, in 
Hitler’s War in the East 
(2002 - co-authored 
with Rolf-Dieter 
Müller). 
Jürgen Forster (b. 
1940) 
University of Freiburg Germany and the 
Second World War 
(1984 – co-authored 
with Horst Boog, Gerd 
R. Ueberschär, Joachim 
Hoffmann, Ernst Klink 
and Rolf-Dieter Müller) 
Joachim Hoffmann (b. 
1930 – d. 2002) 
German Armed Forces 
Military History 
Research Office  
Germany and the 
Second World War 
(1984 – co-authored 
with Horst Boog, Gerd 
R. Ueberschär, Jürgen 
Forster, Ernst Klink and 
Rolf-Dieter Müller) 
Ernst Klink (b. 1923 – 
d. 1993) 
German Armed Forces 
Military History 
Research Office 
Germany and the 
Second World War 
(1984 – co-authored 
with Horst Boog, Gerd 






Rolf-Dieter Müller (b. 
1948) 
German Armed Forces 
Military History 
Research Office 
Germany and the 
Second World War 
(1984 – co-authored 
with Horst Boog, Gerd 
R. Ueberschär, Jürgen 
Forster, Joachim 
Hoffmann and Ernst 
Klink) 
Bryan Fugate University of Texas. Thunder on the Dnepr 
(1976 Ph.D. thesis, 
printed 1985); 
Operation Barbarossa 
(1984); Thunder on 
the Dnepr (1997 – co-
authored with Lev 
Dvoretsky) 
Janusz Piekaliewicz (b. 




Moscow 1941 (1985) 
Werner Haupt Librarian; independent 
researcher and writer 
Assault on Moscow 
1941 (1986) 
POST 1991 AUTHORS 




Colonel in U.S. Marine 
Corps Reserve 
Hitler’s Panzers East 
(1992) 
Walter S. Dunn Jr (b. 
1928) 
University of Wisconsin Hitler’s Nemesis (1994) 
David M. Glantz (b. 
1942) 
Virginia Military 
Institute; University of 
North Carolina; U.S. 
Army Command and 
General Staff College; 
Defense Language 
Institute; Institute for 
Russian and Eastern 
European Studies; 
Military College of 
South Carolina; 
founder and former 
director of U.S. Army’s 
Foreign Military Studies 
Office; United States 
Army (ret.). 
When Titans Clashed 
(1995 – co-authored 







Jonathan House (b. 
1950) 
U.S. Army Command 
and General Staff 
College; Colonel of 
When Titans Clashed 
(1995 – co-authored 





Lev Dvoretsky Amscort International Thunder on the Dnepr 
(1997 – co-authored 
with Bryan Fugate) 
Richard Overy (b. 
1947) 
University of Exeter; 
British Academy; 
King’s College. 
Russia’s War (1998) 
Evan Mawdsley (b. 
1945) 
University of Glasgow Thunder in the East 
(1995 and 2016); 
December 1941 (2011) 
Geoffrey Roberts (b. 
1952) 
University College Cork Stalin’s Wars (2006) 
Rodric Braithwaite (b. 
1932) 
Former diplomat; 
writer and researcher 
Moscow 1941 (2006) 





Moscow 1941 (2006) 
Geoffrey P. Megargee 
(b. 1959) 




Inside Hitler’s High 
Command (2000); War 
of Annihilation (2006) 




The Greatest Battle 
(2007) 
Chris Bellamy (b. 
1955) 
Royal Artillery (ret.); 
Journalist; Cranfield 
University 
Absolute War (2008) 
David Stahel (b. 1975) Humboldt University of 
Berlin; University of 
New South Wales. 
Operation Barbarossa 
and Germany’s Defeat 
in the East (2009); 
Operation Typhoon 
(2013); The Battle for 
Moscow (2015) 
Michael Jones Ph.D. Bristol 
University; Writer and 
consultant 
The Retreat (2009) 
Stephen G. Fritz (b. 
1958) 
East Tennessee State 
University 
Ostkrieg (2011) 




The Drive on Moscow 
1941 (2012 – co-
authored with Anders 
Frankson) 
Anders Frankson Newspaper editor The Drive on Moscow 
1941 (2012 – co-




Jack Radey (b. c.1946) Game developer; 
writer and researcher 
The Defense of Moscow 
1941 (2012 – co-
authored with Charles 
Sharp) 
Charles Sharp U.S. Military; writer 
and researcher 
The Defense of Moscow 
1941 (2012 – co-
authored with Jack 
Radey) 
Christer Bergström (b. 
1958) 




Robert Kirchubel California Army 




Craig W. H. Luther Former Fulbright 
Scholar and U.S. Air 
Force historian (ret.) 
Barbarossa Unleashed 
(2013) 





Academy of the 
German Armed Forces 
Operation Barbarossa 
(2013) 
Frank Ellis Special Air Service 




Gregory Liedtke Royal Military College 
of Canada 
Enduring the Whirlwind 
(2016) 
Alexander Hill University of Calgary The Red Army and the 















Pre 1991 11/25 (44%) 5/25 (20%) 3/25 (12%) 6/25 (24%) 
Post 1991 12/27 (44.5%) 2/27 (7%) 5/27 (18.5%) 8/27 (30%) 
Table I  
 
The two criteria for making the list are that they have made a contribution 
to the study of 1941 recognised in the footnotes of other writers and that 
they have conducted, or at least claim to have conducted, original 
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research on the issue of 1941. A noticeable trend that can be seen in 
Table I is that, with two exceptions, they are all males resident in the 
West with varying backgrounds ranging across academia, the military, 
foreign affairs and diplomacy and popular military history. Authors can be 
difficult to describe if simple labels like “American historian” are used. 
Nagorski, a veteran journalist and author, wrote one of the first post-
archival accounts of the Battle of Moscow and might best be described as 
an “American journalist”. Yet he was born in Scotland to Polish parents 
and studied both in Krakow and in Massachusetts while his father served 
with the American Foreign Service. In this study, the aim is not to 
pinpoint why a particular historian has chosen to take the position they 
have in terms of their backgrounds or stated political views, even though 
such considerations might indeed be very relevant in understanding an 
individual author’s views. Rather, a paradigm exists because a majority of 
practitioners consider a particular way of looking at an issue normal, 
mainstream, standard or orthodox. What will be established here for the 
West at least is that it was once “orthodox” to see 1941 as a case of a 
missed opportunity for the Wehrmacht and that such a view is no longer 
the majority view among the experts on this issue.  
 
In the second half of the thesis, attention will turn to the Soviet and 
Russian historiography around 1941 in order to compare with its Western 
counterpart. Works published in Russian in the Soviet Union or the 
Russian Federation have been consulted in order to understand the Soviet 
view of the war, the Gorbachëv-era rejection of the previously official 
Soviet view of the war, and the patriotic revival of the Putin era. It should 
be noted that it is not always easy to distinguish between a ‘Western’ and 
‘Russian’ historian given that there is a category of native Russian-
speaking historians who have published in the West and have exercised a 
major influence. Suvorov, for instance, is an especially interesting 
phenomenon of this type because he was brought up in the Soviet Union, 
trained and worked in Soviet intelligence, wrote his historical accounts 
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while living in the United Kingdom and has had his greatest influence 
among historians and commentators in the Russian Federation. In other 
words, it depends on context as to whether native Russians writing in 
English since the end of the Cold War are considered part of the 
“Western” canon on 1941. 
 
An important qualification is that this thesis is not primarily concerned 
with popular representations of the war on the Eastern Front in fiction, 
films or games, a topic that has been covered elsewhere.97 The object of 
study here is probably best described as “military history” meaning expert 
historical accounts of why the military events of 1941 developed the way 
that they did. Of course, the historian in question might well reject the 
label of military history, which is sometimes viewed as a proxy for an 
obsession with violence and weapons. Erickson, arguably the 
quintessential military historian given his unmatched knowledge of the 
detailed working of the armies of the Eastern Front, insisted that he was 
engaged in “social history”.98 “Military history” is the term used here but 
all that is meant by it is that the historian is attempting to explain the 
military events of 1941 with reference to political and military strategy, 
and the issues of command, control, morale and tactics that impact upon 
an army’s performance.  
 
It should also be noted that a striking feature of the literature about the 
Soviet-German War is the degree to which it has attracted writers whose 
training is an area outside of the discipline of history.99 Experts with 
backgrounds in the military, intelligence, journalism and diplomacy have 
all made contributions to the historiography both in the West and in 
Russia. The author’s lack of a Ph.D. in the discipline of history was not 
used to exclude any account that was frequently cited by other expert 
accounts. Rather, the criterion used was the historian or account’s 
                                                 
97 See Smelser and Davies, The Myth of the Eastern Front, pp. 187-222. 
98 Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, p. vii. 
99 Stahel, ‘Writing the Nazi-Soviet War’, p. 246.  
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prominence in the bibliographies of what were widely acknowledged as 
the major histories of the era. The exception here is the most recent 
literature about 1941, which is not yet prominent in bibliographies; here 
the decision was made to consider as much of the expert military history 
published in the last decade and dealing with 1941 as could be found 
again with the qualification that the expert or his account was taken 
seriously by others working in this field.  
 
The structure 
Chapter One outlines the issues and controversies that surround the June 
to December period of 1941. It notes the events that have come under 
close scrutiny in subsequent historical literature, and identifies those 
events that have formed the most enduring areas of historical 
controversy.  
 
Chapter Two is an account of the development of the view of former 
German generals into a “dominant paradigm”. It argues that there are 
two interlocking premises of the paradigm developed by former Nazi 
commanders such as Franz Halder, Heinz Guderian, Fedor von Bock, 
Günther Blumentritt, Erhard Raus and Erich von Manstein. The first is the 
credibility of the German generals as sources in the absence of credible 
Soviet sources. The second is a stereotypical view of the Red Army, which 
suggested that the Soviet state could not have resisted effectively if Hitler 
had made better decisions.  
 
Chapter Three shows how the classic Western military histories 
exemplified by Basil Liddell Hart, Albert Seaton, and Earl F. Ziemke led 
the way in prioritising the German generals as their principal sources. 
These historians described a professional and superior German army 
against which the Soviet state and Red Army were clearly no match. It 
was the Germans who were the active players in these accounts. The 
German defeat was caused by Hitler’s mistakes, the weather, and Stalin’s 
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good fortune in having the endless cannon fodder of the Red Army, in 
that order. Beyond the classic accounts, the accounts of authors such as 
Ronald Seth, Paul Carell, Alan Clark, Alfred Turney, Werner Haupt, 
Matthew Cooper, Janusz Piekalkiewicz and John Keegan added gripping 
detail to the German invasion and humanised the German soldier to the 
detriment of his Red Army counterpart. The impression to be gained from 
this literature was that the Wehrmacht was a uniquely professional and 
effective military force for which the Red Army was no match. The 
Wehrmacht’s main opponents were firstly incompetent political leadership 
and secondly Russia’s geography and weather; not the Red Army.  
 
Chapter Four looks at the decline of the influence of the German generals 
during the second half of the Cold War. From the 1970s, the trend in the 
military histories of 1941 was to describe the German invasion as a 
foolhardy enterprise hamstrung by the limited German resources and the 
unique challenges of Russian geography and weather. The challenge to 
the view of the German generals was fuelled by new sources of 
information and a changing Cold War context. The result was that by the 
end of the Cold War, the German invasion was widely viewed as a 
“mission impossible”. However, Hitler, and Russia’s geography and 
weather figured more prominently than Soviet resistance in explaining the 
outcome of the Battle of Moscow. 
 
Chapter Five shows that a new historiography or paradigm in relation to 
the events of 1941 has emerged that is sceptical of the account of the 
German generals and much more likely to rate Soviet resistance as more 
important to the outcome than Hitler’s mistakes or the weather. The 
opening of the Soviet archives in the late 1980s gave the proponents of 
the Soviet resistance thesis vast new sources of information, which were 
thoroughly mined to build a much more credible “Soviet resistance” 
thesis. This attack on the older historiography was led for the first time by 
American historians, most notably by David M. Glantz and Roger R. 
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Reese. This last wave of new information overturned older stereotypes in 
ways that damaged the paradigm established by the Halder School. What 
is “new” about the “new historiography” is that for the first time a broad 
consensus has emerged between those studying the Soviet and German 
sides of the war and between historians on both sides of the Atlantic 
about how 1941 is to be explained. 
 
Chapter Six looks at the ‘responsibility for the war’ issue. If the 
Icebreaker thesis were to be widely accepted, the standard of what would 
constitute a ‘Red victory’ would necessarily change. Yet the Western 
literature has mostly rejected the Icebreaker thesis. Moreover, a tendency 
has emerged to reject the view of Stalin as gullible fool in regard to Hitler.  
A trend in the historiography around the success of the surprise attack is 
to picture Stalin as an active player in the start of the war, even if he 
were not planning his own attack in 1941. 
 
Chapter Seven looks at the Soviet view of the war from the Cold War. It 
argues that the official Soviet view of the war was based upon the three 
pillars of an unjustified and surprise attack, the solidarity of the Soviet 
state, army and people, and the activity of the Red Army in fighting back 
successfully against the odds. Despite minor fluctuations, such as the 
depiction of the role of key figures such as Stalin and Zhukov produced 
during Khrushchëv’s ‘thaw’, the central tenets of the official Soviet view 
remained steadfast until Gorbachëv’s reforms in the mid-1980s. The 
works consulted include standard Soviet accounts and official histories.100  
 
                                                 
100 Boris Shaposhnikov, Bitva za Moskvu: Reshaiushchee srazhenie Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ 
(Moscow: Iauza, Ėksmo, 2011 [1943]); A. Samsonov, Velikaia bitva pod Moskvoĭ 1941-1942 
(Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1958); the Khrushchëv-era six-volume Istoriia Velikoĭ 
Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. (Moscow: Voenizdat, published between 
1950 and 1965); the Brezhnev era twelve-volume Istoriia vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 gg 
(Moscow: Voenizdat: published between 1973 and 1982); the Sovetskaia Voennaia Ėntsiklopediia 
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976); and the Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-
1945. Kratkaia istoriia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984). Also consulted were the memoirs of Soviet 
commanders, published from the 1960s onwards, including those by Timoshenko, Sokolovskiĭ, 
Konev, Zhukov, Vasilevskiĭ and Rokossovskiĭ. 
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Chapter Eight focuses on the Russian-language revisionist critique of the 
dominant and official Soviet view of the war. The revisionist critique 
began in the works of a number of Soviet dissidents prior to perestroika, 
but did not begin in earnest until Gorbachëv’s reforms. For the first time, 
historians such as Dmitri Volkogonov, V. A. Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov, Mark 
Solonin, and Vladimir Beshanov called into question the Soviet view of 
1941. The revisionists turned attention to the massive defeats of 1941 
and questioned Stalin’s intentions, the competence of Soviet leaders such 
as Zhukov, the solidarity of Soviet society and whether Moscow would 
have fallen had Hitler followed the advice of his generals. It is argued that 
the revisionist account of 1941 was clearly moving in a different direction 
to the new post-archival Western historiography about 1941. 
 
Chapter Nine looks at the substantial and growing pushback against the 
revisionists that is developing in Putin’s Russia. Uldricks has described 
how “a national-patriotic school of Russian historiography has emerged in 
recent years”.101 Members of this school seek to answer and counter the 
revisionist account of the Great Patriotic War, which they claim is 
diminishing Russia’s status as a great power, endangering Russia’s 
borders, and acting as a fifth column for hostile Western powers by 
undermining Russia’s self-belief. This patriotic literature comprises 
individuals connected to the Putin administration and its military 
establishment as well as ‘private historians’ who espouse the patriotic 
line. While critical of Stalin and unashamedly biased in its patriotism, this 
literature has clearly embraced a “Soviet resistance” explanation for the 
outcome of the Battle of Moscow.  
 
The Conclusion argues that Citino’s claim that 1941 was a Red victory 
rather than a German defeat has more traction now than at any time in 
the past. For the first time in the historiography around 1941, what might 
                                                 




be described as a new paradigm has emerged that stresses Soviet agency 
rather than German mistakes or Russia’s geography and the weather as 
the answer to the puzzle of 1941. As we shall see, a “Soviet resistance” 
answer is now widely shared among Western historians looking at 1941 
from the perspective of both the Soviet and German wars. While by no 
means the only voice on the subject in Putin’s Russia, the “patriotic” 
Russian accounts of the last two decades argue a case that has much in 





Chapter One: Issues and Controversies 
 
There is no one convenient overarching term to describe all of the military 
events of 1941. The events under study go by various names and cover 
different periods. On 22 June 1941, the Germans launched Operation 
Barbarossa, a three-pronged attack that spanned the entire Soviet 
frontier, with the aim of destroying the Red Army as close to the Soviet 
border as possible. Operation Typhoon, which was launched three months 
after Barbarossa on 30 September, aimed to take the German Army 
around and beyond Moscow to a line that would run from the Arctic Ocean 
to the Caspian Sea. For Soviet writers, the Battle of Moscow began with 
the launch of Operation Typhoon in September 1941 and came to an end 
in April 1942 when the front stabilised between one hundred and two 
hundred kilometres west of Moscow. There are many accounts of the war 
that are entitled ‘Operation Barbarossa’ or ‘the Battle of Moscow’ that 
cover a far longer timeframe than the specific operation that the title 
refers to. It would be fair to say that the period June-December 1941 is 
often discussed as a discrete period. This is when the German Army 
initially advanced at a great rate but then failed to achieve not only the 
capture of Moscow but also its principal strategic goal of the destruction of 
the Red Army.102 The first six months of the war is the timeframe under 
examination in this thesis. 
 
Almost everything about the events of 1941, including the relative 
importance of the Battle of Moscow, is a matter of controversy in the 
literature. In recent years, the one issue that seemed to be more or less 
settled – Hitler’s responsibility for the war - has become a lively 
discussion once more. Historians have now begun to reinvestigate how 
committed the Soviet Union or Britain really was to anti-Hitler ‘collective 
security’, whether the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 made 
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Stalin co-responsible for the war, what plans the leaders of the German 
and Red Armies had for waging war, why Stalin refused to believe that an 
attack was imminent, and above all, whether Stalin was planning to 
attack Hitler in 1941.103  
 
What is clear is that Operation Barbarossa began in the early hours of 22 
June 1941. In the largest invasion in military history, four million German 
and allied troops,104 625,000 horses, 600,000 motor vehicles,* 3,350 
tanks and 7,184 artillery pieces poured into Soviet territory.105 The 
invading forces were divided into three Army Groups. The largest force, 
Field Marshal Fedor von Bock’s Army Group Centre, was to advance from 
the Soviet-German border in occupied Poland across the River Bug in the 
direction of Moscow. Notably, the Soviet capital itself was never 
designated as the principal goal of the invasion. Bock was tasked with the 
capture of the key cities of Brest, Minsk and Smolensk and to enact huge 
encirclements of Soviet troop formations to ensure that the Red Army 
would not live to fight another day.106  
 
To achieve his task, Bock had at the start of Operation Barbarossa three 
infantry armies (the 2nd, 4th and 9th), and two armoured groups (Panzer 
Groups 2 and 3), each with the equivalent strength of an army. Including 
its reserves, Army Group Centre amounted to some 1,200,000 soldiers 
and airmen, at the time the largest military force under the command of a 
single officer in recorded military history.107 By the evening of 23 June, 
the German 3rd Panzer Group had outflanked the Soviet 3rd Army and 
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reached Vilnius.108 Despite Red Army counter-attacks, on 26 June, the 
Germans completed a huge encirclement of Soviet troops at Bialystok.109 
On 28 June, Bock captured Minsk.110 Two days later, encirclements of 
Soviet troops west of Minsk culminated not just in the loss of the bulk of 
3rd, 10th, 4th and 13th Armies of the Red Army’s West Front, but of 
Belorussia as a whole.111  
 
Within eighteen days of the beginning of the invasion, Bock’s Army Group 
Centre had advanced some six hundred kilometres, seized all of 
Belorussia, killed or captured 341,073 Soviet soldiers, wounded a further 
417,790, and caused the loss of 4,799 tanks and 9,427 Soviet guns and 
mortars.112 By the end of June 1941, the German Army appeared to be on 
track to accomplish a victory as stunning and quick as had been achieved 
in France, confirming British and American predictions made before the 
invasion.113 German military commanders too were supremely confident. 
Chief of Staff Halder relayed to his diary the hubris of the German 
command at this time when he judged that the war had been won in two 
weeks.114  
 
The forces of the Red Army positioned on the border on the eve of the 
invasion were comparable in size to the German invaders: 170 divisions 
and four million men.115 Soviet forces were divided into five Fronts, each 
smaller than a German Army Group though comparable in function. 
Facing Bock’s Army Group Centre was the Western Front commanded by 
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General Dmitriĭ Pavlov whose task was made immeasurably harder by the 
fact that the Kremlin issued orders to reach full combat readiness only 
one hour before the invasion began, and even then troops were instructed 
not to respond to any German provocations.116 According to Hastings, the 
first weeks of Operation Barbarossa should be remembered as “some of 
the greatest victories in the annals of war”.117 Or, as a Russian account 
has put it, the loss of 300,000 soldiers of the West Front under Pavlov’s 
command dead or taken prisoner in June 1941 was a catastrophe that 
could only be compared to the defeats of the Kiev Rus’ princes in 1223 
and the defeat of the tsarist General Aleksandr Samsonov in East Prussia 
in 1914.118 
 
Stalin’s conviction that war could be avoided in 1941 was one of many 
miscalculations of the Soviet political and military leadership that 
facilitated the rapid advance of the German Army. While it is now known 
that the Soviet air force was not completely taken out on the first day of 
the war, German superiority in the air was crucial to the early victories of 
the Wehrmacht.119 Decades later, Zhukov and Aleksandr Vasilevskiĭ, key 
Soviet military planners in 1941, would admit that they had completely 
underestimated how quickly and effectively the German armour would 
penetrate the frontiers and take the battle deep into Soviet territory. The 
Red Army’s leaders had expected a frontier war that would last three 
weeks before overwhelming Soviet counter-attacks would crush the 
enemy.120 In the first twenty days of war, the Red Army lost over 750,000 
soldiers, including nearly 600,000 killed. This was twelve times the 
German tally of 64,000 casualties, including a mere 13,000 killed. The 
loss of life was accompanied by the loss of nearly twelve thousand Soviet 
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tanks, nineteen thousand artillery pieces, more than a million firearms 
and nearly four thousand combat aircraft.121  
 
In May 1941, Stalin, de facto leader of the Communist Party and 
government since the mid-1920s, formally took on the role of the official 
head of government. The German invasion saw the emergence of two 
new committees: the GKO (Gosudarstvennyĭ Komitet Oborony - State 
Defence Committee) and the Stavka. The GKO consisted of members of 
the Politburo and dealt with wider aspects of military, political and 
economic strategy.122 The Stavka was a purely military body, its chief 
members being high-ranking Soviet military figures such as the Minister 
for Defence, Chief of the General Staff and commanders of various fronts. 
Crucially, both of these committees were headed by Stalin who, like 
Hitler, now had to apply his political skills to the business of running the 
machinery of war. Stalin responded to the invasion by creating new 
command structures, moving commanders from post to post, mobilising 
new forces for the front, ordering counter-attacks, and demanding that 
the Soviet people resist the invasion in every way possible. West Front 
commander Pavlov was executed, along with a number of other senior 
Soviet commanders, for “criminal behaviour in the face of the enemy”.123 
Arguably, the only clear success for the Soviet state in the first month of 
fighting was that a massive and ultimately successful evacuation of 
essential factories and war industries to the Urals and western Siberia got 
under way.  
 
After conquering Belorussia, Army Group Centre moved westwards with 
the aim of encircling and destroying what was left of the Red Army. The 
Smolensk engagement – which involved some 900,000 German and 1.2 
million Soviet troops – signalled the transfer of the fighting to Russia 
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itself.124 The Soviet authorities raised new armies to halt the German 
advance, but to no avail. Despite desperate fighting, Smolensk, the 
‘gateway to Moscow’, fell on 16 July.125 German forces encircled the Red 
Army’s 16th, 19th and 20th Armies.126 The Smolensk encirclement 
resulted in the loss of a further 300,000 Soviet troops dead or taken 
prisoner. Soviet counter-attacks from the east facilitated the escape of 
100,000 troops from the cauldron.127 Guderian recalled that Hoth closed 
the pocket east of Smolensk on 26 July.128 Bock issued an order 
proclaiming the victory on 5 August.129  
 
Meanwhile, Army Group North had moved quickly through the Baltic 
States to besiege Leningrad while Army Group South moved less quickly 
across Ukraine towards Kiev. One reason that Army Group South met 
sterner resistance in Ukraine was that it was in the south that the Red 
Army had placed its largest and best-equipped forces. Stalin, wrongly, 
expected the main German attack to target Ukraine.  
 
Andrei V. Grinëv’s 2016 study of German war diaries has noted that the 
German commanders criticised Red Army leadership but acknowledged 
the capacity of Red Army soldiers to fight.130 Guderian recorded in his 
memoirs that, on 1 July 1941, “the enemy continued, as always, to resist 
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stubbornly. His battle technique, particularly his camouflage, was 
excellent”.131 Days later, when preparing to cross the Dnepr River, 
Guderian noted strong Soviet bridgeheads at Rogachëv, Mogilëv and 
Orsha, with reinforcements soon to arrive.132 On 13 July, Bock reported 
that Soviet counter-attacks between Vitebsk and Orsha showed that his 
opponents were “far from throwing in the towel and [that] the numerous 
reports that the enemy was in retreat appear premature”.133 On the same 
day, Guderian noted heavy counter-attacks.134 The most celebrated of 
these victories took place in August 1941. The Germans took the town of 
El’nia on 19 July.135 Soon after taking control of the Reserve Front on 30 
July, Zhukov went onto the offensive and retook the town after twenty-six 
days of heavy fighting.136 On 12 August, Bock noted in his diary that “[i]f 
the Russians don’t soon collapse somewhere”, then there could be no 
victory before winter.137 Thus, the question that has generated much 
controversy in recent years was whether these early successes were 
Pyrrhic victories for the Germans. The German plan was to destroy the 
Red Army in six weeks. As Evan Mawdsley has put it, this was “the 
Barbarossa fallacy – that the Red Army would be destroyed on the 
frontier”.138  
 
It was in late July that the question of the objectives of Operation 
Barbarossa re-emerged. From its very inception, Operation Barbarossa 
was plagued by disagreement over how much importance should be 
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attached to the capture of Moscow.139 Hitler never prioritised the Soviet 
capital but did prioritise securing the economic resources of Ukraine and 
southern Russia.140 The Red Army’s massive South-West Front defending 
Ukraine offered far stiffer resistance than the West Front and threatened 
the southern flank of Army Group Centre as it marched east. By far the 
most contentious of Hitler’s wartime decisions was the diversion of forces 
from Army Group Centre in August and September 1941. Notably, Hoth’s 
3rd Panzer Group was to assist in operations near Leningrad, while 
Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group was to assist in the envelopment of Kiev to 
the south.141 Whether the Kiev diversion fatally delayed the German 
advance on Moscow was and remains a major point of contention. 
Guderian later described how he pleaded with Hitler in August 1941 to 
press on for Moscow: 
 
Moscow was the great Russian road, rail and communications centre: 
it was the political solar plexus; it was an important industrial area; 
and its capture would not only have an enormous psychological effect 
on the Russian people but on the whole of the rest of the world as 
well.142 
 
The Germans took Kiev on 19 September, and a week later ended the 
battle with the taking of a further 665,000 Soviet prisoners of war.143 
Hitler, evidently still pleased with the course of events, described Kiev as 
“the greatest battle in the history of the world”.144  
 
Much ink has been spilled over the wisdom of Hitler’s decision to halt 
Army Group Centre and divert its forces. Western accounts written before 
the opening of Soviet archives were usually in agreement with the 
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German generals that the Kiev diversion seriously harmed Germany’s 
chances of capturing the capital.145 Despite the undeniable successes at 
Kiev, the delay crucially led the Germans down a path first to the crippling 
mud, then to the Russian winter. The accounts that presented Hitler’s 
delay in attacking Moscow as an unmitigated disaster in retrospect appear 
based on a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument: Hitler delayed the 
assault, Moscow was not taken, ergo, Hitler’s delay cost the Germans 
Moscow. These accounts tend to dismiss the issue of whether, without 
destroying the largest concentration of Red Army forces at Kiev, Bock 
would have faced a deadly threat to his increasingly over extended 
southern flank as he raced towards Moscow.146  
 
The view propagated by the former German generals and adopted by 
many in the West is that Moscow would have fallen had this strategic 
‘blunder’ not been made. Hill, who has written the most recent account of 
the Nazi-Soviet War considered for this thesis, noted that in 2017 “debate 
still rages over whether taking Moscow in the late summer as promoted 
by the likes of Halder would have brought about Soviet collapse”.147 The 
German generals’ contention that they could have won the war in 1941 
has certainly figured prominently in the general works of major English-
language military historians from the 1970s until the present day. In 
1989, John Keegan quoted Guderian’s assessment of the delay as a 
“nineteen-day interregnum”, and added that it “may well have spared 
Stalin defeat in 1941”.148 Richard Overy concluded that the Kiev diversion 
“possibly saved the Soviet capital”.149 P. M. H. Bell described the delay as 
“one of the might-have-beens of Barbarossa”, in which Hitler “may well 
                                                 
145 This tendency is noted in Citino, The German Way of War, p. 294; also see Stahel, Operation 
Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, pp. 15-16; David Stahel, Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle 
for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 350. 
146 Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, pp. 439-440.  
147 Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War, p. 294. 
148 John Keegan, The Second World War (Great Britain, Hutchinson, 1989), p. 194; Keegan made 
the same argument in Barbarossa: Invasion of Russia 1941 (Great Britain: Macdonald & Co, 
(Publishers) Ltd, 1971), p. 83.  
149 Overy, Russia’s War, p. 91. 
49 
 
have lost the Germans their best chance of taking the capital”.150 Beevor 
stressed that Hitler did not have the support of his professional military 
commanders, but instead was a prisoner to his “instinct” and a 
“superstitious avoidance of Napoleon’s footsteps”.151 Hastings noted that 
the delay before Moscow gifted the Red Army crucial time needed to build 
up the defences necessary.152 However, as we shall see, it is a view that 
is facing increasing scepticism in modern Western literature and was 
never widely accepted in the Soviet Union or later in the Russian 
Federation.  
 
It was only after the capture of Kiev that the German focus returned to 
Army Group Centre. Operation Typhoon never actually stipulated that the 
intention was to take Moscow, only to encircle troops at Viaz'ma and 
Briansk.153 Operation Typhoon began on 30 September when Guderian’s 
2nd Panzer Army and Weichs’ 2nd Army attacked the Red Army’s Briansk 
Front to the south-east of Moscow.154 The main German assault then 
followed on 2 October with attacks on the Red Army’s Western and 
Reserve Fronts. This six-hundred-kilometre wide assault was one of the 
largest German operations of the Second World War.155 The second phase 
of Operation Typhoon was the subsequent chasing of escaping Soviet 
forces and eventual assault on Moscow.156 In October, the Germans 
advanced successfully and once more encircled and destroyed the main 
Red Army resistance.  
 
Soviet accounts could not use Hitler’s perfidy as the excuse for being 
caught off balance once more. Instead it was claimed that the Germans 
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now outnumbered the Red Army, which, in the Moscow direction could 
only muster 1.2 million soldiers.157 As for the numbers involved in 
Operation Typhoon, Klaus Reinhardt cited the total German forces of 
Army Group Centre at the beginning of October 1941 as 1,929,406.158 
There is some disagreement about the exact size of the opposing forces. 
Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, for instance, stated in 2012 that 
the German forces positioned west of Moscow (from Ostashkov in the 
north to Vorosba in the south) amounted to only 1.25 million men, 1,050 
tanks and over 10,000 guns and mortars.159 That the Red Army was 
stretched thin at Moscow is beyond doubt.  
 
On 7 October, as the Germans advanced towards Moscow, Hitler ordered 
Bock not to accept any form of surrender.160 Hitler supposedly intended to 
destroy the city, leaving nothing behind but an enormous artificial lake.161 
After breaching the Soviet lines, German forces met on 14 October and 
completed enormous encirclements of Soviet forces at Viaz’ma and 
Briansk. The closure of these pockets resulted in the deaths of some 
332,000 Red Army soldiers and the taking of 668,000 prisoners of war. 
German casualties totalled 48,000.162 Blumentritt later described the 
Viaz’ma encirclement as the greatest double envelopment in history: “a 
modern Cannae – on a greater scale”.163 On 12 October organised 
resistance in the Briansk pocket ended as the German 13th Corps took 
Kaluga. In the next two days, the 3rd Panzer Army captured both Rzhev 
and Kalinin, albeit amid heavy fighting. In the remaining days of October 
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1941, Army Group Centre would also take Mozhaĭsk and Volokolamsk, 
and cross the Zusha River at Mtsensk.164  
 
On 1 October 1941 Bock’s diary recorded its first mention of a factor in 
the Battle for Moscow that would become a matter of fierce historical 
argument: the mud. The modest entry noted that on the southern wing of 
Guderian’s forces, the 25th (Motorized) Division was under heavy attack 
from Soviet tanks. Bock noted that the division only managed to escape 
after, “abandoning the vehicles of an entire regiment, which were stuck in 
the mud”.165 Six days later, Halder too recorded his first mention of the 
adverse weather, also noting 2nd Panzer Group’s movement being 
affected by the mud.166 Bock and Halder were describing the early stages 
of the infamous Russian rasputitsa or ‘time of no roads’, in which 
autumnal rains and melting sleet turn the vast steppes into seas of thick 
mud. This period, which began in earnest in mid-October 1941, made 
movement of troops and supplies extremely difficult for both armies.167 
Or, as Bock recorded in his diary, “[t]he Russians are impeding us far less 
than the wet and mud!”.168 Whether the weather was as bad or as 
influential as Bock claimed became an enduring argument in Soviet, 
Western, and modern Russian literature.169  
 
The Great Patriotic War’s most celebrated commander, Zhukov, assumed 
control of the combined Reserve and Western Front on 10 October 1941. 
Zhukov had to find whatever reserves he could to place in front of the 
Soviet capital.170 Nonetheless, the threat of the loss of Moscow loomed 
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large for the rattled Soviet government and its battered Red Army. 
Foreign embassies, Soviet government departments and even Lenin’s 
body were evacuated from the capital.171 In mid-October, disorder set in. 
Known as the ‘Moscow Panic’ of 16 October, wide scale looting and revolt 
had to be suppressed by intervention from Soviet government forces in 
order to prevent chaos from prevailing.172 By 19 October, a state of siege 
and martial law was declared in an effort to bring order to the city.173 
Order was re-established and the civilian population prepared to defend 
the capital alongside the Red Army.  
 
For many contemporary observers and historians, Stalin’s decision to stay 
in Moscow on 16 October 1941 was crucial to stiffening the Soviet resolve 
to hold the capital.174 The ideological response of the Soviet state to the 
German invasion has also been described as a turning point in the war. 
On the eve of the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, 
Stalin delivered his most famous speech in the underground shelter of the 
Maiakovskiĭ metro station. Stalin’s speech invoked patriotic themes of 
Russian greatness, xenophobia, and resistance in the face of the enemy:  
 
The enslaved peoples of Europe under the yoke of the German 
invaders are looking to you as their liberators … Be worthy of this 
great mission! The war you are waging is a war of liberation, a just 
war. Let the manly images of our great ancestors - Alexander 
Nevsky, Dimitri Donskoi, Kusma Minin, Dmitri Pozharsky, Alexander 
Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov – inspire you in this war! Let the victorious 
banner of the great Lenin fly over your heads! Utter destruction to 
the German invaders! Death to the German armies of occupation! 
Long live our glorious motherland, her freedom and her 
independence! Under the banner of Lenin – onward to victory!175 
 
                                                 
171 For an excellent account of the Moscow panic, see, John Barber, ‘The Moscow Crisis of October 
1941’, in Julian Cooper, Maureen Perrie and E. A. Rees (eds), Soviet History, 1917-53: Essays in 
Honour of R. W. Davies (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995), pp. 201-218; 
Nagorski, The Greatest Battle, pp. 53-58.  
172 Braithwaite, Moscow 1941, pp. 223-234.  
173 Reinhardt, Moscow – The Turning Point, p. 100. 
174 See, for example, Rees, ‘What Was the Turning Point of World War II?’, p. 36. 
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Geoffrey Roberts has noted that Stalin’s speeches of 6 and 7 November 
reinforced in a masterly fashion the now familiar message that Stalin was 
a “nationalist”, “state builder”, and “protector”.176 Stalin cleverly used the 
Communist Party as a base of operations, but replaced Communist 
rhetoric with patriotism as a basis for rallying the Soviet people; this 
“may well have made the difference between victory and defeat” at 
Moscow.177 The speech accelerated the tendency, already noticeable in 
the 1930s, to emphasise the Russian character of the Soviet state and its 
mission to save civilisation.178 There were more practical concessions to 
the people, including greater toleration of the Orthodox Church.179 The 7 
November parade through Red Square saw Red Army troops march under 
Stalin’s gaze straight from the square to the front, an act of bravado 
designed to impress the local population and the Soviet Union’s foreign 
allies.180 The arrival from the Soviet Union’s far east of some eight to ten 
rifle divisions, ‘Siberians’ as they were often referred to in German 
sources, one thousand tanks and one thousand aircraft in October and 
November 1941 bolstered the stretched Red Army.181 The reinforcements 
take on extra significance when one considers Bock’s statement, recorded 
in Halder’s diary on 22 November, that the Battle for Moscow was similar 
to “the Battle of the Marne, where the last battalion that could be thrown 
in turned the balance”.182  
 
Bock recorded in his diary on 11 November 1941 that the temperature fell 
to minus eleven degrees centigrade.183 The low temperatures would cause 
great discomfort to ill-prepared German soldiers. On the other hand, the 
Germans were able to renew their assault on Moscow on 17 November as 
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frost hardened the previously impassable seas of mud. It was in this 
second phase of Operation Typhoon that Moscow was to be encircled and 
occupied. Colonel General Hans Georg Reinhardt’s 3rd and Colonel 
General Erich Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Armies were to form a northern 
pincer in order to destroy Major General Konstantin Rokossovskiĭ’s newly 
reformed 16th Army. From here, they were to form a bridgehead over the 
Moskva-Volga Canal and advance towards Moscow itself.184 To the south, 
Guderian’s forces, which formed the southern pincer, were to capture Tula 
then advance to Kolomna. As the pincers advanced, Field Marshal Günther 
von Kluge’s 4th Army was to hold up Zhukov’s movements by attacking 
along the River Nara.185 The Germans planned to swiftly take Tula in 
order to form a southern pincer with which to encircle the capital.186 That 
Tula did not fall to Guderian’s relatively weak 3rd Panzer Division, which 
was pitted against an array of Soviet units, including the 156th NKVD 
Regiment, the Tula Workers’ Militia Regiment, the 732nd Anti-aircraft 
Regiment, elements of the 32nd Tank Brigade and the 447th Corps 
Artillery Regiment, was hailed in Soviet-era accounts as a crucial moment 
in the war.187 David Stahel has described the failed German attack on 
Tula as “in many ways the last whirlwind of Army Group Centre’s 
Typhoon”.188  
 
In late November, the Germans came as close to Moscow as they ever 
would, with the advance troops and tanks of Hoepner’s Fourth Panzer 
Army and units of the Fourth Infantry Army penetrating as far as Tushino, 
a suburb on the outskirts of Moscow on 29 November.189 On 1 December 
a motorised patrol of the 62nd Panzer Pioneer Battalion breached the Red 
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Army’s defence line at Khimki only nineteen miles from the Kremlin.190 
Under heavy pressure, the overstretched Germans pulled back from this 
high water mark on 5 December.191 Meanwhile, to the south, a Red Army 
counter-attack drove the advance units of Army Group South out of 
Rostov-on-Don on 29 November, a foretaste of the Red Army’s 
capabilities in urban warfare that would be in evidence at Stalingrad a 
year later.192 
 
The Soviet authorities began to prepare for a major counter-attack to 
drive the Germans from Moscow as early as the beginning of 
November.193 The Stavka successfully organised the deployment of seven 
new armies for the defence and counter-attack before Moscow, all at a 
time when Hitler was publicly proclaiming that the Soviet Union could no 
longer offer any more resistance.194 With more and more reinforcements 
arriving throughout December, the Soviet forces taking part in the 
counter-attack at Moscow constituted some forty-one per cent of the 
entire Red Army.195 The Red Army launched its celebrated counter-
offensive on 5 December 1941. Ivan Konev’s 31st Army attacked across 
the River Volga south of Kalinin,196 and the 29th Army assaulted from 
Kalinin’s north; both armies penetrated deep into the now defending 
German 9th Army.197 The following day, Zhukov’s Western Front, 
bolstered by the newly formed 1st Shock Army, 10th Army and 20th 
Army, launched its major counter-offensive against all three of the 
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German panzer armies.198 Although not decisive enough to win the war 
for the Soviet Union, the December 1941 counter-attack did save the 
capital.  
 
Ernst Klink noted that as the Red Army began to counter-attack, Bock 
began to search for answers as to how Army Group Centre found itself in 
this situation. He noted that Bock concluded that it was the mud that had 
been the cause of all the problems: “In his analysis, however, Bock 
carefully avoided addressing the question of his own share of the blame 
for the disaster, and that of the chief of the Army General Staff”.199 When 
Hitler called off the assault on Moscow on 8 December in his Directive 39, 
he blamed “the surprisingly early severe winter weather”.200 Hitler now 
ordered his armies to stand and fight, much to the consternation of his 
generals. Hitler also replaced commanders in an effort to stiffen German 
resolve.  
 
The Soviet counter-attack phase involved a final historical controversy 
surrounding the Battle for Moscow; the wisdom of Hitler’s decision to 
order his men to hold firm in the face of Soviet assault rather than push 
back to a more easily defended winter line until the spring allowed greater 
ease of action. After the war, former German commanders were to lament 
Hitler’s decision to order the Haltbefehl.201 According to Halder, the lives 
of many Wehrmacht troops could have been saved had a proper 
withdrawal been allowed.202 For others, however, the decision was not 
Hitler’s to make due to the force and dominance of the Soviet counter-
stroke: “Hitler could force the German troops to stand fast and die, but he 
could no more stop the Soviet advance than King Canute could prevent 
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the tides from coming in”.203 Others contend that Hitler’s order was 
ultimately beneficial for the German Army as his tough decision in 
ordering his troops to hold fast avoided a disastrous rout as experienced 
by Napoleon’s Grande Armée in 1812.204 According to Ziemke, even 
Hitler’s harshest critics would later concede that the German Army may 
have disintegrated had it been ordered to conduct a retreat lacking 
equipment and winter clothing.205 
 
The Battle for Moscow also resulted in a significant reshuffle of the 
command of the German armed forces from which Hitler ultimately 
emerged as supreme commander. As Citino has noted, Hitler’s self-
appointed ascendency to the rank of Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
brought an end to the German military tradition of independence for 
German commanders, a tradition that dated back to the seventeenth 
century.206 The Battle for Moscow saw the replacement (either through 
dismissal or illness) of many key German commanders, including Bock, 
Guderian, Hoepner and Walther von Brauchitsch, to be replaced at the top 
by, as Mawdsley has put it, a “military amateur of fanatical 
temperament”.207  
 
Viewed in these terms, the Battle of Moscow is certainly a candidate for 
‘turning point of the war’. Yet even though the German Army would never 
again threaten Moscow, it was able to launch a second successful 
offensive in the spring and summer of 1942 that culminated in the Battle 
of Stalingrad. For many historians in the West, Stalingrad was the turning 
point of the war. There was, however, one influential group that always 
insisted that the war was won and lost in 1941. This was the German 
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generals whose memoirs, diaries and self-justifications appeared in great 






Chapter Two: The ‘Halder School’ 
 
In the absence of Soviet archival material and reliable Soviet histories, 
the main sources available to Western historians of the Cold War era were 
official Soviet histories, German archives, and the diaries/memoirs of 
retired German generals and soldiers. Unlike their heavily propagandistic 
Soviet counterparts, the German memoirs and diaries appeared authentic 
and authoritative to Western historians.208 It also helped too that 
historians from the English-speaking world wrote most of the histories of 
the post-war period and they generally found less of a significant 
language barrier with German sources.209 Hew Strachan has noted that 
Liddell Hart and other English-speaking historians of the early Cold War 
era interviewed the German generals after the war and became the 
“midwives in the translation of their memoirs into English”.210 Or, as Craig 
Luther has put it, the views of the German generals “conveyed to British 
military historian Liddell Hart in the late 1940s … successfully made their 
way into the mainstream of western historiography”.211 
 
Central to the emergence of the dominant German historiographical 
school was former German commander Halder, who worked for the 
American military and for fifteen years headed the ‘Operational History 
(German) Section’, known informally as the ‘Halder group’.212 The 
establishment of this section by the United States military was originally 
intended to document the German perspective on the war, specifically as 
it related to American operations. However, with the onset of the Cold 
War, focus soon shifted eastwards to the Soviet war and Soviet tactics.213  
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Halder was a prolific writer and commentator on the war and has been 
documented as an influence upon the writings of other former 
commanders.214 Halder enthusiastically took up his post-war role in the 
United States, his staff at one point including twelve lieutenant generals, 
four major generals, nine brigadier generals, nine colonels, and four 
lieutenant colonels.215 So successful was Halder in presenting a version of 
the war amenable to the United States in the Cold War, that he was 
awarded the ‘Meritorious Civilian Service Award’ in 1961, making him the 
only German general to be decorated by both Hitler and an American 
president.216 Those cultivated by Halder included fellow Eastern Front 
veterans Gotthard Heinrici, Günther Blumentritt, Heinz Guderian, Albert 
Kesselring, Hasso von Manteuffel, Oskar Munzel, Erhard Raus, Hans von 
Greiffenberg, Lothar Rendulic, Georg Küchler, Geyr von Schweppenburg 
and Adolf Heusinger. Halder handpicked these former soldiers, and many 
would go on to write books and memoirs that ingrained the German view 
of the war into popular Western understanding.217 The ‘Halder group’ 
produced over 2,500 manuscripts relating to the Nazi-Soviet War. These 
documents, though initially not available to the general public, received a 
warm reception by a United States military keen to find out everything it 
could about its new adversary. When the manuscripts did become 
available in the 1960s, their status as official United States Military 
publications gave them an air of legitimacy that their Soviet counterparts 
could not match in the West.218 
 
When this group was being formed, the intention on the part of the 
former commanders to preserve the honour of the Wehrmacht was clear. 
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When asked if he would like to participate in writing history while in 
American custody, Guderian consulted the most senior German 
commander at hand, Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, as to whether it 
would be wise to contribute. In the secretly recorded conversation, Leeb 
blessed Guderian’s participation, but added that he would “have to 
consider [his] answers a bit carefully…so that [he said] nothing which 
might embarrass the Fatherland”.219 Halder openly claimed that his goal 
was to continue the fight against Bolshevism.220 The Halder group 
disseminated ideas about the Nazi-Soviet War designed to rehabilitate the 
reputation of the German command and Wehrmacht alike.221 War crimes 
became the responsibility of the fanatical Nazi elite, not the average 
Wehrmacht soldier. Halder was able to mix, “truth, half truth, myth, and 
lies to establish the wisdom and innocence of the German military – and 
thus himself”.222 Through stressing the innocence of the Wehrmacht, the 
Halder group created the enduring myth of the German military’s ‘lost 
cause’ in the fight against the existential threat to European civilisation 
that was Soviet Communism.223  
 
This version of the war not only emphasised the United States’ role in 
defeating European Fascism, but also helped to strengthen ties between 
the United States and the new West German state in the fight against 
Communism.224 Chief Historian for Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 
Colonel W.S. Nye noted that when the history-writing program began, 
German contributors were all prisoners of war working voluntarily for the 
United States. For the German generals it was a remarkably favourable 
turn of events. Even when they joined the Allied payroll, they were 
motivated “mainly by professional interest and by the desire to promote 
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western solidarity and mutual defense”.225 Liedtke has described the 
Halder group and its reception in the West as an, “historiographical 
perfect storm”, in which a: 
 
large number of German accounts, produced in the context of the 
Cold War, complacently accepted by eager Western audiences, and 
largely left unchallenged by competing narratives, practically ensured 
the dominance of the German perspective.226 
 
Works aimed at a more general readership accompanied the official 
manuscripts produced for the United States Military. Halder’s influential 
Hitler as War Lord, published in 1949, stressed Hitler’s central and 
meddling role to the Nazi war effort and his responsibility for the defeat at 
Moscow. Halder sarcastically referred to Hitler as “[t]his ‘great military 
leader’”: 
 
… [who] knew full well that he lacked the equipment for solving 
problems of generalship. He made up for it by a sublime faith in the 
infallibility of his intelligence, which enabled him to look down on all 
forms of expert knowledge as though from a superior level, and by a 
conviction that as a result of his service in the First World War, he 
himself was possessed of abundant military experience. Many self-
assured pronouncements of his bear witness to this.227 
 
For Halder, the dilettantish Hitler was wrong most of the time in big and 
small matters. Prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, 
discussion of Moscow as an important objective was quickly shut down, 
and “evoked a strangely violent reaction from Hitler which cast a glaring 
light on his unspoken thoughts”.228 During the campaign, Hitler similarly 
ignored advice to target Moscow, and instead pressed for a million men 
from Army Group Centre to wheel north for Leningrad:   
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It was an idea which did not derive from Hitler’s military thinking, but 
from his political fanaticism which had set itself on the destruction of 
Leningrad. The Supreme Commander Hitler subordinated himself 
without question to the fanatical Politician.229 
 
Hitler’s unshakeable belief that the campaign would last only six to eight 
weeks ensured that any discussion of winter provisions received a “curt 
refusal”. Halder noted that Hitler’s unwillingness to heed the advice of his 
tank commanders before Kiev in August 1941 led to overworked and 
broken tanks being unsuccessfully deployed before Moscow months later. 
The effect of wear on the tanks was exacerbated by the onset of the 
Russian winter, which “entered the fray as a powerful ally of the Russian 
before the objective of the operation had been reached”. As the Red Army 
counter-attacked before Moscow in December 1941, Hitler’s refusal to 
countenance an orderly withdrawal led to “heavy losses in men and 
material which could, without the slightest doubt, have been avoided”. On 
Hitler replacing Brauchitsch with himself as head of the German military 
in December 1941, Halder noted that, “the Army was deliberately 
deprived of its head and rightful representative” and that this move was 
“[t]he decisive step on the road to ruin”.230 
 
Halder’s diary was first published in the early 1960s,231 and indicated the 
racial stereotyping and hubris that was typical of many German politicians 
and soldiers of the period. Halder wrote on 3 July 1941 that the Red Army 
contained “hordes of Mongols” and, on 5 July, that the war was already 
won.232 These two observations were clearly linked in Halder’s mind. 
Halder, like most of the German diarists and memoirists, had to 
acknowledge that his respect for the Red Army grew over time. Halder 
noted “stubborn and skilfully directed” Soviet resistance and an 
                                                 
229 ibid., p. 44; this plan did not come to fruition, but is used to illustrate Hitler’s haphazard plans. 
230 This paragraph is a summary of aspects of Halder, Hitler as War Lord. Quotes and information 
retrieved from pp. 42, 13-14, 47, 51 and 10-11. 
231 Various works cite the publication date at different years. Stahel, Operation Typhoon cites 
publication date as 1963; Zetterling and Frankson, The Drive on Moscow as 1964; Seaton, The 
Battle for Moscow [1993] as 1962. 
232 Halder, The Private War Journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder, 3/7/41, p. 196. 
64 
 
unwillingness to surrender. On the other hand it was not the ability of the 
Red Army that posed the real threat to the German advance: 
 
Despite our extraordinary performance, we shall not be able to 
totally destroy the enemy this year. Given the vastness of this 
country and the inexhaustibleness of the people, we cannot be totally 
certain of success.233 
 
To “the vastness of this country and the inexhaustibleness of the people”, 
Halder added severe weather conditions affecting German supply, as well 
as troop movements.234 Only on one occasion did Halder concede that 
severe climactic conditions might have hindered the Red Army too; it was 
the Germans, though, who suffered more.235  
 
Bock’s war diary was just as effective as Halder’s in promoting this 
version of the war. Bock died in 1945 after his car was strafed by a British 
aircraft, so his diary cannot be considered as a direct attempt to influence 
history as can be seen in the memoirs of his colleagues. However, a 
version of Bock’s diary exists in which the author, cognisant of the role his 
diary would have in later histories, made adjustments to the text as the 
war came to a close. The version studied here was kept by Bock’s step-
son and purportedly contains no “dubious ‘improvements’ or 
‘corrections’”.236 Nonetheless, sources such as this always need to be 
considered for self-censorship and the author’s intentions, and the diary is 
an invaluable source for assessing German attitudes during the conflict. 
 
Bock noted first the mud and its effects on roads, supply and troop 
movements, “[t]he Russians are impeding us far less than the wet and 
mud!”237 Later, it was the freezing temperatures:  
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The engines of the tanks are beginning to fail as a result of the drop 
in temperatures to 15 to 20 degrees below freezing. Large numbers 
of trucks have broken down on the deeply-rutted, now hard frozen 
roads.238 
 
Describing the Battle of Viaz’ma, Bock’s diary offered the usual qualified 
acknowledgement of Red Army resistance: “[a]s a result of the fighting 
there and the awful road conditions, Guderian has not yet been able to 
continue to the northeast – a success for the Russians, whose 
stubbornness paid off”. The next day, Bock noted limited progress for the 
4th Army on account of “bottomless roads and stiffening resistance”. Bock 
also noted the importance of newly arrived ‘Siberian’ units whose 
existence was previously unknown to Germany’s military planners. Yet the 
‘Siberians’ were only able to force the 4th Army onto the defensive in 
October because the German artillery was trapped on muddy roads. 
Inevitably, the impression given in Bock’s diary was that the Germans 
were up against an inferior Red Army that was saved by the weather.  
 
In summing up the German defeat in the December counter-attack, Bock 
explained how his under-supplied and exhausted men faced “an opponent 
who has gone over to the counterattack by ruthlessly employing his 
inexhaustible masses of people”. According to Bock “[t]he breakthrough 
against the 2nd Army is due less to the employment of powerful forces by 
the Russians than it is to a breakdown by our totally exhausted troops”. 
On 7 December, Bock summarised his view as to the three main causes of 
the German predicament: the autumn muddy period, the failure of the 
railroads to withstand the Russian winter, and an “[u]nderestimation of 
the enemy’s ability to resist and his reserves of men and material”.239  
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Bock’s point was that the Soviet Union’s capacity to replenish its forces 
and its stubborn resistance would have been irrelevant were it not for the 
weather and the failure of German logistics brought on by Hitler’s 
blunders. Hitler emerges from Bock’s diary as out of touch with the 
realities of the front, ordering troop movements that would “involve 
unnecessary lateral movements over frightful roads, and open one hole in 
order to plug another”.240 Bock complained on numerous occasions that 
his superiors did not seem to comprehend the dire state of his force.241 
Hitler was prone to irrational decisions based on misleading information 
being fed to him.242 When ordered to hold his ground in the face of the 
Red Army’s December counteroffensive through mass deployment of 
reserves, Bock recorded that, “I could only report that I have no reserves 
left”.243 Bock’s diary reveals the tendency of the German generals to only 
offer acknowledgement of Soviet military strength with some type of 
qualification. It also reveals the tendency to look for the failures of 
Operation Barbarossa in external factors: namely, Hitler and the weather 
mattered more than their opponents.  
 
According to Smelser and Davies, the most influential of the German 
generals who chose not to work directly for the Americans was Erich von 
Manstein.244 For his supporters, Manstein embodied Prussian military 
professionalism, consummate battlefield skill and was an outstanding 
example of the ‘clean Wehrmacht’. In Lost Victories (1958), Manstein was 
at great pains to ensure that Hitler’s blunders overwhelmingly accounted 
for the German loss.245 Manstein, like Halder, noted Hitler’s ability to 
recite from memory a veritable avalanche of facts and figures should the 
need arise to divert attention away from an issue he did not wish to 
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discuss. An amateur surrounded by military professionals, Hitler 
dissembled rather than argued his case. 246  
 
Guderian’s Panzer Leader, a bestseller in Germany in 1953, emphasised 
the Führer’s indecision and friction between Hitler and his commanders.247 
Guderian noted that early in the campaign, on 14 July 1941, Hitler and 
members of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres - German Army High 
Command) were already organising occupation forces for the “inevitable” 
defeat of the Soviet Union, and that “[s]uch trains of thought take a man 
far from reality”. Guderian fumed about Hitler’s mistaken belief that the 
campaign in the east would be swift and that he subsequently did not 
order enough winter provisions for German troops; Hitler’s decisions 
reflected “baseless optimism”. When German commanders met at Borisov 
on 27 July 1941, Hitler displayed a preference for German forces to focus 
on comprehensive small-scale encirclements in order to bleed the Red 
Army dry. According to Guderian, Hitler’s convictions were based on his 
mistaken belief that the main objectives of Operation Barbarossa had 
already been achieved in the destruction of the Red Army at the Dnepr 
and Dvina rivers. For Guderian, Hitler was “living in a world of fantasy”.248 
In sum, the consequences of Hitler’s poor decision making were that: 
 
Only he who saw the endless expanse of Russian snow during this 
winter of our misery and felt the icy wind that blew across it, burying 
in snow every object in its path: who drove for hour after hour 
through no-man’s-land only at last to find too thin shelter with 
insufficiently clothed, half-starved men: and who also saw by 
contrast the well-fed, warmly clad and fresh Siberians, fully equipped 
for winter fighting: only a man who knew all that can truly judge the 
events which now occurred.249 
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Clearly, the ‘Siberians’ mattered to the outcome of the contest, but only 
because Hitler’s mistakes had put the Germans in an impossible situation.  
 
In the aptly titled 1956 account, The Fatal Decisions, Blumentritt, who 
served as Chief-of-Staff of Army Group Centre’s 4th Army, joined the 
growing chorus blaming Hitler for the disaster that befell the Wehrmacht 
in December 1941. For Blumentritt, the decision to invade the Soviet 
Union was a mistake, and when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, 
“he swung round the helm and steered the German ship of state straight 
for the rocks of disaster … With the taking of this fatal decision the war 
was lost for Germany”. Furthermore, indecision as to what the main 
objectives of the campaign should have been led to friction between the 
German leaders and subsequent disaster. Blumentritt’s assessment of the 
role of the weather was often tied in with his criticism of Hitler, 
particularly the inadequate preparation for winter. The mud affected 
German troop movements and supplies, and the final assault on Moscow 
“ground to a halt in the ice and snow”.250 
 
Erhard Raus, commander of the 6th Panzer Division during Operations 
Barbarossa and Typhoon, reached similar conclusions to other German 
commanders in his assessment of the Battle for Moscow. Mother Nature 
suddenly erected a “protective wall” around Moscow with mud and cold.251 
It was a type of mud of which the German Army previously had “no 
conception”.252 Raus described the climate as the Soviet Union’s greatest 
ally.253 To be fair, Red Army resistance is mentioned, but mostly in the 
same breath as the weather. For example, describing the outcome of the 
Battle for Moscow, Raus summed up the view of the German generals: 
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“The numerical superiority of the Russians, aided by climactic conditions, 
saved Moscow and turned the tide of battle. Hitler neither expected nor 
planned for a winter war”.254 For good measure, Raus made it clear that 
the German cause was noble; what was required was “indomitable will to 
prevent the Russian Moloch from devouring the world”.255  
 
German generals often skilfully interwove Hitler’s misjudgements and 
Soviet resistance into their narrative of a German defeat. Gotthard 
Heinrici was a corps and army commander during the invasion of Russia 
whose diary is often cited as one of the most even-handed and perceptive 
accounts written by a German general.256 At the top of Heinrici’s list of 
seven factors leading to the failure of Operation Barbarossa was Hitler’s 
underestimation of “the inner stability of the Bolshevik system”, which 
proved to be “tenacious and consolidated”.257 This stability rested on the 
fact that the urge to defend ‘Mother Russia’ was greater than their 
“rejection of the Communist dictatorship”. It did not help the German 
cause that the appalling deeds of the occupiers alienated the populations 
of the Baltic States and Ukraine. Heinrici’s second and third factors were 
the surprising economic and military capability of the Red Army. A fourth 
factor was the Kiev diversion. The fifth factor was the inability of the 
German infantry to keep pace with the panzers. The sixth factor was the 
nature of Russia’s strategic depth and the seventh factor comprised the 
weather and the terrain. Nonetheless, argued Heinrici, this was still a war 
that the Germans might have won if different decisions had been made. 
Heinrici concluded that the war could have been won had the German 
advance not slowed to the degree that it did in July and August.258 
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The diaries and memoirs of former Nazi commanders laid the foundations 
of the ‘German historiographical school’, the term used by Glantz, which 
would come to dominate Western histories of the war for decades.259 The 
works stressed that German victory could have been achieved had Hitler 
and the weather not intervened. The German generals acknowledged that 
the Red Army offered resistance, that the numbers of Red Army soldiers 
came as a surprise, and that the Red Army improved over time. But the 
point of view espoused by the former German commanders was that the 
Red Army was not sufficiently capable to win had it not been for Hitler’s 
errors. It is a view in which the historical agency is held almost 
exclusively in German hands. 
 
What is striking to the modern reader is the degree to which the German 
generals embraced racial/ethnic stereotypes both in their diaries and their 
post-war writings. Nazi ideology stereotyped Slavs as lower-level humans 
incapable of sophisticated undertakings such as mounting a successful 
defence against German attack.260 In Mein Kampf, Hitler referred to the 
“analphabetic Russian”,261 claimed that the intellectual classes of Russia 
were in fact a small nucleus of ethnic Germans in Russian territory, and 
that Russian state building came from this Germanic route.262 According 
to the Nazi worldview, Russia was not only backwards, but the Bolshevik 
seizure of power in 1917 had placed it under the leadership of a Jewish 
conspiracy.263 There is overwhelming evidence that the racial view of the 
Nazi political leadership overlapped with the racial worldview widely 
shared among Germany’s military leaders.264 As the historian Luther has 
put it, the “average German soldier, and even more so his commander 
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embraced the official National Socialist view of Soviet Russia as a pariah 
nation, dominated by Jews, and signifying an existential threat”.265  
 
As Merridale has noted, Western observers of Russian soldiers considered 
that the raw material to make an excellent army was certainly present 
because Russians were tough, uncomplaining and unusually brave.266 On 
the other hand, the Russians lacked the intelligence, organisation and 
sophistication of the armies of Western Europe. According to Smelser and 
Davies, German generals admired “the toughness of the ordinary Russian 
soldier” but assumed that the Russian was incapable of “complicated 
large-scale operations”.267 Soviet resistance was the passive element in 
this story of German triumph and tragic defeat. The Germans described a 
“barbaric Russian soldier – crude, animal-like, backward, bestial, childlike 
and cruel”.268 As Wolfram Wette has pointed out, the German generals 
knew little about Russia and relied instead on stereotyping of the 
apparently Asiatic, servile and backward eastern Slavs who would be no 
match for the Wehrmacht.269 
 
In writing their accounts, the German generals were part of a centuries-
old Western tradition of writing about Russia. It was not until the 
sixteenth century that Western visitors began to make concerted efforts 
to describe and understand Russia and the Russians. Marshall T. Poe has 
noted that from the beginning Western reports of Russia and Russian 
culture were, “ignorant of Russian ways, biased against Russian manners, 
fooled by Russian stagecraft, or misled by their own self-serving desire to 
create a Russian antipode to the ‘civilized’ nations of Europe”.270 Russia, 
which was cut off from the Renaissance during the Mongol period and 
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relegated to the periphery during the Enlightenment, was perceived in the 
West to be an inferior ‘other’.271 The foundational work that was most 
influential in shaping European views about Russia was Sigismund von 
Herberstein’s Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii (1549), the earliest 
European work to describe Russia in considerable detail.272  
 
Herberstein was not quite sure what was cause and what was effect in 
terms of explaining the apparently tyrannical nature of Russia’s 
government, noting that “it is a matter of doubt whether the brutality of 
the people has made the prince a tyrant, or whether the people 
themselves have become thus brutal and cruel through the tyranny of 
their prince”.273 Herberstein accounted for Russian military success 
according to a formula often used in the centuries to follow:  
 
When they are about to go into an engagement, they place more 
reliance in their numbers, and the amount of forces with which they 
may be able to encounter the enemy, than in the strength of their 
soldiers, or any degree of discipline in their army.274  
 
Western readers were fed a similar diet of Russian stereotypes over the 
centuries that followed. Count Phillipe-Paul de Ségur in his memoirs of 
Napoleon’s campaign in Russia noted of the Russian commander Mikhail 
Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov that, “[h]is slow, vindictive, and crafty 
nature was characteristic of the Tartar”.275 Following the Battle of 
Borodino, Ségur suggested that the ability of Russian soldiers to blindly 
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follow orders, no matter how suicidal, was the result of their simple 
nature: 
 
One thing is certain, they endured pain better than the French. Not 
that they suffered more courageously, but that they suffered less; for 
they are less sensitive in both body and mind, as a result of living in 
a more primitive civilization and having their constitutions hardened 
by a harsh climate.276  
 
In the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, 
Russia suffered major defeats that seemingly confirmed the fact that 
Russia’s only assets were size and numbers. In an effort to rally British 
support for the Crimean War, the British press emphasised the assumed 
inferiority of the Russian soldier, his barbarity, and lack of respect for the 
rules of war.277 It was an idea that resonated even when Russia was a 
British ally. Alfred Knox, a British attaché to Russia during the First World 
War noted in his memoirs that, “the ineffectiveness and lack of mobility of 
the army arose more from want of modern equipment and from inherent 
national characteristics than from merely bad leadership and insufficient 
training”.278 Knox listed Russia’s national characteristics as a lack of 
initiative, laziness, and an unwillingness to perform duties unless 
constantly supervised.279 In 1904, Carl Joubert described the typical 
Russian soldier as: 
 
heavy and dull and slow. He has no initiative whatsoever; he is not 
encouraged to have any, nor would he dare to possess such a 
dangerous commodity … he is … perfectly indifferent as to whether 
he lives or dies for his country and the Tsar.280 
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In summary, the soldiers of the Russian Army were often praised as a 
tough and a deadly adversary.281 Their style of warfare was, however, 
primitive, and unlikely to stand up to a modern, professional force, as 
Russia’s defeats in the Crimean War, Russo-Japanese War and the First 
World War had shown.  
 
The German generals were heirs to the tradition that began with 
Herberstein. Shortly before the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 
1941, Blumentritt summed up the strengths and weaknesses of the 
coming adversary:   
 
The history of all Russian wars illustrates that the Russian as a 
fighter, illiterate and half-Asian, thinks and feels differently. 
Therefore, he is not affected by inclement weather, is very easily 
satisfied, can withstand the sight of blood and casualties.282 
 
In another observation, Blumentritt remarked upon the herd-like and 
servile nature of the Russian: 
 
Eastern man is very different from his Western counterpart. He has a 
much greater capacity for enduring hardship, and this passivity 
induces a high degree of equanimity towards life and death. In the 
East the importance of the individual is not stressed to the same 
extent as in the West. Great losses are accepted almost with 
indifference. Eastern man does not possess much initiative; he is 
accustomed to take orders, to being led.283 
 
As a result, the “highly civilised” Western European is at a disadvantage 
to the Red Army soldier “who lives so much closer to nature”.284 On the 
other hand, the German soldier would prevail because the Red Army’s 
junior commanders were “mechanical, have no initiative and are quite 
inflexible”. As for the senior commanders, they were “hesitant, distrustful 
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and unimaginative”.285 It was not just the crushing victory over France 
that gave the Germans confidence. Blumentritt noted in May 1941 that in 
the First World War, a German division was more than a match for two or 
three Russian divisions:  
 
Today the numerical proportion is very much in our favour. Our 
troops are superior to the Russians in their experience of war, their 
training and their weapons; our commanders are also far superior, as 
are our organisation and preparation.286 
 
Blumentritt expected tough battles for the first “8-14 days” but thereafter 
“we shall not fail to win”.287 
 
According to former German general Friedrich von Mellenthin, the 
“Russian soldier does not think independently and does not control his 
actions, but acts depending on his mood, completely incomprehensible for 
the resident of the West”.288 This explained the unpredictable 
performance of the Red Army: 
 
It is not possible to tell in advance what a Russian will do: as a rule, 
he dashes from one extremity to another. His nature is as unusual 
and complex as this huge and strange country itself. It is difficult to 
imagine the limits of his patience and endurance; he is unusually 
brave and courageous though nevertheless at times shows 
cowardice. There have been cases when the Russian units, which 
selflessly repelled all the German attacks, unexpectedly fled before 
small assault groups. Sometimes the Russian infantry battalions fell 
into confusion after the first shots, while on another day, the same 
division fought with fanatical steadfastness.289 
 
The United States’ military produced a pamphlet for American troops 
written by former Wehrmacht commander Raus that described the 
Russian soldier in similar terms: 
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The characteristics of this semi-Asiatic are strange and contradictory 
... The key to his odd behavior can be found in the native character 
of the Russian soldier who, as a fighter, possesses neither the 
judgement nor the ability to think independently. The Russian is 
subject to moods, which to a westerner are incomprehensible; he 
acts by instinct. As a soldier, the Russian is primitive and 
unassuming, innately brave but morosely passive when in a 
group...He endures cold and heat, hunger and thirst, dampness and 
mud, sickness and vermin, with equanimity. Because of his simple 
and primitive nature, all sorts of hardships bring him but few 
emotional reactions.290 
 
Of course, the brutality of the Russian had certain military advantages. 
The pamphlet noted that characteristics such as primitiveness and 
servility made the Russian a “superior soldier who, under the direction of 
understanding leadership, becomes a dangerous opponent”.291 However, 
such recognition of the potential martial ability of the Russian is soon 
qualified:  
 
It would be a serious error to underestimate the Russian soldier, 
even though he does not quite fit the pattern of modern warfare and 
the educated fighting man. The strength of the Western soldier is 
conscious action, controlled by his own mind. Neither this action on 
his own mind, nor the consciousness which accompanies the action, 
is part of the mental make-up of the Russian.292  
 
In this context, Stalin was indeed fortunate that he had so much cannon 
fodder given the self-evident superiority of the Wehrmacht when it came 
to military operations. The accounts of the German generals assumed the 
superiority of the Nazi war machine over its Soviet rival and stereotyped 
the Slavs as backward. Germany’s failure to defeat Stalin’s backward, 
‘Asiatic’, ramshackle regime therefore represented a puzzle. The outcome 
of the Battle of Moscow could only be understood when external factors – 
Hitler’s blunders and freakish bad luck in terms of the weather – are 
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added to the explanation. As we shall see in the next chapter, the 
influence of the German generals on the English-language historiography 





Chapter Three: Cold War Western Accounts of 1941 
 
To what extent did the Western accounts of 1941 written during the Cold 
War endorse the view of the German generals that theirs was a brilliant 
military campaign brought undone by Hitler’s mistakes, the mud and 
snow, and Stalin’s ruthless use of cannon fodder? The argument of this 
chapter is that such a paradigm did indeed dominate the English-language 
military histories until the 1970s. The reader of this literature learned that 
Hitler’s errors were an important factor in condemning an otherwise 
invincible German Army to an unwinnable war in the mud and snow 
against a barbarian foe.293 It was not the case that Western historians 
during the Cold War were so naïve that they accepted at face value the 
claims of the generals that the dead Hitler was responsible for everything 
that went wrong during the war. From the 1970s, blame was often spread 
more widely to the poor planning not just of Hitler but also his senior 
commanders. What was clear, however, was that it was German error, 
not Soviet military prowess, which saved Moscow. 
 
This dominant paradigm was supported by a number of interlocking 
assumptions. Firstly, the generals themselves published prodigiously with 
the backing of the American and British political and military 
establishment. Secondly, the three leading Western historians specialising 
on the Wehrmacht during this period – Liddell Hart, Seaton and Ziemke – 
relied heavily on German sources and agreed with the German generals 
that this was a German defeat and most definitely not a Red victory. 
Thirdly, key assumptions built into the paradigm such as the importance 
of the weather and the incapacity of the Red Army were taken as givens 
rather than investigated in a critical way. Finally, the counter-narrative 
that Soviet resistance mattered a great deal to the outcome of the Battle 
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of Moscow was marginalised because of the perception that such a view 
relied on dubious Soviet sources. 
 
In 1948, Liddell Hart, the leading British military analyst of his era, 
published two very influential works: The Other Side of the Hill and 
German Generals Talk.294 For these works, Liddell Hart noted that he held 
conversations with various retired German generals about the war in 
order to undertake his research.295 In an attempt to record the attitudes 
of the central players “before memories had begun to fade or become 
increasingly coloured by after-thoughts”, Liddell Hart conducted 
interviews with former commanders such as Halder, Paul Ludwig Ewalt 
von Kleist, Gerd von Rundstedt, Heinrici and Blumentritt.296 The generals 
interviewed, however, had already had some ‘after-thoughts’ about the 
war. On one occasion, upon hearing that they were to be visited by Liddell 
Hart, the senior generals reportedly went into a huddle to discuss what 
line they were going to take in the coming discussion.297 The generals 
were conscious of their reputation, preserving the honour of the 
Wehrmacht in the face of war crimes, and the need to rebuild the 
professional German military in a new democratic state.298  
 
Liddell Hart was fond of the German military tradition, and referred to the 
German generals of the Second World War as “the best-finished product 
of their profession – anywhere”.299 He accepted the idea of the German 
generals that a hesitant Hitler had thrown away his opportunity to win the 
war by suspending the advance on Moscow by instead shoring up his 
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flanks in the north and south.300 Of all Hitler’s mistakes, the Kiev 
diversion was “the most fatal decision of the whole campaign”.301 Liddell 
Hart noted that the Viaz’ma and Briansk encirclements were significant 
victories for the Wehrmacht, but that “it was the end of October before 
[Red Army soldiers] were rounded up, and by that time winter had set in, 
with the result that the exploitation of victory was bogged in the mud on 
the way to Moscow”.302 In Liddell Hart’s heavily German-sourced account, 
the Germans were almost too successful; masses of Red Army troops had 
to be “rounded up”.303 Paradoxically, the Red Army did their greatest 
harm to the German war effort by surrendering en masse, holding up the 
Germans, and bringing the weather into play. 
 
Liddell Hart stressed that Hitler’s victories against France and Norway, 
gained despite the reservations of his professional military advisers, 
convinced the Führer that their opinion mattered little against his own. To 
be fair, Liddell Hart did note that to attribute all German failures to Hitler 
and all German successes to the General Staff is misleading, and that 
despite his obvious shortcomings, Hitler was at times a brilliant strategist: 
he understood the psychological side of warfare, showed prescience in his 
manoeuvres in Norway and France, and knew that pre-war bloodless 
conquests would help to weaken resistance when war finally came. While 
there is no doubt that a number of strategic decisions taken by Hitler 
throughout the war brought his military ‘genius’ into question, it must be 
remembered that history has recorded as a military amateur and a fool 
the same man that on the eve of war appeared to many to be a “gigantic 
figure, combining the strategy of a Napoleon with the cunning of a 
Machiavelli and the fanatical fervour of a Mahomet”. It was only with 
hindsight after the German defeat that “he was regarded as a blundering 
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amateur in the military field, whose crazy orders and crass ignorance had 
been the Allies’ greatest asset”.  
 
Nonetheless, Liddell Hart accepted the basic thesis espoused by the 
German generals. The problem for Germany, Liddell Hart continued, was 
that when the German generals were to estimate later situations more 
correctly, Hitler’s “defects became more potent than his gifts, and the 
debit balance accumulated to the point of bankruptcy”. Once the decision 
to attack the Soviet Union had been made, Hitler’s decisions on a 
strategic, operational and even tactical level led to the unnecessary 
disaster before Moscow.304 As Liedtke has put it, Liddell Hart’s 
broadcasting of the views of the German generals in his works, 
“inoculated the Anglo-American public against contrary views”.305 
 
In 1953, the famed Polish general Lieutenant General Wladyslaw Anders, 
who had fought on various occasions against Imperial Germany, the Third 
Reich and the Soviet Union, authored an English-language account of 
Hitler’s defeat that reinforced the message of Liddell Hart’s post-war 
works.306 In a foreword, retired United States Colonel Truman Smith 
exalted Anders as “about as impartial a writer on this controversial 
subject as it is possible to find anywhere in this troubled and divided 
world”.307 Anders’ account relied heavily on the works of former German 
generals - only two sources listed in the source list were Russian 
language308 - and reflected the view that it was Hitler’s blunders that 
hamstrung the plans of the professional military men and doomed 
Germany to failure in 1941. Anders provided four main reasons why 
Germany lost the Nazi-Soviet War: first and foremost, Hitler’s military 
blunders; secondly, Hitler’s political and moral blunders; thirdly, the 
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material and moral support provided to the Soviet cause by the Western 
Allies; and fourthly, Anglo-American bombing of Germany.309 Soviet 
resistance is notably absent from the list. 
 
Specifically for Moscow, Anders argued that the Wehrmacht failed 
because of the disagreement between Hitler and his generals. Hitler, 
focussing on economics, wanted to seize Leningrad and Ukraine above all 
other targets. The generals, following Carl von Clausewitz’s view that an 
enemy needed to be militarily destroyed, advocated the Soviet forces 
west of Moscow and eventually the capital. Anders described the German 
advances of the early campaign as being virtually unopposed until Hitler 
inexplicably delayed the assault in order to divert forces to Kiev. For 
Anders, this was the turning point of the year. Hitler was stubborn in his 
refusal to listen to his professional generals, and when the assault on 
Moscow resumed, it became stuck in the mud, and then the cold:  
 
what was bound to happen finally occurred: the German offensive 
petered out. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it froze, 
because it was not so much the Russian resistance – strong as it was 
– which ultimately immobilized the Germans, as the Russian winter, 
which began three weeks earlier than usual.310  
 
Notably, Colonel Smith wrote of Anders’ thesis: “This opinion, I believe, 
most professional soldiers share today”.311 
 
Colonel E. Lederrey’s 1955 work for the British War Office made it clear in 
the title that it was not an account of Red victory, but, Germany’s Defeat 
in the East.312 In a note on sources, the author stated that he had at his 
disposal all the important monographs and periodicals available at the 
Federal Military Library at Berne that had been published in Germany, 
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Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Switzerland. In addition, he 
had communiqués from the Soviet General Staff, articles from Krasnaia 
Zvezda, “some brochures published on the other side of the Iron Curtain, 
and the accounts of soldiers, who managed to escape from beyond it”. He 
also conducted interviews with former German, Hungarian and Romanian 
soldiers of the campaign, and found his discussions with Halder to be 
“especially valuable”. The list of principal sources provided lists twenty-
four German works (penned by former generals and others), eighteen 
non-German (non-Russian language) accounts, and three Soviet works. 
According to the introduction, Halder himself welcomed the account as 
“impartial, objective and profound”.313  
 
The work, which covers the entire Nazi-Soviet War, was a self-described 
attempt “to establish, on the one hand, the reasons why the Germans 
themselves contributed to their own defeat, and, on the other, to discover 
the circumstances which permitted the Russian recovery”.314 Lederrey 
described Stalin as a devious schemer, “heir to the imperialist dreams of 
the Tsars”, who had greedily signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, “under 
the very noses of the Allied nations”.315 Hitler appears as a professional 
general’s worst nightmare: 
 
When he was some hundreds of kilometres from the front, he settled 
tactical problems on the map, problems which fell within the 
exclusive competence of local commanders … The instinct of the 
adventurer (‘Wegelagerer’) impelled him to snap up any opportunity 
which might lead cheaply to quick results. But, when it was a 
question of a long term matter or of an important action, he 
hesitated, shilly-shallied and found empty excuses to put off 
indefinitely the decisions which his military advisers begged him to 
take … His intuition, which he believed to be infallible, inspired him to 
improvise without bothering about the limits of the possible. It was 
his wishes alone that counted. His ruthless will was ignorant of 
patience. In critical situations he feverishly issued detailed 
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commands which possessed no rhyme or reason, and he did so 
behind the backs of the responsible commanders.316 
 
Specific to 1941, Lederrey painted a picture of the professional German 
military at odds with the dilettante Hitler. Errors in strategy plagued 
Operation Barbarossa from the very beginning, and in taking on the 
Soviet Union Hitler ignored his own advice about always choosing enemies 
who were certain to be defeated. Soviet resistance played a part: Zhukov 
was the man who prevented Hitler from “achieving his desire,” and 
German generals were astonished and impressed by the “endurance and 
fanatic resistance of their opponents”. Lederrey presented Red Army 
resistance as putting an end to the myth of the invincibility of the 
Wehrmacht, but it was presented more as putting the final nail in the 
coffin of a German Army already brought to its knees by Hitler’s 
blunders.317  
 
The overriding thesis of the work was that Germany was the active agent 
in bringing about its own defeat. The Hitler-Halder crisis, Hitler’s fanatical 
and fantastical orders from the Wolfsschanze, made without heed to the 
realities of the front, and finally the weather ensured Operations 
Barbarossa and Typhoon were failures.318 The Kiev delay allowed the 
Soviets time to build up defences, bring fresh troops from Siberia, and 
wait for their best weapon – winter: 
 
[Hitler] did not contemplate that his sword would turn out to be too 
short an instrument in Russia, [and] that the Red Armies… would 
retreat before him until their ally, winter, entered the lists.319 
 
Ultimately, although the weather was decisive, its devastating effect was 
brought about by Hitler’s strategic errors more than any other factor. 
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Of all the works surveyed, no historian placed more emphasis on the role 
of Hitler’s blunders and the weather than Seaton.320 Seaton was, as one 
reviewer put it, “the foremost authority on the Soviet-German conflict”.321 
Seaton clearly had his biases. While the Wehrmacht soldiers were referred 
to as depoliticised “Germans” rather than “Nazis”, Red Army soldiers were 
“the enemy” or simply “Bolsheviks”.322 Seaton listed in his introduction 
works to which he made “constant reference”; all of them are German 
sources.323 There were approximately one hundred works in Seaton’s 
select bibliography: fifty-nine of these works were originally published in 
Germany, and former Nazi commanders penned ten of them; twenty-six 
were Soviet in origin, and five of those were by former Soviet 
commanders.  
 
For Seaton, the weather was hugely significant for the outcome of the 
Battle for Moscow. The delays of August meant that the serious fighting 
would take place during the rasputitsa. Seaton framed the decision to 
launch the attack on Moscow late in September as nearly insane, noting 
that when the attack did begin “the idea was so unpredictable and erratic” 
that the Red Army’s Stavka could hardly be blamed for not expecting it.324 
For Seaton, Hitler had been too successful for his own good. Seaton 
argued that Hitler’s victory over France and Poland convinced him of the 
invincible superiority of the German Army and soldier, “[d]runk with 
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success, however, Hitler was far removed from such sober reflections … 
The victory over France was in fact Hitler’s undoing”.325 
 
After describing the relentless rain, Seaton noted that, “the rain and thaw 
on 19 October had brought [35 Infantry Division] … to a standstill”. When 
his discussion turned from the rasputitsa to the winter campaign, Seaton 
declared that “[t]he cold was a far more terrible foe than the Russians”. 
Ultimately, though, “[m]ud not snow saved the capital”. Guderian’s 
attempt to take Tula was thwarted because “wheeled motor vehicles could 
not move and the trickle of petrol and diesel supply suddenly ceased; 
tracked vehicles eventually became stranded for lack of fuel”. Infantry 
“advancing at snail’s pace” overtook the Germans’ famed mechanised 
units.326  
 
Seaton happily conceded that extreme weather conditions affected both 
sides in the conflict, but also noted that “[a]ny conditions which inhibit 
movement must favour the defence”.327 Seaton dismissed out of hand 
“Soviet historians … scoffing at what they describe as German excuses, 
[who] maintain that von Bock was halted by the valour and skill of the 
Red Army”.328 In the first two weeks of Operation Typhoon, the 
“unhindered” Wehrmacht was able to destroy at least 700,000 Soviet 
troops with relatively few casualties and that, “with another three weeks 
of dry and clear weather would have been in Moscow. No Russian could 
have stopped it”.329 Seaton conceded that it “would be entirely wrong to 
attribute the German failure solely to the weather or misfortune”, 
nonetheless, the “offensive had been mounted too late in the year at a 
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season when the weather was due to break up”.330 According to Seaton, a 
secondary cause was “the lack of understanding of the effects on mobile 
operations of the weather and the ground”.331 Finally, the German army 
lacked the resources to achieve its goals, but this factor was evidently 
less important than the first and second causes – both linked to the 
weather – noted above.332 
 
Seaton suggested that the task was beyond Germany’s resources and it 
was Hitler’s fault for not understanding this fact. Obviously if the Soviet 
Union had collapsed as quickly as France had done, Hitler’s poor strategy 
would not have mattered. Looking at the Battle of Moscow from the 
Soviet side of the war, Seaton concluded that the Soviet Union’s “success 
in halting the German invasion” was due:  
 
in the first place to the accident of geography, to the vastness of the 
Soviet Union, to its undeveloped road and wide gauge railway 
system, to the vagaries of its climate and the bitterness of its winter. 
The second most important factor was probably Stalin’s brutal 
determination as a war leader and the third the resistance put up by 
the Red Army during this first year of war.333 
 
It is not that Seaton never mentioned the resistance of the Red Army, but 
that Hitler’s blunders, the inherent difficulties of invading Russia, and the 
weather are prioritised above the resistance of the Red Army in explaining 
the outcome of the Battle for Moscow.334 
 
Ziemke, the American historian who was Seaton’s main rival as the 
preeminent Western expert on the Wehrmacht during the 1970s and 
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1980s, shared Seaton’s view that Hitler’s decisions and the mud mattered 
a great deal. Writing in 1968, Ziemke described how: 
 
Army Group Centre jumped off on 2 October and within a week had 
broken open the Soviet front west of Moscow and formed two 
massive encirclements. The victory then appeared so near … Then at 
the end of the first week in October, in the Army Group Center and 
Army Group North areas, it began to rain. Relentlessly through the 
rest of the month and into early November, rain, snow, and alternate 
freezing and thawing turned the roads into oozing ribbons of mud.335  
 
For Ziemke, German leadership was a contest between Hitler’s rigidity 
and “the military professionals’ principles, flexibility, and mobility”.336 
Ziemke and Magna Bauer’s Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East 
(1987) relied on what they described as a “flood” of new memoirs, Soviet 
war histories and articles.337 Nonetheless, the overall conclusion was the 
same as Ziemke’s earlier work. Hitler made crucial mistakes, most 
notably the Kiev delay.338 Soviet resistance played its part, albeit 
intertwined with the role of the mud, snow, and Hitler’s strategic 
blunders.339 Describing the Germans’ first encounter with the rasputitsa, 
Ziemke, in his work co-authored with Magna Bauer, described how 
“[b]ecause of the weather, the Russians, for almost the first time in the 
war, were able to meet their enemy on nearly equal terms”.340  
 
Like Seaton, Ziemke’s work described Soviet resistance, but its main 
feature was Stalin’s sacrifice of his superior manpower resources. To be 
fair, Red Army resistance mattered more as the campaign wore on. 
Describing the December counter-attack, Ziemke and Bauer opined, “the 
weather was the least of the troubles that faced Army Group Centre”.341 
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Ziemke was happy to concede that the Red Army fought well at times, but 
did not credit Soviet martial ability as the main factor in Germany’s 
defeat. Instead, Stalin was fortunate that geography, the weather, and, 
above all, Soviet superiority in manpower conspired to stop the German 
invaders. In his account of the Red Army written after the Cold War, 
Ziemke described how the Soviet Union was only able to stay in the fight 
thanks to “the awesome coercive power of a totalitarian state to generate 
‘reserves’, a euphemism for ‘cannon fodder’”.342 According to Ziemke, by 
4 December 1941, the “confirmed Soviet military dead” for 22 June to 18 
November was a remarkable 6,155,500, twenty-one times the American 
total for the whole war.343 While there was no German victory at Moscow, 
there was no Red victory either because, in the end, “both sides lost”.344 
Certainly, Ziemke saw little Soviet agency and even less Red victory.  
 
This view of Hitler snatching defeat from the jaws of victory became a 
recurring theme of more popular accounts written for a general audience 
that began to emerge in the 1960s. In the popular imagination, the 
military history of 1941 was firmly associated with the mud and snow, 
and the diabolical problems that arose mainly because of Hitler’s 
incompetence. Writing the first specific English-language account of the 
Battle of Moscow, Ronald Seth, an intelligence operative in the Second 
World War who later became a best-selling author, was deeply critical of 
Hitler. Seth noted that all Hitler’s generals agreed that he had doomed 
them to the one thing they had always tried to avoid, a winter campaign 
in Russia.345 Seth quoted Blumentritt as offering the reflection that:  
 
Hitler, if not his generals, seems to have had a poorer memory of the 
past, and in particular of Moltke’s dictum, uttered in 1864, ‘An 
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operation must be based not on the weather but on the season’; 
autumn was beginning, winter would soon come.346 
 
According to Seth, Hitler’s decisions demonstrated his “ridiculous lack of 
military understanding”.347  
 
The theme of Hitler as military amateur dominates in account after 
account from the middle period of the Cold War. In his 1970 book, Alfred 
Turney mined Bock’s diaries and concluded that Bock struggled heroically 
against the weather and stiff Soviet resistance but he could not overcome 
the damage done by Hitler’s amateurish decision making. Turney 
concluded that the indecision in August 1941 “may have lost Germany the 
war”.348 Keegan, for many years one of the preeminent British military 
historians, wrote an account of Operation Barbarossa in 1971 that 
described Hitler’s “incipient tinkering” in strategic matters,349 and stressed 
the colossal error of Hitler’s Kiev decision.350 Writing in 1978, Matthew 
Cooper noted that Operation Typhoon was doomed as soon as Hitler, an 
amateur who dominated his politically inept generals, condemned the 
German Army to fight in the autumn mud.351 Writing in 1985, Januscz 
Piekalkiewicz concluded that because of Hitler’s indecision, “[t]he advance 
on the Soviet capital was delayed so long that the Blitzkrieg literally got 
stuck in the mud”.352 For Piekalkiewicz, the delay of August 1941 provided 
Stalin with two months with which to reinforce his defences around 
Moscow.353 Just as important was the fact that the victory at Kiev had the 
unfortunate effect of increasing Hitler’s sense of his own strategic 
infallibility.354  
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Hitler’s mistakes forced the Germans to fight a winter campaign that 
might otherwise have been avoided. Keegan described how advancing 
German troops could see the Kremlin in their field lenses; “[t]he Russian 
winter in all its cruelty, unknown and unimaginable to a Westerner, was 
now beginning to bite”.355 Seth noted that even when tanks were able to 
move in the cold, the freezing temperatures numbed the men in both 
body and mind.356 Haupt described the cold, ice, frost and snow as 
“‘Problem Nr. 1’ for the German command staffs”.357 We learn from 
Piekalkiewicz that: “the mud proved to be Stalin’s most effective ally”;358 
from Turney that by October 11 the weather “was creating a graver 
problem for Bock’s forces than were the Russians themselves”;359 and 
from Werner Haupt that “a new enemy more dangerous than the ‘Red 
Army’ had appeared – the mud!”.360 Seth stated that when the autumn 
rains began to fall, “Zhukov and the Stavka were already becoming 
conscious of a new ally standing at their shoulder”.361 Carell emphasised 
the effects of “General Mud” on the German defeat before Moscow.362 
Haupt similarly described the mud as Zhukov’s greatest ally.363 
Piekalkiewicz, in comparing the Battle for Moscow to Borodino, claimed 
that the Napoleonic battle was the first great artillery battle of history, but 
that the Germans of 1941 faced an entirely different foe, the rain.364 For 
Turney, the Battle of Moscow became the Battle of Mud: 
 
On 9 October, after a short respite of good weather, the Russian 
countryside was again blanketed by rain, sleet, and snow. And again 
Bock’s military machine bogged down. German soldiers shivered in 
the freezing temperatures and worked with almost superhuman effort 
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to maintain the momentum of the attack. They used horses, 
machines, and sheer human strength in an attempt to extract their 
vehicles from the Russian mud. But despite all they could do, the 
forces of nature proved to be superior.365 
 
The Russian winter that followed the rasputitsa delivered the final blow. 
Cooper stressed the ‘dual blow’ dealt to the Germans by the weather; 
when the renewed German offensive on Moscow was launched in mid-
October, “[t]his time it was not the rain that paralysed the attack; it was 
the tremendous drop in temperature”.366 Piekalkiewicz noted that Soviet 
resistance only became stronger as the temperature dropped.367 When he 
did concede that there was at times tough resistance from the Soviet 
defenders, the weather was decisive: 
 
The Russian winter here was of a severity previously unknown to the 
Germans. The night lasted from three in the afternoon until ten in 
the morning. Temperatures fell to -20 degrees regularly; and soon, 
from November 27, temperatures of -30 and even -40 degrees were 
recorded. The German Army was unable to cope with such weather. 
Tanks, automatic weapons, and radio sets failed to function because 
of inadequate frost protection.368 
 
It would be difficult to avoid the conclusion from reading these accounts 
that the mud and the cold mattered more than Red Army resistance. It 
was also clear in these accounts that this was a war between soldiers 
from different civilizations. The mud, and later the snow, provided a 
backdrop on which intentionally or not, painted a picture of a war 
between a recognisably human German soldier and the faceless hordes 
that Stalin threw into the battle without counting the cost. The accounts 
of the impact of the weather created the impression that the Germans 
suffered defeat because they were more ‘human’ or less animal-like than 
their Soviet opponent. There were countless dramatic accounts of the 
experience of the German soldier freezing to death miles from home that 
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seemed to imply that the Wehrmacht soldier was as much the victim of 
the war as the unfortunate citizens under occupation. Assmann offered a 
vivid description of an offensive frozen in ice and snow: 
 
For almost three months, in ice and snow, in almost unbelievably 
cold weather, without adequate winter clothing and with most 
difficult supply conditions, the German forces in the East had to fend 
off Russian attacks.369 
 
The contest was uneven, according to Assmann, because “the Russians 
were accustomed to the cold weather and better outfitted for it”.370One of 
the many photographs of German soldiers in Piekalkiewicz’s Moscow 
1941: The Frozen Offensive is the image of a young Wehrmacht soldier 
reading his mail. The photo is captioned: “A short interval in the fighting 
near Tula: A German gunner takes the opportunity to read a letter from 
home far away”.371 The reader is reminded that, politics aside, the 
German troops were humans after all; they cared about and were cared 
for by loved ones on the home front. In Haupt’s account, German soldiers 
appear tired and hungry,372 stoic and brave,373 louse-ridden and 
determined.374 Haupt’s German soldiers were relentless but seriously 
hampered by the relentless mud of the rasputitsa: 
 
The regiments, battalions, and companies marched man behind man, 
wordlessly advancing step by step. They plodded through the mud 
and the bogs. Uniforms were drenched from marching through water 
and mud, food – when it was issued – was eaten silently in mud 
puddles at the edge of the march-routes; but they continued to 
advance.375 
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Seth described in graphic detail how German soldiers lost toes, limbs and 
genitals to frostbite.376 James Lucas described miserable and freezing 
Wehrmacht troops waiting for their meagre potato soup, only to find it 
had frozen while being delivered to them.377 Turney too had the frozen 
soup, adding the dramatic flourish that as the forlorn German troops 
received their frozen meals, they “hoped for better days to come”.378 
When describing the Soviet counter-attack of December 1941, Seaton 
described the fate of German soldiers who could not retreat fast enough: 
 
Their lips were cracked and faces frost-bitten, their legs numbed and 
without feeling; one by one men sat or dropped down to await death 
because they could go no further; no reasoning could make them 
continue. Some begged to be shot or shot themselves. Most had to 
be left to await their end by freezing or Russian bayonet. Many of 
those who survived were permanent mental or physical wrecks.379 
 
Or as Haupt put it: 
 
The wounded and the soldiers suffering from frostbite could no longer 
be provided with first aid. Many of the latter fell exhausted into the 
snow, where they were either slain by the Russian cavalry or expired 
after a few minutes because their blood had turned to ice.380 
 
In Seaton’s account, the German soldier was up against a truly barbaric 
foe. The German sick and wounded, as well the as medical staff treating 
them “were often butchered by the oncoming enemy. For the Bolshevik 
knew no pity”. The blinding and torture of prisoners was, according to 
Seaton, commonplace. Seaton described Soviet soldiers counter-attacking 
“hurrahing and screaming like animals”; the professional German soldiers 
fought skilfully but were outnumbered by “hordes of Red Army soldiers”. 
Seaton’s account of the Soviet recapture of Maloiaroslavets on New Year’s 
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Eve in 1941 contained a striking description of Soviet soldiers, whom 
Seaton, as a historian from Canada who later served in the British 
military, curiously described as “the enemy”: 
 
In a temperature of minus 40 degrees centigrade, in the glare of 
burning houses, there was close hand to hand fighting of the fiercest 
and most brutal kind. There was no quarter. Many of the enemy 
troops, fortified with vodka, massacred the German wounded or flung 
them out of the upper windows, the drunken hordes roaming around 
the suburbs of the town hurrahing and screaming, and killing 
everyone in their path. 
 
Seaton’s depiction of drunken, animal-like Soviet hordes massacring 
helpless Germans is consistent with the traditional negative Western 
stereotype of Russia and Russian soldiers: “There was no alternative to 
kill or die and this was reflected in the desperate resistance put up by the 
Red Army men”.381   
 
On occasions there were descriptions of the plight of wounded Soviet 
soldiers, but they are usually described differently to their German 
counterparts. Lucas quoted a German soldier who, observing the suffering 
of Red Army soldiers, was astonished that: 
 
Among the prisoners waiting to be ferried back across the river were 
wounded, many of whom had been badly burnt by flame-throwers … 
Their faces had no longer any recognisable human features but were 
simply swollen lumps of meat … Not one of them was moaning as 
they sat there on the grass ... Why did they not moan?... some of 
our soldiers brought out barrels of margarine and loaves of Russian 
bread… The man without a jaw swayed as he stood up; the man with 
the five bullet wounds raised himself by his good arm … and those 
with burned faces ran … but this was not all; a half dozen men who 
had been lying on the ground also went forwards pressing back into 
their bodies with their left hands the intestines which had burst 
through the gaping wounds in their stomach wall. Their right hands 
were extended in gestures of supplication … as they moved down 
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each left behind a broad smear of blood upon the grass…and not one 
of them cried … none moaned … they were all dumb, as dumb as the 
poorest of God’s creatures.382 
 
This passage is reminiscent of Ségur’s descriptions of the Russians 
suffering in silence at Borodino in 1812. The Red Army soldiers were 
capable of suffering, but there was little suggestion that they were 
capable of winning the greatest war in history.  
 
In looking at the English-language histories of 1941 published between 
1945 and the mid-1970s, there was a close correlation between what the 
German generals argued and what the ‘classic’ texts of Liddell Hart, 
Seaton and Ziemke described. Liddell Hart, Seaton, and Ziemke had a 
deep respect not for the Nazi regime, but for the Wehrmacht’s 
achievements on the battlefield and the credibility of the subsequent 
testimony of the German generals.  
 
The Cold War context played a significant part in boosting the case of the 
German generals. According to Citino, the “Western (or English-speaking) 
identification with the Wehrmacht in the war on the Eastern Front” was a 
result of Cold War politics:  
 
it is a phenomenon that has lasted to the present day. A strange 
view of the war in the east arose, focusing almost exclusively on the 
German point of view and asking repeatedly how the German army 
could have won.383  
 
Hitler was a convenient villain both for the generals and for Western 
writers operating within the Cold War orthodoxy that the Soviet Union 
was responsible for the lost peace after 1945. The story that the generals 
told gave little credit to the new Cold War enemy for the victory over the 
Nazis. Readers of this literature would have learned that even by Russian 
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standards, the extraordinary rasputitsa and then the especially harsh 
winter stopped the Germans, who otherwise had little to fear from a 
Soviet state whose only military assets were the size of the Eurasian 
landmass and hordes of primitive fighters.  
 
Important assumptions like the severity of the weather went largely 
untested.384 While the accounts of the mud and snow humanised the 
Wehrmacht, stereotypes about Stalin’s endless hordes dehumanised the 
Soviet ‘other’. According to Stahel, the German generals’ view that 
Hitler’s Kiev decision was the main key to German defeat enjoyed 
popularity in the West because to consider the counterfactual, that if 
Hitler had not interfered the Germans would certainly have taken Moscow, 
is a simple answer to a complex problem.385 It was especially useful for 
the former German commanders who ensured that their own complicity in 
the running of the war was diminished in the historiography.386 According 
to Liedtke the war on the Eastern Front was poorly understood in North 
America and Western Europe because of a Western historiography that 
has fetishized all things related to the military of the Third Reich and 
incorporated “a host of interminable fallacies that even decades of 
scholarship appear unable to overcome”.387  
 
On the other hand, there is a good case for thinking that the reason that 
the German generals’ account of 1941 became the mainstay of the 
references of all the histories of that era is that the alternative source of 
information, that is, Soviet sources, was so problematic. Writing in 1972, 
Reinhardt, no friend of the generals’ historiography, noted that, “works 
written on this subject in German have generally given scant 
consideration to the measures taken by the Soviet leadership”.388 As for 
why that was so, Reinhardt wrote that “the historical trustworthiness of 
                                                 
384 See Radey and Sharp, ‘Was It the Mud?’, pp. 650-652. 
385 Stahel, Kiev 1941, p. 350. 
386 ibid., pp. 350-351. 
387 Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, p. xxi. 
388 Reinhardt, Moscow – The Turning Point, p. xii. 
98 
 
Russian accounts of events cannot be ranked as highly as that of German 
ones”.389 The only ‘Soviet’ archives available at all to foreigners were 
those beyond the control of the Soviet state such as the Trotsky archives 
at Harvard and the Smolensk Archive captured by the Germans and 
housed in the United States after the war.390  
 
Historians in the West had no way of independently checking archival 
material referenced in Soviet works and the assumption was that the 
material presented was designed to offer a pro-Soviet narrative.391 In 
1953 former U.S. Colonel Truman Smith summed up Western reluctance 
to believe Soviet sources by commenting that the official histories could 
“well challenge the tales of Baron Munchhausen for imagination and 
improbability”.392 As Cyril Falls commented in his introduction to a 1956 
collection of memoirs of the war by retired Wehrmacht commanders, 
“[s]ince the Second World War most of the best unofficial military 
literature on the subject has come from German officers”.393 In 1963, 
Erickson, who would become Britain’s foremost expert on the Red Army, 
noted that due to the imbalance of sources, many in the West had no 
alternative but to write the history of the war from the German 
perspective.394 In 1966, the American historian Jesse D. Clarkson agreed 
that, “though much of the story can be documented from Western 
sources, the inaccessibility of the Soviet archives makes a definitive 
account of the diplomatic and military history of Russia’s part in the war 
impossible”.395 Ziemke noted in 1968 that, “virtually no significant Soviet 
documents relating to military operations in World War II have been 
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made available”.396 The result of this was that Western historians 
considered official Soviet sources too tainted to be taken seriously. The 
memoirs of former German generals played a big part in filling the void.  
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Chapter Four: Paradigm in Transition 
 
Almost every recent account concerning the events of 1941 has noted the 
spell cast by the German generals over the literature about that year. It is 
certainly possible that, as Citino has suggested, the Cold War context 
fostered an admiration among military historians for the Wehrmacht, an 
imaginary surrogate of the West in its war against the Soviet Union. What 
this chapter will show is that the spell once cast by the German generals 
was already under attack long before the Cold War ended. The challenge 
to the German generals began with a broad questioning of their accounts 
that began to emerge in the 1960s. While new accounts by the generals 
had mostly dried up by the 1970s, military historians conducting primary 
research began to rely more and more on archival materials, especially 
materials that became available in Germany from the 1960s. The 
historians conducting this archival research mostly chose to tell a different 
story to that of the generals. 
 
The “revising” of the view of the German generals in part reflected the 
fact that historians writing more than a decade after the collapse of 
Nazism inevitably began to develop new perspectives on the German 
defeat. As Donald Kagan has noted:  
 
In a sense, all historians are revisionists, for unless they merely tell 
the same old story in different words, each tries to make some 
contribution that changes our understanding of the past.397 
 
According to Kagan, the term ‘revisionism’ first came into use when 
historians in the 1920s questioned Germany’s guilt in causing the First 
World War. Other ‘revisionisms’, more relevant to this thesis would follow. 
By the 1960s, American historians such as William Appleman Williams and 
Gar Alperovitz were revising the “orthodox” historiography of the Cold 
War, arguing that Stalin and the Soviet Union had been unfairly cast in 
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the role of villain in starting the Cold War.398 According to this ‘revisionist’ 
viewpoint, the origins of the Cold War were more complicated than was 
traditionally assumed, and the Soviet state had acted rationally in its deep 
suspicion of American intentions as the war against Hitler and Japan came 
to an end.399 Cold War revisionism coincided with a new emphasis on 
social history that was inspired by the “liberation” movements of the era – 
feminism, civil rights, and subaltern histories. In the case of Soviet 
studies, Fitzpatrick led the way in arguing for a “revision” of the top-
down, Stalin-dominated, totalitarian model of understanding the Stalin 
era.400 The prominence of these “revisionisms” may help to explain why 
the German generals found fewer and fewer supporters in the second half 
of the Cold War. In this context, the accounts of the German generals 
became problematic relics of an earlier era of the Cold War in the eyes of 
a new generation of academic historians, especially those writing in West 
Germany.  
 
Referencing Seaton’s Battle of Moscow (1971) and The German Army 
(1982), John Taylor has noted that Seaton was the last major historian to 
argue that the Germans would have captured Moscow were it not for 
Hitler’s errors.401 This may be a slight exaggeration because a handful of 
specialist writers and many popular accounts still contend that Germany 
could have or should have won were it not for Hitler’s mistakes.402 On the 
other hand, as we shall see, Taylor was right that the idea that the 
Germans would have won the war if only Hitler pulled the right strategic 
levers largely disappeared from the specialist literature from the 1970s. 
This did not, however, mean that those historians writing from the 
perspective of the German side of the war now embraced a “Red victory” 
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explanation of the Battle of Moscow. Instead, the Battle of Moscow 
became a “mission impossible” because German military planners – and 
not just Hitler – failed to take into account Soviet geography, the 
consequent logistical challenges, and the resistance offered by the Soviet 
state and Red Army. Soviet resistance, however, was only very rarely 
described as the most important factor in the German defeat. 
 
Early revisions 
It was not necessary to be sympathetic to the ‘Soviet view of the war’ or 
even Soviet politics in order to suspect the German generals of bias in 
their history writing. Alan Clark, later a British Conservative politician and 
self-taught military historian, in 1965 produced the first account of 
Operation Barbarossa that attempted to debunk the conventional wisdom 
established by Liddell Hart.403 Clark noted that only those who denounced 
the Kiev diversion wrote the post-war memoirs; “those who were against 
the centre thrust are all dead. Keitel, Jodl, Kluge, Hitler himself ... had no 
time to publish justificatory memoirs”.404 The fact that the Germans had 
failed to realise that the Red Army could lose two million soldiers and 
replace them suggested to Clark that this was more an impossible task 
than a “lost victory” for the Wehrmacht.405 As Clark told the story, the 
Red Army turned the conventional wisdom about German superiority on 
its head: 
 
The speed and depth of a panzer thrust, the tireless ubiquity of the 
Luftwaffe, above all the brilliant coordination of all arms had given 
the Germans an aura of invincibility that had not been enjoyed by an 
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army since the time of Napoleon. Yet the Russians seemed as 
ignorant of this as they were of the rules of the military text-book.406  
 
Clark’s version of Red Army resistance still relied on traditional 
stereotypes: “Like some prehistoric monster caught in a net the Red Army 
struggled desperately and, as reflex gradually activated the remoter parts 
of the body, with mounting effect”. According to Clark, Typhoon failed 
because of “the impact of the weather, in terms of its effect upon morale 
and on the efficient working of equipment, was already greater than 
expected; far from waning, Russian resistance had intensified”. It was 
“under the double impact of the blizzards, and the ubiquity of the Russian 
attack” that Army Group Centre ground to a halt. Whereas Seaton rated 
Red Army resistance as the least important factor in slowing the 
Germans, Clark suggested that, while the weather was crucial, Red Army 
resistance was almost as important.407 
 
Another example of this questioning of the generals in the early 1960s 
was Carell’s 1964 Hitler’s War on Russia. Carell (real name Paul Schmidt) 
was a former lieutenant colonel in the Allgemeine SS, best-selling author 
in Germany and the United States, and notorious denialist of Wehrmacht 
and SS war crimes.408 In Hitler’s War on Russia (1964), which relied 
heavily on the accounts of the former German commanders, Carell 
mocked the Soviet view of the war for its insistence that Soviet victory 
was assured by the superiority of Communism, and asked, “[h]ow then do 
they explain the victorious German advance right up to the very gates of 
Moscow? How do they explain the fact that even Stalin’s Government 
expected to lose the capital?”. Like the German generals, Carell also 
argued that 1941 was the decisive year of the Nazi-Soviet War, 
specifically the German failure before Moscow. 
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Carell’s work for the most part presented Hitler as the amateur at odds 
with the professionals. Carell described how after the fighting at 
Smolensk:  
 
No general, no officer, no rank-and-file trooper in the Eastern Front 
had any doubts about the further course of operations… Moscow, of 
course - Moscow, the heart and brain of the Soviet Empire… when 
the great victory seemed within arm’s reach, when all the world was 
waiting for the order, ‘Panzers forward! Destination Kremlin!’ Hitler 
suddenly scotched these plans. 
 
When Hitler finally gave the order that Leningrad and Ukraine were to be 
prioritised over Moscow, “[t]he generals had listened in amazement. They 
had shaken their heads”.  
 
On the other hand, Carell was an unlikely harbinger of the new 
historiography that will be described in Chapter Five. Amidst his dramatic 
descriptions of the long-suffering generals at odds with Hitler, Carell 
hinted that blame did not rest solely on Hitler’s shoulders. He argued that 
the key to Soviet victory was its manpower potential, and the successful 
mobilisation of the vast Soviet population to meet the needs of total war. 
For Carell, the weather and the use of crack troops from the Far East 
played a decisive part in the Battle for Moscow, but these factors were too 
over-stated in the literature. ‘General winter’ and the ‘Siberians’ were the 
most obvious explanatory factors, and thus dominated the discourse, but 
Soviet victory instead came from a fundamental German miscalculation of 
the effort required to achieve victory: 
 
The ‘miracle of Moscow,’ as the Soviets call the turn of the tide 
outside their capital, was due to a simple fact which was anything but 
a miracle - a fact that can be summed up in very few words. There 
were too few soldiers, too few weapons, too little foresight on the 
part of the German High Command … Adolf Hitler and the key figures 
of his General Staff had underestimated their opponent, in particular 
his resources of manpower and the performance and morale of his 
troops. They had believed that even their greatly debilitated armies 
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would be strong enough to deal him his coup de grâce. That was the 
fundamental error. 
 
Importantly, in this assessment the miscalculation was not Hitler’s alone. 
Carell similarly deviated from the view of the Halder group in his 
assessment of Hitler’s decision to divert Army Group Centre away from 
Moscow and instead focus on Kiev. Carell argued that the importance of 
the Kiev decision had in fact been overplayed in accounts of the war up to 
that point: 
 
It has been fashionable to describe Hitler’s turning away from 
Moscow as the key error of the summer campaign. This view cannot 
be proved wrong, but the author does not believe that Hitler’s 
decision to turn towards Kiev, with the time lost in consequence, was 
the sole cause of the subsequent disaster before Moscow. Upon 
objective consideration Hitler’s decision seems, in many respects, 
justified and reasonable. 
 
For Carell, pushing straight for Moscow would have exposed Bock’s flanks, 
and allowed the Red Army to apply its every increasing armour and 
manpower strength to severely weaken German forces. Carell argued that 
regardless of whether Hitler’s decision was indeed “justified and 
reasonable”, Germany was already too far into Soviet territory for any 
move to be decisive:  
 
If the idea of a Blitzkrieg against the heart of the Soviet Union was 
dropped altogether and the enemy given time to recover, then surely 
the campaign and probably the whole war was lost. Seen in this light, 
Hitler’s decision represented an admission that Yelnya-Smolensk had 
broken the impetus of the German Blitzkrieg.409 
 
Carell’s questioning of Kiev as an inexplicable and unmitigated disaster 
wrought on Germany by Hitler’s foolishness was at odds with the view 
espoused by the Halder school. As noted above, however, his work was 
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for the most part one that heavily criticised Hitler for his wartime 
leadership, and one that depicted the Red Army as faceless hordes at 
odds with the human and war crime-free Wehrmacht. 
 
It was a measure of the changing historiographical trend that Liddell Hart 
himself offered a final, more nuanced view in his 1970 History of the 
Second World War. Liddell Hart maintained his emphasis on Hitler’s Kiev 
diversion, the weather and the backwardness of Soviet roads as pivotal in 
the outcome of 1941. The delay caused by indecision between Hitler and 
his generals in August, “was an amazing level of mental haziness on the 
topmost level of the German Command”. In the end however, Liddell Hart 
concluded that the Germans had chosen a uniquely challenging task: 
 
As it was, Russia owed her survival more to her continued 
primitiveness than to all the technical development achieved since 
the Soviet revolution. That reflection applies not only to the 
toughness of her people and soldiers – their capacity to endure 
hardships and carry on under shortages that would have been 
paralysing to Western peoples and Western armies. A greater asset 
still was the primitiveness of the Russian roads. Most of them were 
no better than sandy tracks. The way that they dissolved into 
bottomless mud, when it rained, did more to check the German 
invasion than all the Red Army’s heroic sacrifices. If the Soviet 
regime had given Russia a road system comparable to that of 
Western countries, she would have been overrun almost as quickly 
as France. 
 
Liddell Hart now conceded that from the very outset, German progress 
was stunted by, “extremely tough resistance by the Russians. The 
Germans usually out-manoeuvred their opponents but they could not 
outfight them”. Furthermore, and in a blow to the Kiev delay argument, 
Liddell Hart stressed that, “[t]he issue in Russia depended less on 
strategy and tactics than on space, logistics, and mechanics”. In this 
telling, it was not simply Hitler’s foolishness that cost the Germans an 
otherwise certain victory, it was a combination of flawed strategy, the 
climate, tough Soviet resistance, and the hardships in movement and 
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logistics brought about by these factors, that cost Germany victory in 
1941.410  
 
Arguably the most serious blow to the German generals and the 
contingency of Hitler’s mistakes was struck by the Israeli historian Martin 
van Creveld, whose Supplying War appeared in 1977. In his widely-cited 
chapter on Operation Barbarossa, van Creveld argued that Germany's 
logistic network and its lack of the crucial resources of fuel and rubber 
condemned Germany to defeat. ‬While the Wehrmacht had proved itself to 
be a formidable fighting force in France, the invasion of the much larger 
Soviet Union was simply not a winnable war given the glaring 
inadequacies of German planning. This was the fault not just of Hitler, but 
also of the whole machinery of senior military planning. For van Creveld, 
Germany fatally underestimated what would be required to win the war. 
It was the ‘crisis in railway transportation’ - especially of fuel - that began 
well before the onset of the frost that was the real issue, because even 
when the ground hardened it was still difficult to resume the offensive:  
 
It seems certain, therefore, that the mud was only one factor that 
brought the Wehrmacht to a halt. No less important were the 
railways, which had already experienced such tremendous difficulties 
in building up a base at Smolensk and which were simply unable to 
cope with the increased demands for a fresh offensive. ‬‬‬‬‬‬  
 
‪Van Creveld dismissed the Kiev diversion as a decisive factor. Given the 
poor supply situation, Army Group Centre could not have attacked 
Moscow at the end of August because of the need to wait for supplies. ‬‬‬‬‬‬  
Van Creveld also noted that the Red Army continued to fight when 
surrounded and that this delayed the German attack and caused further 
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supply problems. ‬‬‬‬‬‬  Hitler, the mud and the snow mattered far less than the 
German military planners getting their sums wrong.411 ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬ ‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪‪ 
 
Taken together, the effect of these accounts was to shift the focus away 
from Hitler to the generals and German military planning more broadly. 
Germany had fatally underestimated the task of defeating the massive 
Soviet state. Confirmation that a change had occurred in the way 1941 
was being described in the military histories of the mid-Cold War period 
came from the most vehement advocate of the Halder school. Writing in 
1982, Russell H. S. Stolfi recognised that he was part of a minority of 
historians when he argued that the blame for the German defeat lay with 
the “dilettantish” Hitler. According to Stolfi, “Western historians and 
writers” had by this stage fallen into line with the Soviet view that “Hitler 
subjected himself and the Germans to inevitable defeat by the invasion of 
the Soviet Union”.412  
 
Nonetheless, Carell, Liddell Hart, and van Creveld were still describing a 
German defeat in the terms described at the beginning of the thesis. It 
was the geography of the Soviet state, the difficulties of transportation, 
the need to repair and replace tanks and aircraft when resources were 
stretched across multiple fronts, the mud and the snow combined with 
Stalin’s seemingly inexhaustible reserves that the Germans should have 
taken into consideration but suicidally did not. At the same time, these 
authors clearly rejected the claim of the German generals that the war 
would obviously have ended successfully for Germany were it not for 
Hitler’s mistakes. 
 
The German counter-narrative 
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Van Creveld was not the first historian to argue that Germany simply 
lacked the resources to achieve a successful invasion of the Soviet Union. 
German historians had been developing just such a case from the 1960s. 
The flood of memoirs, commentary and diaries from the German generals 
began to dry up by the 1960s. Thereafter a very different German “voice” 
regarding 1941 came to the fore.  
 
David Stahel has noted how in the early 1960s, historians in Communist 
East Germany began to suggest that the focus on the initial runaway 
successes of Operation Barbarossa placed undue emphasis on this one 
aspect of the war at the expense of explaining the longer-term reasons 
for German failure.413 In 1962 Hans Busse challenged the Halder group’s 
assertion that Hitler’s decision to divert troops in July and August 1941, 
and the subsequent argument with Halder, was the main explanation for 
the failure to capture Moscow.414 In 1965 Helmut Göpfert noted that 
German forces enveloping large Soviet armies in the early phase of the 
war were overexposed and unable to be adequately protected from Soviet 
counterstrokes. The massive successes of the German kessels therefore 
simultaneously drained overall German fighting strength at an 
unsustainable rate.415  
 
These accounts had little impact outside of East Germany. According to 
Ueberschär, to put forward these ideas in West Germany inevitably 
attracted “a storm of accusations about being a tool of Communist 
propaganda”.416 Or as Stahel has put it, the East German accounts “fitted 
all too well into the familiar communist mythology … that a Soviet victory 
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was inevitable from the very beginning”.417 On the other hand, the 
accusation that a counter-narrative to the German generals was simply 
Soviet propaganda became more difficult to sustain when the United 
States began to release German military archival material in the 1960s.418 
As Stolfi has described it, documents covering “several thousand feet of 
shelf space” were transferred from the American National Archives in 
Virginia to the Federal Republic of Germany.419 This was information that 
was not available to the German generals in the 1940s and 1950s but did 
become available in the late 1960s and 1970s to West German historians 
who could now present their work as based on array of primary sources 
not previously available.420  
 
The author who had the greatest impact by mining this archive was 
professional soldier Klaus Reinhardt, whose Ph.D. became the now classic 
book Die Wende vor Moskau. Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im 
Winter 1941/42 (1972).421 It was the first work published by ‘The Military 
History Research Office’ of the West German military or Bundeswehr.422 
Like the German generals, Reinhardt considered 1941 to be decisive. 
According to Reinhardt, however, the extensive source material “now 
available” demonstrated that the traditional narrative of the war - that 
despite the setback at Moscow, the German Army and German industry 
was able to recover and it was only at Stalingrad where there was the 
true turning point of the war - “does not stand up to critical analysis”. As 
for exactly when the war was lost, Reinhardt claimed that Hitler’s plans 
“and therefore the prospects for a successful outcome of the war for 
Germany” had failed most likely by October 1941, “and certainly so at the 
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start of the Russian counter-offensive in the Battle of Moscow in 
December 1941”. It was therefore misleading to assert that the war could 
have been won if not for Hitler’s decisions. German political and military 
leaders shared the illusion that they would win the war long before there 
was mud or snow.  
 
Reinhardt’s central claims were that blitzkrieg could not be maintained 
over a long period, labour shortages restricted Germany’s military and 
armament capabilities, hopes of compensating for raw material shortages 
in captured Soviet territories went unfulfilled, as did hopes of “enabling 
Germany to become economically self-sufficient from the Anglo-Saxon 
naval powers”. Reinhardt noted that from the planning of Operation 
Barbarossa in the autumn of 1940, the assumption was that quick victory 
would be won and that it would be a war of marching and organisation of 
supply more than a war of eliminating and neutralising Soviet armies: 
“The German Army High Command (OKH), overrating its own capabilities, 
simply thought that a different outcome was unworthy of further 
consideration”. According to Reinhardt, the striking German successes of 
1941 were Pyrrhic victories:  
 
Although the German Eastern Army had not yet been defeated, but – 
in strictly military terms – had won one victory after another, its 
combat effectiveness had been greatly reduced, even before the final 
decision had been achieved on the battlefield. 
 
A crucial problem was that matériel lost by the panzer divisions was not 
being replaced by Hitler. Hitler believed he could successfully take 
Moscow with the forces at their current strength, and as a result was 
reluctant to free up forces earmarked for campaigns after the Soviet 
demise. In mid-July, when Hitler was told that an estimated fifty per cent   
of panzers on the entire Eastern Front had been lost, he released only 
seventy new Panzers (IIIs and IVs), as well as some seized Czech tanks. 
Hitler appeared to be “hoarding” for planned winter operations in the 
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Middle East and North Africa. More generally, the German war machine 
simply did not have enough trains, tank workshops or the capacity to 
manage spare parts that differed from tank to tank. 
  
Reinhardt questioned whether Moscow would have fallen had the assault 
on the Soviet capital been ordered in August. Reinhardt did concede that 
the mud mattered in October, when the rasputitsa slowed the German 
spearheads, especially around Tula. At the same time, the role of the mud 
had been overplayed by the former German generals in their history 
writing: 
 
 [t]he failure of the OKH to prepare themselves in time for the 
consequences of the muddy season led them, after it had begun in 
the autumn of 1941, to claim to be the victims of an extraordinary 
natural disaster and to speak of an ‘abnormally long and hard muddy 
season’…The army command attempted thus to ascribe the blame for 
their own failure to a higher power.423 
  
Reinhardt even suggested that the level of rainfall in October and 
November 1941 was less than usual, making the rasputitsa drier and less 
devastating than would normally be expected.424 Reinhardt criticised 
Hitler’s generals as much as the Führer himself. On 7 December, Bock’s 
diary listed several reasons for the crisis the Germans found themselves 
in. The list included the autumn mud as a crucial factor that crippled 
supply and prevented the Germans from capitalising on the victory as 
Viaz’ma. He also listed the failure to predict the extent of Soviet 
resistance in terms of fighting and industrial capacity as crucial.425 To 
Bock’s assertions, Reinhardt argued that: 
 
it must be remembered that he himself was largely responsible for 
the inaccurate assessment of the enemy. His demand that the 
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offensive be continued in mid-November despite the obvious 
shortcomings in rail transport was an important contributing factor to 
the difficulties now facing his units.426 
 
Reinhardt’s thesis suggested that this was not just a German defeat, but 
also hinted at the possibility that 1941 could be reframed as a Red 
victory. At one level, Reinhardt described a massively unrealistic plan on 
the part of German political leaders and military planners, an explanation 
for the German defeat that places huge importance on German 
incompetence. On the other hand, Reinhardt’s point was that this 
incompetence only mattered because of unexpected Soviet resistance. If 
the Soviet Union had collapsed as France had done, none of the German 
miscalculations would have mattered. Reinhardt’s conclusion was that: 
 
the Eastern Army was brought to a standstill not by the cold, but, 
even before the first cold spell, by the catastrophic state of their own 
units, by the breakdown of supplies and especially the continuing 
resistance of the Russian troops in the sectors of all three army 
groups.427  
 
This last claim – “especially the resistance of the Russian troops” – was of 
course something that Reinhardt could not develop before the opening of 
the Soviet archives.  
 
Reinhardt’s views received significant confirmation in the Military History 
Research Office’s thirteen-volume History of Germany and the Second 
World War. The fourth volume of this series, which was published in 
German in 1984 and released in an updated form in English in 1998, was 
devoted to Operation Barbarossa.428 In a direct criticism of the view 
pressed by the former German generals, Manfred Messerschmidt noted in 
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his introduction to the fourth volume that, “[t]he findings of this volume … 
[a]bove all … show the very limited value, in many respects, of the 
‘Studies’ produced under Halder’s general editorship on behalf of the 
American army”.429 For Messerschmidt:   
 
The first wave of West German accounts, more especially the military 
memoirs of the postwar period, failed, with a few exceptions, to bring 
out the dimensions of that war. In them, Hitler frequently appeared 
as an amateur who messed up the victory for his military men … 
Such an approach is inappropriate in every respect.430 
 
Messerschmidt argued that the Battle of Moscow was decisive for the 
Second World War. The German failure was a result of three factors, 
“[o]pponent, geographical expanse, and climate brought the Wehrmacht 
to the brink of disaster; in that order”.431 Messerschmidt’s hierarchy of 
factors – opponent, geography, then weather - was certainly not in accord 
either with the German generals or the histories written in the West by 
Liddell Hart, Seaton, and Ziemke.  
 
Writing in the same volume, Rolf-Dieter Müller argued that Operation 
Barbarossa was poorly planned at least in part because the German 
leadership underestimated the Red Army.432 Müller noted that from the 
very beginning of planning the attack on the Soviet Union, several key 
factors were not considered, especially the economic potential of the 
Asian part of the Soviet Union. The warnings from military geographers 
about the Soviet Union’s daunting problems for an invader “received scant 
attention”.433 For Müller, the idea that the Soviet government might 
organise enough stubborn resistance to weaken German fighting strength 
and allow time to relocate armaments industry further east “was left out 
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of consideration from the outset”.434 The inability to consider these things 
stemmed from a prejudice against the Bolsheviks and their organisational 
abilities more than any practical considerations.435  
 
Ernst Klink’s contribution to the volume continued Müller’s discussion of 
the lack of cohesion in the German High Command, though focussed on 
the disagreement once the invasion actually began.436 Klink argued that 
despite later claims that all mistakes were Hitler’s alone, the German 
generals were not entirely free from blame: “Hitler’s rejection of their 
views caused great dismay among the army leaders, but the officers 
concerned obeyed him”.437 Klink criticised Bock’s failure to concede that 
that failure before Moscow was not caused by the weather alone, but by 
“his own share of the blame for the disaster, and that of the chief of the 
Army General Staff”.438 Klink’s account did note the weather as being a 
factor in the outcome of 1941, but presented the supply crisis caused by 
the rasputitsa as occurring at the time that “strategic ideas replaced 
reality in the thinking of the Army General Staff”.439  
 
Writing in 1994, Gerhard Weinberg declared that Reinhardt’s view that 
Germany lacked the resources to win the war against a determined and 
much underestimated Soviet opponent was now “generally accepted”.440 
Nonetheless, the views put forward by Reinhardt and the German official 
history would take time to make an impact outside of Germany. In the 
first place, Reinhardt’s work did not appear in English translation until 
1992. Secondly, Reinhardt and the official German history were still 
vulnerable to the criticism that they were simply following a political 
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agenda. According to Ziemke, the West German attack on the generals’ 
view was driven more by domestic and foreign policy concerns than 
anything else. For Ziemke, Reinhardt expressed the 1970s version of the 
‘German point of view’ that sought to reassure the Soviet Union that 
Germany was no longer a threat. At a time of Ostpolitik, the German 
military establishment thought it desirable to demonstrate that the Soviet 
victory was straightforward and that the war was won in October 1941, or 
at the latest in December 1941.441 This emphasis upon the lack of 
capacity of Hitler’s war machine reinforced the message of the West 
German government that Germany constituted no real threat to the 
Soviet Union. Ziemke was plainly unconvinced by this “quaintly 
tendentious Cold War relic”.442  
 
Thirdly it should be noted that the post-war German histories did not 
speak with one voice. Joachim Hoffmann’s chapter in the official History, 
entitled ‘The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes’, flatly contradicted 
the general thrust of the volume.443 Hoffmann was deeply sceptical about 
the claims of the official Soviet view of the war. Hoffmann noted that after 
the war the likes of Zhukov, Konev and Vasilevskiĭ all claimed that the 
desperate fighting by encircled Soviet troops at Viaz’ma played a vital role 
in gaining time for strengthening the Mozhaĭsk Line. For Hoffmann, this 
advantage, so stressed by Soviet historians, came at an enormous price 
in men and matériel. It was therefore impossible to talk of the “undying 
glory” of the encircled troops without mentioning that 673,000 of them 
surrendered.444 According to Hoffmann, incompetent and profligate Soviet 
commanders cobbled together defences with untrained soldiers to save 
Moscow. The reader would get the impression from Hoffmann that 
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something close to a miracle was needed to save Moscow.445  
 
Moreover, the fourth volume in the official history was soon eclipsed by 
the controversy of the historikerstreit that took place in Germany between 
1986 and 1989. This controversy was set off when intellectuals from the 
conservative right of German politics argued that it was time for Germany 
to recognise that Stalin’s crimes were the equal of Hitler’s, and that the 
Wehrmacht had fought to save Germany from a barbaric Red Army.446 In 
opposition to these ‘revisions’ of history, prominent historians such as 
Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat argued against what they saw as 
diminishing of Nazi crimes and German responsibility for the Holocaust.447 
Bartov and Wette argued that the German generals were mostly in 
agreement with the Nazi leadership in terms of waging an ideological and 
racist war in the East and that they did just that.448 
 
The accounts of Clark, Reinhardt, the German official history, and van 
Creveld suggested that the German defeat had to be viewed in much 
broader terms than an otherwise flawless plan being brought undone by 
Hitler’s blunders. In each case, the assertion was made that Soviet 
resistance mattered a great deal, perhaps more than Hitler and the 
weather. This in itself would not count as a “Red victory” argument in the 
terms described in the introduction to this thesis. These accounts of the 
German side of the war simply did not go into any detail about what the 
Red Army actually achieved; Hoffmann’s account of the Soviet side of the 
war explicitly rejected any suggestion that the Red Army was the agent of 
its own survival in 1941. Among historians writing in Britain, however, 
there was a more sustained effort to tell a story of Soviet agency in the 
war.  
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The British counter-narrative 
Alexander Werth was arguably the first well-known writer in the West to 
make the case that Soviet resistance was clearly the most important 
factor in the defeat of the German invaders in 1941. Werth grew up in 
Saint Petersburg before his family migrated to the United Kingdom in 
1917 to escape the Revolution. Despite having fled the Bolsheviks, Werth 
remained fond of Russia, and even sympathetic to the Soviet cause. In 
1942 he stated that upon hearing of the German invasion “the Russian 
half of me was clamouring to ‘go home’ – after 24 years”.449 Rejecting 
Cold War stereotypes was clearly one of the motivations for Alexander 
Werth, who knew wartime Russia as a journalist working in the Soviet 
Union for the London Sunday Times and the BBC. Werth’s Russia at War 
appeared in 1964 and was unusual because of its aim to broaden 
knowledge of the Soviet contribution to the Allied victory to a wide 
audience. This was a reworking of earlier reports on the war aimed at the 
general reader. Werth’s work was clearly sympathetic to the Soviet war 
effort, and in the preface to Russia at War indicated that his efforts were 
intended to counter widespread ignorance and deliberate Western 
amnesia with regard to the role of the Soviet Union in winning the war, 
specifically the misinformation spread by the anti-Communist John Birch 
Society.450 Werth was of the view that the Western powers should have 
collaborated with the Soviet Union to stymie Nazi aggression, and that the 
Soviet Union was justified in annexing eastern Poland and the Baltic 
States.451 Werth acknowledged that Russia at War was not meant to be a 
work of academic history, but that he had been able to speak informally 
to soldiers and civilians alike, and visit battlefields.452  
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Werth stressed the enormous role played by the Soviet Union in the 
defeat of Nazi Germany and the debt therefore owed by the Western 
Allies.453 When he discussed Guderian’s complaint regarding mud and rain 
affecting the German war effort, Werth noted that German claims that the 
thermometer dropped to minus sixty-eight degrees were improbable and 
scoffed at “Guderian’s urge to blame everything on the weather!”454 What 
mattered was the extraordinary effort of common Red Army soldiers, 
volunteers from Moscow and civilians in defending against the German 
invader.455  
 
The difficulties facing those who wanted to make the case for more Soviet 
agency in the events of 1941 during the Cold War is illustrated in the 
accounts of two British historians of the Red Army, Malcolm Mackintosh 
and Geoffrey Jukes. For these experts on the military history of the Nazi-
Soviet War, only published Soviet sources were available. They relied 
upon the memoirs of the generals that Khrushchëv and then Brezhnev 
permitted to appear in the 1960s.  
 
Mackintosh’s Juggernaut: The Russian Forces, 1918-1966 appeared in 
1967 and described the evolution of the Red Army from the Russian Civil 
War of 1918-1920 to 1966. Strikingly for the modern reader, 
Mackintosh’s account was based entirely on published Soviet sources, 
such as the memoir of Marshal Vasiliĭ Sokolovskiĭ. Furthermore, its 
account offered few references and no primary sources. Mackintosh 
devoted considerable space to the Nazi-Soviet War, but had nothing to 
say about whether the Germans could have won at Moscow or not. 
Instead, Mackintosh emphasised the Red Army’s capacity to endure the 
German attack of 1941 and learn from its mistakes.456  
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The first English-language account dedicated to telling the military history 
of the Battle of Moscow from the perspective of the Red Army was written 
by Jukes and appeared in 1970.457 Like Mackintosh, Jukes was hamstrung 
by a lack of reliable primary evidence. The Defense of Moscow was limited 
in scope, appearing as a volume in Ballantine’s Illustrated History of 
World War II. Apart from the plentiful illustrations, the first half of the 
book was a description and analysis of events: the second half of the 
book comprised lengthy extracts drawn from Zhukov’s recently published 
memoirs.458 Its theme was summed up in Jukes’ contention that the 
defence of Moscow “was primarily the work of one man”, Zhukov.459 Apart 
from the hero worship of Zhukov, there was no attempt to stake out a 
clear position on whether this was a German defeat or a Red victory in 
the terms discussed in this thesis. It was testimony to how little was 
known about the Soviet side of operations that most of Jukes’ 
commentary was about the conflicts over German strategy. Jukes devoted 
an entire chapter to the conflict between Hitler and his generals over 
whether to strike at Moscow or Kiev. According to Jukes, Hitler’s decision 
on 21 August not to advance directly on Moscow was decisive: 
 
This, then, was the vital decision. The idea of actually capturing 
Leningrad was quietly abandoned, and an advance on Moscow was 
ruled out for the time being.460  
 
On the other hand, Jukes made mention of staunch Soviet resistance 
throwing the German plans into chaos. Jukes noted that the mud of the 
rasputitsa equally affected the actions of each combatant side: as Soviet 
troops retreated they found the mud as much of a hindrance as the 
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advancing Germans.461 With regard to the devastating winter, Jukes 
noted that the lack of winter clothing did have an enormous effect on the 
Wehrmacht, but pointed out that the resulting handicaps were self-
imposed.462 Jukes also noted that Soviet historians covered up the scale 
of the Red Army’s horrendous losses. Jukes’ account of the Defense of 
Moscow minus the illustrations and the quotations from Zhukov amounted 
to only about forty pages of text. Taken together, Werth, Mackintosh and 
Jukes made a case for the importance of Soviet resistance but, outside of 
published Soviet sources, had no evidence for their claims.  
 
It was left to Erickson’s histories, Road to Stalingrad (1975) and Road to 
Berlin (1983) to provide the first analytical and detailed account of the 
Red Army at war.463 Erickson’s work was a synthesis of German archival 
material, Soviet war literature and interviews with Soviet veterans with 
whom he had cultivated a relationship during the Khrushchёv ‘thaw’.464 
Erickson, for example, interviewed Marshal Konev as part of his research. 
He was able to make an extensive study of “diverse private papers, 
diaries, single documents and personal accounts, many of which 
undoubtedly have their counterpart in the central archives”.465 When 
using published Soviet materials, Erickson made contact with the author 
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or research group responsible in order to discuss the findings.466 These 
contacts would help Erickson overcome a lack of access to Soviet 
archives.467 
 
There are many references to the role of the mud and snow in Erickson’s 
account.468 However, Erickson insisted that both sides were equally 
affected.469 The weather was only important in connection with the 
resistance of the Red Army. As the German assault faltered before 
Moscow in late November and early December, Erickson seemed to share 
some of the Soviet schadenfreude: “At Istra, Beloborodov’s Siberian 
troops fought hand-to-hand with the SS infantry of Das Reich Division, 
the young Aryans who died icy and bare-footed in their boots”.470 This 
type of flourish is, however, rare. Erickson’s own view on the reason for 
the Red victory is hinted at in his assessment of the failure of the final 
German push on the Soviet capital in which he summarises the Germans 
faltering due to “losses, exhaustion and undiminished Soviet 
resistance”.471 Erickson’s dense narrative implies that the mud and 
resistance worked together: 
 
Heaving itself forward out of a sea of clinging mud, the German 
attack on 9th Army was held up at Kalinin, where Panzer Group 3 (re-
designated Third Panzer Army) was under direct attack by the Soviet 
30th and 31st Armies: driving straight from the west, the German 
Fourth Army ran into fresh Soviet formations (49th, 43rd and 33rd 
Armies) and on its southern wing could push no further than the 
Nara-Serpukov area.472 
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To illustrate how Erickson differed from his contemporaries, Erickson’s 
depiction of the German assault on Kalinin can be compared with Seaton’s 
account of the same battle. Both accounts deal with the events of 12 
October 1941. According to Seaton: 
 
Because of the shortage, the remaining motor fuel was pooled in 
order the make a motorized infantry battalion, supported by a tank 
company and artillery battery, fully mobile. This motorized battalion 
group was detailed to make a thrust on the great city and industrial 
area of Kalinin, fifty miles to the north, and made excellent progress 
during 12 October, the demoralized and panic-stricken Soviet enemy 
running away, leaving trenches and equipment at the sight of the 
armored personnel carriers.473 [emphasis added] 
 
Erickson described this same event differently: 
 
On 12 October, Kaluga had fallen and two days later Kalinin (ninety 
miles north-west of Moscow and leading into the rear of the Soviet 
North-Western Front) also fell, in spite of the furious resistance of 
units formed out of Moscow AA gun-crews, motor-cycle companies, 
machine-gun squads and more militia.474 [emphasis added] 
 
The footnote used by Seaton to support his description of the mopping up 
operations around Kalinin cited Bock’s diary as a key source. However, 
Bock’s description of the assault on Kalinin is very matter of fact and 
tends to support Erickson over Seaton: “Panzer Group 3 entered Kalinin in 
heavy fighting”.475 Erickson noted that he consulted two of Seaton’s 
works, The Battle for Moscow (1971) and The Russo-German War (1971) 
for information on Soviet defence and German exhaustion, describing 
Seaton as invaluable for his analysis of German operational matters.476 
The implication is that Seaton was less valuable when it came to 
describing the actions of the Red Army.  
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Erickson’s scholarship attracted praise for having greater balance than the 
accounts based simply on German sources.477 On the other hand, 
Erickson’s terse academic style presented facts with scant editorialising 
and revealed little to the reader about the author’s personal perspectives. 
Often, the reader is left to draw his or her own conclusions. Mawdsley 
commented that, Erickson “does not readily share on paper his own 
analysis of individuals and events”.478 As the American historian Peter 
Kenez noted, Erickson is “ambivalent” on whether the Germans could 
have triumphed at Moscow.479 Certain aspects of Erickson’s approach 
became clear, however, in his discussion of his sources. Erickson rejected 
the notion that there was a dearth of useful Soviet source material at the 
time of writing.480 He added that it was acceptable to use official Soviet 
publications as long as one was aware of some shortcomings: “much 
Soviet work is far from ‘propaganda’ in the blatant or simplistic sense 
(though a somewhat perfervid patriotism is never entirely absent)”.481 
Erickson himself summarised his aims as “an attempt to probe how the 
Soviet system functioned under conditions of maximum stress: from this 
point of view it is less military history per se and might more properly be 
regarded as a form of social history”.482  
 
Erickson’s account does not resemble more recent ‘social history’ because 
the war experience of the common Red Army soldier is mostly absent. As 
Kenez noted, “Erickson sees the war through the eyes of the generals: he 
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makes no effort to comprehend the world of the private”.483 Erickson’s 
works provided a sense of the desperate and brutal nature of fighting at 
the front, but vignettes detailing the individual exploits of common 
soldiers were conspicuously absent. For example, as the Germans made 
their final push on Moscow in late November, desperate Soviet defenders 
died in their thousands: 
 
The shreds of these Soviet formations hung on like grim death, 
where many died inconspicuous and wretched, others in a great glow 
of fame, like Panfilov’s 316th anti-tank men, ground to pieces fighting 
German tanks on the Volokolamsk highway.484  
 
Erickson rejected the automatic dismissal of Soviet histories, suggesting 
that such an approach had undermined the attempt to understand the 
war. As Erickson put it: 
 
Distortion and imbalance, however, do not reside exclusively on the 
Soviet side. Ignorance of and apathy towards important sections of 
Soviet historiography of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ on the part of non-
Soviet historians and commentators have led to some serious 
shortcomings even in avowedly serious works dealing with the Soviet 
Union at war.485 
 
Erickson did not have an obvious political agenda like Werth. He clearly 
did not approve of the brutal methods of the Communist state, but nor 
did he think that repression underpinned the victory. He noted the 
ruthless role played by the NKVD (Narodnyĭ Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del 
– People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in forcing Soviet troops to 
fight through the “discipline of the revolver”.486 Erickson described how 
during the Battle for Moscow, “the army’s political baggage train grew 
more unwieldy with the weight of commissars and political inspectorates: 
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deep in its wake came the NKVD”.487 Erickson, like Seaton, viewed Stalin 
as an example of the dysfunction of a totalitarian system. For Seaton, 
Stalin “displayed oriental deviousness” and eventually infected the entire 
Soviet system with his own long list of defective personality traits: “brutal 
and harsh, a hypocrite and a liar, he scorned human decency and human 
life, exploiting for his own purpose only the lower instincts of human 
nature, by provocation, terror, demoralization, corruption, and 
blackmail”.488 Erickson’s description of the dangers of entrusting all power 
to Stalin contains fewer stereotypes but is just as critical: 
 
Locked up in the Kremlin, the master of a world which he had 
created by his own selective killings, and which reflected back upon 
him only those images he had himself ordained, steeped in his own 
‘genius’ and fed on its outpouring, Stalin could rage away dissension 
and doubt, from whatever quarter it came.489 
 
For Erickson, the Soviet leadership made amateurish errors in preparing 
for the war:  
 
the whole organisation of the defence rested on the assumption that 
the Red Army would not be taken by surprise, that decisive offensive 
actions would be preceded by a declaration of war, or that that 
enemy operations would be initiated by limited forces only, thus 
giving the Red Army time to fight covering actions to facilitate 
mobilisation.490  
 
What made Erickson’s work stand out however were his many hints that 
Red Army resistance was a crucial, perhaps the crucial, factor in the 
defeat of the Wehrmacht. As a result, Erickson’s scholarly tomes were still 
criticised for producing an account too sympathetic to the Cold War 
enemy.491 In 2006 Norman Davies criticised Erickson for choosing to 
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“stress the colossal and victorious war effort of the U.S.S.R. while turning 
a blind eye to the manifest failings of the Soviet political system”.492  
 
Challenges to the conventional wisdom did not attract a wide readership. 
The works of Erickson and Werth, the two authors that deviated most 
from the dominant German school in the pre-glasnost’ era, did not enjoy 
much commercial success. Smelser and Davies noted that Erickson’s Road 
to Stalingrad and Road to Berlin both went out of print soon after 
release.493 Not surprisingly, Werth was an easy target, and his works 
were criticised for his apparent over-reliance on official Soviet 
publications.494 Russia at War went out of print after its first release in 
1964 and was not re-published until 1986.495 As van Creveld pointed out, 
by the 1970s there were thousands of books on Hitler’s invasions of 
Russia;496 there were far fewer on what the Soviet state, army, and 
people did in response. 
 
One striking feature of the Cold War is that the counter-narrative 
described above did not tend to come from American historians; 
according to Liedtke, the United States’ military establishment had 
“wholeheartedly embraced” the view pushed by the Halder group, and 
that view had become especially dominant.497 There was, however, one 
noteworthy American exception. Of all the Cold War accounts published in 
the West, arguably the most favourable to Stalin was the American 
historian Bryan Fugate’s claim that Stalin foresaw the events of 1941 and 
fought a brilliant strategic war. Writing just before the archival gold rush, 
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Fugate argued that Western researchers had failed to notice that there 
was more than a kernel of truth to the Stalin-era accounts of how Stalin 
shrewdly revised his plans in a timely fashion.498 Fugate’s original thesis 
was followed by the 1997 work Thunder on the Dnepr, co-authored with 
retired Russian Lieutenant-colonel Lev Dvoretsky. This work presented 
the same thesis, this time supported by previously unavailable archival 
materials.499  
 
Fugate considered that the failures of the German High Command were 
important to the story of 1941.500 However, the overarching thesis of the 
works was that Soviet strategic prowess mattered more. For Fugate, it 
was simply an enduring myth that Stalin and the Red Army were caught 
by surprise and had no sense of the importance of a controlled strategic 
retreat.501 Stalin and his generals’ “plan for Soviet defence took 
advantage of the Soviet Union’s intrinsic strengths: its resources, 
manpower, and overall capabilities”.502 The Soviet generals, particularly 
Zhukov, deliberately allowed Soviet armies to be encircled in order to 
slow down the German advance and hopefully destroy it from within.503 
They made excellent use of the time bought by the large encirclements to 
build up defences and vast reserves, which were then deployed to deadly 
effect.504 Hitler and his generals walked into Stalin’s carefully prepared 
trap, which then sprung shut at Moscow.  
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Fugate’s claim that Stalin was largely in control of events from the outset 
has remained a distant outlier among the accounts of the events of 1941 
to this day. Fugate’s criticism of the German generals came from his 
assessment of their operations after the Battle of Kiev. For Fugate, the 
Kiev diversion was a necessary measure to protect Bock’s southern flank, 
but the German commanders erred when they resumed the assault on 
Moscow rather than pressing further into the Caucasus.505 The difference 
between Fugate’s and other accounts is that where Cold War-era histories 
settled with German error as the cause of the failure of Operation 
Barbarossa, Fugate argued that German failure resulted from, and then 
was exacerbated by, Soviet military planning. Fugate summed up the 
interplay between German error and Soviet strategic brilliance by arguing 
that: 
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that Germany could have won the 
war on the Eastern Front had they forgone the assault on fortress 
Moscow in December 1941 and not placed Army Group Center in 




In that respect, Fugate resembled the testimony of the German generals 
– 1941 was a close run thing and could have turned out very differently 
were it not for the contingencies of German decision making. On the other 
hand, Stalin’s strategic genius contrasted favourably to the mistakes of 
Hitler and the German generals. 
 
Conclusion 
In retrospect it is clear that the influence of the German generals began 
to decline from the 1960s as new sources came into play, especially in 
West Germany. This was also an era when academic historians were 
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exposed to Cold War revisionism, which attempted to modify the Cold 
War demonization of the Soviet Union. If we look at the period from the 
1960s to the 1990s, there was a flourishing of diverse perspectives and 
certainly no global alignment of views. Liddell Hart, Seaton and Ziemke 
remained the major texts on the German invasion, and the story of 
Hitler’s amateurism and images of the mud and snow dominated much of 
the less specialised literature. In Britain, the likes of Werth, Jukes and 
Erickson described a much more active Soviet state and Red Army but 
had little impact in the short term because of a lack of credible Soviet 
sources. The most striking change was the scepticism first in evidence in 
the 1960s with the likes of Clark and Carell about Germany’s capacity to 
win the war. In West Germany, Reinhardt’s thesis that 1941 was indeed 
the “turning point”, because his claim of Germany’s lack of capacity to 
sustain the war gradually became the dominant argument about the 
Battle of Moscow. Given that Reinhardt was not translated into English 
until 1992, many readers would have associated the “mission impossible” 
thesis with van Creveld who argued much the same case. 
 
The influence of the German generals was clearly less important in the 
second half of the Cold War than it was in the first half of the Cold War. 
As we have seen, there was a strong connection between the accounts of 
the German generals and the English-language military histories from the 
1940s and 1950s. Many accounts of the Nazi-Soviet War written after the 
Cold War suggest that the view of the generals remained stubbornly 
important all the way through to the present. In fact, the view of the 
German generals was heavily criticised by the likes of Clark, Carell, 
Reinhardt, and van Creveld. The paradigm established by the German 
generals did not suddenly collapse when the Soviet archives opened in 
the 1980s. It was clearly in decline during the two decades before. 
 
Taken together, Reinhardt and Erickson wrote the first draft of what, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, would become the new orthodoxy or 
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paradigm after the opening of the Soviet archives. Until the opening of 
the Soviet archives in the late 1980s, however, it could not be said that a 
“Red victory” paradigm was in place. Reinhardt and van Creveld 
emphasised the importance of Soviet resistance but offered little detail. 
Erickson wrote the only substantial account of what the Soviet Union 
actually did on the battlefield, although his work remained silent on the 
impact of Hitler’s mistakes and the weather. He also offered the most 
substantial evidence of the agency of the Red Army in 1941, but his work 
was still vulnerable to the accusation that historians emphasising the 
agency of the Red Army were duped by the official Soviet history and that 
their accounts lacked independent verification from the archives. Erickson 
was understandably timid in what was asserted and offered no opinion on 
whether Moscow was likely to fall had Hitler headed straight for Moscow in 
August 1941.  
 
Before the end of the Cold War, it was difficult, arguably impossible, to 
make a credible case that the Battle of Moscow should be viewed as a 
“Red victory”. This would change only when Soviet archival material 




Chapter Five: A New “Red Victory” Paradigm?  
 
It is argued in this chapter that something new has occurred in the 
Western historiography of 1941 since the opening of the Soviet archives. 
This new historiography has four main features: a) it is explicitly critical of 
the account offered by the German generals, b) it tends to date the 
defeat of the German Army to the failure of the blitzkrieg in the summer 
of 1941, c) it suggests that Soviet resistance was more important than 
Hitler’s mistakes and the weather in the failure of Operation Typhoon, d) 
it describes a Soviet state and Red Army with considerable agency that, 
these accounts argue, was underestimated both by the German invaders 
and a previous generation of historians.   
 
It has to be acknowledged that this new historiography is not an 
endorsement of Stalin and Soviet Communism. Nor do the historians 
speak with one voice. Most accounts note that explaining the outcome of 
1941 is complicated – German decision-making, Soviet resistance, and 
the weather all deserve discussion. For the first time in the Western 
historiography of the war, the agenda was set by new information from 
Soviet archives. Another new aspect was that for the first time American 
historians took the lead role in establishing the agenda around 1941. The 
dominant author was David M. Glantz, an American soldier-turned-
historian who published prodigiously on the topic of the Red Army using 
the newly-opened Soviet archives. Importantly, Glantz and other 
historians using Soviet archives to tell the Soviet side of the war are cited 
in just about every recent account telling the German side of the war. The 
result, as Citino has put it, is that historians looking at the German and 
Soviet sides of the war “are now living in the ‘Glantz era’”.507 At three 
levels – Soviet leadership, Red Army operations, and the motivations of 
Soviet soldiers – there has been a clear tendency over the last two 
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decades to recognise Soviet agency as crucial to understanding the 
events of 1941. 
 
To examine this question, some thirty historians and their accounts of 
1941 were considered. The initial question asked was whether the 
historian prioritised Soviet resistance over the weather and Hitler’s Kiev 
delay in their account of why the Germans failed to defeat the Soviet 
Union/capture Moscow in 1941. The results – with a comparison to the 
Cold War era - are summarised in the following table: 
 
























Agree Ambivalent Agree Strongly 
agree 
Former German commanders 
Halder 1949 YES     
Raus 1949 YES     
Assmann 1950 YES     
Guderian 1952 YES     
Blumentritt 1956 YES     
Manstein 1958 YES     
PRE-Soviet Archives  
Liddell Hart 1948 YES     
Anders 1953 YES     
Lederrey 1955 YES     
Seth 1964 YES     
Carell 1964  YES    
Werth 1964     YES 
Clark 1965    YES  
Ziemke 1968 YES     
Jukes 1970    YES  
Liddell Hart 1970  YES    
Turney 1971  YES    
Seaton 1971 YES     
Keegan 1971  YES    
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Reinhardt 1972    YES  
Erickson 1975    YES  
Van Creveld 1977    YES  
Cooper 1978  YES    
Boog et al 1984    YES  
Fugate 1984    YES  
Piekalkiewicz 1985 YES     
Haupt 1986 YES     
Ziemke & 
Bauer 
1987  YES    
POST-Soviet archives 
Stolfi 1991 YES     
Dunn 1994     YES 
Glantz & 
House 
1995     YES 
Fugate & 
Dvoretsky 
1997    YES  
Overy 1998    YES  
Glantz 1998     YES 
Glantz 2001     YES 
Ueberschär 2002    YES  
Ziemke 2004  YES    
Glantz 2005     YES 
Mawdsley 2005    YES  
Roberts 2005     YES 
Braithwaite 2006     YES 
Forczyk 2006   YES   
Megargee 2006  YES    
Nagorski 2007 YES     
Bellamy 2008    YES  
Stahel 2009    YES  
Jones 2009     YES 
Fritz 2011     YES 
Glantz 2012     YES 
Stahel 2012    YES  
Zetterling & 
Frankson 
2012   YES   
Radey & 
Sharp 
2012    YES  
Bergström 2013   YES   
Kirchubel 2013   YES   
Luther 2013    YES  
Hartmann 2013    YES  
Stahel 2013    YES  
Ellis 2015  YES    
Stahel 2015    YES  
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Liedtke 2016    YES  
Hill 2017    YES  
SUMMARY 
German Generals 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Pre-Soviet archives 36% 27% 0% 32% 5% 




What follows is an examination of specific key texts to see how they 
explain the outcome of the Battle of Moscow. As we shall see, it is not the 
case that every historian offers an explicit view on why the Battle of 
Moscow turned out as it did. A result of this is that there is a category for 
“ambivalent” in the table. Inclusion in this column means that the author 
is unclear in their conclusions, or silent on the issue. The historian in 
question will typically describe German errors as part of the analysis. 
What is noteworthy however is that Soviet resistance, which in the Cold 
War-era historiography was often the last factor mentioned or was not 
mentioned at all, is now explicitly prioritised in the majority of accounts 
discussed below.  
 
Archival Revolution  
While there is much debate among historians as to Gorbachëv’s motives 
in taking the course of action that he did, there is general agreement that 
the Soviet leader’s determination to build a new and cooperative 
relationship with the West effectively ended the Cold War even before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Western historians were among the 
beneficiaries of Gorbachëv’s policy of glasnost’. In the 1970s and 1980s a 
small number of British and American historians were allowed limited 
access to the Soviet state archives; but they were confined to a special 
reading room where access to certain files was strictly vetted and 
controlled.508 It was not until 1989 that foreign researchers were first 
allowed to move beyond the constraints of the special reading room in the 
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state archives, an event that R. W. Davies described as a “memorable 
day”.509  
 
One striking change in Western historiography brought about by the 
opening of the Soviet archives was that the Soviet-German War is no 
longer the “unknown war”. The secondary literature dealing with the 
military events of 1941 has grown enormously. In the words of Jukes, 
there is a case for saying that the Soviet-German War has been “done to 
death”.510 Not only has the Eastern Front become a favoured object of 
study, but also the conventional wisdom about it has changed: Western 
historians are much more likely to readily accept the importance of the 
Eastern Front and the decisive nature of the fighting there.511 As Mark 
Harrison has put it, the view that the Eastern Front was decisive, “once 
seemed radical and is now a tired orthodoxy”.512  
 
Secondly, after gaining access to the Soviet archives, the official Soviet 
historiography, memoirs and document collections could now be checked 
with at least some independence by Western scholars working with 
Russian historians and archivists. At the elite level, there was new 
information about Stalin, his interactions with leading Soviet political and 
military figures, and the considerations and disputes among the leaders of 
the Red Army about how to fight the Nazis. It became clear that just 
about every building block of the story of 1941 needed to be checked and 
rechecked. For example, it used to be thought that Stalin’s military purge 
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decapitated the Red Army by sending half its officers to their deaths. As 
Roger Reese has shown, the Red Army’s officer corps was considerably 
larger than was once thought, and the percentage of executed officers 
was much lower than the fifty percent commonly cited in the past.513 
Attention has turned from the impact of the executions to the impact of 
the poorly-managed expansion of the Red Army’s officer corps. Another 
staple of the standard accounts was Stalin’s apparent nervous breakdown 
and retreat to his dacha upon learning of Hitler’s attack; the appearance 
of Stalin’s appointments diary made it clear that he was actively involved 
in the conduct of the war from the very beginning.514  
 
Thirdly, much new information emerged about how the Red Army actually 
fought the war. Mackintosh, Jukes and Erickson writing in the 1960s and 
1970s had to rely upon the edited memoirs of Soviet generals to look 
behind the official documents. Since the early 1990s, historians of the 
Red Army have had to contend with the opposite problem of enormous 
numbers of hitherto unpublished materials that had to be analysed and 
assessed for their significance. Russian archivists have assisted this 
process by publishing new document collections that are very different to 
their Soviet predecessors. Zhukov’s memoirs appeared in an expanded 
three-volume form that could now be checked against the expurgated 
Soviet version. This enabled a major re-evaluation and debate about 
Zhukov, whose record as the architect of the Red victory was questioned 
and defended.515 The publication of significant archival collections such as 
V.A. Zolotarev’s twenty-five volume Russkiĭ Arkhiv: Velikaia 
Otechestvennaia Voĭna, 1941-1945 published between 1993 and 1998 
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dramatically increased the sources available to historians.516 Valuable 
materials also found their way onto the Russian Ministry of Defence’s 
People’s Victory website. 
 
Complementing the 'archival revolution' of the last twenty years there has 
occurred what Budnitskii has described as a “revolution of memory”. 
Unpublished diaries, memoirs and interviews with Soviet political and 
military figures have had an enormous impact on how the history of the 
war is written.517 Soviet soldiers were forbidden from keeping diaries at 
the front, although those diaries that were secretly kept became an 
important resource for historians.518 At the same time, the online oral 
history project ‘ia pomniu’ (https://iremember.ru - available in Russian 
and English) provided a unique platform for Russian and Soviet veterans 
to share the stories of their wartime experience. The website, funded by 
the Russian Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communication, is 
regularly cited in the bibliographies of Western historians and has done 
much to provide a human face to the ordinary Red Army soldier.519 Other 
valuable internet sources such as the website Podvig Naroda and 
militera.lib.ru are collated by Russian historians and enthusiasts, and 
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The Soviet Side of the War 
As noted in the previous chapter, American scholars were noteworthy for 
their absence in the challenge to the German generals in the Cold War 
era. This changed dramatically with the opening of the Soviet archives. 
The historian who made most use of the new archival freedom and who 
has towered over the history of the Red Army in the Second World War 
since the opening of the Soviet archives was Glantz. Glantz made such 
extensive use of Soviet archival material for his 2005 work Colossus 
Reborn that he provided a companion volume to detail his sources.521 One 
agenda driving Glantz was that “consciously or unconsciously … German 
accounts were often just as biased as their Soviet counterparts, warping 
our understanding of the titanic struggle that occurred on what the 
Germans taught us to call the ‘Eastern Front’”.522 As Robert Kirchubel has 
put it, Glantz went on a “one-man mission to set straight the record of 
the Nazi-Soviet War”.523  
 
One of Glantz’s early contributions was to draw attention to the “forgotten 
battles” of the Soviet-German War. For Glantz, what conventional 
Western histories viewed as minor hurdles on the road to greater and 
more famous battles at Moscow and Stalingrad were actually of critical 
importance. Glantz noted that the relative anonymity of these battles 
stemmed from the imbalance of sources as well as the unwillingness of 
many Soviet/Russian historians to discuss severe Red Army defeats.524 
For Glantz, the Wehrmacht’s “seamless and inexorable march” towards 
Moscow was a figment of the imagination of Nazi propagandists.525 
Furthermore, Soviet offensives and counter-offensives in 1941, such as 
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those at Kelme, Rasenai, Grodno, Dubno, Sol’sty, Lepel’, Bobruisk, Kiev, 
Smolensk, El’nia and Roslavl’ played an enormous role in slowing down, 
blunting, and eventually stopping Operation Barbarossa.526 The confused 
and fluid nature of the fighting meant that the Germans at the time did 
not recognise the battles for what they were, and they have consequently 
been ignored with dire consequences for our understanding of why the 
Germans eventually failed to achieve their goals in 1941. In Glantz’s 
telling the mud and snow played a role in the outcome of Operation 
Typhoon,527 but both sides were disadvantaged.528 It was the consistent, 
costly and determined Soviet counter-attacks that brought the 
Wehrmacht to the point of exhaustion by December 1941. Without this 
resistance, the weather and overextended supply lines would not have 
stopped the Germans.529  
 
While Erickson could not deliver on his promise of a “social history” of the 
Red Army, Glantz most certainly could. Glantz stated that his aim in 
Colossus Reborn was to provide the “perspectives of the Red Army 
soldiers, Slav and non-Slav, men and women alike, who fought in the 
army’s ranks and either perished or survived in a war whose ferocity and 
brutality knew few bounds”.530 This was not a Soviet-era story of every 
Soviet soldier as a volunteer. This was a conscript army and some 
420,000 political prisoners and convicts were pressed into the Red Army 
in 1941 alone.531 The Red Army’s patriotism was rooted in any number of 
factors, ranging from pan-Slavism to traditional Russian nationalism to 
loyalty to the Soviet state.532 For Glantz, the iron discipline of Stalin and 
his henchmen was the “essential ‘glue’ that bound the Red Army 
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together”.533 Yet, Red Army soldiers also fought for patriotic reasons: 
“Whether or not they despised Stalin’s regime, like their ancestors before 
them, they understood that foreigners were invading their motherland 
(rodina)”.534 Glantz is a careful historian and makes it clear that Hitler’s 
decision-making, the geography of the Soviet Union and the weather have 
to be taken into account. Glantz’s point is that the Soviet state and Red 
Army’s capacity to endure and fight were much more significant than the 
German invaders anticipated and an earlier historiography was willing to 
admit.  
 
Roger Reese’s account of the Red Army offered a less than glowing 
assessment of Red Army performance, but still pointed in the direction of 
Soviet agency when it came to explaining why Germany could not achieve 
its goals in 1941.535 According to Reese, the Red Army’s problems 
revolved around the lack of respect and trust at all levels. Not just the 
purges, but also the ill will caused by collectivisation and above all a 
hopelessly mismanaged expansion of the Red Army ensured a lack of 
coordination at the front, which was apparent in the Red Army’s less than 
stellar performance in the Winter War of 1939-1940 and its response to 
Operations Barbarossa and Typhoon. Unable or unwilling to trust their 
subordinates in more complicated tasks such as manoeuvre, the Red 
Army commanders reverted to “typical Russian massed infantry attacks” 
with predictably dire consequences.536 For Reese, the defeats of 1941 
were caused not by a rejection of the Stalin regime but by superior 
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German operational capacity and the failure of the Red Army’s plans to 
counter-attack and win the war at the frontiers. Reese distinguished 
between the relatively weak “tactical performance” of the Red Army from 
its strong “effectiveness” which depended upon small-group cohesion and 
the desire of the army at all levels to overcome its enemy.  
 
The key to 1941 for Reese was that the Red Army kept on fighting. 
Soldiers fought for a variety of social and personal reasons: “[s]ervice, 
however, was not an endorsement of the oppression of the Stalinist 
state”.537 Patriotism did not necessarily equate to loyalty to Stalin’s 
regime. It was “a patriotic love for the historic Russian motherland that 
transcended politics”.538 Coercion mattered too, but not as much as the 
older stereotypes of blocking units mowing down retreating Red Army 
units en masse suggested. What in the end decided the outcome of 1941 
was the capacity of the Soviet state to mobilise millions of its citizens. 
Reese made a great deal of the mobilisation of women into the armed 
forces, as well as the willingness of Red Army soldiers in general to fight, 
which was encouraged by coercion and propaganda but also reflected the 
array of motivations described above. For Reese, 1941 was not decisive, 
and it was not until 1944 that the war would be won. Nonetheless, 
Reese’s narrative is about the capacity of the Soviet state and Red Army 
to absorb the Wehrmacht’s blows and fight on to victory.539  
 
Mark von Hagen noted that during the Kliment Voroshilov era (1925-
1940) a cult of invincibility pervaded the Red Army. Meanwhile the 
“pathology” of the Stalin system, especially the “inordinate power of the 
Soviet security police” harmed military professionalism at all levels.540 The 
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lessons of the Finnish War and the replacement of Voroshilov by 
Timoshenko was supposed to lead to reforms, but investigations into the 
Red Army’s performance in 1940-1941 found depressingly widespread 
evidence of inattention, laziness, lack of initiative, failure to take 
responsibility and poor training that stretched all the way from senior 
commanders to privates, from engineering units to the cavalry. This was 
still a peacetime army and the soldiers, often freshly conscripted into 
units, lacked the necessary complement of officers and had no training in 
camouflaging their operations of crossing rivers.  
 
According to von Hagen, the Red Army suffered greatly from 
‘shapkozakidatel’stvo’ (‘cap-tossing’), suggesting “carelessness and lack 
of discipline and authority grounded in a false sense of superiority or 
invincibility”. It was not surprising that encircled soldiers in 1941 
demonstrated confusion and panic given that much of their inadequate 
training had been wasted on non-military tasks. The cult of secrecy 
around enemy movements and capabilities and fear of punishment 
contributed to the confusion and lack of initiative that soldiers would 
display when confronted by the German blitzkrieg. Nonetheless, these 
defects would not prove fatal in part because the “majority of Red Army 
men, the Russians and Ukrainians, shared some degree of Soviet 
patriotism and commitment to the political and social order of the Soviet 
state”.541 
 
One of the early post-archival accounts of the Red Army was Walter S. 
Dunn’s 1994 study of Red Army doctrine, mobilisation and wartime 
performance, Hitler’s Nemesis, which was endorsed in a foreword written 
by Glantz.542 Dunn’s target in writing his book was the stereotype of a 
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backward Red Army prone to surrendering en masse: 
 
The popular Western image of the Red Army during World War II was 
a huge army of illiterate, ill-trained, ill-clad, poorly-equipped, sub-
human soldiers who fought because they feared the NKVD machine 
guns at the rear. Victory for the Red Army as viewed by the West 
came only by trading ten Russian lives for one German life. 
 
For Dunn, this was a distortion. The Red Army was not a passive 
bystander in 1941, and, from the outset, its superior use of artillery and 
antitank weapons wreaked havoc on German strong points. According to 
Dunn, Soviet military doctrine and organisation stood the test of war: “the 
mobilization was an outstanding accomplishment … the new divisions 
went into the field and halted the German Army in December 1941”. This 
was not a story of mass surrender: encircled Red Army units, especially 
those that remained in their prepared positions, were able to bog down 
the Germans in drawn out defensive engagements. Battles such as El’nia 
and Smolensk were crucial in halting the German advance. The initial 
success of Germany’s invasion meant that Stalin did not have unlimited 
manpower at his disposal: Soviet manpower was torn between the needs 
of the military and the needs of industry, and thus the Soviet Union had 
to develop a system of ruthless efficiency in the deployment of its 
resources. For Dunn, “[t]he Russians were not robots but individuals with 
dissimilar emotions”. They fought “as most soldiers, not with outstanding 
brilliance but with persistent determination… because of national pride 
and hatred of the Germans.543 This “normalising” of the Red Army soldier 
became a common theme during the two decades after the opening of the 
Soviet archives. 
 
In addition, the opening of the Soviet archives offered more information 
about the weather so that the diaries of the German generals could be 
reinterrogated. Arguably the main advance here was made by two non-
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academic authors, Jack Radey and Charles Sharp, who have specialised in 
Operation Typhoon, especially the Battle of Kalinin on the northern 
approaches to Moscow and the weather issues that the German generals 
claimed were so important.544 In a book with an approving foreword 
written by Glantz, Radey and Sharp focused upon a ‘forgotten battle’, 
Kalinin, which proved to be crucial in saving Moscow.545 As Operation 
Typhoon got under way, the Wehrmacht attempted to outflank Moscow 
from the north. While the Mozhaĭsk Line directly west of Moscow was 
heroically defended, what mattered was that significant German forces - 
9th Army and Panzer Group 3 – became bogged down in bitter fighting 
around Rzhev and Kalinin on the northern flank of Army Group Centre. 
Much to the surprise of the Germans, the supposedly beaten Red Army 
mounted fierce counter-attacks.546 Soviet defenders delayed German 
spearheads and inflicted enough damage to blunt the final stages of their 
advance.547 Between 7 October and the end of that month: 
 
A closer look at the movements of various units … clearly 
demonstrate[s] that all maneuver was not prevented by muddy 
roads. The fact is that there was something else that stopped the 
Germans from reaching Moscow in mid-October … Along virtually 
every major axis leading into the Soviet capital, they found 
determined defenders blocking the road, defenders who refused to 
roll over and play dead.548 
 
Radey and Sharp also offered the first critical analysis of the weather and 
its impact upon German and Soviet operations. Studying German and 
Soviet field diaries and reports from the Kalinin area covering the period 9 
to 23 October 1941, the period often cited as the height of the 
Wehrmacht’s mud problem, Radey and Sharp found that “[a]ll in all the 
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roads were useable to some degree on all but the 19th-23rd, four days 
out of fourteen”.549 Radey and Sharp were happy to acknowledge that the 
mud was important, but not as important as earlier historiography 
suggested.550 Army Group Centre became bogged down at the end of 
October because of four factors; one factor was the failure to marshal 
sufficient fuel, ammunition and other resources to support the advance; a 
second was the capacity of the Red Army to regroup and blunt the 
German spearheads; a third was the poor quality of the transport 
network, especially the roads, and the demolition of bridges; finally there 
was the weather, which was not as severe as is often imagined, and 
affected different parts of the front in different ways.551 They concluded 
that, “[m]ud was a contributing factor to the breakdown of Operation 
Typhoon, but it was far from the only, or even most important factor”.552  
 
This leaves open the question of how important is a “contributing factor” 
and how helpful is a conclusion that mud was “far from the only, or even 
most important factor”? While historians often do attempt a hierarchy of 
causes in explaining a particular outcome, Radey and Sharp concluded 
that a list of four interacting factors is the best that can be achieved: 
 
The weather played a part but each of these factors contributed to 
the long pause in offensive operations. It is pointless to assign 
responsibility to one factor and ignore the others, just as it also 
seems pointless to try to quantify the relative responsibility of each 
factor in causing the outcome.553  
 
Radey and Sharp’s account in the end made the point that the weather 
only mattered because Soviet resistance endured and strengthened in 
that critical month. On a small-scale tactical level, the professional 
Wehrmacht remained a quality and experienced fighting force. However, 
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“at the operational and strategic levels, there was wildly unrealistic 
optimism, based on unfounded assumption of enemy inferiority and wilful 
disregard of the constraints of time, distance, and logistics”.554 Instead, 
the Germans were confronted with “mass heroism”, which they suggested 
was more than just Russian nationalism or the defence of Holy Russia. 
Rather, what was at work here was a sense of loyalty to the Soviet state. 
Radey and Sharp echoed Werth’s account when they wrote that: 
 
Whatever its shortcomings, Soviet socialism was something that was 
theirs, that was building up their country and giving it a chance at a 
better life, and they were willing, if necessary, to die to stop those 
who came to destroy it.555 
 
Outside of the United States, a major contributor to the study of the Red 
Army in 1941 is Evan Mawdsley.556 Mawdsley’s Thunder in the East was 
first published in 2005 and was followed by a second edition in 2016. The 
differences between the two editions of the same work are instructive. In 
the preface to the second edition, Mawdsley stated that “[m]y overall 
interpretation of the Nazi-Soviet war has not changed fundamentally over 
the past decade, but I have certainly ‘refined’ my views on specific events 
and aspects”.557 The newer work was supplemented with a wider variety 
of source material, and was able to take advantages of developments in 
the historiography of the past decade.  
 
An example of the ‘refining’ is Mawdsley’s 2016 discussion of the Battle of 
Smolensk. The 2005 version of Thunder in the East described the Battle 
of Smolensk as an important and overlooked engagement, in which 
desperate Soviet resistance played a large part in stalling German plans. 
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The 2005 edition argued that Smolensk played a role in disrupting the 
German plan to quickly knock the Soviet Union out of the war; however, 
the battle was not as decisive in thwarting German plans as many Soviet, 
and some Western historians, have previously argued.558 The 2016 edition 
repeated the earlier claim that Soviet losses at Smolensk were severe,559 
but cited more recent research by Glantz and Stahel to argue that 
Smolensk had a far more serious impact on German strategy than was 
previously assumed in the historiography. Smolensk in fact derailed 
Operation Barbarossa.560  
 
Mawdsley’s main theme was that the crucial factor in the failure of 
Operation Barbarossa was the delusion of both Hitler and the German 
generals that the war could be won at the frontiers. This flawed plan was 
as much Halder’s fault as it was Hitler’s. Contrary to the German High 
Command’s expectations, the Red Army did not collapse, and instead 
conducted fierce, albeit costly, withdrawals, and the Soviet political 
system was robust enough to produce and field new armies despite 
enormous losses. The German successes in the first weeks of the 
campaign were vast, but they were of a Pyrrhic nature: “although the 
German Army won great victories in the first months of Operation 
Barbarossa, it had done so at a heavy cost”.561    
 
Mawdsley described Liddell Hart’s thesis that Hitler’s Kiev decision was a 
fatal error as “influential, but wrong”. Hitler in fact had good reason to 
divert forces away from Army Group Centre in August 1941. Firstly, there 
was the lure of the vast production and resource potential of Ukraine. The 
war against Britain and the Soviet Union was lasting longer than German 
planners had expected, and Hitler’s decision was driven first and foremost 
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by economic considerations. In this instance, Hitler was simply following 
the long-held German nationalist idea that Ukraine was vital for securing 
Germany’s food and resources. Secondly, the decision to divert parts of 
Army Group Centre to assist Army Group North was consistent with the 
Operation Barbarossa plan, which always envisaged seizing Leningrad 
before Moscow. Finally, leaving aside the Soviet capital’s political value, 
Moscow was no more important than Leningrad or Ukraine in terms of 
resources and industry. For Mawdsley, however, “the ‘resource’ side of 
Hitler’s argument made little sense in the short or medium term. If the 
war was to be won in 1941, then Russian resources did not matter”. 
Furthermore, the diversions to the north and south were necessary to 
secure Bock’s flanks, to allow Army Group Centre time to recover from 
the effects of weeks of fighting, to address growing logistical concerns, 
and to deal with Soviet soldiers caught behind German lines.562  
 
Mawdsley argued that the situation for Army Group Centre in August, 
when it supposedly should have pressed for Moscow, was fundamentally 
different from what it was when it actually did attack in late September. 
The conditions favoured the September attack, not the August. First, 
Army Group Centre received significant reinforcements between August 
and late September. Second, the fighting at Kiev and in the north did 
indeed protect Bock’s flanks. Third, the supply situation by late 
September was much better than August, tanks had been refitted and 
allowed to catch up. Fourth, the fighting at Kiev forced the Soviet 
Command to send troops to the south, and weaken the defences in front 
of Moscow: “We know that the decision Hitler took at the beginning of 
September ended in German failure. That does not mean that another 
decision, an earlier move on Moscow, would not also have failed”.563 
 
For Mawdsley, all of Germany’s problems flowed from the “Barbarossa 
                                                 
562 This paragraph is a summary of aspects of Mawdsley, Thunder in the East [2005]. Quotes and 
information taken from pp. 73 and 70-71. 
563 ibid., pp. 73-74. 
150 
 
fallacy”, the notion that victory would come with the destruction of the 
Red Army west of the Dvina and Dnepr rivers. Red Army resistance, while 
poorly managed and excessively costly in human lives, had the effect of 
stymieing the Germans to a degree that neither Hitler nor the Wehrmacht 
expected. Meanwhile, Soviet forces used the weather to their advantage 
in a way that the Germans could not. Mawdsley concluded that, “the 
Russians were victorious at Moscow and elsewhere in December 1941 
because the Wehrmacht was exhausted and because the Red Army had 
much greater recuperative powers than Hitler and his generals expected”. 
Other relevant factors were that Stalin was able to transfer fresh troops 
from Siberia and that Hitler had to shore up Mussolini’s ailing campaign 
against the British in the Mediterranean by transferring his air power. In 
the end, Soviet resistance ruined Germany’s plan for a quick victory, and 
the subsequent disruption of German plans led to the logistical nightmare 
in the mud, and the freezing death of the winter: “The Germans did not 
fail to get to Moscow because the weather broke; they were caught by the 
freeze because they had failed to reach Moscow”.564  
 
There are accounts of 1941 that appear to follow the old historiography, 
but on closer inspection do not. Of all the accounts examined for this 
thesis, Chris Bellamy’s account contained the most extensive discussion of 
the weather.565 Bellamy described the winter of 1941-1942 as an 
especially harsh one: “no one could predict the uncertain, fickle nature of 
the weather. The winter of 1941-2 was the worst in central and eastern 
Europe for many years”. Yet Bellamy’s account was not like those of the 
Cold War era. Bellamy’s unusually detailed description of the winter has to 
be viewed in the context of his argument that, by the time the snows 
struck, the German war effort was already petering out as a result of 
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exhaustion and over-stretch. The Germans got tantalisingly close to 
Moscow, but could not reach their objective:  
 
With just 41 kilometres to go to the Kremlin, the Germans’ energy 
had run out. This was the ‘culminating point’. The logistical bungee 
cord, stretching from around Warsaw, through Minsk, and then 
Smolensk, was starting to pull them back. 
 
As noted in the Introduction, Bellamy’s view that the Germans were 
capable only of Pyrrhic victories was perhaps best summed up in the 
name of his chapter, ‘Winning oneself to death’. In Bellamy’s telling of the 
story, German successes were always hampered by consistent, persistent, 
and strong Soviet resistance, which came either from regular attacks from 
the east or by partisan activity. Hitler’s decision to halt Army Group 
Centre at the end of July was a classic case of the Germans’ hand being 
forced by fierce Soviet resistance more than any other factor. The 
encirclement of Soviet troops at Viaz’ma was undoubtedly a catastrophe 
for the Red Army, but desperate fighting by encircled troops did tie down 
five German divisions until the end of October. 
 
The Soviet disasters at Viaz’ma and Briansk made the Germans 
overconfident, and Army Group Centre was ordered to spread like a giant 
funnel to the north and south as it approached Moscow: “The combined 
effects of funnel and mud had an inevitable synergy” and the German 
attack faltered. Ultimately, the Germans fighting on the approaches to 
Moscow faced terribly cold weather and “ever-hardening resistance and 
constant counter attacks”. The cold played a major part, but the Germans 
had already reached the end of their tether. In making an assessment of 
how the Soviet state survived this ordeal, Bellamy noted that both the 
people’s patriotism and the resources of an effective totalitarian state 




The survival of the Soviet Union in 1941-42 and its resilience in the 
face of the shattering defeats can be ascribed to the character and 
patriotism of its people, especially the Russians, or to the draconian 
measures imposed by Stalin, Beria and the Lieutenants. In fact, it 
must be ascribed to both. During the war, the already authoritarian 
system became more so. In spite of the catastrophic errors that led 
to the events of 1941 and 1942, the system was able, using the 
mixture of terror and propaganda, to mobilize the latent patriotism of 
the nation.566  
 
Alexander Hill too follows the formula of the new historiography 
established by Glantz.567 In his account, Soviet resistance was described 
as less nimble than its German opponent, but the Soviet state was certain 
to win a long war because of its superior resources. The German 
leadership erred because of its “complete and utter disregard for the 
resolve of the Soviet regime” and its underestimation of Soviet 
mobilisation capacity based on “ideological prejudice rather than rational 
analysis”. As for Halder’s plan for establishing a new defensive line along 
the Urals, this “was in the light of evidence from the summer of 1941 
sheer fantasy”.568  
 
For Hill, it was not the Germans who almost won, but the Red Army that 
could have stopped the Wehrmacht at the frontiers with different 
deployment had they avoided the mistaken idea of having skeleton units 
deployed at the front. What the Germans had not realised was not just 
the “sheer size” of the Red Army but just as importantly was the “resolve 
of many of its troops who fought hard despite the predicament in which 
their leaders had put them”. As for why these soldiers fought hard, Hill 
echoed Reese by noting that that commitment was “fostered by the barrel 
of a gun, sometimes by patriotism, sometimes by the sort of factors that 
                                                 
566 The quotes and information taken for this summary of Bellamy, Absolute War come from pp. 
302,323, 318, 239-263, 244-245, 247-248, 276-277, 301, 315-316, 322-324 and 687 (long 
quotes from pp. 318 and 687). 
567 Alexander Hill is a British academic based at the University of Calgary in Canada. He has 
written the most recent account of the Red Army available for this thesis. For his contribution to 
the debate about 1941, see, for example: Alexander Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
568 Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War, pp. 294-295. 
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could motivate soldiers in any army like loyalty and commitment to 
comrades in arms”.569 In short, the reasons for fighting were varied and 
complex. 
 
As noted earlier, Overy suggested that Hitler’s decision to prioritise Kiev 
and Leningrad may well have harmed the Wehrmacht’s prospects of 
victory.570 However, Overy’s theme overall was the hitherto unrecognised 
contribution that the Soviet state and people made to its own survival. 
According to Overy, the key to understanding 1941 was German hubris: 
“Soviet forces were capable of a great deal more than their enemies and 
allies supposed. They were the victims not of Bolshevik primitivism but of 
surprise”. Soviet soldiers continued to resist. Overy was happy to concede 
that the Kiev diversion “possibly saved the Soviet capital”, but Hitler’s 
drive to the south was justified on military grounds. While, “[t]he savage 
fighting held up but could not halt the German armies”, Overy rejected 
the weather as the explanation because it affected both sides:  
 
It is commonplace to attribute the German failure to take Moscow to 
the sudden change in the weather. While it is certainly true that 
German progress slowed, it had already been slowing because of the 
fanatical resistance of Soviet forces and the problem of moving 
supplies over the long distances through occupied territory. The mud 
slowed the Soviet build-up also, and hampered the rapid deployment 
of men and machines. 
 
On the other hand, the German victories between June and October were 
insufficient because Soviet resistance strengthened rather than weakened 
the longer the war went on:  
 
By late November the power of the German assault was visibly 
wilting … The last offensive demanded too much of the tired German 
soldiers, short of tanks and ammunition and poorly prepared for the 
                                                 
569 ibid., p. 200.  
570 Richard Overy is a British historian who has published prodigiously on the Second World War in 
the Red Army. For his contribution to the debate about 1941, see, for example: Richard Overy, 
Russia’s War (Great Britain: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1998).  
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fierce winter conditions. The number of dead and wounded increased 
spectacularly with stiffening Soviet resistance.571 
 
Geoffrey Roberts’ account of the Soviet-German War was entitled Stalin’s 
Wars for a good reason: Stalin made errors of judgment, and his brutal 
policies at times led to millions of deaths, “but without his leadership the 
war against Nazi Germany would probably have been lost. Churchill, 
Hitler, Mussolini and Roosevelt were all replaceable as warlords, Stalin 
was not”.572 Like Glantz, Roberts stressed that “[t]he Red Army did not 
defend passively; in line with its offensivist ethos it launched numerous 
counter-attacks, often forcing German forces to retreat and regroup”.573 
Roberts dismissed complaints about the Kiev diversion as “the self-
serving arguments of German generals re-fighting the Second World War 
in their fantasies”, and noted the utility of the decision given the potential 
exposure of Army Group Centre’s flanks.574 Stalin was much better at 
waging war than Hitler and was better able to maintain the support and 
cohesion of his leading military personnel. According to Roberts:  
 
In truth, the German-led forces lost to an army that was better as 
well as bigger: an army with superior arms, strategy and leadership. 
Stalin was a far better Supreme Commander than Hitler. The Soviet 
dictator did not seek to dominate his generals. He did not always 
take their advice but he learned from their military professionalism 
and strove to create a coherent and effective high command.575 
 
Roberts put an extremely positive spin on Stalin’s wartime leadership as 
being at the heart of a “Red Victory”, something that most of the 
                                                 
571 The quotes and information taken for this summary of Overy, Russia’s War come from pp. 76, 
87, 91, 113-114 and 117 (long quotes from pp. 113-114 and 117). 
572 Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, p. xi; Geoffrey Roberts is a British historian who focusses on the Second 
World War and the Red Army. For his contribution to debates about 1941, see, for example: 
Geoffrey Roberts, ‘Operation Barbarossa: The 75th Anniversary of the Nazi Invasion of the Soviet 
Union’, Russia Insider, 19 June, 2016. Available at: http://russia-
insider.com/en/barbarossa/ri15045 (accessed 22/6/16); Geoffrey, Roberts, Stalin’s General: The 
Life of Georgy Zhukov (London: Icon Books Ltd, 2012); Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From 
World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Geoffrey Roberts, 
Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle that Changed History (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 
2002). 
573 Roberts, ‘Operation Barbarossa: The 75th Anniversary of the Nazi Invasion of the Soviet Union’. 
574 Roberts, Victory at Stalingrad, p. 43. 
575 Roberts, ‘Operation Barbarossa: The 75th Anniversary of the Nazi Invasion of the Soviet Union’. 
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historians described above do not do. Nonetheless, all of these historians 
agree that 1941 was a crucial and perhaps the crucial moment in the war, 
that the Soviet capacity to resist went unappreciated by the Nazis and the 
standard historiography, and that Hitler’s alleged errors and the weather 
only mattered because of Soviet resistance. 
 
According to Glantz, Reese was the first historian to put a “human face” 
to the Red Army soldier. He was certainly not the last. For her 2006 study 
on the experiences of ordinary Russian soldiers, Catherine Merridale 
conducted more than two hundred interviews with veterans.576 Merridale 
used interviews and first-hand accounts - diaries, letters home - to 
describe how the common soldier fought, thought and trained, how they 
lived, rested and what inspired them. Merridale noted that to generalise 
about the Red Army is to generalise about a thirty million strong army 
representative of a whole society: “[g]eneralizations about Ivan, in other 
words, are either crude shorthand, or cruder racism”.577 While her 
account of the Battle for Moscow was only a small part of her project, 
Merridale noted the German tendency to blame the weather through 
extensive quotation of Hoepner’s account, and added that the “Red Army 
deserves more credit for stalling the Nazi advance than Hoepner gave it”. 
After noting that Zhukov is often credited with the victory at Moscow, she 
added that, “the capital was also defended by conscripts from the 
hinterland, and even by intellectuals, old men, and students”. Similarly to 
Reese and Hill, Merridale argued that the motivations of Stalin’s soldiers 
were varied and complex: fear alone was not enough to force people to 
fight for Stalin. On the other hand, it was too simplistic to argue that 
Soviet soldiers fought for ‘patriotism’, because the meaning of the term 
was vastly different for different people. There was a gap between what 
                                                 
576 Merridale, Ivan’s War, p. 9; Catherine Merridale is a British academic who has published several 
books on the Soviet period. For her contribution to the debates about 1941, see, for example: 
Catherine Merridale, ‘Culture, Ideology and Combat in the Red Army, 1939-45’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, vol. 41, no. 2 (April, 2006), pp. 305-324; Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: 
Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).  
577 Merridale, ‘Culture, Ideology and Combat in the Red Army, 1939-45’, p. 307. 
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the Soviet authorities meant when they said ‘patriot’, and what those who 
signed up were thinking. The soldiers themselves were more likely to 
conceive of patriotism as “love for home village, family, language and 
even – for some – an informal nostalgia for peasant religion”. For 
Merridale, it was in the end the fact that “the Soviet state commanded 
real support among large numbers of ordinary citizens” that mattered 
more than repression or the “idealism of an elite of young activists”.578  
 
Michael Jones and Rodric Braithwaite have both made extensive use of 
oral history and primary evidence to write accounts of the Battle of 
Moscow. Braithwaite, who used his contacts as a former British 
ambassador to Russia to write an account of the Battle of Moscow, 
focused on how ordinary Soviet citizens experienced the war.579 His 
account too fits the mould established by Glantz. Apart from his use of 
nine Russian, five British and four United States archives, Braithwaite’s 
bibliography included seventy-seven interviews. Braithwaite argued that 
Hitler’s decision to divert troops to Kiev only appears poor with hindsight. 
Having not mentioned the weather in the first half of his account, 
Braithwaite noted that the “rasputitsa spared the Russians no more than 
it spared the Germans. Their vehicles and their wagons sank into the mud 
just as quickly”. The Red Army was hamstrung in its efforts to move 
wounded soldiers to the rear, and to supply food and ammunition to the 
front. Braithwaite noted that 100,000 German soldiers had died by the 
time that the advance halted short of Moscow in December 1941. Victory 
rested upon the solidity of the Soviet regime: “the army’s subsequent 
recovery, its willingness to fight in encirclement, to retreat without 
breaking, to hold its ground and to counterattack were due in no small 
                                                 
578 Information in quotes in this paragraph taken from Merridale, Ivan’s War, pp. 118, 120, 318, 
314-315 and 33. 
579 Edward N. Luttwak, [Book Review] Braithwaite, Rodric, ‘Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at 
War’, Commentary, vol. 123, no. 1 (2007), p. 64; Rodric Braithwaite is a former British diplomat 
who has published three books on the Soviet period. For his contribution to the debate about 
1941, see, for example: Rodric Braithwaite, Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).  
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measure to Stalin’s ruthless willpower”. On the other hand, “Stalin himself 
understood that the people were fighting for Russia, not the regime”.580  
 
Jones’s The Retreat: Hitler’s First Defeat (2009) had as its focus the 
Battle of Moscow and the German retreat from the Soviet capital in the 
winter of 1941-42.581 Jones’s theme was that Western readers still did not 
realise the significance of the Eastern Front and his account quoted from 
diaries, letters home, memoirs and interviews to tell the story of the 
Soviet War. Jones described his project as focusing on, “the experience of 
soldiers, prisoners of war and civilians”,582 and an effort to “pay tribute to 
the remarkable courage of these Russian fighters ... and tell the human 
story of the Red Army”.583 Citing examples such as Brest-Litovsk as the 
type of stubborn resistance the Red Army could offer in even hopeless 
situations, Jones contended that resistance only got stronger as the war 
went on. Jones described Kiev as an enormously successful battle, but 
one that fatally exhausted the German troops. By mid-October, “everyone 
assumed that the Red Army was finished”, and yet, the Soviet formations 
continued to fight. While the weather figured prominently, Jones 
contended that both sides were adversely affected, and, if the Germans 
were more adversely affected, it was because their commanders 
inexplicably refused to recognise the entirely predictable realities of 
Russia’s climate. Meanwhile, the Soviet state continued to field new 
armies.584  
 
                                                 
580 This paragraph is a summary of aspects of Braithwaite, Moscow 1941. Quotes and information 
taken from pp. 373-373, 164-165, 211 and 320. 
581 Michael Jones is a British writer, media consultant and academic who has published numerous 
books on various aspects of military history. He has published several books specifically on the 
Nazi-Soviet War. For his contribution to the debates about 1941, see, for example: Michael Jones, 
The Retreat: Hitler’s First Defeat (Great Britain: John Murray (Publishers), 2009); Michael Jones, 
Total War: From Stalingrad to Berlin (Great Britain: John Murray (Publishers), 2011).  
582 Jones, The Retreat, p. xiii. 
583 Jones, Total War, p. xv.  
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from pp. 16, 32, 57, 60, 71 and 43. 
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Mark Edele summarised the polarised nature of the earlier debate by 
providing two contrasting narratives of motivation in the Soviet state.585 
In one account, Soviet citizens welcomed the Germans as liberators, and 
mass desertion, surrender and panic characterised Red Army 
performance. In the other reckoning, Soviet solidarity drove the 
narrative: Soviet citizens enlisted en masse, soldiers doggedly resisted 
the German assault, soldiers desperately fought to escape encirclement, 
and news of German atrocities only served to strengthen an already 
stiffening resolve.586 As Edele put it, both accounts were “empirically 
correct, and yet both [were] wrong in their universalism”.587 Similar to 
Reese, Merridale and Hill, Edele noted that there is in fact no blanket 
explanation to account for Soviet loyalty to Stalin and the motivations of 
Red Army soldiers who served. For Edele: 
 
People fought for Stalin, Socialism, or Russia, the homeland or their 
native city, to defend women and children and to avenge the death 
of loved ones or conationals; many simply did as they were told, 
subjecting themselves to the authority of the state, while others saw 
the defense against aggression as a just war; many hoped that the 
war would usher in a more humane kind of socialism, devoid of 
coercion, terror, and collective farms, while others hoped to redeem 
their own or their family members’ past “sins.”588 
 
The shift away from attributing Soviet motivation to either visceral fear or 
blind love for Stalin showed the growing tendency to see the Red Army 
less as an amorphous mass, fighting and dying at Stalin’s will. Instead of 
passive sub-human hordes, Red Army soldiers who resemble the soldiers 
of other armies have emerged. Edele’s list of possible motivations finds an 
                                                 
585 Mark Edele is a German academic based in Australia. He specialises in the Soviet period and 
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echo in the summary of studies of German ‘morale’, provided by Stephen 
Fritz: 
 
A complex set of motives was at work: ideology, the successful 
creation of a Nazified vision of the nation, a sense of duty, the 
material successes and rewards proffered by the regime, fear of 
Communism, a strong sense of camaraderie, and the growing 
realisation that the enormity of Nazi war crimes left them no way 
out.589  
 
In other words, the post-archival accounts normalised Red Army soldiers 
in a way that had not been true of Cold War accounts. Citing Soviet 
archival materials, Western historians were much more likely to note that 
‘complex motivations’ were at work in the minds of Red Army soldiers. 
Stereotypes were less in evidence as readers were shown a Red Army 
soldier who was both more complicated and more human. It became at 
the very least possible to imagine how such an army might have achieved 
a Red victory brought about mainly through its own efforts.  
 
Moreover, the historians studied here were often struck by the fact that 
the Soviet system had considerable capacity because, even when it 
displayed strategic and tactical weaknesses, the populace mostly stayed 
loyal. Bernd Bonwetsch summed up this rejection of the older view that 
the Red Army was vulnerable because of widespread antipathy to the 
Soviet state: 
 
The people of the Soviet Union really did accomplish miracles under 
material conditions much worse than before the war. Red Army 
soldiers fought at least as stubbornly as soldiers of other countries… 
the capture of huge masses of Soviet soldiers by the invaders was 
evidently due to the speed of the German advance and inadequate 
strategies and tactics on the Soviet side, not to anticommunist 
                                                 
589 Fritz, Ostkrieg, p. xxiv.  
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feelings among the troops, as historians like Joachim Hoffmann tend 
to believe.590 
 
These assertions about the surprising solidarity of the regime and 
populace received more detailed evidence as historians mined the newly 
available archives. It is the type of claim that risked scorn and the 
accusation of gullibility to Soviet propaganda during the Cold War. Such 
claims are now routine. 
 
While the post-archival literature about the Soviet war built on the work 
of Erickson and others, it is clearly different to the literature of the Cold 
War. In the first place, American authors – most notably Glantz - have 
taken the lead in rewriting the history of the war with Soviet resistance 
factored in. Secondly, the older stereotypes of faceless Russian hordes 
have given way to a more complex view of the Red Army soldier. Thirdly, 
the new histories are sourced with an abundance of archival references 
and oral history that just was not available to the Cold War generation of 
historians. These accounts tend to agree that the Soviet state was mostly 
united in the fight against the Nazi invaders, an important factor in 
cancelling out the military advantages enjoyed by the Germans brought 
about in part by the miscalculations of the Soviet political and military 
elite. 
 
As for why the likes of Glantz, Reese, Mawdsley, Bonwetsch, and Hill have 
chosen to interpret their archival findings in this way, multiple factors are 
likely to be at work. Correcting Cold War stereotypes and calling into 
question the account of the German generals is likely to have been a 
motivation for Glantz given that this is part of the justification he offers 
                                                 
590 Bernd Bonwetsch, ‘War as a “Breathing Space”: Soviet Intellectuals and the “Great Patriotic 
War”, in Bonwetsch and Thurston (eds), The People’s War, p. 142; Bernd Bonwetsch is a leading 
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for his work.591 It is possible that the end of the Cold War removed the 
stigma of disloyalty from writing a history recognising the Soviet 
contribution to the Allied victory. It is also possible that the sheer weight 
of evidence about Soviet agency in 1941 meant that inevitably these 
accounts would challenge the idea that the Red Army was essentially 
roadkill for the Germans until the weather set in. As Fitzpatrick has 
pointed out, “revisionist” history around the Stalin era flourished from the 
1970s. The generation of historians that emerged after the Vietnam War 
and the social movements of the 1970s tended to be critical of earlier 
histories that emerged during the Cold War.592 Historians such as Glantz 
and Reese, like Erickson before them, are plainly motivated by the desire 
to tell the story of the Red Army “from below” and not simply repeat older 
clichés about the totalitarian system and its endless reserves of cannon 
fodder.  
 
The German side of the war 
It could be suspected that historians specialising in the Soviet side of the 
war might have an inbuilt bias that would cause them to emphasise 
evidence of Soviet agency. What is striking about those telling the 
German side of the story in the last twenty years is that overwhelmingly 
they are the heirs of Reinhardt and van Creveld, and not of Seaton, 
Liddell Hart and Ziemke. They emphasise the hubris of Hitler and the 
German generals, the Pyrrhic nature of the victories of the summer of 
1941, the sound military reasons for the “Kiev diversion”, and the 
importance of Soviet resistance in combination with Russia’s weather and 
geography in bringing the advance of the Wehrmacht to a halt before 
Moscow. For the majority of these accounts, the war was lost for the 
Germans in the summer long before the mud and snow. While an earlier 
generation of experts on the German army overwhelmingly relied upon 
                                                 
591 See, for example Glantz, Colossus Reborn, pp. 7-13; Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, p. 56; Glantz, 
Barbarossa, p. 10; Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed, p. 15; Glantz, ‘Forgotten Battles of the German-
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592 See, for example, Fitzpatrick, ‘Revisionism in Retrospect: A Personal View’, pp. 683-685; 
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the testimony of the German generals and German archival material, the 
post-archival historians of the German war invariably reference the works 
of Glantz and others who have specialised in telling the Soviet side of the 
war using Russian archival material.  
 
Robert Citino has written fourteen books on the Nazi-Soviet War and 
might well be regarded as Seaton and Ziemke’s replacement as the 
leading North American expert on the German side of the conflict. There 
is little doubt as to where Citino has placed himself on the “German 
Defeat” versus “Red Victory” spectrum. Hitler’s former generals blamed all 
errors made in the war on Hitler as a “convenient way for former General 
Staff officers to shift the blame. He had the perfect credentials. He was 
dead, first of all, and therefore incapable of defending himself; and 
second, he was Hitler”. For Citino, the buck stopped with Hitler, but 
standing alongside him when major decisions were made was the General 
Staff, which “for all its glorious intellectual tradition, all the thought it had 
poured into wars both historical and theoretical over the centuries, the 
staff designed and launched some terrible operations in this war”.  
 
The most terrible of the decisions was the invasion of the Soviet Union in 
the expectation of a quick victory. Germany did not do enough to take 
advantage of its (albeit brief) domination of most of Europe to help its 
war effort. It is wrong to say that Germany’s only ally, Italy, was too 
weak to be advantageous: “Germany began this war with the mighty ally 
indeed: the Soviet Union”. When Operation Barbarossa began, the 
Germans sliced through the Soviet armies like a hot knife through butter, 
the grand attacks and encirclements “gave a new definition to ‘battle of 
annihilation’”:  
 
The only trouble was, it didn’t annihilate. Although the Red Army was 
getting clobbered, it continued to defend tenaciously, and the 
Wehrmacht even found the Kessels to be troublesome. Sealing off a 
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pocket to two hundred thousand men was like trying to blockade a 
small city, and in fact the Germans failed repeatedly. 
 
Many Soviet troops escaped encirclement and returned to their lines, or 
joined the partisans. The Germans underestimated Soviet equipment such 
as the T-34, and German intelligence failed to recognise the size and 
potential mobilisation of the Soviet population. They also had poor 
knowledge of the nature of Soviet roads and terrain. Meanwhile, “[t]he 
Red Army never stopped counterattacking”. 
 
The German generals would claim that the Kiev encirclement was one of 
the turning points of the campaign, but, according to Citino, “this 
reasoning is specious all the way down the line. The road to Moscow was 
certainly not wide open. The battles in front of Smolensk had proved 
that”. Despite post-war complaints about Hitler, there was quite a lot of 
support in the General Staff and command echelons for the attack on 
Kiev. Furthermore, Citino questioned whether a battle that took 665,000 
prisoners of war really can be considered a disaster: “Certainly, from the 
perspective of the battle of annihilation, the only perspective most 
German officers had, Kiev was a masterstroke”.  
 
For Citino, the Germans made crucial mistake when deciding to resume 
the advance on Moscow. Typhoon was an operational mess for which all 
of the German commanders must accept some blame. Army Group Centre 
did not concentrate its forces enough. Guderian was pushing for Tula, but 
at the same time much of his 2nd Panzer Army was tied up maintaining 
the Briansk pocket. At the same time, OKH was ordering to push east to 
Kursk, “Guderian was a flexible panzer leader, but even he had a difficult 
time going in three directions at once”. In the north, forces of Army 
Group Centre were diverted northward to support the south of Army 
Group North: “This was no longer concentric advance, but ‘excentric’ – 
with main bodies flying away from one another. It was the sort of thing 
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one did when the enemy was defeated and one was occupying as much 
territory as possible”. The Germans pushed on, Soviet resistance 
stiffened, and by the time of the Soviet counter-attack, the German 
offensive had “sputtered out”. The theme of Citino’s account is that the 
German errors only mattered in the context of the Soviet resistance that 
the German generals, and not just Hitler, had totally underestimated.593 
 
David Stahel aimed to demolish what he considered to be two myths: the 
first was that the German advance of 1941 was in some sense a German 
success story because both Operations Barbarossa and Typhoon degraded 
the Soviet capacity to resist. What has to be remembered, however, is 
that “for good reason both operations were tasked with achieving victory 
in the east” and they failed.594 The second myth was that Moscow was a 
“near-run thing”. According to Stahel, Germany had lost the war by the 
middle of August 1941 when Operation Barbarossa had failed in its key 
objective of decisively destroying the Red Army before the weather 
became a factor.595  
 
For Stahel, Hitler was no fanatical or ideological madman when it came to 
strategy on the Eastern Front; the Führer simply shared the strategic 
delusions of the German military establishment.596 The German generals 
failed to realise or wilfully chose to ignore the fact that as they appeared 
to be winning the war, they were in fact losing.597 Stahel argued that Kiev 
was an enormous victory for the Germans, but a Pyrrhic one, where the 
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vagaries of over-extension and concerted Soviet resistance greatly 
reduced German success later in the campaign.598 Stahel noted that 
German commanders tended to refer to Kiev as a modern Cannae and 
Tannenberg, but added:  
 
Without disputing the decisiveness of such battles, the German 
generals nevertheless missed the fundamental point that in 1914 and 
1941 even their greatest battles did not necessarily determine the 
outcome of their campaigns or wars. At Tannenberg, Cannae and 
Kiev, the victor ultimately lost.599   
 
While seventeen panzer divisions invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, 
only the equivalent of six panzer divisions remained by November. The 
state of the infantry was somewhat better; of 101 infantry divisions that 
invaded in June, the equivalent of sixty-five were still fighting in 
November. By November, the 3.4 million strong invasion force had 
suffered 686,000 casualties in four and a half months. Red Army 
casualties were far higher, but Stalin’s resources were much more 
plentiful. In June, the German Army and its allies outnumbered the Red 
Army in the western districts of the Soviet Union, 1.4:1. In December, the 
Red Army at Moscow outnumbered the Ostheer 1.2:1.600 The Germans’ 
only strategy of a war of movement had failed and there was no realistic 
possibility of making good the losses.601  
 
Stahel made the point that the inclusion of the role of the Red Army into 
the Western narrative is not an acquiescence to the Soviet view that the 
heroic Red Army and population alone stopped Hitler’s forces, “but rather 
recognition of the fact that events on the ground were impacting upon the 
strategic circumstances of the war to a much higher extent than the 
decisions of the German high command”.602 Moscow was saved by a 
                                                 
598 Stahel, The Battle for Moscow, p. 18; Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 1-2.  
599 Stahel, The Battle for Moscow, p. 18. 
600 ibid., p. 316 
601 Stahel, The Battle for Moscow, p. 90; Stahel, Kiev 1941, p. 349. 
602 Stahel, Operation Typhoon, p. 299. 
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deeply flawed German strategy and the unexpected resilience of the Red 
Army: the two are not mutually exclusive. Neither Hitler, nor his generals, 
paid sufficient attention to the build-up of Soviet strength:  
 
Indeed, the Red Army would prove to be the single greatest obstacle 
in reaching Moscow and, even if it was not apparent to the principal 
German commanders, a Rubicon had been crossed and the success 
of Operation Typhoon was at exceptionally long odds.603 
 
Stahel argued that Germany’s failure to quickly destroy the Red Army 
near the border meant that Germany lost the war in a matter of weeks: 
“By late August 1941, Operation Barbarossa was a spent exercise, 
incapable of achieving its central objective of ending Soviet resistance”.604 
Furthermore, it was hardly surprising that the Red Army actively used the 
Russian climate to its advantage. Discussion of the role of the rasputitsa 
must be placed in the wider context of failed Nazi strategy: “The autumn 
rains did not create the supply crisis behind the eastern front; they only 
intensified a preordained problem, which the German command had failed 
to foresee”.605 
 
Similarly to Stahel, Craig Luther considered the turning point to be August 
1941, when appearances suggested that the Germans were enjoying 
enormous victories.606 As Luther has put it, the “cruel calculus of 
production, industrial capacity, and material and manpower reserves” that 
were plainly not in Germany’s favour leads to an intriguing question: 
 
Is it possible to pinpoint the precise moment when 
Operation Barbarossa was defeated – when the opportunity, however 
slim, to crush Soviet Russia was, in all likelihood, gone forever? In 
this author’s view, the question can be answered in the affirmative: 
The critical turning point came in August 1941, with the disruption of 
                                                 
603 ibid., p. 80. 
604 Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 1-2. 
605 Stahel, Operation Typhoon, p. 21.  
606 Craig Luther, a former Fulbright scholar and retired U.S. Air Force historian is the author of a 
700-page study of Operation Barbarossa. For his contribution to the debates about 1941, see, for 
example: Craig W. H. Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed: The German Blitzkrieg through Central 
Russia to the Gates of Moscow, June-December 1941 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 2013).  
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Army Group Centre’s advance on Moscow during the three-week 
battle of Smolensk. 
 
Even as the Germans surged forward, the depletion of German units 
amounted to more than three hundred thousand men; Bock’s fatal 
casualties amounted to 50,000 soldiers in August and the average time a 
German infantryman fought on the Eastern Front was two months before 
being wounded or killed. Unlike the Red Army, the German Army lacked 
the capacity to replenish losses of this magnitude. In other words, 
Germany lost the war before the Kiev diversion, Operation Typhoon and 
the rasputitsa. By 30 September, German forces had suffered 185,198 
casualties, and the situation continued to deteriorate; there were 51,033 
fatalities in September compared to 46,066 in August.  
 
It was at Smolensk that “the seemingly unstoppable momentum of the 
German blitzkrieg was first broken by the Red Army’s increasingly 
effective resistance”; thereafter, the prospects of a German victory 
receded each day as the Soviet state and Red Army rebalanced and 
became stronger, not weaker as Hitler and his generals had assumed. 
Like Stahel, Luther was of the view that the Germans could never have 
won a long war of attrition, no matter their virtues of tactics, 
professionalism and courage. At the start of Operation Barbarossa, the 
Germans had more than 1,800 tanks and 2,300 combat-ready planes. By 
September 1941, they had only 510 operational tanks and 960 combat-
ready planes. The Soviet Union’s evacuation of some fifteen hundred 
factories and rolling stock, and the destruction of the transportation 
network slowed the German advance. The Germans soon suffered 
significant shortages of ammunition, petroleum and oil.  
 
The crucial point for Luther was that the Red Army offered unexpected 
resistance:  
 
Unlike France in 1940, the Soviet state, its people and its armed 
168 
 
forces, simply refused to acknowledge defeat, no matter how many 
blows they endured – a remarkable fact which not only underscored 
the collective will of the Soviet people, but the enormous strategic 
depth of a country which could absorb such catastrophic blows and 
survive. 
 
Luther’s theme was that the Soviet Union was a considerably more 
formidable opponent than Hitler and his generals ever imagined: “If 
Stalin’s pre-war policies helped to bring his country to the brink of 
extinction in the summer of 1941, they also built the foundation that 
enabled the Soviet Union to emerge victoriously in 1945 and survive 
another 46 years”. Furthermore, Stalin has to be compared favourably to 
Hitler: 
 
if Stalin’s military decision-making sometimes proved calamitous in 
the summer of 1941 – for example, his tardy decision to withdraw his 
forces from Belorussia in late June, and his failure to abandon Kiev 
and much of the Ukraine in August – it at least avoided the paralysis 
and byzantine politics which characterized the German command 
apparatus in July/August 1941, due to Hitler’s inability to control his 
own refractory and disloyal general staff.607 
 
Gregory Liedtke is a dissenting voice.608 However, this is not because he 
thinks that Germany would have won the war were it not for Hitler’s 
mistakes and the weather. Instead, in Enduring the Whirlwind (2016), he 
targeted Halder’s claim that the German Army was constantly 
outnumbered and fought heroically against the odds. For Liedtke, the 
spurious assertion that the Wehrmacht lacked the necessary men and 
equipment in 1941 was advanced by former German commanders seeking 
to rescue the reputation of the German military, as well as themselves. As 
Liedtke has noted: 
 
                                                 
607 Quotes and information for this summary of Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, retrieved from pp. 
24, 654, 396, 618-623, 161 and 552 (long quotes from pp. 654, 618 and 552). 
608 Gregory Liedtke is a military historian at the Royal Military College of Canada who has written a 
400 page book on the Nazi-Soviet war from 1941 to 1943. For his contribution to the debates 
about 1941, see, for example: Gregory Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and 
the Russo-German War 1941-1943 (England: Helion & Company Limited, 2016). 
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This argument of a German Army possessing generally superior 
leadership and near-flawless operational and tactical skill but starved 
of sufficient men and equipment that doomed it to defeat became 
one of the main pillars upon which Western perceptions of the Russo-
German War were constructed. 
 
Liedtke used an analysis of German field diaries and other sources to 
argue that the Wehrmacht was not severely outnumbered by the Red 
Army, and in fact at many stages during the advance to Moscow enjoyed 
a numerical advantage. Losses sustained during the enormously 
successful advances of Operation Barbarossa were able to be replaced 
from German Feldersatz (Field Replacement) battalions already in the 
east and from formations elsewhere. To take one example, Army Group 
Centre lost 198,000 men between 22 June and 30 September. In this 
same period, 125,000 reinforcements came from Germany, which, when 
combined with men available in Feldersatz battalions, amounted to some 
161,340 available reinforcements. According to Liedtke, this meant that 
on the eve of Operation Typhoon, Army Group Centre was short 37,058 
men - an average of seventy-two men per battalion - theoretically 
keeping each battalion at 92-93 per cent of its authorised combat 
strength. Liedtke made a similar argument for the German ability to 
replace war machinery lost throughout the campaign. Germany built up 
vast supplies in war matériel during rearmament before the war, and 
military production only increased after the war began in 1939.609 
Logistical problems and Soviet partisan activity played a role in 
hampering German efforts, but “given the availability of spare parts and 
time, operational readiness could be restored in relatively short order”.610 
For Liedtke, it was not Germany’s shortage of men and matériel but 
                                                 
609 Quotes and information for this summary of Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, taken from pp. 
xxi-xxii, xxv-xxix, 164, 113-114, 128, 138-139 and 316-317 (long quote from p. xxii). 
610 Liedtke argued that it was necessary to make the distinction between partial loses (ie, 
equipment that can be repaired), and Totalausfalle (unrecoverable losses). Using tanks as an 
example, he noted that the majority of losses came not from battle, but from wear and tear on the 
poor roads. Combat losses tended to be unrecoverable, but losses from wear and tear could be 
fixed and sent back to the front. Liedtke, Enduring the Whirlwind, pp. 128-129. 
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instead a litany of causes. The order of his list is typical of the new 
historiography: 
 
Operation Barbarossa would fail for a number of reasons – the 
resistance of the Red Army, poor German planning, logistical failures, 
the climate and terrain – but faltering unit strengths and personnel 
and equipment shortages only became a significant issue after the 
operation had already been lost.611 
 
Stephen G. Fritz’s Ostkrieg (2011) focussed on the Wehrmacht’s 
complicity in Hitler’s war of annihilation in the east.612 The first third of 
the 612-page book focussed on the military events of 1941. The theme of 
this work was how the military and exterminationist aspects of the 
German invasion overlapped. Fritz offered a variation on the theme 
described above. He was of the view that 1941 was lost for the Germans 
at Smolensk but that the Germans received a second chance in 1942 
when they finally did indeed lose the war. For Fritz, stubborn Soviet 
resistance was the key to the German failure to capture Moscow in 1941; 
the resistance halted blitzkrieg, and was therefore was a crucial factor in 
the failure of the Operation Barbarossa plan to win a quick and decisive 
victory in the east. 
 
Fritz used the image often found in the post-archival historiography: “The 
Germans did, indeed, kick in the front door, but contrary to Hitler’s 
expectations, the structure wobbled but did not collapse”. For Fritz, the 
Germans were losing the war at the very moment that it appeared that 
they were winning; German losses in the successful battles of July 1941 
far exceeded those of December and were the worst suffered by the 
German Army until Stalingrad. During the Battle of Smolensk, the 
German command came to realise that, rather than collapsing, Red Army 
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resistance was in fact stiffening, causing panic in the German command in 
the second half of July. While discord between Hitler and the generals did 
not help the German cause, “if they were to achieve a decisive victory, 
the Soviet forces had to be annihilated, a task, given previous experience, 
every Landser knew meant bitter fighting and heavy casualties”. When in 
July the Soviet-German War became a war of attrition, victory was no 
longer obtainable in the timeframe that the Germans had set themselves. 
As for Hitler’s decision to delay the attack on Moscow, Fritz was of the 
view that this made perfect military sense in the context of stiff Soviet 
resistance on the flanks of the advancing Germans. The problem was that 
“far from pursuing a defeated foe, as advocates of the thrust to Moscow 
imply, German commanders readily acknowledged that Soviet resistance 
was stiffening rather than slackening”.613  
 
The opening of the archives did not bring about a change of perspective 
on the part of the German historians associated with the earlier West 
German official history project. Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd R. 
Ueberschär’s Hitler’s War in the East: A Critical Assessment, which 
became available to English-language readers in 2002, is a good example. 
Ueberschär wrote the chapter on the military campaign and argued that 
the most important factor in the failure of Operation Barbarossa was 
German hubris. Nazi planners completely underestimated the military 
potential of the Soviet Union and the Red Army, and thus failed to 
adequately prepare for the war. Despite the heavy losses in the early 
phase of the war, the Red Army fought doggedly and with great skill and 
prevented the Germans from seizing a quick victory: 
 
The assumption that the Soviet Union would rapidly crumble or 
disintegrate from within proved to be grossly in error. In fact, it was 
the German forces that were gradually worn down by the conquest of 
                                                 
613 Quotes and information used to make this summary of Fritz, Ostkrieg, taken from Fritz, 
Ostkrieg, pp. 88, 91, 116, 121-122, 144 and 148. 
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such vast expanses, and their ability to launch powerful new 
offensives steadily eroded. 
 
Ueberschär rejected the argument that the weather was the biggest 
factor, and instead stated that the winter of 1941-1942 was, “neither 
especially hard or unusual”, and that, “snow fell on the Red Army as 
well”. Ultimately, the failure of 1941 did not rest with Hitler alone, but all 
of the High Command. 
 
For Ueberschär, the emphasis on the weather was a view first established 
by the German High Command when seeking to explain the loss, and 
became prominent in later histories of the conflict. Similarly, Ueberschär 
argued that emphasis on indecision in German strategy and the so-called 
Hitler-Halder crisis simplified the reasons for the German defeat. To argue 
that a lack of firm, established targets in German plans from early on in 
planning Operation Barbarossa led to ‘detours’ such as Kiev later on failed 
to take into account that German operational plans were always 
“predicated on unrealistic expectations”, and that disagreements, such as 
those between Hitler and Halder were not so crucial. There were many 
reasons for the failure of Operation Barbarossa, but the most important 
was the underestimation of the military potential of the Soviet Union and 
the Red Army. This underestimation led to an arrogant belief in swift 
victory and a consequent lack of adequate planning.614   
 
In a similar vein, Christopher Hartmann noted that Operation Barbarossa 
flowed from Hitler’s fanatical ambition and ideology.615 Hartmann argued 
that German planners had forgotten the military maxim that victory is 
only assured with a three-to-one advantage. Despite the enormous 
German successes early in the campaign, the Soviet Union had enormous 
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reserves of manpower at its disposal, and as the war progressed, the 
increasingly exhausted Germans faced an increasingly well-equipped and 
experienced Red Army. According to Hartmann, the German concentration 
of vehicles into motorised divisions created enormously powerful and 
decisive forces in the early phases of the war, but the relatively slow 
infantry coming up the rear was unable to keep up, leading to exhaustion 
of motorised and foot soldiers alike as early as the autumn of 1941. The 
toll on German men and equipment was too great as the Germans pushed 
further and further east: “it was the largest military force Germany had 
ever assembled. But it would not be large enough”. 
 
For Hartmann, the attack on Kiev was a militarily sound decision and the 
battle had been a success, but had not proved decisive. The attack on 
Moscow was carried out too late in the year by an increasingly exhausted 
army: “It is almost as though the German military, in near desperation, 
were clutching at this one tangible goal merely so as to make sense of an 
increasingly unmanageable campaign”. For Hartmann, seizing Moscow 
would have been an enormous blow to the Soviet Union, but a successful 
outcome for Germany would not perhaps have proved as decisive as 
German commanders were later to insist. The Germans did get their 
decisive battle, “albeit moving in the other direction”.616 
 
For Geoffrey P. Megargee the German Army was indeed a superior 
fighting force: “Materially, tactically, and operationally, the Wehrmacht 
simply outclassed its opponents”.617 The problem was that Germany 
simply could not match the vast manpower, economic and industrial 
capability of Stalin’s regime. Whatever its merits as a fighting force, the 
German Army was not equal to the task. In Megargee’s telling, this was 
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as much the fault of the German planners and commanders as Hitler. The 
decision to invade the Soviet Union was a gamble, a gamble that may 
only seem unreasonable with hindsight, but a gamble nonetheless. The 
German generals had “no fallback position, no alternative plan should the 
Soviets continue to fight”. The hubris of Hitler and his generals was 
decisive here: “the Germans set themselves an overly ambitious goal and 
then, through poor planning and ruthlessness, made its achievements 
even less likely”. 
 
For Megargee, the debates over Kiev missed the point. By the end of 
August, the Germans were experiencing logistical problems that were 
already affecting their ability to fight. Army Group Centre could muster 
enough men and supplies to support Guderian’s drive to the south, but 
not enough for Bock to reach Moscow. Bock found it difficult enough to 
hold his line, let alone press forward, and if Kiev had not been taken the 
exposure of Bock’s southern flank would have proved disastrous. The 
Germans simply did not have the resources to do everything they needed 
to do if they were to win the war.618 
 
Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson co-authored an in-depth account of 
Operation Typhoon in 2012.619 In their work, they criticised the tendency 
of Western historians to heap the causes for the failure of Operation 
Typhoon into an oversimplified basket such as the weather and Hitler’s 
blunders. Unlike Liedtke, Zetterling and Frankston strongly argued that it 
was the Germans who were outnumbered at the start of Operation 
Typhoon. As their account put it, the Germans had foolishly taken on the 
world and did not have the resources to achieve their goals. Germany’s 
industrial and economic capacity was never enough to defeat the Soviet 
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Union in a long war. Hitler was both short of resources and excessively 
optimistic about a quick victory in the east. Soon after German troops 
crossed the Soviet border, the misguided expectation of a quick and 
decisive victory caused Hitler to order German military production be 
shifted away from army weapons and equipment to production for the 
navy and air force. The belief was that the land war in the Soviet Union 
would soon finish and that air and sea power would be needed for the 
inevitable war with the United States. When the Soviet Union was not 
quickly defeated as planned, the Germans found themselves stuck in a 
protracted land war with the wrong war production regime, a problem 
that could not quickly or easily be rectified. As Zetterling and Frankson 
put it, “[t]he Germans had, effectively, already mortgaged the expected 
victory over the Soviet Union”.  
 
Zetterling and Frankson pointed out that it would be wrong to say that 
the weather did not matter. Given that the Germans easily broke the 
Soviet lines at the beginning of October and that the training and combat 
experience of the troops, and the state of communication lines, were 
significantly poorer in mid-October, it was “unlikely that the Red Army 
would have coped better along the Mozhaisk Line without some new 
advantages”, and that, “[i]t is hard to accept any conclusion other than 
that the weather seriously impeded German efforts during the second half 
of October”. On the other hand, the war was supposed to have been won 
long before the weather was a factor. Time was not on the German side 
and it was the timing they had got wrong:  
 
Weather was thus crucial and contributed significantly to the halting 
of the German offensive in mid-October, but that was hardly a 
surprise. When the Germans began Operation Taifun, they knew they 
were in a race against the clock, but they did not know when their 




They reminded the reader that the Red Army similarly faced the 
seemingly intractable problems that came with waging a war on this 
scale: “Had no Soviet forces been in position between the Germans and 
Moscow, the Soviet capital would have fallen, despite adverse weather”. 
For Zetterling and Frankson, the Germans might have been better off to 
mop up at Viaz’ma and Briansk and then build new defensive lines to 
consolidate their gains for 1941, extending the war into 1942. This was, 
however, an unattractive option for Hitler and his generals given the 
looming threat of American entry into the war.620  
 
Christer Bergström belongs in a different category to Stahel, Luther, 
Citino, and Liedtke, but not because he endorsed the view of the German 
generals.621 According to Bergström, the West “allowed itself to be duped 
by the ideologically distorted accounts by former servicemen of Nazi 
Germany”. Worse, according to Bergström:  
 
distorted accounts of the war on the Eastern Front dominate in 
literature. Even though the facts are readily available in archives and, 
in some cases, in publications, the image in most Western accounts 
of the war between Germany and its allies and the Soviet Union 
remains in general colored by old accounts by Germans and former 
allies of Nazi Germany”. 
 
For Bergström, the crucial German error was the assumption that the 
Soviet Union would collapse soon after the invasion, and that Hitler’s plan 
to invade and colonise the Soviet Union was “doomed from the start”: 
 
Operation Barbarossa, based on the huge misjudgements of racial 
prejudices, was Hitler’s greatest military mistake, and led directly to 
Germany’s defeat in the war. 
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The Germans took Hitler’s quote about ‘kicking in the door’ too literally, 
and the unexpected refusal of the Soviet Union to bow down despite 
heavy losses threw German plans into disarray. What saved the Soviet 
state was its “impressive capacity of generating new forces in those few 
days [in July]”. Bergström dismissed the claim of the German generals 
that the dispute between Hitler, Alfred Jodl, Bock and Halder fatally 
undermined the campaign. In fact, Hitler ordered major advances of Army 
Group Centre on Moscow on 8 July, 19 July and 22 July. In each case it 
was the Red Army that thwarted the German advance.  
 
Hitler’s hubris in believing that the road to Moscow lay open led him to 
order Army Group Centre to advance on Moscow only with infantry armies 
and to divert the motorised units to Kiev and Leningrad. On the other 
hand, Bergström defended the Kiev decision because after taking Kiev 
and the surrounding areas, Hitler not only seized some of the Soviet 
Union’s most important industrial, agricultural and mining areas but 
dramatically reduced Stalin’s ability to generate new forces, the principal 
threat to German operations. It was because of “tenacious Soviet 
resistance” that Bock was “reduced from the main force of Operation 
Barbarossa to a mere supplement to the two other army groups”. For 
Bergström, it was “German accounts colored by racist prejudices" that led 
to the myth of massive Red Army casualties and mass surrenders. 
Nothing of the sort occurred despite the advantages that the German 
Army had in terms of supply and skilful execution of its plans. The 
Germans inflicted a higher ratio of losses on their Western foes; the ratio 
was 19:1 in favour of the Germans in the Western campaign, and 
between 3.2: 1 and 4.8:1 during Operation Barbarossa.  
 
For Bergström, Kiev was the great success of the German campaign, an 
achievement for which both Hitler and the flawless execution of the 
German armies in the field deserved credit. At the start of Typhoon, the 
Red Army had 1,250,000 men against Army Group Centre’s 1,183,000. 
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While the Germans were concentrated and primed for the attack, the Red 
Army was widely spread across their front and rear areas and desperately 
trying to rebalance after the disaster at Kiev. The weather did indeed 
matter at this point. Bergström described the mud as being both 
dishonestly underplayed in Soviet literature, and misleadingly overstated 
by the former German generals. The German forces at the end of October 
were held up by severe shortages of fuel and ammunition caused by the 
mud, and had Army Group Centre been able to attack with all its might, 
"the Soviet persistence would not have sufficed". On the other hand, 
Bergström rejected what he described as the myth that the weather 
decided the outcome when in fact, the revitalised Red Army in the second 
half of October played just as much of a role. Ultimately, Bergström 
concluded that the fact that the Soviet Union managed to survive rested 
on three main pillars: “The generation of new forces, the relocation of the 
industry to the east, and the incredible resilience of the Red Army’s 
troops”.622 
 
Robert Kirchubel penned a 2013 study of Operation Barbarossa that was 
aimed at a popular audience, and is complete with maps, case studies, 
dramatic paintings and timelines.623 Kirchubel belongs in the ambivalent 
category because he is somewhat sympathetic to the view of the German 
generals. He described the Kiev diversion as a “self-inflicted paralysis” 
that was “arguably the most critical nonoperational factor in Barbarossa’s 
failure”. On the other hand, Kirchubel noted that the success at Kiev 
secured Bock’s southern flank, and that “[i]t is hard to imagine Typhoon 
or any other autumn maneuver being nearly as successful with the 
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Southwestern Front intact in the Ukraine”. There was no open road to 
Moscow because, as Smolensk showed, Red Army resistance was 
continuing and, if anything, stiffening. An over-extended German 
spearhead isolated on the road to Moscow may well have suffered a 
catastrophic defeat and it was for this reason that the Germans had to 
pause and plan their next move. In the end, Operation Barbarossa was 
doomed by the “four horsemen” of Nazi strategic overstretch: troop 
exhaustion, personnel and matériel attrition, anaemic logistics, and the 
continuing inability to settle on attainable objectives. Given the fact that 
this was “a relatively small country … invading the world’s largest nation”, 
the Germans would have had to “perform flawlessly if they were to win in 
Russia”. They did not. 
 
Kirchubel noted that “[e]xhaustion, poor logistics, and the rasputitsa 
would put the final bullets into the German leaders’ plans to rush into an 
undefended Moscow”. Of course, Moscow was far from defenceless. As the 
Germans sought to capitalise on the victories at Viaz’ma and Briansk, 
“[t]heir own weaknesses, the weather and Soviet resistance made this 
impossible”. Elsewhere, Kirchubel attributed the German failure of 1941 
to unrelenting Soviet resistance: “The constant Soviet counterattacks, the 
death-by-a-thousand-cuts technique, eventually saved the USSR”.624  
 
Another historian who belongs in the ambivalent category is Robert 
Forczyk.625 Forczyk’s account was critical of the German generals’ 
perspective, but at the same time urged caution against ascribing the 
outcome of 1941 to the superior performance of the Red Army. This really 
was a case of failed German planning and a failure to foresee that the war 
would not be won at the frontiers. For Forczyk, German operational 
mistakes were the root cause of both Operations Barbarossa and 
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Typhoon. Despite Soviet claims that it was their military prowess that 
saved Moscow, “the performance of the Red Army against Typhoon was 
generally weak”. On the other hand, Forczyk did not entirely accept the 
case made by the German generals. Hitler’s decision to divert troops to 
Kiev was, regardless of historical hindsight, a “militarily sound” one given 
the need to protect Bock’s flanks. Bock, according to Forczyk, was 
mistaken in his haste to press for Moscow and overly keen for German 
and personal glory.  
 
Forczyk noted that given that Operation Typhoon covered an area some 
five hundred kilometres long from north to south, it is difficult to discuss 
the weather as consistently affecting the entire German operation at any 
one period of time. Most of the rain fell in the south, affecting Guderian’s 
movements; further north in the area covered by the Ninth Army, rain 
barely affected manoeuvres at all. For Forczyk, “[t]he greatest impact of 
the mud upon German operations was to add further strain to the 
impoverished Wehrmacht logistical system”. With regard to the cold, 
Forczyk noted that although German frontline troops may have been 
miserable throughout November as the temperature began to drop, it was 
not until the end of November and early December that the effects of 
illness and frostbite seriously began to affect the German troops, by which 
point Typhoon had already failed.626  
 
In briefly describing and quoting from these authors, it is impossible to do 
justice to the breadth of scholarship and the complexity of their 
arguments. What is clear is that these accounts reject the older view that 
Hitler’s mistakes and the weather alone were sufficient to explain the 
outcome of the Battle of Moscow. They tend to follow Reinhardt, rather 
than Halder, in arguing that Hitler was losing the war even when he 
appeared to be winning because the invaders spectacularly 
                                                 
626 Quotes and information used to make this summary of Forczyk in in Moscow 1941 taken from 
pp. 91-92, 8-9 and 90-91. 
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underestimated the resources that would be needed to defeat the Soviet 
Union. As for why the resources were not sufficient, all the accounts refer 
to Soviet resistance, German decision-making, geography and the 
weather. Soviet resistance is explcitly prioritised in the accounts of Citino, 
Stahel, Luther, Fritz, Liedtke, Bergström, and Ueberschär. Usually, the 
historians telling the German side of the war – like their counterparts 
telling the Soviet side of the war - urge caution when it comes to Soviet 
claims that the Red Army outfought the Wehrmacht. The accounts of 
Zetterling and Frankson, Forczyk, and Kirchubel emphasise the military 
feats of an outnumbered German army. Nonetheless, the point that all of 
these accounts make is that it was Soviet resistance and not Hitler’s 
amateurish decisions that imposed the crucial strain on German logistics.    
 
Hitler’s errors of underestimating the enemy and poor planning were also 
the errors of his generals. The plans of the German High Command were 
brought undone by a total underestimation of the task that confronted 
them and the capacity of the Soviet state and Red Army to offer 
resistance. If the Soviet state had collapsed as the Germans expected, 
their failure to plan a long war would have gone unnoticed. For many of 
these writers, the war was lost in summer because the Germans only had 
the one plan, which was to win a quick war of annihilation. Smolensk, 




Another way of demonstrating the change in the historiography is to 
quantify the accounts that explicitly endorse the older paradigm. There 
are certainly general Western accounts that dismiss any suggestion that 
1941 was a Red victory. This case was put most forcefully by Norman 
Davies in his 2006 No Simple Victory, a discussion of the entire Second 
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World War in Europe.627 Davies did note that attributing the Soviet victory 
solely to the weather simplified the matter and that the failings of German 
logistics also need to be taken into account.628 He also stressed that if 
justice were truly done all histories of the war would have at three 
quarters of their content devoted to the Eastern Front.629 However, he 
also stressed how important it was that heavy rain, snow and a falling 
thermometer delayed Operation Typhoon.630 This was indeed fortunate for 
Moscow, which was protected only by newly formed armies of “press-
ganged, over-age veterans, a trawl of Moscow’s jails, and conscripted 
zeks” leavened by freshly arrived Siberian troops taking advantage of the 
-40ºC temperatures to counterattack on 5 December.631 This was a view 
closer to Seaton than Stahel.  
 
On the other hand, this study found only four English-language military 
histories that focus upon the Battle of Moscow, have appeared since 
1991, and argue the case made by the German generals. The most noted 
in the literature is Russell H. S. Stolfi’s Hitler’s Panzers East, described by 
Citino as “the definitive statement on how Germany could have won the 
war in the east”.632 According to Stolfi when Hitler chose to delay the 
advance on Moscow he made “the most important decision of his life - 
and the most important judgement for the political shape of the twentieth 
century world”.633 Stolfi argued that Germany lost the war in August 
1941, when: 
 
                                                 
627 Norman Davies is an academic British historian who has published widely on European history, 
particularly Poland, the Soviet Union, and the Second World War. For his contribution to the 
debates about 1941, see, for example: Norman Davies, No Simple Victory: World War II in 
Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2006). 
628 Davies, No Simple Victory, p. 98.  
629 ibid., p. 94. 
630 ibid., p. 97. 
631 ibid.  
632 Citino, The German Way of War, n. 3, p. 366; Russell H. S. Stolfi is former lecturer at the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School and U.S. Marine Corps reservist. For his contribution to the debates 
about 1941, see, for example: Russell Stolfi, ‘Barbarossa Revisited: A Critical Reappraisal of the 
Opening Stages of the Russo-German Campaign (June-December 1941)’, The Journal of Modern 
History, vol. 54, no. 1 (March, 1982), pp. 27-46; R. H. S. Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East: World War 
II Reinterpreted (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
633 Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East, p. 201. 
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Hitler’s dilatory orders strayed from the army strategic concept to 
smash immediately the Soviet armies defending Moscow and move 
into the Moscow-Gorki space. He missed the golden opportunity to 
defeat the Soviets quickly and shifted the entire war into one of 
attrition, logistics, and production.634  
 
In this telling, responsibility for the outcome of the war rests squarely on 
Hitler’s shoulders, there was little his long-suffering generals, or the Red 
Army, could have done about it. It is perhaps a measure of how 
paradigms discriminate against outliers that Stolfi has come under furious 
attack from those with a perspective less sympathetic to the German 
generals and the Wehrmacht. Kirchubel denounced Stolfi’s work as 
“completely discredited” and of “doubtful analytical value”.635 For Stahel, 
Stolfi’s work contained “glaring factual errors” and his thesis as “laden 
with contentious assertions and beset by dubious methodology, 
underlining the difficulty of supporting a largely untenable case”.636  
 
R. D. Hooker also made a spirited case for how fortunate the Red Army 
was at Moscow: 
 
By mid-month in August 1941, Russian forces defending along the 
Smolensk-Moscow highway stood swaying, like a punch-drunk 
fighter waiting for the knockout blow…Supreme in the air, 
dominant on the ground, with all the advantages of the initiative 
and unchecked success, the final operational bound from Smolensk 
to Moscow against a shaken and demoralized Red Army was surely 
within their grasp, as the German generals themselves argued so 
vehemently.637 
 
Yet Hooker himself lamented that his was already a maverick view by the 
late 1990s; the standard view had become that Operation Barbarossa was 
“mission impossible” from the very outset.638 Hooker blamed van Creveld 
                                                 
634 ibid., pp. 229-231. 
635 Kirchubel, Operation Barbarossa, p. 355. 
636 Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, p. 18. 
637 Hooker, ‘“The World Will Hold Its Breath”: Reinterpreting Operation Barbarossa’, p. 160; R. D. 
Hooker is a student of Stolfi’s and a senior American military officer with a doctorate in 
international relations. 
638 ibid., p. 150. 
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for the tendency to dismiss Hitler’s errors as pivotal in the outcome of 
1941, and instead argued that a German victory always depended upon 
boldness and speed. Once Hitler overruled the generals, the Wehrmacht’s 
best chance of taking Moscow and dealing a fatal blow to Stalin was 
lost.639  
 
Arguably, the most substantial account endorsing the older view came 
from Frank Ellis, who published a ‘reframing’ of Operation Barbarossa in 
2015.640 Ellis acknowledged unexpectedly stubborn Red Army resistance 
and self-sacrifice as well as the ability of the Soviet Union to recover from 
the initial devastating blows.641 However, for Ellis, the Kiev diversion was 
a huge mistake. Guderian was right when he argued that the Germans 
needed to press straight for Moscow; the disruption to railroads and 
political impact would have been fatal to Soviet war efforts.642 To be fair, 
Ellis noted eight relevant factors for the German defeat; Red Army 
resistance was factored in at number six. First, Ellis prioritised “time, 
space, and terrain” as contributing to German exhaustion. Second, third 
and fourth came the treatment of occupied non-Russian peoples of the 
Soviet Union: the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, the treatment of 
commissars, and the treatment of Jews. Their maltreatment led to fierce 
resentment and a rallying to the Soviet cause. Fifth on the list came 
German intentions to exploit Soviet agriculture and maintain the 
kolkhozy, which also rallied support for Stalin. The sixth cause was the 
mistaken assumption that the Soviet Union would collapse soon after the 
invasion. Seventh was Hitler’s failure to make a radio address to the 
Soviet people, which would have persuaded the Soviet people that the 
                                                 
639 ibid., p. 159. 
640 Frank Ellis is a retired member of the Special Air Service and published academic historian. He 
began his academic career as an expert on Russian and Soviet literature. See, for example: Frank 
Ellis, ‘Concepts of War in L. N. Tolstoy and V. S. Grossman’, Tolstoy Studies Journal, vol. 2 
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about 1941, see, for example: Frank Ellis, Barbarossa 1941: Reframing Hitler’s Invasion of Stalin’s 
Soviet Empire (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2015).  
641 Ellis, Barbarossa 1941: Reframing Hitler’s Invasion of Stalin’s Soviet Empire, pp. 80-81. 
642 ibid., pp.448-449. 
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Wehrmacht brought liberation. Finally for Ellis came the failure to heed 
the advice of commanders such as Guderian and press for Moscow above 
all other objectives.643 In this telling, 1941 was a case of poor German 
decisions and different decisions would have led to a different outcome at 
the Battle of Moscow.  
 
Of the post-archival accounts telling the story of the Soviet side of the 
Battle of Moscow, the only account sympathetic to the German generals 
this study could find was Nagorski’s The Greatest Battle (2007).644 
According to Nagorski, it was Hitler’s indecision that caused the effects of 
the weather to be so keenly felt by the Wehrmacht late in 1941. Hitler 
was a stubborn amateur in the face of advice from his professional 
Wehrmacht generals. Aside from his failure to prepare his troops for a 
winter war, Hitler’s other colossal blunder was to refuse to listen to 
Guderian and his other generals “who wanted to keep driving due east 
from Smolensk in August, making Moscow their immediate goal”. The 
generals in the field were left dumbfounded by three weeks of 
prevarication and delay. This was not a story of Soviet agency; Stalin 
credited himself for his victory at Moscow despite the fact that “Hitler had 
bailed him out by making enormous mistakes”. As for Soviet resistance, 
Nagorski considered that this was the discipline of the revolver: “most of 
those who went to war in 1941 recognized – or soon came to recognize – 
that it was not only the Germans who threatened their lives; it was also 
their own comrades, superior officers, and NKVD enforcers”. Stalin, unlike 
nearly every other war leader, had no concern for the human price of 
                                                 
643 ibid., pp. 445-450. 
644 Nagorski, a well-known journalist, writer and former Director of Public Policy and Senior Fellow 
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military operations. Were it not for Hitler’s errors, which led to the mud 
and snow, Stalin’s regime was likely to have come crashing down.645  
 
In the accounts described above, Soviet resistance was clearly not the 
decisive factor in the outcome of 1941, at least not compared to Hitler’s 
mistakes and the weather. Nagorski’s or Ellis’s account would have been 
considered mainstream if they had been written during the Cold War. 
Situated among the accounts of Glantz, Reese, Citino, Stahel, Luther, 
Mawdsley and Hill, they instead look like outliers. Of course this does not 
mean that Nagorski or Ellis are wrong about 1941, it is just that their 
accounts are now a counter-narrative to a new historiography that 
stresses Soviet resistance.  
 
Conclusion 
In accounts of 1941 published in the West since the opening of the Soviet 
archives, the ground has clearly shifted away from the idea that Moscow 
was saved simply by geography, weather and Hitler’s mistakes. There is a 
trend towards viewing Soviet resistance in a more favourable light than 
was the case in the past. There is also a strong trend towards viewing the 
contest as one of competing systems in which the relatively weak German 
state was doomed to lose almost from the outset.646 While historians are 
unlikely to claim that Hitler fought a flawless war or that the weather did 
not matter, the type of history that is now written is much more likely to 
emphasise the agency of the Soviet state and army than works written 
during the Cold War. In that sense, the post-archival historiography can 
be described as having moved towards describing a “Red victory” rather 
than a “German defeat”. 
 
                                                 
645 These two paragraphs are a summary of aspects of Nagorski, The Greatest Battle. Quotes and 
information taken from pp. 312, 102-103, 230, 311, 103-104, 313, 64 and 247. 
646 This is the theme, for example, of Stahel, The Battle for Moscow; Luther, Barbarossa 
Unleashed; and Glantz, Barbarossa. 
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Why has the historiography changed? Or to put the question differently, 
why are the military historians writing today the heirs of Reinhardt and 
Erickson rather than Liddell Hart, Seaton or Ziemke? This is not a 
straightforward question to answer because various factors including new 
information, broader changes in the historiography about the Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany, and the influence of dominant researchers like Glantz 
are just some of the factors that need to be considered. The case made 
here is that the breakdown of the paradigm established by the German 
generals evolved over time and not because of a decisive new piece of 
information or archival revelation.  
 
Three interrelated factors seem especially important in the justifications of 
their work offered by the historians themselves. Firstly, the archival 
revolution in Soviet studies has given those telling the Soviet side of the 
war a cornucopia of new information by which to test the official Soviet 
accounts and the accounts of the German generals, and to describe the 
strengths as well as the weaknesses of the Soviet state and Red Army; 
secondly, there is an explicit rejection of the German generals’ emphasis 
on Hitler’s mistakes and the weather as being unreliable and self-serving; 
thirdly, more general shifts in academic circles such as the movement 
away from racial/national stereotypes and a deepening scepticism about 
the ‘clean’ Wehrmacht must be considered. 
 
The archival gold rush that began in 1987 during the Gorbachëv era 
supplied ample evidence of Soviet activity for those historians who 
wanted to tell the Soviet side of the war. While the new openness of 
Soviet society produced a profound questioning of the old Soviet myths 
inside Russia, most of the revelations about the horrors of the Stalin 
dictatorship were not news to Western historians. Instead, the latter 
tended to document the ample new evidence of Red Army activity in 
1941, the sum of which was to create a picture of the Red Army as the 
agent of its own survival in 1941. The impression to be gained from 
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Seaton or Liddell Hart was that the Germans were at war with themselves 
and the elements. The evidence unearthed by Glantz and his fellow 
archive-diggers was that Soviet resistance thwarted the German invaders 
and the role of the weather could only be understood as interacting with 
Soviet resistance. Earlier historians, just like the Nazi invaders, had 
underestimated the capacity of the Soviet state and Red Army to offer an 
effective resistance. This was not the old Soviet propagandistic story of 
certain victory and universal heroism. The Red Army at great cost – 
although not at the cost described by the German generals - derailed first 
Operation Barbarossa and then Operation Typhoon.  
 
The goal of giving due credit to the Soviet war effort has been in evidence 
at least since the 1960s. British historians such as Jukes and Erickson 
attempted to expand on what was known about the Soviet side of the war 
by incorporating into their accounts the new documentary and memoir 
literature of the Khrushchëv and Brezhnev eras. The opening of Soviet 
archives from the mid-1980s led to a flood of new material, the effect of 
which was to add enormously to the evidence of the decisiveness of 
Soviet activity in the face of the German invasion, and to humanise the 
Red Army soldier so that older stereotypes have all but disappeared from 
the specialised miliary histories.  
 
In terms of the justifications offered by the historians themselves, one 
clear theme is the aim of finally killing off the legacy of the Halder school. 
Luther spoke for most of the other recent accounts examined here when 
he claimed to offer “a sober alternative to the dubious narrative first 
advanced by Hitler’s generals”.647 Reading the introductions to the 
specialised military histories of 1941 published in the last two decades, 
the reader would get the impression that the paradigm established by the 
German generals remains a powerful influence to this day. This is despite 
the fact that the accounts of 1941 written by Western military historians 
                                                 
647 Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, p. 619. 
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today are radically different to the classic accounts of Liddell Hart, 
Seaton, and Ziemke. While for Cold War historians Soviet propaganda 
was routinely criticised, now the criticism is routinely directed at the 
German generals. In reality, the enemy against whom Glantz, Citino, 
Bergström, Stahel, Hill, or Smelser and Davies have directed their fire has 
become a phantom that had all but disappeared from the military history 
literature even before the opening of the Soviet archives.  
 
It is possible that the desire on the part of these historians to finally lay to 
rest Cold War mythologies - such as the reliance upon the testmony of 
the German generals, the West’s turning of the Eastern Front into the 
“unknown war”, and the persistence of the “clean Wehrmacht” myth -
served to foster the “Red victory” case at the very time that the opening 
of the Soviet archives made such a case credible for the first time. From 
the perspective of a new generation of Western historians who wanted to 
put an end to Cold War mythology, the ghost of the Halder school was 
revived once more. 
 
Broader influences on the historiography are likely to have been 
important in bringing about this paradigm shift. For example, it is no 
longer fashionable in academic history writing to rely on national 
stereotypes that were common in the 1940s and 1950s. For those 
historians specialising in the German side of the war, the efforts of Bartov 
and Wette to demolish the myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht called into 
question the credibility of the German generals. Cold War “revisionism” 
suggested that the contribution of the Soviet state to the victory over 
Hitler had been minimised and Stalin’s role in starting the Cold War was 
exaggerated. The “revisionism” in Soviet studies that began with 
Fitzpatrick encouraged historians to look at the Soviet state and army of 
the Soviet era as having greater capacity and solidarity than was 
previously thought. The information available in the Soviet archives for 




It cannot be said that there was any single “smoking gun” revelation from 
the archives that changed the historiography. In reality, the Halder school 
was in steep decline at least from the 1970s when Reinhardt and van 
Creveld wrote their critiques, and Erickson argued the case for greater 
Soviet agency. In the West, the effect of the opening up of the Soviet 
archives was to provide ammunition for historians to bolster the case of 
Reinhardt, van Creveld and Erickson: the new information did not create 
the new paradigm itself. The early Cold War histories viewed the Germans 
as a virtually invincible invader and the Soviet state as weak and 
vulnerable. The military histories written in the West since the opening of 
the Soviet archives tend to suggest that the invaders were much weaker 
and more vulnerable than previously thought, and the defenders much 




Chapter Six: Responsibility for the War   
 
In suggesting that 1941 was a Red victory, Citino’s assumption was that 
the Red Army resolutely fought back against a surprise German attack. 
But what if the war started in very different circumstances and Hitler had 
only launched a pre-emptive strike across the Soviet border because he 
knew of Stalin’s plans to attack westwards? During the Cold War, the 
claim – originally made by the Nazis - that Stalin intended to attack Hitler 
in 1941 was widely dismissed. It is more widely discussed today because 
of the controversy that has developed around the so-called Icebreaker 
thesis.  
 
The argument of this chapter is that the Icebreaker thesis has not 
achieved much traction in the West. As a sample of the historiography on 
this issue, twenty-seven well-known accounts of the outbreak of the war 
were examined, including twenty-one accounts published since the 
opening of the Soviet archives. The only noteworthy change that has 
occurred is that post-archival accounts are more likely to be sympathetic 
to Stalin’s bungling of the opening phase of the war. The results are 
summarised in the following table.  
 











Pre-opening of archives 
Churchill 1950 YES   
Garthoff 1954 YES   
Shirer 1960 YES   
Whaley 1973  YES  
Erickson 1975 YES   
Hoffmann 1984   YES 
Post-opening of archives 
Conquest 1993 YES   
Raack 1995   YES 




Roberts 1998  YES  
Gorodetsky 1999  YES  
Glantz 2001  YES  
Erickson 2001 YES   
Glantz 2005  YES  
Murphy 2005 YES   
Roberts 2006  YES  
Nagorski 2007 YES   
Bellamy 2008  YES  
Mosier 2010 YES   
Hastings 2011 YES   
Roberts 2012  YES  
Beevor 2012 YES   
Kirchubel 2013  YES  
Hartmann 2013 YES   
Luther 2013  YES  
Haslam 2015  YES  
Ellis 2015 YES   
SUMMARY 
Pre-opening of archives 66.6% 16.7% 16.7% 
Post-opening of archives 42.9% 52.4% 4.7% 
Table III 
 
Cold War accounts dealing with the start of the war mostly depicted a 
cynical yet helpless Soviet leadership that was left stunned by the 
surprise German invasion on 22 June 1941. The utter incompetence of the 
Soviet leadership in 1941 was a consistent theme of the early accounts of 
the disastrous performance of the Red Army. William Shirer’s classic 
history of the Third Reich described how Stalin’s pact with Hitler came 
back to haunt him. When France, Poland and the British Expeditionary 
Force were defeated, Hitler had the entire Western European military-
industrial complex at his disposal, and there was no chance of a second 
front opening up in Western Europe to help the Red Army. In 1939-1940, 
an anti-Hitler coalition was still possible, and would have massively 
reduced the German forces thrown against the Soviet Union. In fact, if 
Hitler had known from the start that he would eventually have to take on 
Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union all at once, there might 
not have been a war at all. Stalin received accurate and timely warnings 
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of the looming German attack from the American and British 
governments. For Shirer, it was “almost inconceivable, but is nonetheless 
true, that the men in the Kremlin, who were usually so hard-headed and 
suspicious, refused to take note of the enormous German force on their 
border and the information they were receiving”.648  
 
Winston Churchill agreed with Shirer on these points. He described Soviet 
foreign policy before the invasion as an “error” as much as it was a “cold-
blooded calculation”, which showed the “amazing ignorance about where 
they stood themselves”. To not see the coming German invasion, said 
Churchill, was perhaps the greatest mistake in the history of the world. 
Rather than “selfish” calculations, the collaboration with Hitler was an act 
of “simpletons”. For Churchill, the Soviet victory was won by the heroic 
Soviet masses despite the terrible Soviet leadership: 
 
The force, the mass, the bravery and endurance of mother Russia 
had still to be thrown into the scales. But so far as strategy, policy, 
foresight, competence are arbiters Stalin and his commissars showed 
themselves at this moment the most completely outwitted bunglers 
of the Second World War.  
 
On the other hand, Churchill acknowledged that until the end of March 
1941 he himself was not convinced that Hitler was going to invade the 
U.S.S.R. If anything, it seemed more likely that Hitler and Stalin were 
planning to join forces and divide the spoils of the British Empire. 
Nonetheless, Churchill claimed that all of the evidence from the middle of 
June pointed to a German attack on the Soviet Union, which Stalin chose 
to ignore.649 
 
In the United States, Raymond Garthoff in 1954 offered only a slightly 
                                                 
648 Quotes and information for this summary of Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 
retrieved from pp. 542, 843-844 and 846. 
649 Quotes and information for this summary of Winston Churchill, The Second World War. Volume 
III: The Grand Alliance (Great Britain: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1950) retrieved from pp. 315-317 (long 
quote from p. 316). 
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more sympathetic account of Stalin’s role in the outbreak of the war.650 
According to Garthoff, there were eight main causes of the Soviet 
reverses of the period from June to December 1941. The first was the 
failure of Soviet leadership to follow their doctrine of preparedness 
against attack. The second was German operational and tactical surprise 
and the unplanned retreat. The third was the deployment of Soviet forces 
at the frontier without the necessary mobile reserves. The fourth was that 
there was no plan for withdrawal or strategic defence in depth. The fifth 
was that there was inadequate tactical defensive training. The sixth was 
the breakdown of the communication and command network almost from 
the outset of the fighting. The seventh was the qualitative inferiority of 
Soviet tanks and aircraft. The eighth was the greater combat experience 
of the German invaders.651 While this was a long list of failings for which 
Stalin was ultimately responsible, it is these failings that mean that, 
according to Garthoff, Stalin could not be accused of seeking to launch a 
surprise attack on Hitler’s Germany. 
 
Robert Conquest, who was ferociously critical of Stalin’s method of rule, 
nonetheless did not suggest that Stalin started the war. Conquest’s 
judgment was that Stalin did receive a lot of information about the 
coming invasion, but that: 
 
Not only was Stalin’s assessment erroneous. His system of rule also 
prevented alternative counsels being put forward. His colleagues 
either accepted his superior wisdom, or had to behave as if they did. 
 
Conquest noted that Stalin was convinced of his own military genius. He 
kept close control of how the war was run and thus made a series of 
disruptive “petty interventions”. His steadfast belief in his military genius 
led him to make orders to hold untenable lines and make suicidal counter-
attacks. Such orders culminated in Kiev, “the single greatest defeat of the 
                                                 
650 Raymond L. Garthoff, How Russia Makes War: Soviet Military Doctrine (London: Allen and 




whole war”. Red Army troops fought mainly for fear of Stalin and his 
commissars. It was only “a great increase in the size and powers of the 
army’s security apparatus” that enabled the Red Army to fight at all. Even 
German mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war was in the final analysis 
Stalin’s fault because it was Stalin who refused to sign the Geneva 
Convention. Yet despite this criticism, for Conquest it was Hitler and not 
Stalin that started the war.652 
 
Barton Whaley, writing in the early 1970s, noted that the vast majority of 
experts, analysts and commentators were in agreement that “only the 
monstrous fatuity of a Byzantine dictator and his authoritarian system 
could explain such blindness” as Stalin’s refusal to face facts. Yet upon 
investigating the information available to Stalin, Whaley concluded that 
even the “authentic warnings were mutually inconsistent, individually 
ambiguous, and often transmitted by less than credible sources”. 
Furthermore, the majority of world leaders and intelligence services, 
using basically the same data, miscalculated Hitler’s intentions as badly as 
Stalin did. It was not authoritarianism, paranoia or blindness that lay 
behind the attack because democracies made the same mistakes. For 
Whaley, the surprise Operation Barbarossa attack fitted the Wohlstetter 
model, named after an American analyst who showed, using Pearl Harbor 
as an example, that “strategic surprise could result from ambiguous 
information, information that only the wisdom of hindsight makes seem 
explicit”.653  
 
At the end of the Cold War, the majority view among experts on Soviet 
foreign policy was that Stalin was genuine about his commitment to 
collective security. A minority view held that Stalin preferred to partner 
                                                 
652 Quotes and information used in this summary of Robert Conquest, Stalin: Breaker of Nations 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1993) retrieved from pp. 234, 240, 241-242 (long quote from p. 
234). 
653 Quotes and information used in this summary of Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (The 
MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1973) retrieved from pp. 3-7. 
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with Hitler.654 The view that Stalin had in mind an aggressive war against 
Hitler was confined to a relatively small number of historians. Ernst 
Topitsch and Joachim Hoffmann had written accounts whose aim was to 
show that it was Stalin who was planning a war of annihilation.655 
Hoffmann, the author of the official history’s chapter dealing with the 
Soviet view of the war, argued that Germany had had little choice other 
than to launch a pre-emptive strike. For Hoffmann, there was certainly no 
surprise German attack: as Khrushchëv acknowledged, the Soviet 
leadership had ample warning from diplomatic channels, espionage and 
reconnaissance.656 Soviet scholars did not want to admit to the failings of 
the Communist Party and Soviet government on the eve of the war and 
thus tried to explain the failure to prepare on various “political, economic, 
and military factors” which were “basically no one’s fault”. However, in 
truth “the responsibilities cannot be fudged”. For Hoffmann, blame must 
rest with Stalin, his cronies in the Politburo, the Central Committee and 
the Soviet Government, as well as Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Zhukov and 
Golikov.657  
  
It was Viktor Suvorov (real name Vladimir Rezun), and his Icebreaker 
thesis that brought the question of Stalin’s imperialistic intentions in 1941 
to the fore. Suvorov, who had worked in Soviet intelligence and defected 
to the United Kingdom in 1978, published a series of books in the West 
detailing how Stalin planned to attack Hitler. Suvorov initially attracted 
little attention in the West, but in the 1990s became enormously popular 
in Russia as an explanation of how the Red Army could perform so poorly 
in the opening battles of the war.658 Stalin, according to Suvorov, was a 
fanatical Communist, who was about to attack Hitler in his own version of 
                                                 
654 Uldricks, ‘War, Politics and Memory: Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World War II’, 
p. 66-67; Teddy J. Uldricks, ‘The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?’, Slavic 
Review, vol. 58, no. 3 (Fall, 1999), pp. 628-629. 
655 Gabriel Gorodetsky, The Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. x-xi. 
656 Hoffmann, ‘The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes’, p. 833. 
657 ibid., p. 834. 
658 David M. Humpert, ‘Viktor Suvorov and Operation Barbarossa: Tukhachevskii Revisited’, The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 18, no.1 (2005), p. 73. 
197 
 
Operation Barbarossa; Hitler, anticipating Stalin’s fiendish plan, was able 
to strike first. Suvorov claimed that Stalin intended to invade westward – 
an invasion timed for 6 July 1941 - and had prepared an enormous 
invasion force.659  
 
Suvorov’s case revolved around what he considered to be evidence of 
plans for an offensive war going back to the early 1930s; the advanced 
positioning of Red Army forces near the Soviet border; the massing of 
Soviet paratroopers; the deployment of wheeled tanks to move swiftly 
along the German Autobahn; and ‘flying’ Soviet tanks ready to be airlifted 
into German territory all pointed to the offensive intentions of the Red 
Army.660 According to Suvorov, other pieces of the jigsaw puzzle now 
fitted perfectly. Stalin’s push into eastern Poland massively weakened the 
Soviet Union’s defences, but brought the German and Soviet borders into 
a direct contact more favourable for offensive than defensive action. The 
Soviet Union showed that it was capable of erecting massive, in-depth 
defensive lines over a large area in a short amount of time in 1943 when 
preparing for Kursk. The fact that it did not use its skills in this area in 
1939 could only mean that it had no interest in preparing defences at all. 
Stalin could have bolstered the existing defensive line, built new ones on 
the Soviet-German border, and built several lines in between. Instead, 
the Red Army improved roads and built bridges to open up, rather than 
shut down, the frontier. 
 
Suvorov pointed out that in 1939-1941, when the Soviet Union 
proclaimed itself to be neutral, many thousands of its troops were fighting 
and dying in various campaigns. Stalin seized territories with a population 
of about twenty-three million people: “not bad going for a neutral state”. 
The fact that Hitler had called for Stalin to sign a non-aggression pact 
only days before he invaded Poland was part of the theatre of this era. 
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For Suvorov, Hitler and Stalin were co-accomplices, although Stalin was 
worse than, not just equal to, Hitler in his deviousness. Stalin’s treachery 
began as soon as he signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. According to 
Suvorov, Stalin was following his own timing, and desperately wanted to 
appear to have peaceful intentions with Germany and not provoke war 
before he was ready to attack. Stalin did everything he could to convince 
Hitler that he would remain neutral. Stalin’s orders that there were to be 
no attacks on German reconnaissance planes flying over Soviet territory, 
and the TASS proclamation about the commitment of the Soviet regime to 
the pact with Hitler, constituted an elaborate ruse to lull Hitler into leaving 
the German-Soviet border undefended.661  
 
Suvorov’s account certainly suggested greater agency on the part of 
Stalin who was so often portrayed in the manner of a frightened animal 
paralysed by the headlights of the oncoming German invasion. Yet Stalin 
had often made the point that the Bolsheviks were not pacifists: Bolshevik 
propagandists were developing their themes around the concept of an 
offensive war in May-June 1941, and the Red Army’s doctrine was to fight 
the next war on enemy territory. In the decade following its first 
publication, Suvorov’s Icebreaker thesis was greatly helped by two new 
pieces of evidence that received widespread attention as the Soviet Union 
collapsed. The first piece of evidence was Stalin’s speech to graduating 
students on 5 May 1941. In this speech, Stalin proclaimed that: 
 
Defending our country, we must act offensively. From defence to go 
to a military doctrine of offensive actions. We must transform our 
training, our propaganda, our agitation, our press in an offensive 
spirit. The Red Army is a modern army and the modern army is an 
offensive army.662 
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The second piece of evidence was a proposal to Stalin over the signatures 
of Commissar for Defence Timoshenko and Stavka head Zhukov to launch 
a pre-emptive strike against Hitler that appears to have been formulated 
for the dictator on 15 May 1941.663  
 
Richard Raack was the most outspoken of the minority of Western 
historians to have come out in support of the Icebreaker thesis. For 
Raack, Stalin was the arch villain of the twentieth century. Stalin was the 
joint instigator of the Second World War, and a totalitarian and duplicitous 
expansionist who caused the Cold War as well. According to Raack, Stalin 
never abandoned the Communist dream of world revolution.664 Stalin, like 
Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese military government, viewed war as 
the means of achieving political goals. It was only because Stalin was 
more cautious and less flamboyant than his counterparts that he was able 
to convince Western statesmen that he was a “sincere, plausible, and 
reasonable partner in international affairs”.665 The invasion of Finland and 
Poland were small steps towards the goal of conquering central and 
Western Europe for Communism. It was the signing of the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact and the carving up of Eastern Europe that led directly to the 
outbreak of the Second World War.666 The ease with which Stalin was able 
to annex Poland, Bessarabia and the Baltic States emboldened Stalin to 
think that he could get away with anything. Stalin provoked Hitler by 
pushing his imperialist agenda in the Balkans and then adopted the 
wrong-headed view that Hitler would not repeat the mistake of the First 
World War and open a second front with Russia.667 For Raack the denial 
by the majority of Western historians of the Icebreaker thesis was 
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evidence of a Leftist conspiracy to hide Stalin’s shared guilt in the causes 
of the Second World War.668  
 
If it were true that Stalin had intended to attack Hitler in 1941, then that 
would raise the bar considerably in terms of what a ‘Red victory’ would 
require. Yet Western historians have largely rejected the Icebreaker 
hypothesis. The evidence strongly shows that the Red Army was simply 
not ready, organised, trained, or equipped enough to carry out an attack 
in the summer of 1941.669 For many Western historians, Stalin did not 
want war against Germany in 1941 because he knew that he would lose. 
The standard view during the Cold War was that the Red Army had been 
severely weakened by the purges. The effects of the purges were 
especially noticeable on the front line where the Red Army performed 
poorly in 1939-1941.670 While the war against Japan in the Far East had 
gone reasonably well, the invasions of Poland and Finland in 1939 
revealed the full scale of the deficiencies of the Red Army. As Glantz has 
put it, the 15 May pre-emptive strike plan, often cited as evidence of 
Stalin’s intentions, was “normal contingency planning, a routine function 
of the General Staff”.671 There is no clear evidence that Stalin approved or 
even saw the plan.672  
 
For Glantz, the Icebreaker thesis was “a virtual by-product of political 
turmoil in the Soviet Union shortly before its fall”.673 Glantz noted that, 
“[all] existing archival sources refute this contentious assertion”.674 For 
Glantz, Stalin was not guilty of “obstinate blindness” in refusing to believe 
that the Germans would invade when they did, but was guilty of “wishful 
thinking”.675 Stalin genuinely believed that Germany’s enemies - Britain 
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and the Polish resistance - were actively trying to involve Moscow in a 
war. Stalin considered that putting extra troops on the border in a war 
footing would be the kind of casus belli that might provoke Hitler to 
invade.676 Evidence of Stalin’s desperation includes his scrupulous 
adherence to the economic clauses of the Soviet-German agreement; the 
last Soviet train to enter German territory did so only hours before the 
invasion began.677 Ironically, the fact that Hitler delayed the start of the 
invasion of the Soviet Union to accommodate the invasion of Yugoslavia - 
a delay often criticised as dooming the invasion - helped sow confusion 
around Operation Barbarossa by causing its start date to be changed from 
the original date of 15 May. Many of the initially correct intelligence 
warnings of the invasion were rendered incorrect, thus leading Stalin to 
become more distrustful of warnings of impending war.678 For Glantz, the 
Red Army was caught in between a defensive and offensive posture when 
the invasion came.679 The most important factor was not strategic or 
tactical surprise, but institutional surprise. Hitler managed to attack when 
his forces were strongest, and when the Soviet forces were in a state of 
transition and reorganisation.680  
 
Uldricks attacked Suvorov by pointing out that his thesis is “not entirely 
novel; it has been made before – by Adolf Hitler”,681 and that his books 
are “sensationalistic and journalistic in the worst sense”.682 The Israeli 
historian Gabriel Gorodetsky strongly criticised Suvorov’s “flimsy and 
fraudulent” work and placed Suvorov in the context of the German 
historikerstreit of the late 1980s.683 The historikerstreit was a dispute 
over Germany’s ‘historic past’ where conservative German historians 
launched an attack on ‘left-wing’ views that Nazism and Hitler were 
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somehow different to and worse than Communism and Stalin. According 
to Gorodetsky, Stalin’s actions were driven above all by a genuine desire 
to avoid war.684 The Soviet state’s foreign policy was characterised by “a 
gradual but consistent retreat from hostility to the capitalist regimes 
towards peaceful coexistence based on mutual expediency”.685 The Nazi-
Soviet Pact was not an alliance with a view to attacking the West, but was 
a product of Stalin’s deep mistrust of Britain, an historic enemy of 
imperial Russia. Stalin believed that Britain would do everything in its 
power to foment war between the Soviet Union and Germany.686 Stalin, a 
practitioner of Realpolitik, understood the weakness of the purged Soviet 
military and did everything he could to avoid war, not because he was a 
proponent of peace, but because he was not ready for war. Stalin’s 
intense desire to avoid war meant that he ignored not only the British 
reports, but also his own intelligence services. 
 
For Gorodetsky, Stalin was no revolutionary zealot. Instead he was typical 
of the tsars who preceded him in his concerns for maintaining the great 
power status of Russia. Stalin was defensive rather than offensive, but 
ultimately mistaken in his rational assumption that Hitler would not be so 
foolish as to launch a two-front war.687 Stalin cowed his entourage into 
submission, and his suspicions “led to self-deception of colossal 
proportions”. Stalin subscribed to the illusion that there was a split 
between a peaceful Hitler and a warlike Wehrmacht. In mid-April when 
Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, head of military intelligence, informed Stalin of 
massive German troop movements to the west, Stalin’s strategy was to 
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balance his loyalty to the pact with not appearing to be so weak that the 
Germans would be tempted to attack him.  
 
Gorodetsky dismissed the idea that Stalin had excellent knowledge of the 
likely date of the invasion. Soviet spy Richard Sorge’s reports from Tokyo 
were contradictory, sometimes based on out-of-date information, and did 
nothing to steer Stalin away from his conviction that an invasion was 
much less likely than further diplomatic pressure from Hitler. Nonetheless, 
the disaster of 1941 was Stalin’s fault because: 
 
Stalin’s refusal to reckon with the potential consequences of a 
miscalculation, while adamantly pursuing his appeasement and 
avoiding provocation at all costs was perhaps the single most 
important factor in the calamity.688  
 
Western accounts that are very critical of Stalin’s political and military 
acumen have nonetheless tended to exonerate Stalin of aggressive intent 
in 1941. David E. Murphy described a duped Stalin whose actions were in 
part driven by suspicion of Western provocation, and added that even 
though intelligence reaching Stalin regarding German intentions was 
accurate, the Soviet dictator was locked into a Marxist view of the world 
that assumed that Western governments and their intelligence services 
saw the Soviet Union as the principal enemy.689 Ultimately Stalin did not 
expect an attack in June 1941 and did everything in his power to avoid 
provoking one, including lulling his own people with calming propaganda 
about the strength of the relationship with Germany. All of this proved 
almost fatal when it was the Germans who struck with massive force and 
the advantage of surprise. 
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According to Hastings, Stalin was well informed by spies such as Sorge as 
to the exact date of the coming invasion, but refused to believe the 
reports for inexplicable reasons. To make matters worse, his obstinate 
refusal to prepare for war was a fatal and terrible mistake.690 Hitler was 
simply the better poker player who easily fooled a surprisingly gullible 
Stalin. Even though Stalin expected that he would eventually end up 
fighting Nazi Germany, in 1939 he sought territorial expansion with the 
aid of Hitler. Hastings argued that Stalin’s refusal to heed the warnings 
were a result of German misinformation, a firm belief that Germany would 
not open a second front, and Ruldof Hess’ flight to Britain, which only 
served to heighten his suspicions of potential British-German co-
operation. According to Hastings, Stalin foolishly thought that he would be 
the one to choose when war began. As a consequence, the opening 
months of the war were a remarkable mismatch. The Red Army was 
caught unprepared for war. Stalin’s purges had killed off most of the 
senior officers and replaced them with “incompetent lackeys”. After the 
routs of Bialystok, Minsk and Smolensk, Stalin retreated to his dacha in a 
state of nervous collapse.691 
 
Kirchubel described an active and somewhat shrewder Stalin who was 
confronted with a dilemma that would have been difficult for any leader to 
resolve. According to Kirchubel, Stalin never took the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
seriously and was just buying time to continue his military build-up via 
the third Five Year Plan. In this, Stalin was no different to Britain and 
France, who sacrificed Czechoslovakia in order to buy a few more months 
of peace at Munich. The Pact, from a Soviet perspective, was an entirely 
successful undertaking because it kept the Soviet Union out of the 
European war for nearly two years. Stalin was aggressive and confident in 
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this period, as shown through his actions in the Baltics and Bessarabia, 
but also in his dealings with Hitler. Stalin genuinely believed that he had 
Nazi Germany in his pocket through the trade agreements that he 
assumed were vital to Hitler, whose war in Western Europe made him 
dependent on Soviet resources. Stalin was convinced too that Hitler would 
not dare open a second front while the Anglo-American maritime powers 
maintained their ascendency over the oceans. Thirdly, he was convinced 
that the invasion would be announced with some kind of ultimatum, as 
had been done with Czechoslovakia and Poland. Ultimately, Stalin got it 
very wrong, and in doing so handed the Germans operational, strategic 
and tactical surprise. In the final analysis, however, Stalin was “amply 
forewarned” of the German invasion, yet chose to remain “blissfully 
ignorant”.692 
 
Erickson dismissed any suggestions that Hitler’s was a pre-emptive attack 
as “fantasies, fictions and inventions [that] do not bear comparison with a 
horrendous reality”.693 For Erickson, no matter how much Stalin tried to 
“wall up in a safe” the mounting evidence of the impending German 
invasion from internal and external sources, “[before] many weeks were 
out, the safes began to bulge”.694 Thus, Stalin’s “dogged, obstinate 
pursuit of what became self-disarming mechanisms” became a terrible 
cost that the Soviet Union had to bear.695  
 
Bellamy argued that Stalin and Hitler belong together in the “totalitarian 
camp”, but noted that the British and French left Stalin with little choice 
other than to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Most likely, Stalin was getting 
ready to attack Germany at some point, but Bellamy inclined to the more 
traditional view that 1942 would have been the preferred option. In the 
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lead up to the Nazi invasion, Soviet intelligence services had been 
receiving varied, contrasting and disparate reports, leading to confusion 
more than anything else. According to Bellamy, part of the case made for 
the pre-emptive strike, the text of an address to the Politburo by Stalin on 
19 August 1939, was a forgery planted by French intelligence. Instead, 
the Red Army was “in the middle of reorganization, retraining and re-
equipment. Their formations were gearing up for a war still some way 
ahead”. Bellamy described the 15 May “considerations” as 
“circumstantial” and noted that the plan was simply one of many drawn 
up by the Soviet command before the war. When elements of the plan 
were used after 22 June, this was simply because it was one of the only 
workable plans the Soviet command had at their disposal once the 
invasion came. For Bellamy, Stalin was suffering from a psychological 
illness: 
 
Stalin’s behaviour shows the classic symptoms of someone who is in 
‘denial’. Humanistic psychologists recognize a phenomenon where 
people who have an overinflated idea of their own abilities or 
importance slip (unconsciously) into a state where they do not look 
for, or dismiss, information which contradicts their formed view.  
  
Nonetheless, Bellamy’s criticism of Stalin is muted. Stalin ignored the 
“superb intelligence provided by his own services, and also sincerely given 
by the British”. On the other hand, Stalin rejected or ignored this 
intelligence “for understandable reasons”.696  
 
Mawdsley is one historian who has taken a different approach to the 
problem of the disastrous start of the war for the Red Army. While not 
agreeing with the Icebreaker hypothesis, he does accept that, rather than 
their lack of preparation for war, it may have been the nature of their 
plans that doomed the Red Army. Mawdsley has argued that the 
calamitous early defeats are only comprehensible when it is realised that 
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the Red Army chose not to prepare a defence in depth, but instead was 
planning either an attack or counter-attack in the opening phase of the 
war. Stalin had absorbed the lessons of history too literally. In the First 
World War, the Russian Army became bogged down when it attacked 
Germany through northern Poland, but had subsequently achieved its 
great successes further south. In 1941 then, Stalin’s plan was to attack 
southern Poland through the corridor that separated the Pripiat’ marshes 
from the Carpathians. This meant that the Red Army was strongest west 
of Kiev and weakest in Belorussia where the main German attack actually 
came.  
 
Stalin’s generals wrongly assumed that the Germans would need weeks to 
concentrate their forces and that this could not be done secretly. 
Catastrophically for the Red Army, the Soviet generals “could not grasp 
that it was the Red Army that would be caught by surprise”. The strong 
Red Army forces on the border were supposed to hold the Germans while 
the remainder of the Red Army was mobilised. Because the Red Army 
planned to fight and hold an invasion at the border, aviation and tanks 
had to be placed near the frontiers, and the new borders in Poland had to 
be fortified because the rail network did not allow for timely movement 
from deep inside the Soviet Union. Thus when the invasion came, Soviet 
forces were both incorrectly concentrated to the south, and too close to 
the border to avoid disaster.697 
 
For Roberts, Stalin’s refusal to heed the warnings of invasion was not a 
question of Stalin’s psychology. The dictator’s hand was forced by the 
political and military realities of the situation. Roberts has noted that 
Stalin may have been well aware of the danger, but underestimated the 
likely consequences of a German attack. From what Zhukov and 
Vasilevskiĭ reported later it is clear that the strategic thinking in the 
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Politburo and the High Command was that even an undeclared war would 
be fought for a period (possibly as long as three weeks) along the 
frontiers.698 Stalin was of the view as late as 21 June that “what was 
unfolding was a peace scenario, not the outbreak of war”.699 The German 
campaign to deceive Stalin was successful because it confirmed for Stalin 
his hope that, while there were tensions, Hitler would not launch a 
premature two-front war against Britain and the Soviet Union.700 For 
Roberts, Stalin’s mistake was his failure to realise just how quickly the 
Germans could overrun the Soviet frontier were they to launch a surprise 
attack.701 
 
In summary, only a minority of Western historians agree with Suvorov 
that Hitler pre-empted an imminent Red Army attack on 22 June 1941. 
This is not to suggest that Stalin’s role in the outbreak of the war is 
settled for all time. There are many documents apparently still to be 
released from Russia’s Presidential Archive and available information 
about the war is much less plentiful in Russia today than it was in the 
1990s. Archival freedom for Western or Russian historians was never total 
and there remains the suspicion that potentially crucial material is still 
hidden. Ever since the early 1990s, historians have complained that many 
sections of the archives – notably the Presidential Archive - remain 
closed.702 Orders, directives communicated orally, and formal as well as 
informal conversations that took place during important meetings may 
have left no trace. Dmitri Volkogonov, the principal Soviet military 
historian of the Gorbachëv era, claimed that the extensive archival 
materials he was allowed to consult in his research contained “practically 
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nothing on the General Staff’s discussion of strategic questions”.703 
Meanwhile, Russian definitions of a ‘sensitive’ topic have changed over 
time. At first, scholars were more likely to be rebuffed by archive officials 
if they were investigating the 1920s and 1930s. That is now more likely to 
be true if they are researching the Great Patriotic War.704 Gorodetsky has 
described how he had significantly more access to archival documents 
when he started his research into the events of 22 June, but that 
documents that he was previously allowed to study are now prohibited 
and stored in the Presidential Archive.705 Although once extensively used 
by researchers,706 the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense 
(TsAMO) is again largely off-limits to foreigners.707 Writing in 2017 Hill 
lamented that:  
 
The Soviet military archives were for a number of practical and 
political reasons not opened up to the same extent as many other 
archives, and access for Western researchers is now arguably worse 
than it was during the 1990s.708 
 
Because historians have no way of knowing what remains hidden in 
Soviet archives, it cannot be claimed that the Icebreaker controversy is 
definitively resolved. The point to be made here is that for most Western 
historians writing after the Cold War, Stalin’s alleged intention to strike at 
Hitler in 1941 is a dead end that hinders an understanding of why the 
German invasion was initially so successful. Apart from Raack, Topitsch 
and Hoffmann, it is difficult to find arguments for the Icebreaker thesis in 
the Western military literature about 1941. Even the vehemently anti-
                                                 
703 Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. Edited and Translated by Harold Shukman 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), p. 452.  
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708 Hill, The Red Army and the Second World War, p. 1. 
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Stalin Frank Ellis described Suvorov as a “talented maverick”,709 whose 
thesis “spectacularly unravels” when put to close scrutiny.710  
 
Viewed in these terms, the debate around the origins of the war between 
Stalin and Hitler has not undermined a “Red victory” case in the terms 
discussed in this thesis. Western historians are mostly in agreement that 
1941 saw an unprovoked German invasion of the Soviet Union, and that 
Stalin was desperately trying to avoid war. The only noteworthy change in 
the historiography is that over time Western historians tended to suggest 
that Stalin, far from being unaware of or paralysed by the danger, was 
faced with a difficult predicament, that warnings of the invasion were 
often contradictory, and that Soviet plans made for the coming war were 
based on the mistaken assumption of a war fought at the frontiers. Stalin 
received many varied and contradictory reports regarding whether 
invasion would come and what date it would begin, and thus can be 
partially excused for not believing the one of many that finally gave him 
the correct details.711 The Icebreaker thesis has gained much more 
traction in Russia since the end of the Cold War. As we shall see, the 
divergence over the Icebreaker thesis was the main point of difference 






                                                 
709 Ellis, Barbarossa 1941, p. xxvii. 
710 ibid., p. 430; see pp. 425-430 for Ellis’ step by step rebuttal of Suvorov’s arguments. 
711 Luther, Barbarossa Unleashed, pp. 162-164; Bellamy, Absolute War, pp. 136-137, 145-153; 
Jonathan Haslam, Near and Present Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), pp. 100-115.  
211 
 
Chapter Seven: The Official Soviet View of the War 
 
It would simply not be possible to read all, or even a significant 
proportion, of the Russian-language military histories devoted to the 
events of 1941. A Russian research team calculated that by 2002, there 
were some 8,784 publications, including 875 books, dedicated to the 
Battle of Moscow.712  This vast literature was spread across five periods: 
the Stalin era from 1941 to 1953; the Khrushchëv era from 1956 to 1964; 
the Brezhnev era from 1965 to 1982; the Gorbachëv era of 1985-1991; 
and the post-Soviet period. As we shall see in Chapter Nine, the debate 
over the war continues to fuel new publications at a great rate. 
 
Rather than try to cover all of that literature, the approach in the next 
three chapters is to look at publications that are prominent in the expert 
commentary and bibliographies and represent the three most noteworthy 
Russian-language paradigms; the official Soviet view of the war; the 
“revisionist” critique of the Soviet view of the war that came to 
prominence after 1987; and the “national-patriotic” reaction to the 
revisionists that is especially prominent in the Putin era. In much the 
same way that the German generals set the agenda for decades of debate 
about 1941 in the West, the official Soviet account of the war was the 
starting point for all subsequent Russian-language histories.  
 
Writing during the Cold War, Harrison Salisbury remarked that the 
“[h]istory in Russia should be published in loose-leafed books so that 
pages can be extracted and new ones inserted”.713 In fact, the Soviet 
view of the war was more consistent than this remark suggests. While 
figures such as Stalin, Khrushchëv and Zhukov moved in and out of 
Soviet histories depending upon the era, the basic account of the events 
                                                 
712 V. I. Nevzorov and V. P. Filatov (eds), Moskovskaia bitva v khronike faktov i sobitiĭ (Moscow: 
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713 Harrison E. Salisbury, ‘Introduction’ in Zhukov, Zhukov’s Greatest Battles [1971], p. 17. 
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of 1941 did not change during the Soviet period. There were at least 
three consistent assertions of the official Soviet view. Firstly, the Soviet 
Union was the only European state in the 1930s genuinely committed to 
peace. Secondly, the Soviet system displayed unprecedented solidarity in 
the face of the trial imposed by the Nazis because it had the unwavering 
support of its people. Thirdly, the Red Army, unlike other victims of Nazi 
aggression, was a powerful fighting machine that fought on against the 
odds in 1941 and displayed incredible heroism on the battlefield. 
 
From the start of the war to the dictator’s death in 1953, the events of 
1941 were used to show Stalin as a military genius, who enacted a grand 
plan to lure the Germans deep into Soviet territory before the Red Army 
launched its powerful counter-attack.714 Apart from claiming that Stalin 
successfully planned the defeat of the Germans, Stalin-era accounts also 
insisted that it was the West and not the Soviet Union that had facilitated 
Hitler’s aggression. Responding to the publication in the early period of 
the Cold War of documents detailing Soviet-Nazi co-operation, the Soviet 
government countered that the Communist state had made every effort 
at collective security in order to prevent Nazi aggression.715 Out of hatred 
of Communism, Russophobia, and the influence of anti-Communist 
politicians such as Harry S. Truman, the West preferred to encourage Nazi 
Germany to attack the Soviet Union.716 The Nazis were part of a Western 
“crusade” against the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the enemy 
became not “Fascism”, but “imperialism”, a broad category in which many 
enemies of the Soviet Union could be placed. The Soviet Union alone had 
delivered the world from Hitlerite tyranny, and the so-called Allies had not 
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only betrayed the Red Army by refusing to open a second front, but had 
actively colluded with the Germans.717  
 
A first draft of what would become the official Soviet view of the war 
appeared as the conflict still raged, when a classified military guide 
analysed the Battle of Moscow. It focused upon the winter of 1941-1942 
and its authorship was attributed to Boris Shaposhnikov, a veteran 
member of Stalin’s inner military elite.718 Shaposhnikov’s study restricted 
its coverage to the period 16 November 1941 to 31 January 1942, thus 
avoiding the defeats of the summer and the Moscow panic while focusing 
on the winter counter-attack. Shaposhnikov scrupulously avoided 
mentioning the names of all Soviet commanders apart from Stalin and 
Zhukov. The most important factor in the Red victory at Moscow was, in 
Shaposhnikov’s view, Stalin’s “wise plan”. Firstly, the Germans were worn 
down by the Red Army’s “active defence” at the frontiers based around a 
solid system of fortifications. Secondly, the Moscow zone of defence 
became a stronghold both for the defence of the capital and the 
assembling of new forces that could be directed as required to 
endangered sections of the front line. Thirdly, reserve armies were 
created behind the front and were used by Stalin to defend Moscow and 
enable the decisive counter-attack of December 1941. In the end, “the 
German defeat at Moscow was carried out according to the plan of the 
Supreme Commander Stalin, and under his personal guidance”.719  
 
Shaposhnikov scoffed at suggestions that the weather was responsible for 
the “miracle of Moscow”. For Shaposhnikov, the weather only became 
important during the Red Army counter-attack in January 1942. It was 
                                                 
717 Matthew P. Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories, and Realities (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publisher, 1963), pp. 3 and 23; Tumarkin, The Living and the 
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Soviet manoeuvres that were most adversely affected by the cold. 
Shaposhnikov pointed to the average temperatures of November (minus 
five), December (minus two) and January (minus nineteen). Thus, 
according to Shaposhnikov, the Germans had it relatively easy in 
November and December, and were fortunate that Zhukov’s counter-
attack was blunted as a result of the difficulties wrought on Soviet 
logistics by the severe cold weather of January. In fact, the weather was 
the cover for a series of German blunders. Shaposhnikov noted errors in 
German war planning, including the failure to take the Russian landscape 
properly into consideration when planning Operation Typhoon, and the 
absence of reinforcements behind frontline troops.  
  
Shaposhnikov also set the tone for future accounts of the Battle of 
Moscow by citing instances of heroism drawn from Soviet press reports. 
Between July 1941 and July 1942, 5,050 newspaper articles – between 
twelve and thirteen every day – appeared in the national and local 
Moscow press detailing the heroic defence of the capital by Red Army 
soldiers at the front, partisans in the rear of the enemy and the civilians 
of the home front.720 The most famous story concerned the deeds of 
General Ivan Panfilov and the 316th Infantry Division. Allegedly based on 
events during the Battle of Moscow, Stalin’s propagandists embellished 
this story beyond all recognition.721 On 16 November, during the defence 
of Volokolamsk, Panfilov’s twenty-eight men found themselves under 
attack from twenty German tanks.722 The hero of the story was 
Commissar V. I. Klochkov who was reported to have turned to his men 
and proclaimed, “[i]t’s not so bad. Less than one tank per man!”.723 In 
the ensuing fighting, the outnumbered Soviet troops destroyed eighteen 
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tanks and killed scores of German troops.724 Klochkov himself was killed 
running under a tank holding grenades after being badly wounded.725 
There was no sympathy for alleged cowards and traitors. As 
Shaposhnikov described the Panfilov twenty-eight: 
 
Among them were Russians, Ukrainians, collective farm workers from 
Tal’gar and Kazakhs from Alma-Alta. Their brotherhood, bound in 
blood, was the embodiment of the martial friendship of the peoples 
of our country, which rose up against their mortal enemy. There 
were 28 heroes. A twenty-ninth was a despised coward who was 
terminated by the Guards themselves.726  
 
By an order of 21 July 1942, all twenty eight Panfilovtsy became Heroes 
of the Soviet Union, the most prestigious recognition of wartime service 
during the Soviet period.   
 
Similar to the Red Army example of Panfilov’s twenty-eight, tales of 
individual civilian heroism summed up a remarkably patriotic response to 
the invasion. While lands housing forty per cent of the Soviet population 
were occupied, the people resisted rather than collaborated. As early as 
August 1941, partisan committees prepared stocks of weapons and 
supplies in response to the government’s call. By November 1941, Soviet 
propagandists highlighted the stoic bravery of Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia, a 
young Komsomol activist and partisan executed by the Germans on 29 
November 1941, as the model partisan.727  
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During the war, the salvation of Moscow was celebrated for propaganda 
purposes.728 After the war, Stalin did not encourage close examination of 
the events of 1941 and the studies of the Battle of Moscow were relatively 
few in number.729 To discuss 1941 too closely was to discuss how the 
Germans managed to get so close to the Soviet capital. The accounts of 
the Battle of Moscow that appeared in the early part of the Cold War 
instead followed Shaposhnikov’s formula. The chaotic opening to the war 
was ignored, German and Western collaboration emphasised, iconic tales 
of heroism such as Panfilov’s twenty-eight and Zoia substituted for the 
reactions of ordinary people to the war, and Stalin was praised as a 
strategic and military genius. 
 
The question that could not be asked while Stalin was alive was how it 
could have been that the Red Army, the ‘greatest army in the world’, 
could have performed so badly in the opening battles of the Great 
Patriotic War. In his 1956 address to the Twentieth Party Congress, 
Khrushchёv virulently attacked Stalin, his repressions following the Kirov 
decrees, his ‘cult of personality’, his purge of the military, his failure to 
heed the warnings of impending war, and his conduct once the war 
actually started. Khrushchёv argued that Stalin had strayed from the path 
laid down by Lenin, and that it was anathema in “Marxism-Leninism to 
elevate one person, to transform him into a superman possessing 
supernatural characteristics, akin to those of a god”.  
 
Khrushchёv attacked the official Stalin-era histories as instruments of 
Stalin’s propaganda and megalomania: 
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When we look at many of our novels, films and historical-scientific 
studies, the role of Stalin in the Patriotic War appears to be entirely 
improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. The Soviet Army, on the 
basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the 
tactics of so-called "active defense," … The epic victory gained 
through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through our 
heroic people, is ascribed in this type of novel, film and "scientific 
study" as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin. 
 
Stalin refused to adequately prepare for war despite the warnings: “Had 
our industry been mobilized properly and in time to supply the Army with 
the necessary materiel, our wartime losses would have been decidedly 
smaller”. To add insult to grievous injury, Stalin then claimed victory in 
the war to rest entirely on his own shoulders. Khrushchёv stated that: 
 
Stalin very energetically popularized himself as a great leader. In 
various ways he tried to inculcate the notion that the victories gained 
by the Soviet nation during the Great Patriotic War were all due to 
the courage, daring, and genius of Stalin and of no one else … Not 
Stalin, but the Party as a whole, the Soviet government, our heroic 
Army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the whole Soviet nation 
– these are the ones who assured the victory in the Great Patriotic 
War.730 
 
On 12 September 1957, the Central Committee decreed that work would 
begin on the first multi-volume history of the war. The six-volume Istoriia 
Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg (hence 
‘Khrushchëv-era Istoriia’) emerged from the Institute of Marxism-
Leninism between 1960 and 1965. This work, according to Glantz, 
“exemplified the de-Stalinization process and Khrushchevian glasnost’”.731 
In the Khrushchëv era, Stalin’s name all but disappeared and the 
combined efforts of the Communist Party and the heroic Soviet people 
took his place as the key to victory. In the Khrushchëv-era Istoriia volume 
dealing with the Battle of Moscow, Stalin is not mentioned until the forty-
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sixth page of the chapter on Operation Typhoon, and even then only as 
the Chairman of the State Defence Committee giving his report on the 
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution “on behalf of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU(b)”.732 When Stalin is mentioned, the references 
are to his address in the Maiakovskiĭ Square Metro station on 6 November 
1941 and his appearance at Red Square the following day.733  
 
Just like in the Stalin era, Soviet historians had to adjust their accounts to 
suit the politics of the era. As soon as the war was over, Zhukov fell out 
of favour and was written out of the histories so that Stalin alone was the 
genius of victory. Zhukov returned to favour after Stalin’s death and 
assisted Khrushchëv and his allies in the arrest of Lavrentiĭ Beria, a rival 
for power. By 1957, Khrushchëv had fallen out with Zhukov who now 
disappeared, along with Stalin, from the histories; a Resolution of the 
General Committee concluded at the time that Zhukov’s “person and role 
in the Great Patriotic War were excessively glorified”.734 In A. M. 
Samsonov’s account of the Battle of Moscow that appeared in 1958, there 
was only a single mention of Zhukov, who was described simply as the 
commander of the West Front at the time of the December counter-
offensive.735  
 
As Erickson has noted, a ‘mini-cult’ of Khrushchëv now emerged.736 In the 
Khrushchëv-era Istoriia, Khrushchëv was mentioned on one hundred and 
thirty two occasions: more often than the GKO and Stalin. Khrushchëv 
was mentioned seven times more than Zhukov, whose name appeared 
only sixteen times, and mostly in connection with failures of one kind or 
another.737 Stalin’s stubborn determination to hold Kiev led to the mass 
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encirclement of Soviet troops: disaster would have been avoided if only 
Stavka had at the time agreed with Khrushchёv’s proposals.738 
 
Soviet readers under Khrushchëv were granted a very limited view into 
how the Soviet state and Red Army had planned for the war. The 
Khrushchëv-era Istoriia noted that there was a plan of “defence of the 
Western state frontiers” whereby the forces positioned at the frontier 
would repulse the invader’s blows, cover the mobilisation, strategic 
concentration and development of the main forces of the army. The 
Soviet leadership, that is, Stalin, had failed to take into account the 
possibility of a surprise attack. It was assumed that there would be a 
declaration of war or fighting at the frontiers that would allow the Red 
Army to set in motion an effective defence. An indecisive Soviet 
leadership did not give the necessary orders to ready the Red Army for 
war in the immediate pre-war period.  
 
For all the criticism of Stalin and the disappearance of Zhukov, the 
Khrushchëv-era histories did not alter the basic storyline of 1941. Hitler 
was the aggressor, the Soviet state responded magnificently to the 
challenge, and the people stayed loyal to their government. The Red 
Army was taken by surprise and was outnumbered by the Germans who 
were at the height of their power with a battle-hardened army, excellent 
equipment and all of Europe as their resource base. The Soviet Union was 
attacked at a time when the Red Army, unaware of the planned sneak 
attack, was not at combat readiness, and in was some cases many miles 
from front defence positions. The core of this version of the history - the 
Soviet people holding together in the face of a surprise attack by a 
powerful Germany – remained constant until the Gorbachëv period.739 
Khrushchëv-era histories contended, as Stalin had done, that German 
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aggression was allowed to go unchecked for so long due to the Western 
refusal to genuinely embrace collective security. Western governments 
actively encouraged a German attack on the Soviet Union.740  
 
There was now an attempt to tell the story of the Soviet people at war, 
but conducted within strict limitations. The Khrushchëv-era Istoriia 
described the remarkable reaction of the Soviet people to the news of the 
outbreak of war: 
 
With tears in their eyes, the Soviet people learned that the Nazis had 
lied when disseminating messages about the fall of Moscow, and that 
Moscow stood unshaken. Listening to the voice of their Party, they 
were imbued with a deep faith in the power of the Soviet state, in the 
unbreakable will for the Soviet people’s victory, in the inevitable 
defeat of the Nazi invaders.741 
 
The solidarity of the Soviet state and people was emphasised in new 
histories dealing with the defence of the Soviet capital.742 In 1964, there 
appeared a history of the Battle of Moscow under the auspices of the 
Military-History Section of the General Staff with overall editorship 
attributed to Marshal Sokolovskiĭ that was devoted to the contribution not 
just of leaders but of Muscovites more broadly.743 The experiences of 
soldiers, partisans and civilians were included in a detailed military 
history. Needless to say, only the recollections of Soviet patriots and 
heroes were included in these accounts of the people at war. When the 
military historian Samsonov attempted to insert a more realistic view of 
the suffering, dying and heroism, he was denounced for slandering the 
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heroes of the war; Soviet histories, including Samsonov’s, had to be 
written to a formula that did not allow grief and suffering to move outside 
official boundaries.744  
 
Samsonov’s 1958 account of the Battle of Moscow began with an attack 
on the Western historians Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller, whose crimes 
were to emphasise the importance of the weather in order to belittle the 
Soviet military achievement.745 Samsonov pointed out that the Germans 
were first defeated on 28 November at Rostov on the Sea of Azov, where 
the conditions were relatively mild.746 This was an early example of the 
long-running interaction between Soviet and Western texts. Although 
Western histories were not available to the average Soviet reader, they 
certainly were available to the Soviet historians, who criticised the West 
for their adherence to the view of the German generals, and their 
belittlement of Soviet martial prowess.  
 
Another target of Soviet historians was the claim made in the West that 
crucial Western aid had propped up the Soviet war effort. Soviet accounts 
did sometimes acknowledge Western Lend-Lease aid by noting 
Roosevelt’s willingness to support the Soviet Union. However, these 
accounts invariably framed the American aid as cynical pragmatism, a 
response to the fact that a German victory over the Soviet Union would 
not be beneficial in the short term to Western plans.747 According to 
Sokolovskiĭ, before December 1941 the Western Allies refused to believe 
that the Soviet Union could win, and thus the total economic assistance 
received only amounted to only one tenth of a per cent of that promised 
by the end of the year.748 Western promises were cynical and 
disingenuous until Soviet victory seemed possible, and later supplies only 
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came grudgingly. Certainly, these supplies were not decisive in achieving 
the victory. Khrushchëv himself knew the truth that Western aid had 
contributed to the Soviet victory by supplying lorries, food and medicine 
at crucial periods but only admitted this in his memoir, which was 
smuggled to the West to be published six years after his removal from the 
Soviet leadership.749 
 
Khrushchëv fell from power in 1964 in part because he was perceived as 
too radical a reformer. The ensuing Brezhnev era (1965-1982) might be 
viewed as an attempt to compromise between the Stalin and Khrushchëv 
versions of the war with ever greater emphasis upon the contribution of 
the Soviet people to the victory. As Nina Tumarkin has pointed out, from 
the mid-1960s, the Brezhnev regime “created nothing less than a full-
blown cult of the Great Patriotic War. This included a panoply of saints, 
sacred relics, and a rigid master-narrative of the war”.750  
 
While the overblown rhetoric of the Soviet era can be easily dismissed as 
Communist propaganda, it should be recognised that this ‘super-
patriotism’ had a long history in Russia. How the story of the Great 
Patriotic War was framed during the Soviet period has to be viewed in a 
broader context of the traditional discourse that Russian elites have 
deployed to talk about Russia. Hitler and his generals often described 
Russia as barbaric, backward and “Asiatic”. This was the mirror reverse of 
the image that dominated within the Soviet Union itself. Long before the 
Communists, most Russians learned from government propaganda that 
the tsarist state was a benevolent civilization builder in contrast to the 
violence and exploitation of the Western colonial empires.751 As Hosking 
has put it, “Russian national feeling itself readily takes universalist and 
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messianic forms”.752 According to this view, the Russian state has had a 
civilising mission.753 Over the centuries this idea of the good Russian 
empire united imperial state builders like Peter the Great, Slavophiles, 
pan-Slavists, Westernisers, Eurasianists, Communists like Stalin and, 
arguably the modern Russian elite, Putin included.754 As James Billington 
has put it, there was a “Russian predilection for theories of history that 
promise universal redemption but attach special importance to Russian 
leadership”.755 The narrative of the Great Patriotic War fitted this idea of 
Russian leadership saving the world from evil perfectly. 
 
In the Brezhnev era, there were Soviet historians who sought to go 
beyond the official Party line, but this was a difficult choice likely to end in 
unemployment and/or arrest. The fate of Aleksandr Nekrich was the 
clearest example. Having established himself as prominent historian and 
member of the Academy of Sciences, Nekrich published in 1965 1941.22 
iiunia, a history of the period leading up to the war and the first days of 
the invasion.756 On the one hand, Nekrich’s work contained many 
elements that would not be out of place in any other official Soviet-era 
histories. Nekrich consistently praised the three pillars that held up the 
official Soviet view of the war: the Party, the people, and the Red Army. 
In explaining the Soviet victory, Nekrich argued that the Germans failed 
to appreciate the bond between the Soviet people and the state, and thus 
underestimated Soviet fighting capacity. According to Nekrich, the 
Communist Party instilled in the people a deep patriotism and love for the 
Soviet Union that prepared them to defend the motherland at all costs: 
“This thought was so natural that it became a simple, everyday affair for 
millions of young men and women”.  
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When the invasion came, Nekrich noted that Red Army soldiers, “fought 
heroically, to the last round, to the last breath”, and that, “[h]istory has 
not known such massive heroism as Soviet soldiers demonstrated in the 
years of the Great Patriotic War”. Equal in stature to the deeds of the Red 
Army was the selfless sacrifice and hard work of all of the peoples of the 
Soviet Union, whose ceaseless efforts made victory possible. Finally, it 
was the role of the Communist Party that: 
 
unified and directed all the efforts of the people. Communists were 
the steadiest, bravest fighters wherever they were in the years of the 
Patriotic War. In battles and in labour alike they always marched in 
front, not sparing their own lives, carrying the people along after 
them by their personal example. 
 
Like other Soviet works, Nekrich insisted that the U.S.S.R. was genuinely 
committed to collective security, and faithfully upheld the non-aggression 
pact with Germany. What made Nekrich’s history distinctive was his 
withering attack on Stalin’s competence in the lead-up to the war. Stalin 
foolishly relied upon his flawed strategy of appeasing Hitler, ignored the 
warning of military experts such as Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiĭ and 
launched “baseless repressions” against the Red Army. Nekrich was of the 
view that the war could have turned out very differently: “It is quite 
obvious that the war would have started and developed very differently if 
Hitler’s army had been stopped on the territory of the border military 
districts”.757 Nekrich’s book was researched and written in the Khrushchëv 
period, but appeared just as the Brezhnev-era re-Stalinisation got under 
way. Nekrich virtually overnight became historicus non grata, and the 
new leadership began to retreat to a more traditional Soviet interpretation 
of Stalin and the first phase of the war. 1941.22 iiunia was banned, 
Nekrich expelled from Communist Party (which he had been a member of 
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since 1943), publicly attacked, and eventually moved abroad.758 Nothing 
like Nekrich’s account would appear again in the Brezhnev era.  
 
The Brezhnev period was noteworthy for the appearance of a twelve-
volume history not just of the Great Patriotic War but of the Second World 
War as a whole. According to one recent “patriotic” account, the Istoriia 
vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 gg (hence ‘Brezhnev-era Istoriia’) was the 
“most serious achievement of the Soviet period” and its research 
“continues to hold scientific significance to this day”.759 Stalin became 
more prominent, but the big winner of the Brezhnev era (apart from 
Brezhnev himself) was Zhukov.760 During the 1960s, Soviet commanders 
published their memoirs for the first time: Konev, Rokossovskiĭ, Zhukov, 
Vasilevskiĭ, and Sokolovskiĭ gave their perspectives and settled scores 
with other generals.761 In the Brezhnev era, Zhukov replaced both Stalin 
and Khrushchëv as the real architect of victory, the military genius who 
never lost a battle.762  
 
Zhukov’s memoirs, which were more sympathetic to Stalin than the other 
memoirs of the leading generals, became the crucial insider source of 
what had happened in the fight for the Soviet capital.763 For Zhukov, the 
claims that Hitler cost Germany the Battle for Moscow by diverting troops 
to Ukraine were simply a falsification of history concocted by embarrassed 
former German generals and bourgeois historians aiming to divert the 
onus of victory away from the Soviet Union.764 Had the Red Army at Kiev 
not been defeated, the flanks of Army Group Centre would have been 
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placed under serious threat in the ensuing Battle for Moscow.765 According 
to Zhukov, the Germans were intoxicated by their success in Ukraine and 
underestimated the fighting power and spirit of the Soviet people. 
 
Zhukov emphasised that the tragedy of the early defeats was caused 
mostly by the benefits of surprise enjoyed by the German Army.766 The 
Red Army’s leaders had expected a frontier war that would last three 
weeks before overwhelming Soviet counter-attacks would crush the 
enemy.767 The plan was for the covering forces – mainly infantry - at the 
frontier to hold the Germans while a second echelon of mechanised corps, 
infantry and aviation mounted a devastating counter-attack. This was the 
basis of the mobilisation plan MP-41 developed in February 1941. There 
was no planning for a strategic defence. The counter-attacks were 
expected to seize the initiative from the enemy. Apart from the surprise 
attack, another factor was the numerical advantage of the German 
invasion forces compared to Soviet defence forces. Soviet accounts 
stressed that on the eve of the invasion the Germans had an enormous 
number of fully staffed, well-equipped and well-trained divisions 
positioned ready for the attack.768 Unlike the Soviet troops opposing 
them, the German troops at this point had two years of modern warfare 
experience.769  
 
What the Khrushchëv and Brezhnev eras did agree upon was that the 
weather had not influenced the fighting to any significant extent. The 
Brezhnev-era Istoriia’s fourth volume referred to the weather only twice 
                                                 
765 ibid. 
766 G. Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections. Volume 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), pp. 
300-301. 
767 Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 83. 
768 See, for example Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 
(1961), pp. 9-13; Istoriia vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 gg. Tom chetvërtyĭ (1975), p. 88; 
Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia istoriia (1984), pp. 54, 57, 
63-54. 
769 Istoriia vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 gg. Tom chetvërtyĭ (1975), p. 37; this observation 
seems to forget that a number of Soviet troops had been involved in campaigns against Japan and 
Finland in the previous years, although these were not necessarily the same troops manning the 
Soviet western border.  
227 
 
in its presentation of Operation Typhoon, once to explain that the 
Germans were desperate to complete Operation Barbarossa and seize 
Moscow before the onset of winter,770 and once to note that the Soviet 
troops were kept warm in their winter uniforms by the time of the Soviet 
counter-attack on 5-6 December 1941.771 The 1976 Sovetskaia Voennaia 
Ėntsiklopediia 1: A - Biuro (hence ‘Ėntsiklopediia’) offered only one 
mention of weather in its entry ‘The Battle of Moscow 1941-42’; in that 
telling, Soviet troops were ultimately successful in their counter-attack of 
early December 1941 despite the severe frosts and intense snow cover.772 
There was a concession to the influence of the weather in the 1984 
Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia 
istoriia (hence ‘Kratkaia istoriia’), which conceded that the Germans 
suffered 100,000 casualties as a result of frostbite.773 Despite this, the 
reader is left in no doubt that the Germans were beaten militarily before 
the elements left their mark.  
 
The point of the Soviet diatribes about the weather was that this was the 
key method by which the ‘West’ was seeking to rob the Red Army of its 
victory. According to the Kratkaia istoriia, the West had come up with the 
great lie that: 
 
it was the autumn rains and mudslides that supposedly slowed down 
the German advance. This clumsy evasion was later picked up all 
sorts of falsifiers of history who are biased and do not want to admit 
the truth, that the so-called general offensive by the Nazis on 
Moscow was thwarted not by the rasputitsa, not the cold autumn 
rain, but the greatest durability and endurance of the Soviet soldiers, 
the unparalleled courage and inexhaustible strength of the people, 
and the deep belief in the victory of their cause.774 
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The Brezhnev-era Istoriia made only one mention of the differing opinions 
in the German High Command in October 1941, claiming that the discord 
was above all the result of the unexpectedly strong resistance of the 
Soviet troops.775 The Kratkaia istoriia stated that Hitler’s indecision after 
Smolensk and the subsequent diversion of troops from Army Group 
Centre came as a direct result of the stubborn resistance offered by 
Soviet troops.776  
 
Soviet memoirists confirmed that Generals ‘Mud’ and ‘Winter’ were merely 
the imagined enemies of the beaten German generals. Konev noted that 
on 7 October - the same date that Halder first mentioned the mud in his 
diary - Soviet manoeuvrability was restricted by a lack of motor vehicles; 
the Germans, however, were able to move easily and freely.777 Zhukov 
and Vasilevskiĭ were equally dismissive of the importance of the weather: 
the Western meteorological focus was simply an excuse invented by 
former German commanders and other Westerners unwilling to accept 
that it was the Red Army who truly defeated the Wehrmacht before 
Moscow.778 According to Zhukov, the mud was only truly impassable for a 
relatively brief period in October 1941.779 Zhukov added that the 
Muscovite women who were digging defences around the city at the same 
time had to work on equally impassable roads and yet managed to get 
the job done: “Mud stuck to their boots, too, and to the wheelbarrows 
they used to haul earth, and added an incredible load to shovels that 
were unfamiliar in women’s hands”.780 As Zhukov summed up (while at 
the same time taking the opportunity to attack the Western strawmen 
historians): 
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Bourgeois historians and former Nazi generals have tried to convince 
the public that the million picked German troops were beaten at 
Moscow not by the iron steadfastness, courage and heroism of Soviet 
soldiers, but by mud, cold and deep snow. The authors of these 
apologetics seem to forget that Soviet forces had to operate under 
the same conditions.781 
 
Rokossovskiĭ was one of the few Soviet commanders who conceded that 
the mud did indeed play a role in stifling the German attack. However, he 
also noted that by 17 November, the freezing of the muddy ground 
allowed Nazi armoured and motorised units, “their main striking force”, to 
have a much freer hand.782  
 
The Stalin, Khrushchëv and Brezhnev-era historians all acknowledged that 
the situation was grave in 1941. Nonetheless, the eventual victory 
brought about by the superior capacity of the Soviet system was never in 
doubt. The most common euphemism employed in the official works to 
describe dire situations was “complex” (slozhnyĭ).783 For example, the 
Kratkaia istoriia described the German taking of the key city of Kalinin as 
an example of the situation at the front becoming “all the more 
complicated”.784 The 1976 Ėntsiklopediia, in perhaps the greatest 
understatement of them all, described the envelopment of the forces of 
the Briansk Front as a situation where the troops “found themselves in 
complicated conditions”.785 In other words, Soviet literature specialised in 
euphemisms when describing what by any standards were truly 
calamitous states of affair.  
 
According to much of the Cold War-era literature written in the West, the 
Germans overcame the significant Soviet numerical superiority thanks to 
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superior German leadership, professionalism and military art. Soviet 
sources claimed that it was the other way around, insisting upon the 
military and numerical superiority of the Nazi forces attacking the Soviet 
capital.786 It was the Germans who enjoyed first the advantage of surprise 
and then the advantage of overwhelming numerical superiority. According 
to the Brezhnev-era Istoriia, seventy-eight fully operational Nazi divisions, 
1,700 tanks and one thousand planes lined up to storm Moscow as part of 
Operation Typhoon. The German forces at the beginning of October 
amounted to 1,800,000 soldiers facing a Red Army that was only 
1,250,000 strong.787 
 
The Soviet history-writers sought to stress German numerical superiority, 
to focus on the heroism and sacrifice of the Red Army, and to find silver 
linings even in the most “complex” situations. The Soviet defeats at 
Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev, and Viaz’ma were all Pyrrhic victories for the 
Germans. Soviet readers learned that in the encirclements of the first 
months of the war, “tens of thousands” of Soviet troops were killed in an 
unequal battle with the enemy.788 However, the German success came at 
great cost. As the Kratkaia istoriia claimed, the Kiev encirclement cost the 
Germans more than one hundred thousand officers and men. As a result 
of the engagement the Germans were delayed in their assault on Moscow 
and failed to complete the blitzkrieg before the onset of winter.789  
 
On occasions where the Red Army was forced to retreat, it was always a 
fighting retreat. For example, the failure of the Mozhaĭsk Line to hold the 
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German advance is explained by overwhelming German numerical 
superiority; the Red Army troops fought nearly to the death in the face of 
overwhelming odds and only retreated when faced with the risk of 
encirclement.790 Soviet troops responded to the call of the Party by 
declaring that “there would not be Fascist thugs in Moscow”.791 Displaying 
“unprecedented heroism and resilience”, Red Army soldiers defended 
every inch of their native land.792 The Red Army gained the necessary 
experience to take on their experienced and well-equipped foe.793 Red 
Army troops fought bravely and to the last man, defending every inch of 
their native soil against imperialist German aggression.794  
 
All Soviet accounts paid tribute to the organisational powers of the 
Communist Party. In their memoirs, Timoshenko and Sokolovskiĭ both 
heavily attributed the victory at Moscow to the organisational powers of 
the Communist Party.795 Zhukov described the welding of front and rear 
under the guidance of the Communist Party as “the key factor in our 
victory at Moscow”.796 Vasilevskiĭ similarly stressed that victory belonged 
to the Communist Party, whose “intrepidity, organisation and staunchness 
cemented the troops”.797 The Kratkaia istoriia noted how a grateful Soviet 
people “paid tribute to the organisational genius of its Leninist party, who 
bore the full responsibility for the fate of the country”.798 In the first five 
months of the war alone, 100,000 Communists and 260,000 Komsomol 
members enlisted for the front.799 When the threat to the capital re-
emerged in October, within only a few days twenty-five ‘Communist’ and 
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‘worker’ battalions were formed in Moscow; these were seventy-five per 
cent staffed by Party and Komsomol members.800 Not only was this a 
valuable injection of manpower to the front, but “the strong work ethic” 
and “Party temperament” increased the morale of the troops and their 
resilience; their “personal example of selfless bravery and courage 
inspired men to heroic deeds”.801 Political work in general “strengthened 
the soldiers’ confidence in the victory over the enemy”.802  
 
The Party was the key institution in organising the defences of Moscow 
and ensuring the military production necessary to enable the soldiers to 
fight.803 Soviet readers were told that, “[i]n these difficult days the party 
was, as always, with the people, directing their actions, pointing the way 
to victory over the enemy” [emphasis added].804 The frantic production 
efforts that followed Pravda’s call for total mobilisation to defend the 
capital demonstrated the, “great trust of the People in the Party”.805 
Despite the Wehrmacht’s proximity to Moscow, “[t]his call by the Party 
found a warm response in the hearts of the Soviet people, to give new 
strength to soldiers and commanders. A continuous stream of trains filled 
with arms and ammunition came to the front”.806 Muscovites en masse 
joined workers’ battalions and spent their free time voluntarily digging 
extensive defences for the city.807 As the danger to the capital increased, 
Party and Komsomol members energetically organised meetings and 
rallies, Party members had to “appear to all as a personal example of 
courage and perseverance”.808  
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On 4 July the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party issued 
orders for the city to raise twelve divisions of a peoples’ militia, charged 
with the task of constructing defences west of Moscow and of manning 
them as a reserve front behind the active front. These divisions were 
eventually incorporated into the Reserve Front and saw action at El’nia in 
August. When the State Defence Committee called for the reinforcement 
of defensive positions near Mozhaĭsk and for extensive defensive lines to 
be constructed near Viaz’ma, between 85,000 and 100,000 Muscovites, 
mostly women, were mobilised for the task.809 Workers in Moscow began 
to work triple shifts, and many women and youths filled the vacancies: 
“Thus, the entire working-age population of the capital was involved in 
the defence of Moscow”.810 According to Samsonov, it was civilians who 
were responsible for extinguishing eighty per cent of all incendiary bombs 
that fell on Moscow.811 Teenagers, even children, were trained to disrupt 
enemy actions.812 Soviet propaganda developed the image of a mobilised 
city with civilians digging trenches and Red Army units regrouping to 
march to the front.813 Zhukov praised the “common and united efforts of 
Soviet troops and the people of Moscow and the Moscow area, 
unanimously supported by the entire nation”.814 Sokolovskiĭ noted that 
special mention in the victory before Moscow must be made of the people 
of the capital who provided troops and armaments in their darkest 
hour.815 
 
Official Soviet histories conceded that Communists had to be used to stifle 
the slightest manifestations of panic, cowardice and false rumours. There 
                                                 
809 Samsonov, Velikaia bitva pod Moskvoĭ 1941-1942 p. 88; Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny 
Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 233; Istoriia vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 
gg. Tom chetvërtyĭ (1975), p. 98; Sovetskaia Voennaia Ėntsiklopediia 1 (1976), p. 495; Velikaia 
Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia istoriia (1984), p. 107. 
810 Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 244. 
811 Samsonov, Velikaia bitva pod Moskvoĭ 1941-1942, p. 83. 
812 ibid., p. 84. 
813 Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead, pp. 63, 192. 
814 Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles [2002], p. 59. 
815 Sokolovskiĭ, ‘Tak kovalas’ nasha pobeda’, pp. 15, 28. 
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was an acknowledgement that a state of siege was introduced in Moscow 
on 19 October, but this was explained as a reaction to the threatening 
situation on the outskirts of the city, not internal disintegration.816 The 
State Defence Committee urged the people of Moscow at this time to 
“respect law and order, and to the Red Army … give every assistance”.817 
Zhukov produced the most candid of the Soviet accounts, noting that a 
small minority of people did panic and spread rumours, but offered the 
explanation that, “there are black sheep in every family”.818  
 
Overall however, the Soviet view of the war affirmed that, while the 
danger looming over Moscow was a source of deep concern for the entire 
country, the Soviet Union held firm.819 The Soviet people did not succumb 
to fear, but were united in their resolve to work harder for the wartime 
cause.820 Across the country, meetings proclaimed the collective desire to 
defend the capital at all costs.821 According to Zhukov, when Moscow was 
in danger the “entire country, the sons and daughters of all the Union 
republics, heeded the call of the Party and government for the defense of 
Moscow”.822 The Soviet peoples united like never before: “Their persistent 
and selfless struggle exemplifies the military cooperation of the fraternal 
peoples of our country, because in these troubled days, there was nothing 
more important than the salvation of Moscow”.823 Those who did not 
directly take up arms aided the capital with their tireless industrial output. 
Even besieged Leningrad managed to continue to produce weapons and 
armaments for the capital.824  
 
                                                 
816 The Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), pp. 
243, 247-248. 
817 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia istoriia (1984), p. 110. 
818 Zhukov, Zhukov’s Greatest Battles [1971], p. 52. 
819 Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 248. 
820 Istoriia vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 gg. Tom chetvërtyĭ (1975), p. 101; Istoriia Velikoĭ 
Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 249. 
821 Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 249; 
the same events are related, almost verbatim, in Istoriia vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 gg. Tom 
chetvërtyĭ (1975), p. 101. 
822 Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles [2002], p. 48. 
823 Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 249. 
824 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia istoriia (1984), p. 115. 
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The smaller towns that formed Moscow’s perimeter were celebrated too. 
Tula became a hero-city in 1976 when the Brezhnev period was at its 
zenith. Many troops defending Tula were formed from local militias. Other 
workers managed to produce for the defenders significant numbers of 
weapons, ammunition, tanks, machine guns, uniforms and food 
supplies.825 Still others devoted their efforts to erecting fortifications and 
“turning their city into a fortress”.826 After noting that the Germans could 
not take their objective and that the ranks of those who fought were filled 
with Party and Komsomol members, the Brezhnev-era Istoriia concluded 
that Tula was the pride of the Soviet Union: “Their courage was amazing. 
Tula residents turned their city into a fortress and did not surrender it to 
the enemy”.827 The people of Tula showed examples of “revolutionary 
consciousness, discipline and endurance”.828 According to Zhukov, the 
Tula workers regiment demonstrated particular steadfastness and courage 
in battle; “the glory given to Moscow as a hero city belongs also to Tula 
and its people”.829 
  
Conclusion 
The Soviet view of the war differed from the dominant Western Cold War 
narratives about 1941 in almost every respect. In the Soviet Union, it was 
required that historians demonstrate the superiority of Communism, and 
the solidarity of the Soviet people, army, and state. Despite minor 
fluctuations regarding what leader should be credited with the victory, 
and because of the suppression of mildly deviant voices such as Nekrich, 
the dominant Soviet message was consistent. Above all, the Great 
Patriotic War was a righteous struggle against an evil opponent whose 
unprovoked surprise attack was both the sole cause of the war and the 
main explanation of why the Red Army conceded so much ground in 
                                                 
825 Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 264; 
Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia istoriia (1984), p. 115. 
826 Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 251. 
827 Istoriia vtoroĭ mirovoĭ voĭny 1939-1945 gg. Tom chetvërtyĭ (1975), p. 102. 
828 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia istoriia (1984), p. 111. 
829 Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles [2002], p. 58. 
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1941. Especially from the mid-1960s, the victory over the Nazis became 
the principal achievement of the Soviet system and the justification for 
the leadership of Brezhnev and the Communist Party as a whole.  
 
Soviet histories explicitly rejected the view of the German generals that it 
was Hitler’s errors and divisions between the political and military 
leaderships combined with the weather that prevented the Germans from 
capturing the Soviet capital. Nor did the Soviet view of the war agree with 
the logic of van Creveld and Reinhardt that the Germans lost the war in 
1941 because they lacked the necessary resources given the scale of the 
task. According to Soviet historians, the Red Army was often 
outnumbered but fought skilfully to halt the Germans and then drive them 
back in the December counter-offensive. Furthermore, as Zhukov 
maintained, Moscow was only the foundation of the victory; the Germans, 
benefiting from the booty of an enslaved Europe, again seized the 
strategic initiative in 1942 and 1943 before their defeats at Stalingrad and 
Kursk respectively. In the absence of a second front, the Red Army and 
the Soviet state had to carry the burden of the war alone for years after 
Moscow.  
 
The real mistake of Hitler and the Nazis according to the official Soviet 
view was hubris. The Soviet histories described Hitler as “boastful” 
(khvastlivyĭ),830 and the operational name Typhoon as “grandiose” 
(gromkiĭ),831 and “cocky” (kriklivyĭ).832 They portrayed the failure to 
capture Moscow in the first months of Operation Barbarossa as having a 
                                                 
830 Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 206. 
831 ibid., p. 233; “gromkiĭ” can also mean “loud” or “famous”, however, given the context, 
“grandiose” seems the most appropriate translation: “Ėta operatsiia poluchila gromkoe nazvanie 
‘Taĭfun’.”  
832 Velikaia Otechestvennaia voĭna Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia istoriia (1984), p. 104; 
similar to “gromkiĭ”, “kriklivyĭ” can also be translated as “loud”, however, as with the above 
example, the context renders “cocky,” or “in your face” to seem more appropriate: “Stavka 
delalas’ na sokrushenie sovetskoĭ oborony moshchnymi stremitel’nymi udarami. Poėtomu i sama 
gotovivshaiasia operatsiia pomuchila kriklivoe nazvanie – ‘Taĭfun’.” 
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“sobering” effect on a few “opportunistic” Nazis,833 who had “linked the 
fate of their troops” with the capital’s taking.834 Marshal Konev summed 
up the themes of Nazi combat strength, Hitler’s hubris, and the entire 
military capacity of European facing Moscow with a boast of his own:  
 
The enemy was at the zenith of its military power. Using the 
resources of conquered countries in Europe, he was preparing for a 
decisive battle. By grouping a large force in the Moscow area, the 
enemy hoped to end the war before the winter cold. Hitler, 
intoxicated with victory in the West, was hoping for an easy 
victory. He overestimated their strength and underestimated the 
strength of the Red Army, the potential of the Soviet Union, and the 
morale of our people.835 
 
The Soviet view of the war was a story of agency, of the Soviet state, 
army, and people calling upon their reserves of spirit and solidarity to 
overcome a treacherous, cowardly, and genocidal opponent. It was only 
as Communism faltered in the late 1980s that the story of another, quite 
different war became available in the Soviet Union. 
  
                                                 
833 Istoriia Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941-1945 gg. Tom 2 (1961), p. 233; 
(“Proval aviantiuristicheskoĭ zatei s khodu prorvat’sia k Moskve neskol’ko otrezvil gitlerovtsev”.) 
834 Sovetskaia Voennaia Ėntsiklopediia 1 (1976), p. 493. 
835 Konev, ‘Nachalo Moskovskoĭ bitvy’, p. 42. 
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Chapter Eight: The “Revisionist” Critique 
 
The Cold War came to a peaceful end in the late 1980s when Mikhail 
Gorbachëv, the last Communist leader, failed in his efforts to revitalise 
and strengthen the Soviet system. Gorbachёv in February 1987 put out a 
call to “fill in the blank spots of history”.836 Gorbachёv was answered by 
the emergence of a bitter conflict over every aspect of Russian history, 
but especially over the formerly “sacred memory” of the Great Patriotic 
War. The argument of this chapter is that while it might have been 
expected that the new era of glasnost’ might have led to a convergence 
between Western and Russian historians - who were now able to mine the 
archives together in order to reconsider the events of 1941, present 
papers at joint conferences and publish collections of essays that showed 
both Western and Russian perspectives - the reverse occurred. While 
Western historians found in the Soviet archives evidence of greater Soviet 
agency and regime capacity than hitherto suspected, a “revisionist” 
paradigm emerged in Russia that vehemently attacked the official Soviet 
version of the war and the myths that were encrusted around it.  
 
Celebration of the Soviet achievement in the Battle of Moscow did not 
suddenly become extinct as Communism collapsed. During the Gorbachëv 
and Yeltsin eras, well-known historians from the Soviet period used the 
new archival material to offer a more realistic account of the Battle of 
Moscow. These histories argued, as their Soviet predecessors had done, 
that Hitler and not Stalin was the aggressor, that the Red Army was 
unprepared for war but learned from its mistakes, and that actions taken 
by the Soviet state along with the patriotism of the people saved the 
Soviet capital. The titles of their works told the story: L. A. Bezymenskiĭ’s, 
The Taming of Typhoon; V. A. Anfilov’s, The Collapse of Hitler’s March on 
                                                 
836 Wendy Slater, ‘Russia’s Imagined History: Visions of the Soviet Past and the New ‘Russian 




Moscow. 1941; A. M. Samsonov’s, Moscow 1941: From the Tragedy of 
Defeat to a Great Victory; and V. I. Nevzorov’s, Moscow Led the Country 
to Victory, modified the Soviet story of 1941, but did not fundamentally 
change it.837 Historians from the old Soviet military establishment, 
sometimes with financial help from Western universities, published 
material from the archives in huge scholarly collections that became 
available for historians to study. For the Battle of Moscow alone, new 
documentary collections appeared almost every year.838  
 
For those demanding a serious revision of the Soviet view of the war, 
however, these conventional military histories were either inadequate or 
simply continued the falsifications of the Soviet era. The critics of the 
Soviet view of the war are often described as ‘revisionists’, whose attack 
on the official Soviet view was so pervasive that, by 1997, von Hagen 
could write that, “the orthodox views of the war tenaciously holds on, but 
is now clearly a minority position and its adherents are ostracised in the 
'liberal' and 'democratic media”.839 Or, as M. I. Mel’tiukhov, a critic of the 
revisionists, put it in 2000 with a sense of regret: 
 
The events of 1941 are the most studied period of the Great Patriotic 
War from both sides. However, in recent years, the conventional 
wisdom, especially in popular academic and media writings has 
become that this was a period solely of endless defeats for the Red 
Army and victories for the Wehrmacht. As a consequence, the 
                                                 
837 L. A. Bezymenskiĭ, Ukroshchenie “Taifuna” (Moscow: Moskovskiĭ pabochiĭ, 1987); V. A. Anfilov, 
Krushenie pokhoda Gitlera na Moskvu. 1941 (Moscow: Nauka, 1989); A. M. Samsonov, Moskva. 
1941 god. Ot Tragedii porazheniĭ – k Velikoĭ pobede (Moscow: Moskovskiĭ pabochiĭ, 1991); V. I. 
Nevzorov, Moskva vela stranu k pobede (Moscow: 1997).  
838 The new archival material found its way into publications including Bitva za stolitsu: sbornik 
dokumentov. Tom 2 (Moscow: IMI MO, 1994); G. K. Zhukov v Bitve pod Moskvoĭ. Sbornik 
dokumentov (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 1994); Moskva voennaia 1941-1945: Memuary i arkhivnye 
dokumenty (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo ob”edineniia “Mosgoarkhiv”, 1995); Russkiĭ arkhiv: Velikaia 
Otechestvennaia: Sbornik dokumentov Tom 15 (4-1). Bitva pod Moskvoĭ (Moscow: TERRA, 1997); 
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1) (Moscow: TERRA, 1996); Moskovskaia bitva v postanovleniiakh Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta 
Oborony: Dokumenty i Materialy (Moscow: 2001); Rossiia i SSSR v voĭnakh XX veka. Poteri 
vooruzhennykh sil: Statiticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001); Moskva prifrontovaia 
1941 – 1942: Arkhivnye dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Moskovskie uchebniki, 2001).  
839 Mark von Hagen, ‘From Great Fatherland War to the Second World War: new perspectives and 
future prospects’, in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (eds), Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in 
Comparison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 242. 
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impression is created that only a lucky chance saved the Soviet 
Union from defeat.840  
 
Historians in the West often describe more radical critics of the Soviet 
view of the war, especially those who embrace the Icebreaker thesis, as 
‘revisionists’. This term is popular in Russia too, though the term has 
become a pejorative term in much of the recent Russian writing about the 
war. As a result of this, many Russian critics of the Soviet view of the war 
describe themselves as ‘independent’ of the old Soviet establishment 
rather than as a ‘revisionist’ historians. Lev Lopukhovsky and Boris 
Kavalerchik wrote in their 2017 re-assessment of the number of Soviet 
war dead stated that: 
 
Our interest is not revisionism, but rather a re-evaluation of some 
events of the war in light of newly discovered facts…Russia’s military 
history must be liberated from the false dogmas and stratification 
resulting from the ideological tenets of the Central Committee of the 
CSPU.841 
 
These authors wished for their work not to be charged with the label 
‘revisionist’, for in Putin’s Russia, ‘revisionist’ has become a term of abuse 
under which authors are accused of, “trying to reduce the magnitude of 
the heroic deeds of Soviet soldiers and officers, diminish the merits of 
military leaders, and, in the final analysis, devalue the Soviet victory 
itself”.842 These objections to the term ‘revisionist’ must be taken into 
account, but because the term is so widely used it will be used in this 
thesis to describe the Russian-language criticism of the Soviet view of the 
war. 
 
Moreover there is a range of opinions among these critics of the Soviet 
view of the war, although one main idea connects both moderates and 
                                                 
840 M. I. Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyĭ shans Stalina: Sovetskiĭ Soiuz i bor’ba za Evropu, 1939–1941 
(Moscow: Veche, 2000). Available at: http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/13.html 
(accessed 2/2/16). 
841 Boris Kavalerchik and Lev Lopukhovsky, The Price of Victory: The Red Army's Casualties in the 
Great Patriotic War (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2017), pp. 148-149.  
842 ibid. p. 148. 
241 
 
radicals on this spectrum. Instead of a “Red Victory”, the revisionists 
argued the case for a “Stolen Victory”. In other words, Moscow and the 
Soviet state were saved in spite of the regime’s incompetence and 
unpopularity because of the ordinary Soviet citizen’s capacity to fight and 
endure, a characteristic cynically exploited by Stalin and his regime.  
 
According to Tumarkin, the concept of a “Stolen Victory” - that is that the 
regime stealing credit for the victory from the people - first became 
prominent when the newspaper Komsomolskaia Pravda on 5 May 1990 
published a conversation between a leading historian, Gennadi Bordiugov, 
and a journalist on the upcoming 9 May celebrations under the heading of 
“Stolen Victory” (ukradennaia pobeda).843 Bordiugov later summarised 
the “Stolen Victory” concept for English-language readers: 
 
During the war there were two interconnected but heterogeneous 
active forces, the people and the system. In the first stage of the 
war, the system was the leading but ineffective force. It was the 
people who turned into the real leading force and produced talented 
commanders from their ranks… But while the force of the people 
brought about victory, the force of the system gripped the victory in 
its iron vice.844 
 
As Constantine Pleshakov, a historian who grew up in the Soviet Union 
but is now an academic writer in the West, summed up the “Stolen 
Victory” concept: “During the war Stalin’s regime proved staggeringly 
inept at everything except crushing domestic dissent and using millions as 
cannon fodder”.845 Rather than the regime, it was “millions of Uncle 
                                                 
843 Tumarkin, ‘The Great Patriotic War as Myth and Memory’ p. 602; See Gennadiĭ Bordiugov and 
Aleksandr Afanas’ev, ‘Ukradennaia pobeda’, Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 5 May 1990; Bordiugov was 
described by John and Carol Garrard as a “young Russian historian” and senior researcher at the 
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, who used “previously inaccessible materials in the archives of the 
Party's Central Committee” to make his claims about the ubiquity of the NKVD and widespread 
collaboration by a population that despised the Soviet authorities. See John Garrard and Carol 
Garrard, ‘Bitter Victory’, in John Garrard and Carol Garrard (eds), World War 2 and the Soviet 
People: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, 
Harrogate, 1990 (Great Britain: The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1993), n. 41, p. 27.  
844 Gennadi Bordiugov, ‘The Popular Mood in the Unoccupied Soviet Union: Continuity and Change 
during the War’, in Thurston and Bonwetsch (eds), The People’s War, p. 68.  
845 Pleshakov, Stalin’s Folly, p. 11. 
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Vanyas” who died in unnecessary and wasteful operations, who saved 
both Moscow and Stalin.846  
 
From 1987, archival revelations told the story of a mismanaged and cruel 
war fought by the Soviet authorities. According to R.W. Davies, the 
turning point at an official level for frank discussion of the war was the 
General Staff and Chief Political Administration of the Red Army’s 1987 
decision to allow the publication of a candid 1966 interview between 
Zhukov and the writer, Konstantin Siminov: 
 
Since then the conduct of the Second World War has been discussed 
with much greater frankness: the strange and often grim world 
around Stalin, the making of military policy, and the policies 
themselves.847 
 
Documents detailing the decision on 12 September 1941 to form 
“blocking detachments” (zagradotriady) were published in 1988.848 The 
revisionist agenda was often set by newspaper articles, film-makers and 
literary figures rather than historians in the old Soviet military 
establishment.849 The Soviet public, for example, learned about penal 
detachments from the documentary film Shtrafniki and the ensuing 
controversy over the role of coercion and excessive cost in bringing Stalin 
his victory.850  
 
The rigid respect and patriotic fervour of the Brezhnev era gave way in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s to conflicts indicating the disillusionment - 
especially of the young - with the hoary old clichés surrounding the defeat 
                                                 
846 ibid., p. 268. 
847 Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution, p. 103. 
848 Voenno-istoricheskiĭ zhurnal 8 (1988), pp. 73-79.  
849 See, for example, A. Minkin, ‘Ch’ia pobeda’, Sotsium (1991), pp. 6-7; A. Portnov, Razgrom 
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of fascism.851 According to Braithwaite, the list of ‘hallowed truths’ that 
were disputed in the last years of the Gorbachëv era was a long one: 
 
Why had Stalin failed to foresee the German attack? Was he himself 
preparing to attack when Hitler stole a march on him? Why did the 
Red Army perform so badly in the first days and months of the war, 
despite the huge sacrifices, which the people had made to give it the 
best equipment in the world? Could Hitler have captured Moscow and 
won the war if he had not sent Guderian south into the Ukraine? 
Could, above all, the Victory have been won without such an 
appalling expenditure of blood? Were the millions of casualties – 
many, many times what the German enemy had suffered-the 
consequence of German efficiency or Soviet ruthlessness, brutality 
and incompetence?852  
 
It would be impossible given the constraints of this study to examine the 
myriad historians and non-historians who have contributed to the 
revisionist critique. Instead, five prominent revisionist accounts of 1941 – 
Dmitriĭ Volkogonov, Boris Sokolov, Vladimir Beshanov, Mark Solonin, Iuriĭ 
Zhuk, Lev Lopukhovsky – are summarised to show the range of views and 
how these accounts are locked into battle with the Soviet view of the 
war.853 As a consequence of the revisionist attack on the official Soviet 
view, the revisionist wave that peaked in the 1990s did not really align 
with the mainstream Western accounts of that era, which were locked into 
battle with the Halder school and Cold War stereotypes about the Eastern 
Front.  
                                                 
851 For example, Edele reported an attack on a medal-wearing war veteran; his teenage assailants 
proclaimed, ‘[i]f you would not have won, we would now drink Bavarian beer’. See Mark Edele, 
Stalinist Society 1928-1953 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 14-15; Tumarkin 
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workers in a drycleaner: “You, old folks, it was you who stuck us with this terrible life, you who 
ruined everything for us!” When pressed as to what he meant, he retorted that Fascism could not 
have been worse than the Communism they had fought for. See Tumarkin, The Living and the 
Dead, p. 196 
852 Braithwaite, Moscow 1941, pp. 319-320. 
853 The majority of the works produced by these authors are in Russian, though a small amount 
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The Viazma Catastrophe, 1941: the Red Army’s Disastrous Stand Against Operation Typhoon. 
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Commander. Translated and edited by Stuart Britton (England: Helion & Company, 2015); Boris 
Sokolov, The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A Re-Examination (England: 




Just like in the preceding Khrushchëv and Brezhnev eras, there was an 
attempt in the Gorbachëv era to produce an “official” multi-volume history 
that revised the Soviet view of the war. The leading military historians of 
the Institute of Military History embarked upon an ambitious plan to 
rewrite the history of the war through a new ten-volume History of the 
Great Patriotic War dedicated to the Soviet people.854 The project proved 
so contentious that it was shelved by Defence Minister Dmitriĭ Yiazov just 
before he took part in the August 1991 conservative coup against 
Gorbachëv that hastened the Soviet collapse. The editor of the proposed 
series was Dmitriĭ Volkogonov, the director of the Institute of Military 
History, who had already written and published Triumph and Tragedy 
(Triumf i Tragediia) in 1988, an archive-based account of Stalin, much of 
which focused upon Stalin’s wartime record.855  
 
In his account of Stalin, Volkogonov did not challenge the idea that the 
Soviet Union was the innocent party in the outbreak of the war. 
Volkogonov argued that during the 1930s, the Soviet Union was genuinely 
committed to a policy of collective security against Nazi Germany. Stalin’s 
signing of the Non-Aggression Pact was justified in the wake of Munich 
and the obvious failure of collective security. Volkogonov also accepted as 
justified Stalin’s suspicion that the West wanted Hitler to attack the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet occupation of the new borderlands in Poland was 
unfortunate but necessary, and was welcomed by most of the population 
there given the certainty of a German invasion in the near future. The 
Red Army performed poorly in the Winter War with Finland, confirming for 
Stalin the reports of his generals that the Red Army was not ready for 
war. Stalin’s obsession thereafter became appeasement of Hitler. Stalin’s 
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mistake was, despite all of the evidence, to think that war could be 
delayed for two or three years.856 
 
Volkogonov criticised strongly Stalin’s failure to listen to warnings from 
Soviet, British and U.S. intelligence. Stalin ignored the brazen incursion 
into Soviet airspace by the Luftwaffe, and the suspiciously gracious terms 
granted to the Soviet Union by Germany when finalising the new Soviet-
German border. Stalin had placed himself at the helm of such a despotic 
state that his subordinates were unwilling to question his assumptions: 
 
The nature of Stalin’s miscalculations lay not only in his wrong 
assessments, his wrong predictions or even the ill will of the 
aggressor, though these were things were of course all present. His 
unforgivable mistakes stemmed from his personal rule. It is hard to 
blame the commissars or the Chief War Council, when their boss’s 
image was that of the infallible and wise leader. 
 
For Volkogonov, Stalin’s response to the start of war was typical of the 
tyrant in that he simply sacked or executed those around him. By placing 
so much power in himself, Stalin made his miscalculations of Hitler’s 
intentions far worse than necessary. In the first phase of the war, Stalin 
displayed military ineptitude and Civil War era tactical thinking; his 
“impulsive and erratic, superficial and incompetent orders; his “harsh and 
intolerant and often vicious” behaviour; and the atmosphere of fear and 
lack of initiative from those around him.857  
 
Volkogonov noted that a week before Operation Barbarossa, West Front 
commander Pavlov requested permission to improve his defensive 
position for fear of attack, but that the Kremlin denied his request. 
Thereafter Stalin, the military amateur, was responsible for a series of 
costly blunders. As for the loss of the South-West Front at Kiev, “Stalin 
and his Staff were responsible for the tragedy”. According to Volkogonov, 
                                                 
856 This paragraph is a summary of Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 351-366.  
857 Quotes and information for this summary of aspects of Volkogonov, Stalin, retrieved from pp. 
391, 398-400, 387-389, 393, 420-421, 412-416 and 430 (long quote from p. 393).  
246 
 
Stalin was out of touch with the realities of the front. He put out cruel 
orders threatening the families of soldiers who did not stand and fight, 
refused sensible requests for an orderly retreat, and was deluded in his 
thinking that half-formed infantry and cavalry units could plug the gaps.  
 
Volkogonov tended to steer a course that criticised Stalin, but still praised 
the valour of the Soviet people. He noted the strength and unity of the 
people of Moscow in their darkest hour despite Stalin’s inept leadership. 
Volkogonov had no time for the Vlasov movement: “a mixed bag of 
criminals and nationalists, but mainly of people who had found 
themselves in a hopeless situation”. In the dark days of October 1941 
when it seemed to Stalin that all hope was lost: “it was the people who 
saved him, the people who found the strength to stand firm”. Stalin was 
indeed fortunate that, “the nation was prepared to sacrifice much if it was 
for the salvation of the Motherland.858 Neither the weather nor Hitler’s 
mistakes figured in Volkogonov’s summary of the outcome of the war. For 
Volkogonov, it was the steadfastness and patriotism of the Soviet people 
that compensated for Stalin’s horrendous errors. Here Volkogonov started 
the most important trend observable in the revisionist account; the Soviet 
people, motivated by patriotism and not by Communist ideology, won the 
war despite the incredible mistakes of Stalin and the regime. 
 
In retrospect, Volkogonov deepened the Khrushchëv-era criticism of 
Stalin, much as Nekrich had tried to do decades before. Volkogonov did 
not suggest that the Soviet Union was responsible for starting the war, 
but many other historians and writers did. For the first time, the Soviet 
public learned about the existence of the Nazi-Soviet Pact’s secret 
protocols relating to new borders and later a deal of friendship and trade 
with his supposed mortal enemy.859 It was argued that the secret 
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protocols weakened Soviet defences, created a murderously hostile 
population in newly acquired territories, and made the Red Army the 
vanguard of a totalitarian system just as bad as Nazi Germany.860 Stalin’s 
mistaken expectation that if a German invasion were to occur the war 
would be fought on foreign soil was a grave error that cost the Soviet 
Union millions of lives.861 Stalin had accurate and compelling information, 
but refused to heed intelligence reports that a German invasion was 
imminent.862  
 
For many critics of the Soviet view of the war, even more compelling was 
the evidence of Stalin’s aggressive intentions assembled in Suvorov’s 
Icebreaker, first published in the West in 1988 and available in Russian 
from 1991. Suvorov, following his defection from the Soviet Union, had 
made the case as early as 1985 that Stalin saw 1941 as an opportunity to 
launch the offensive war for which the Red Army had been preparing 
since the 1920s. As described in Chapter Six, Icebreaker was a 
fundamental attack on the most basic premise of the official Soviet view 
of the war – that the Soviet Union was a peace-loving, innocent party 
attacked by an unscrupulous opponent who exploited the advantages of 
deception and surprise. Icebreaker had a print-run of some 320,000 
copies when it first appeared, and was serialised in the newspaper 
Nezavisimaia gazeta during the 1993 election campaign.863 As Hill has put 
it, “Suvorov’s thesis had considerable appeal to revisionist historians in 
post-Soviet Russia, who were more than willing to adopt an argument 
running counter to the Soviet image of the Soviet Union desperately 
                                                                                                                                                        
raspada armii’, in Alekseĭ Isaev, Vladimir Beshanov, Vladislav Goncharov, Iuriĭ Zhitopchuk et. al., 
Velikaiia Otechestvennaia Katastrofa II. 1941 god. Prichiny tragedii (Moscow: Iauza. Ėksmo, 
2007), pp. 111-112.  
860 Semiriaga, Taĭny Stalinskoĭ Diplomatii. 1939-1941, pp. 292-294; Verevkin, ‘Katastrofa leta 
1941 g. – nadezhdu naroda na fone raspada armii’, pp. 111-112.  
861 V. D. Danilov, ‘Stalinskaia strategiia nachala voĭny: plany i realnost’’, Otechestvennaia istoriia, 
no. 3 (1995), p. 38. 
862 ibid., p. 42. 
863 Davies, Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era, p. 56. 
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seeking to preserve peace”.864 New pieces of evidence – Stalin’s speech of 
5 May to military graduates describing the Red Army as an attacking 
force, a change in Soviet propaganda around the need for an aggressive 
war, and an appraisal seemingly written by Vasilevskiĭ for Stalin before 15 
May canvassing a pre-emptive strike against Hitler – were published in 
newspapers and journals and embraced by revisionists as ‘smoking guns’ 
that confirmed Suvorov’s case.865  
 
The second issue that has galvanised revisionist histories of the war in 
Russia was the cost of the war. On 14 March 1946, Pravda reported Stalin 
claiming that the Soviet Union suffered seven million losses in the war 
against Nazi Germany. Khrushchëv dramatically increased the figure to 
“more than twenty million”. In the Brezhnev era, the figure became 
twenty-two million. In the Gorbachëv era a final figure of 26.6 million 
dead was announced.866 A research team working within the post-Soviet 
Russian military establishment using data collected by Soviet military 
authorities during the war fixed the number of dead soldiers at 
8,668,400.867 These numbers have long been, and continue to be, 
questioned, even ridiculed.868 The scale of the casualties matter especially 
to critics of the Soviet regime because, as one recent account put it, 
arguments about the scale of human casualties are “inseparably 
associated with the measure of responsibility before the nation of the 
USSR’s military and political leadership at that time”.869  
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866 Ellman and Maksudov, ‘Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note’, p. 671.  
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Volkogonov was part of the Soviet military establishment, but many of 
the voices challenging the Soviet view of the war came from outside. 
Among the first generation of ‘independent’ researchers specialising in 
1941, arguably the most important was Boris Sokolov; he has been 
described by one Western expert as having been responsible for “the 
most notable… attack [on] the Soviet system and is values”.870 Sokolov 
specialised in literature and anthropology before devoting his career to 
rewriting the history of the Red Army and the Second World War. 
Sokolov’s books and articles ranged from revisions of the tally of Soviet 
losses and support for Icebreaker to a damning biography of Zhukov and 
his methods.871  
 
According to Sokolov, Stalin was an aggressive expansionist and was 
twice thwarted in his plans to spread world Communism. Stalin planned to 
attack Hitler as early as the summer of 1940, but his plans were sent into 
disarray by the rapid fall of France. Stalin had hoped to invade west after 
the Soviet-Finnish War concluded; veterans of the Finnish War were sent 
south to bolster already large Soviet forces on the Western Front. After 
the swift defeat of France and fearing the collapse of Britain, Stalin’s 
offensive plans to use a drawn-out struggle in France were temporarily 
shelved. Planning an attack in 1941, Stalin called up 800,000 reservists. 
The annexation of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina 
gave him a platform to invade East Prussia and the Romanian oilfields.  
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According to Sokolov, the Red Army was planning for only one type of 
war, which was an offensive war against a German-led coalition. The 
Katyn massacre was necessary because the Polish officers, intelligentsia 
and propertied classes were the potential core of an anti-Soviet army 
when the Red Army invaded westwards. Stalin ordered the creation of a 
‘Polish’ division, to be completed by 1 July and manned by men of Polish 
descent (or by those who could speak Polish) to assist in the invasion of 
Poland. At the same time, Stalin approved the 15 May pre-emptive strike 
plan proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevskiĭ, confirmation of which was the 
ordering of troop movements consistent with an invasion that was 
intended for the beginning of July.872 Even if Stalin had managed to 
invade first, the war would have followed much the same course. The Red 
Army would swiftly have been pushed back to Soviet territory and the 
defeats would have followed much like actually happened.873 The Red 
Army would have been no match for the Germans in the first phase of the 
war. While it was true that the Red Army’s mechanised corps were less 
than fully staffed and equipped, much more serious were poor training of 
the personnel that were there, weak command and control in the 
armoured formations, and German superiority in the air.874 
 
For Sokolov, the Red Army clearly suffered from a series of defects 
ranging from Stalin’s incompetence to more basic “cultural factors”. The 
Red Army was impressive only on paper as events were to show. Stalin 
and his military leaders were obsessed with creating the perception that it 
was the biggest and the best. Creating more and more understrength 
divisions was popular with the Red Army’s leadership because it created 
command positions and ever-greater patronage networks. The problem 
was that it also created a bloated structure incapable of a nimble 
response to the German invasion. A Soviet mechanised corps had more 
than one thousand tanks, which no Soviet commander was trained or 
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equipped to command. There were not enough radio-sets and the driver-
mechanics could not maintain this armada so that most tanks were lost 
trying to march to the battlefield. This “gigantomania” almost proved 
fatal.875 If there had been a more streamlined defence - fewer Soviet 
divisions of more or less the same size as the German division each 
equipped with radio communication – the outcome might have been 
different.876 Zhukov embodied Stalinist cruelty on a scale that led to the 
cruel waste of cannon fodder.877 Zhukov was not just Stalin’s marshal but 
a Stalinist marshal who had no pity for the victims of his decisions. 
 
On the other hand, Sokolov was not of the view that only draconian 
measures explained Red Army performance. What mattered were 
favourable conditions for defence and the availability of weapons, tanks 
and aircraft. In the right conditions, the average Red Army soldier was 
indeed willing to fight. In a summary of the outcome of the Battle of 
Moscow, Sokolov painted a complex picture of an interplay between the 
weather and Soviet resistance. After the smashing of the Western, 
Reserve, and Briansk Fronts in October, the Germans rushed towards an 
encirclement of Moscow. The Soviet capital was “weakly defended”, but 
the “miserable road conditions of the autumn rains” prevented the 
Germans from quickly moving eastwards and gave the Red Army much 
needed breathing space. In fact, the German offensive ground to a halt 
on 31 October in part because of the mud.  Yet this was not the total 
explanation. Ultimately “the courage of the city’s defenders, the approach 
of reserves from the interior of the country, as well as German logistical 
difficulties in the autumn and winter period thwarted Operation Typhoon”. 
Sokolov made it clear that in his view “there was no way that mud alone 
could have stopped the Germans prior to the freeze”. On 7 December 
Bock complained to his diary that three things – the mud, the inadequate 
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supply and unexpected resistance – were holding him up. Sokolov’s 
commentary was that the first two could not have held up the Germans 
by themselves.878  
 
For Sokolov the weather was one of the factors, but not the most 
important factor, in causing the German advance to halt at Moscow. In 
the end, the Soviet victory occurred because of “the USSR’s supremacy in 
human resources and territory, and the ability of the totalitarian system 
to maintain under critical conditions the assistance from its Western 
allies”.879 Sokolov credited Soviet resistance with slowing the Nazi 
advance, albeit at great cost. Yet this could hardly be described as a Red 
victory as asserted by the official Soviet victories given that Stalin’s goal 
was to strike and defeat the Wehrmacht at the frontiers. It was no 
surprise that the Germans had noticed endless hordes of Red Army 
cannon fodder and civilian sacrifices because this was precisely Stalin’s 
strategy for winning the war. Stalin was unconcerned for and in fact 
despised the ‘little cogs’ in the Red Army and Soviet citizenry and his 
disregard for human life showed in the statistics.  
 
The contribution made by Vladimir Beshanov, a Belarussian former Soviet 
naval professional, was to debunk the Soviet-era myth that not only was 
there a surprise attack, but that the Red Army was outnumbered and 
unprepared.880 Beshanov argued that the Red Army’s military arsenal, 
especially its tank park, was unrivalled, but organisationally the Red Army 
was hopeless in leadership and training. The Soviet Union had the best 
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tanks in the world but they were used in the worst possible fashion. 
Beshanov rejected the Soviet-era “myth” that the Wehrmacht was 
overwhelmingly superior in tanks, aircraft and artillery. It was simply not 
true that the tanks of the Red Army were primitive and prone to burst 
into flames or that there were only enough rifles for one in three Red 
Army soldiers supporting the tanks. It was the Germans who had to 
improvise given that they were massively outmanned and outgunned.  
 
According to Beshanov, the Germans were able to assemble a mere 3,800 
tanks for Operation Barbarossa, two-thirds of which were classified as 
light, while a quarter were out-dated. Meanwhile, the allegedly “peace-
loving land of the Soviets” had amassed by 22 June 1941 25,500 tanks 
including 1,861 units of the KV and T-34 variety that had no equal among 
their contemporaries. While thirteen thousand machines were light tanks, 
even they were well-armed and more than capable in battle. Nearly 
sixteen thousand tanks were positioned on the western frontier, and while 
2,500 of these needed repair this was a serious tank force unprecedented 
in the world. In the first three weeks of the war twelve thousand Red 
Army tanks had disappeared “like snow on a sunny day”. By December 
1941 there were only 1,730 working tanks. Having failed to train and 
prepare this first generation of tankists for the war against Nazi Germany, 
Stalin found that success came through a completely different cohort who 
had to learn how to fight while at war.881 
 
According to Beshanov, in the course of 1941-1942, the Germans lost less 
than 800,000 soldiers but the Red Army lost a staggering eight million. 
For every dead Red Army solider, ten were captured or deserted in 1941. 
Soviet forces lost twenty thousand tanks each year and a grand total of 
more than ninety five thousand tanks. Nonetheless, the Red Army 
succeeded in wrecking the German plan for a lightning war and, having 
                                                 
881 These two paragraphs are a summary of Beshanov, ‘“My byli eshche ne sovsem gotovy”’, 
quotes and information taken from pp. 5-9, 81. 
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stopped the opponent, created conditions for a transfer to the offensive. 
German leaders in Berlin did not realise that the Red Army was capable of 
such resistance because they failed to take into account that they were 
not fighting a Western army. The commanders belonged to “the Stalinist 
generation of commanders who had no understanding of individual 
freedom and drove into battle millions of slaves who had even less rights 
than they did”. For Beshanov, this was a case of:  
 
Two worlds, two systems. In the American and British Armies, 
commanders were obliged to care about the lives of their 
subordinates… In the Red Army, the worst crime was the failure to 
implement even an unimplementable or even criminal order of a 
superior.882 
Even more critical of the Soviet regime’s capacity to fight the war was 
Mark Solonin, an aviation engineer turned historian, who argued that 
while Suvorov was right about Stalin’s plan to attack Hitler, he was very 
wrong about the alleged terrifying strength and preparedness the Red 
Army.883 Solonin argued that Stalin was clearly planning an offensive 
action westward. This was not because of the Red Army’s preference for 
the offensive: all armies plan to attack and defend. What mattered was 
Stalin’s aggressive intent. In the end, Stalin fell victim to a surprise attack 
because his intelligence was poor and unreliable. For Solinin, the striking 
feature of the first months was not the speed and extent of the German 
advances and not the huge losses in the Red Army, but the “surprisingly 
(implausibly low) losses by the enemy”. When advancing, Wehrmacht 
losses were ten times less than the defending Red Army. By the first week 
in July, it was a case of one German loss for every twenty-three Soviet 
losses. Normally in war, it is the attacker that requires an advantage of at 
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least three-to-one to achieve victory. In this case the outcome was as if 
one side was fighting with European weapons and the other side was 
fighting with spears.  
 
There was no excuse that the Red Army was caught by surprise because 
the Red Army had long been (incompetently) preparing for war. For 
Solonin, the Red Army had not just a quantitative advantage in its 
equipment, but a qualitative advantage as well. This advantage applied to 
equipment such as tanks, anti-tank defences, artillery, and radio 
communications. In fact, the Red Army had the best tanks, aircraft and 
artillery in the world. The catastrophe of 1941 cannot be explained by 
problems in operational skill, tactics, or quality and quantity of arms. If 
they were determining factors, the Soviet Union’s victory would have 
been “prompt and inevitable”. It could not have been the “incomplete 
strategic deployment” that caused the problems because only about 10-
15 per cent of the Red Army was at the border. The worst defeats came 
later at Kiev and Viaz’ma when the Red Army had no excuse in terms of a 
perfidious attack.  
 
It therefore must have been “the human factor” that was the reason for 
defeat. In 1941, the Red Army was superior to the Germans in numbers 
and armaments. According to Solonin, the collapse of the Red Army was 
caused by mass non-compliance with orders, mass desertion, and mass 
surrender. The Red Army had enough tanks but not enough 
motivation. While there was no mass anti-Stalinist uprising, no meetings 
and no soldiers committees, Russia’s long-suffering silent majority finally 
got to make a choice as Party officials tore up their party cards and ran 
for the hills. For a few days, Russia was free of Communism until the 
oppression of the Germans turned the people against the invaders.884 
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Iuriĭ Zhuk’s Neizvestnye stranitsy bitvy za Moskvu appeared in 2008 and 
in many respects resembled Nagorski’s The Greatest Battle, which came 
out the year before.885 Like Nagorski, Zhuk suggested that divisions 
between Hitler and his generals were crucial to saving Moscow. Like other 
revisionist accounts, Zhuk’s aim was to dispel the Soviet mythology 
around the first six months of the war. Stalin’s ‘defensive’ war in 1939-
1940 led to the invasion of Poland, Finland, Rumania, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia. The invasion force of at most 4.3 million was outnumbered 
more than two to one by the ten million mobilised soldiers of the Red 
Army; Germany’s 4,203 military aircraft amounted to two and half times 
less than what was available to the Red Army’s western military districts; 
Germany’s 3,844 tanks were vastly outnumbered by the Red Army’s tank 
park of 25,932 machines. Despite Stalin’s obsession with war, many Red 
Army soldiers went into battle untrained and without weapons.  
 
Zhuk’s main target was Zhukov’s memoirs, which, according to Zhuk, 
were sadly the “cornerstone” both of Soviet and contemporary 
historiography. Zhukov’s reminiscences claimed that the Battle of 
Smolensk wore the Germans down and caused the crucial pause in the 
German advance. Zhuk noted that, thanks to Zhukov’s falsifications, the 
German decision-making process was still not well known to the Russian 
public. What happened was that Hitler, who had never understood the 
importance of the Soviet capital, overruled his generals who wanted to 
push on directly to Moscow. This was just as well given the incompetence 
of the Red Army’s command, which was addicted to mindless frontal 
assaults that only wasted the advantages that the Soviet Union enjoyed in 
numbers and armour. Zhuk, like Sokolov whom he often cited, viewed 
Zhukov as callous and uncaring when it came to the losses suffered under 
his command. For Zhuk, Zhukov “never gave special consideration to 
such ‘trifles’ as the strength and means of the opponent”. His main 
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concern was his fear of Stalin to whom he constantly boasted about 
“brilliant victories” achieved through brutal and often pointless frontal 
assaults. 
 
Zhuk concluded by noting that “[n]evertheless we won. Only at the price 
of colossal losses was the Red Army able to stop and then defeat the 
Wehrmacht”. Soviet histories and the memoirs penned by the generals 
then stole this victory from the people and attributed it to themselves. 
This was no Soviet victory given that Stalin’s regime triumphed in the end 
only because of its willingness to send millions of its citizens to their 
deaths.886 
 
Another ‘independent’ historian committed to challenging the Soviet view 
of the war is former Soviet rocket artillery expert Lev Lopukhovsky.887 
Lopukhovsky might be described as a moderate in Russia’s “history wars”. 
He rejected the label of revisionism, nonetheless, Lopukhovsky’s themes 
are the massive incompetence on the part of the Soviet political and 
military leadership and the systematic hiding of the truth about the cost 
of the war. 
 
According to Lopukhovsky, the calamity of 1941 was “pre-programmed” 
but not because Stalin was planning a pre-emptive strike. Instead, defeat 
was inevitable because of the relative weakness of the Communist 
political and economic system, mistakes made by Stalin and his generals, 
the relative poverty and lack of education of the Soviet people, and the 
botched mobilisation plans of the Red Army. Lopukhovsky has reassessed 
the Krivosheev figures for the Red Army dead and concluded that they 
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underestimated the casualties by nearly half. When the dead from battles 
that were not acknowledged by Soviet historians and those who died 
while making their way to the battlefield are included, the real figure was 
closer to 14.6 million.888 This was testimony to how poorly the regime 
used its admittedly limited resources. 
 
In Lopukhovsky’s account of the Battle of Moscow, Hitler did not achieve 
strategic surprise because his plans for an attack were already well-
known to Stalin and his Red Army. What the Wehrmacht achieved was 
tactical and operational surprise by thwarting the Red Army’s plans to 
cover the borders and then astonishing the Red Army with the speed at 
which it concentrated forces on its preferred axes of attack and 
implemented its goals of encircling and demoralising the Red Army piece 
by piece. Lopukhovsky’s incredibly detailed account of the Viaz’ma battle 
and its casualties emphasised that the heroic efforts of the Red Army 
were undermined by a system of leadership that at every level prioritised 
fear over initiative. The German commanders were superior because of 
their independence and initiative and their fearlessness in reporting truths 
to their superiors. In the view of Lopukhovsky, the German commanders 
“didn’t fear Hitler in the same way our commanders feared Stalin”.  
 
Initially the German armoured corps completely outclassed its Red Army 
counterpart. The training of Red Army’s driver-mechanics was totally 
inadequate. There was insufficient cooperation between tanks, and 
between armour and the infantry, aviation and cavalry arms. In the early 
stages, the Red Army infantry often conducted mass attacks in closed 
ranks, which were easily repulsed by a well-trained opponent. Another 
problem was that this was an army where “the majority of the 
commanders had a greater fear of the high command than they did of the 
enemy”. Information was never reported accurately for fear of reprisal. In 
                                                 
888 Kavalerchik and Lopukhovsky, The Price of Victory, pp. 85, 150. 
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August alone, the Red Army’s fronts received two million reinforcements 
but these were poorly used.  
 
Nonetheless, the Red Army prevented the German Army from achieving 
its objectives: “The main result of two months of fighting, plainly, should 
be considered the fact that the enemy was unable to achieve his aims of 
destroying the Red Army quickly”. The predicament of the German Army 
was dire; while Army Group Centre lost nearly 220,000 soldiers between 
June and the end of September, there were only 151,000 replacements. 
By 4 September less than half the number of tanks with which the 
German Army invaded in June were still operational. Operation Typhoon 
began successfully and then dramatically slowed in the second half of 
October. Lopukhovsky doubted that the mud was to blame and noted that 
the weather affected both sides. The real cause of the German failure to 
achieve their goals was the remarkable heroism of parts of the Red Army, 
the ‘phoenix-like’ capacity of the Red Army to renew itself, and the fact 
that a more battle-hardened Red Army began to fight more effectively 
having learned the bitter lessons of defeat in the first three months of the 
war. In the end, it was the heroism of poorly-led soldiers and civilians 
that saved Moscow.889 
 
Conclusion 
The ‘revisionist’ attack on the official Soviet view of the war that got 
under way in the Gorbachëv era went much further than Khrushchëv’s 
criticisms of Stalin. It brought into focus the question of the responsibility 
for the war, the inept performance of the Soviet state and the Red Army 
throughout 1941, and the lack of solidarity within the Soviet state in the 
face of the German invasion. It is stating the obvious that judgements 
about Soviet wartime leadership and the support from the Soviet people 
were often connected to broader judgments about Communism and the 
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Soviet Union. A feature of the Gorbachëv and Yeltsin eras was that 
Russia’s history wars were fought out not just in academic histories, but 
in newspaper articles and books written by critics of the Soviet 
establishment. There was, as Tumarkin has put it, “a rich amalgam of 
passion, regret, nostalgia, rage and remembrance”.890  
 
Many revisionists embraced the Icebreaker thesis, but this was not the 
defining feature of their critique. The criticism of the cult of the Great 
Patriotic War introduced the concept of the “Stolen Victory”, the idea that 
the regime sent millions to unnecessary deaths and then claimed the 
victory as their own.891 Because of the regime’s incompetence, Ukraine, 
Belarus, the Baltic States and significant parts of European Russia were 
surrendered to the Nazis more or less without serious losses for the 
Wehrmacht. This was a story of regime helplessness in the face of the 
Nazi invaders. Because Stalin and his generals squandered their massive 
tank and aircraft resources, poorly-trained and poorly-armed conscripts 
then had to wear down the Germans at a cost of ten or more to one. The 
regime only survived because Stalin was willing to resort to any measure 
to stay in power. The ungrateful dictator then claimed that the success in 
the war proved the superiority of the Communist system and vindicated 
his leadership.  
        
Such a view does not meet the criteria of a “Red victory” described in the 
introduction to this thesis: the cost of the victory was too high for the 
Soviet people. Instead, the concept of a “Stolen Victory”, which 
dominates the revisionist literature was more akin to the accounts of 
Seaton, Ziemke, and Nagorski. Importantly, however, where Seaton, 
Ziemke and Nagorski tended to credit the Soviet victory to Hitler’s 
mistakes or the weather, the revisionists were much more likely to credit 
the salvation of Moscow to the Soviet people. Despite expectations that 
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the collapse of Soviet Communism would lead to increased consensus 
between English and Russian language accounts, the revisionist accounts 
move in the opposite direction to the post-Cold War military histories 
produced in the West described in Chapters Five and Six. The accounts of 
the “Glantz era” tended towards the view that the regime had 
considerable capacity and popular support, much to the surprise of the 
German invaders.    
 
The end of the Cold War did not immediately bring about an alignment 
between Western and Russian historians about 1941. Revisionist 
historians from Russia now find their works published in English, and their 
views are widely available. On the other hand, the themes of Stalin’s 
responsibility for the war, regime incapacity, and the excessive cost rarely 
figure as core issues in the literature of the Western military historians 
discussed earlier. Not surprisingly, critics of the revisionists argued that 
the latter had trashed the reputation of Russia and its victory over the 
Nazis. This ‘national-patriotic’ voice would become much more prominent 




Chapter Nine: The National-Patriots 
 
The replacement of Boris Yeltsin by Vladimir Putin in 1999 began another 
process of political change in Russia whose main features were an 
emphasis on patriotism, nostalgia for the power and prestige of the Soviet 
Union, the recreation of an “us and them” view of Russia’s international 
relations and a new emphasis upon rebuilding Russia’s military power. In 
the West, the debate over when and how the Soviet-German war was 
decided is largely an academic one. There are few Western historians who 
would suggest that diabolical political consequences will flow if the debate 
is decided one way rather than the other. In Russia, this is not the case. 
The ongoing controversy over 1941 and the horrendous Soviet losses is a 
political contest where the stakes are extremely high. While revisionists 
are of the view that if the fight to correct Soviet propaganda about the 
war were to be lost, the door opens for Russia to return to Stalinism, the 
“anti-Suvorov” or national-patriotic line favoured by Russia’s military 
establishment insists that if Russia abandons the positive image of the 
Great Patriotic War it might cease to exist as a state.  
 
The Icebreaker controversy prompted a furious reaction from Russia’s 
political and military establishment whose own modified version of the 
Soviet view of the war is now in fierce competition with revisionist 
accounts. The anti-revisionist “national-patriots”, as Uldricks has 
described them, “enjoy the patronage of the government and its 
educational system, the favor of most of the mass media, and the 
allegiance of much of the general public”.892 The Putin administration has 
taken the position that the criticism and revision of the Soviet Union’s 
wartime record was part of a Western plot to weaken Russia.893 Putin on 4 
December 2014 told Russia’s Federal Assembly that the bitter lessons of 
                                                 
892 Uldricks, ‘War, Politics and Memory: Russian Historians Reevaluate the Origins of World War II’, 
p. 75. 
893 See, for example, Miguel Vázquez Liñán, ‘History as a propaganda tool in Putin’s Russia’, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 43 (2010), 167–178. 
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the start of the war have to be learnt so that the tragedy is not 
repeated.894 During the Dmitriĭ Medvedev presidency, a “Presidential 
Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify 
History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests” came into existence from 
2009 to 2012 with the explicit aim of combatting views that diminished 
the Soviet Union’s role in the Second World War.895  
 
Recently, the Russian parliament has passed a bill threatening gaol time 
or sizeable fines for ‘rehabilitating Nazism’. Conservative defenders of the 
bill have noted similar laws exist in France, Germany and Austria. 
However, as Ivan Kurilla noted, where the law in those countries seeks to 
penalise Holocaust denial, the new Russian law instead aims to prop up 
and perpetuate the heroic version of the Great Patriotic War favoured by 
the Putin administration.896 Furthermore, in response to supposed 
fabrications regarding Russia’s martial past, the Russian Ministry of 
Defence has recently expanded its use of ‘scientific companies’, military 
style units whose sole job is to trawl the archives of the Ministry of 
Defence to find evidence against perceived false attacks on Russia’s 
history by revisionists and the West.897  
 
At the same time, histories penned by Western authors are increasingly 
translated into Russian and made available to the general Russian 
readers. A search of www.ozon.ru, Russia’s leading online bookseller, 
reveals translations available by authors such as Glantz, Beevor, Roberts, 
Hastings, Overy, Keegan, Braithwaite and Jones. At times, Western works 
have caused significant controversy in Russia for their apparent anti-
Russian assessments of the Great Patriotic War. In 2015, works by 
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Beevor and Keegan were banned in various regions of the Russian 
Federation for their accusations of Red Army atrocities in the Second 
World War.898 This recent controversy is an extension of Russia/the Soviet 
Union’s long running attitude to Western histories of the war. In Soviet 
times, the general reading public did not have access to Western works, 
but were assured in the official histories that Western historians parroted 
the views of the former Nazi generals and deliberately falsified history to 
satisfy their bourgeois agenda.899 In modern Russia, national-patriotic 
historians argue that revisionist accounts of the period, including the 
Icebreaker thesis, are part of a liberal and Western-inspired plot to 
discredit Russia’s proudest historical event and threaten the very 
existence of the modern Russian state.900  
 
According to the national-patriots, the 1990s was an era when dilettantish 
popular writers and commercial or unpatriotic motives combined to distort 
the history of the war. In 1995, Elena Seniavskaia anticipated the 
backlash against revisionism that would follow in the Putin era when she 
argued that in much the same way that Soviet historians were 
constrained by official ideology, historians writing 
during perestroika displayed a desire to criticise all things Stalin, and, by 
extension, the entire Stalin-era generation who fought and died in the 
Great Patriotic War.901 Seniavskaia took aim at revisionists as being non-
                                                 
898 ‘Russian Region Bans British Historians’ Books’, The Moscow Times, 5/8/15. Available at: 
https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-region-bans-british-historians-books-48754 (accessed 
12/9/15); Antony Beevor, ‘By banning my book, Russia is deluding itself about its past’, the 
guardian, 6/8/15. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/05/banning-book-russia-past-holocaust-
red-army-antony-beevor (accessed 12/9/15); Shaun Walker, ‘Russian region bans British 
historians’ books from schools’, the guardian, 6/8/15. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/05/russian-region--british-historians-books-from-
schools (accessed 12/9/15).  
899 See, for example, Samsonov, Velikaia bitva pod Moskvoĭ 1941-1942, pp. 10-12; Zhukov, 
Vospominaniia komandushchego frontom, p. 73; Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles 
[2002], p. 75; Velikaia otechestvennaia voina Sovestkogo Soiuza 1941-1945. Kratkaia istoriia 
(1984), p. 111. 
900  See, for example Zolotarev, VOV (2011), pp. 786, 790-791. 
901 E. S. Seniavskaia, 1941-1945, Frontovoe pokolenie: Istoriko-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie 
(Moscow: Rossiĭskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1995), p. 8; Elena Seniavskaia is one of Russia’s best-
known historians of the war and is affiliated to the Institute of Russian History in Moscow. Her 
contribution to the debates about 1941 include: Seniavskaia, 1941-1945, Frontovoe pokolenie; A. 
265 
 
professional historians, whose conclusions were driven by the “publicistic 
boom, when judgements about complex historical phenomena were made 
not by professionals, but often just incompetent people who played on the 
emotions of the reading public”.  
 
Seniavskaia’s psychological study of the wartime generation was critical of 
the “thin layer of Communist ideology” that was “no less cruel and 
oppressive” than Nazism, but argued that when the war came, the 
wartime generation fought out of patriotism more than anything else: 
“The ideas of the world revolution were discarded, and the concepts of 
‘Motherland’ and ‘Fatherland’, which were previously anathema and not 
seen in public, turned out to be decisive in the minds of the people”. 
Despite the problems associated with the Soviet system, by saving itself, 
the system saved Russia. The spiritual awakening of the wartime 
generation in the years 1941-1945 was further developed after the war, 
and directly influenced Khrushchëv’s attacks on Stalin’s cult of personality 
in 1956: “the front-line generation can be called not only the 'generation 
of victors', but also the 'Generation of the 20th Congress'". 
 
According to Seniavskaia it was a tragedy for the heroic wartime 
generation to see their efforts belittled, criticised, and forgotten in the 
turbulent years of perestroika. The wartime generation did not speak with 
one voice, and revisionists keen to discredit and condemn all things 
Soviet should remember the debt owed to modern Russia by those who 
fought Hitler’s armies. Senaivskaia noted that victory in the war 
consolidated the brutal rule of Communism, but at the same it was this 
generation that “saved their homeland and all mankind from the fascist 
plague, which raised the country from the ruins and, in the final analysis, 
made possible the establishment of those democratic values, from which 
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it is now subjected to ‘heavy’ criticism”. For Seniavskaia, it was important 
to honour the wartime generation, not to belittle their role in Russia’s 
history in the tide of revisionism: 
 
We are all indebted to this generation, which, alas, has serious 
reasons to believe that it betrayed their own children and 
grandchildren. But both children and grandchildren should be aware 
that without this Russia has no future. And in our difficult, dramatic 
times the basis for moral - and state - the revival of Russia should be 
a moral example of the front generation at moments of his higher 
spiritual rise.902 
 
Criticisms of revisionism as being a fad driven more by commercial factors 
than genuine historical study are common. As one account put it: 
 
The fabrication of modern counterfeiters, for example V. Rezun, are 
published in a total circulation of more than eleven million copies, 
and the Moskovskiĭ Komsomolets newspaper issues more than two 
million copies daily. Meanwhile, the studies written by historians are 
published in circulations of 500 to 3000 copies. That is 45-2000 times 
less!903 
   
It was for this reason that national-patriotic historians felt that they 
required the direct support of the government to ensure that the non-
sensationalist version of history, as they saw it, prevailed. They have had 
some success in this area. The Russian public is evidently sceptical about 
the Icebreaker thesis. Uldricks noted that only four per cent of 
respondents in a 2008 public opinion poll thought that the U.S.S.R. 
started the Second World War.904 In a 2009 poll, of the two thirds of 
Russians who had heard of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, one quarter had 
a negative view, and fifty-seven per cent saw nothing negative.905 There 
is no evident decline in Stalin’s standing in opinion polls. A Levada poll in 
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December 2015 found that the largest number of respondents (45%) took 
the view that Stalin was “equal parts good and bad”. The second-largest 
group of respondents suggested that Stalin was “more good than bad” 
(25%) and the third largest group saw Stalin as “more bad than good” 
(13%).906 Meanwhile, 34% (up from 28% in 2007) agreed with the 
statement that, “whatever flaws and failures are attributed to Stalin, the 
most important thing is that, under his leadership, Russia was victorious 
in World War II”. At the same time 21% (down from 29% in 2007) 
agreed with the statement that, “Stalin was a cruel, inhuman tyrant guilty 
of the murder of millions of innocent people”. Only 13% (down from 17% 
in 2007) agreed with the statement that, “Stalin's policies (purging the 
military and his deal with Hitler) left the country unprepared for war in 
1941 and led to devastating losses”.907 A 2017 Levada poll found that 
Stalin was more than any other figure to be considered by Russians the 
“most outstanding person” in world history.908 
 
Sacralising the memory of the Great Patriotic War and drawing legitimacy 
from it are as important to the present Putin administration as they were 
to the Brezhnev regime.909 The dilemma for the Putin/Medvedev 
leadership has been how to associate modern Russia and the Putin 
administration with the glorious victory in the Great Patriotic War while 
not endorsing Stalinist repression.910 As Boris Dubin has put it, there are 
two conflicting images of Stalin that Russian society is attempting to 
reconcile: “[w]e find here a clash between two Stalins — Stalin the tyrant 
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and Stalin the victor in the Great Patriotic War”.911 In equal numbers – 
consistently about two thirds of those polled – contemporary Russian 
public opinion accepts Stalin as a war hero while simultaneously holding 
the view that he was a repressive tyrant. The memory of Stalin has 
combined, “the image of Russia as a mighty power—strong, aggressive, 
armed, glorious” and “an image of Russia as victim—long-suffering, 
inexhaustibly patient, uncomplaining, eternally poor, willing to get used to 
and bear any burden”.912  
 
There are at least two views on whether the Putin administration is 
deliberately rehabilitating Stalin for its own political purposes. According 
to T. H. Nielson, Putin’s propagandists have ensured that Stalin has 
become “the symbol of the entire Soviet era, which they portray as an era 
of Russian greatness”.913 Thus, the repressions of the 1930s have been 
worked into the narrative about the necessity of industrialisation, which in 
turn was vital if the Soviet Union were to be victorious in its life-and-
death struggle with Nazi Germany.914 According to Thomas Sherlock, 
while neo-Stalinist perspectives are circulating in Russia, there is no clear 
trend towards re-Stalinisation in popular attitudes, and no real effort on 
the part of the Putin administration to restore Stalin to centre stage in the 
memory of the Second World War. Indeed, “evidence of a concerted and 
sustained pro-Stalin campaign by the Kremlin is weak”.915 If Sherlock is 
correct, we should expect to see neither de-Stalinisation, nor re-
Stalinisation in the Putin era. Certainly, neo-Stalinists believe that there is 
a government plot against them. They accuse Russia’s “ruling elite” of 
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suppressing anti-Suvorov publications and ensuring that Suvorov’s books 
receive wide attention.916  
 
What is clear, however, is that the Putin administration has no interest in 
supporting the revisionist version of the Great Patriotic War and a great 
deal of interest in rejecting the Icebreaker thesis. Vladimir Medinskiĭ, a 
long-standing figure in the Putin administration and Minister of Culture, 
categorised Suvorov alongside Russia’s most famous conspiracy 
theorists.917 Meanwhile, the accounts of 1941 produced from within 
Russia’s military establishment speak with more or less one voice. 
According to their national-patriotic account, the Soviet view of the war 
was right in its essentials. The Soviet Union was the innocent party in the 
outbreak of the war, Soviet political and military leaders made significant 
blunders in preparing for the war but quickly learned from their mistakes, 
the Soviet system as a whole showed incredible solidarity, and the victory 
was achieved by the Red Army without significant assistance from the 
mud and snow.  
 
This national-patriotic reaction is nostalgic for the glories of the Soviet 
past, seeking “to establish a heroic and useable past out of which a 
resurgent, proud, nationalist Russia might be reborn”.918 The political and 
cultural experimentation of the 1920s, Khrushchëv’s ‘Thaw’ and 
Gorbachëv’s perestroika were historical dead-ends. By contrast, the Great 
Patriotic War revealed the real nature of Russia.919 Losing sight of this 
reality during the Gorbachëv and Yeltsin eras gave the West its victory. 
The West wanted to destroy Russia because it envied Russia’s success as 
a Great Power.920 The national-patriots’ aim is to undo the damage 
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inflicted on the memory of war first by Khrushchëv and then by 
Gorbachëv, whose perestroika created an era of “moral nihilism”.921 
According to Elena Seniavskaia, the contrast between the moods of the 
Russian people in the heroic era of the Great Patriotic War and the 
psychological confusion of the Gorbachëv/Yeltsin periods was reflected in 
the fact that while only about 15% of the Soviet population needed 
professional counselling after the war, 70% were in need of such help in 
the early 1990s.922  
 
Typical of the national-patriotic reaction of Russia’s military establishment 
to the menace of revisionism was a lead article in Voenno-istoricheskiĭ 
zhurnal that appeared in 2010 over the signature of Colonel I.V. Ilievskiĭ. 
Entitled ‘Against Lies and Falsifications’, Ilievskiĭ listed a series of reasons 
why the Great Patriotic War mattered more to people than other 
cataclysmic events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ilievskiĭ 
noted that interest in the history of the Great Patriotic War was rising 
despite the enormous amount of historical material that has now been 
published. It was not just that the Great Patriotic War was an event of 
world importance and a matter of great pride to Russians, but that the 
war experience provided a basis for the future growth and development 
for the peoples of the former Soviet Union. Ilievskiĭ noted the divisiveness 
of the issues where instead of shades of grey the fault lines have moved 
into stark relief. What was once a divide between a Soviet and an anti-
Soviet perspective was now a contest between national-patriots and 
revisionists.923  
 
Another example of the backlash against revisionism and of the ‘anti-
Suvorov’ movement is the first volume of the multi-volume Velikaia 
Otechevstvennaia Voina, which appeared in 2011 under the editorship of 
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V. A. Zolotarev, one of the Soviet Union’s and then Russia’s leading 
military historians. A glowing preface over the signature of President 
Medvedev suggests that the sentiments expressed in this volume are in 
tune with government thinking about the memory of the war.924 
According to Zolotarev, the agenda of Russia’s “liberals” and “revisionists” 
was to weaken Russia’s place in the world. Revisionist rhetoric was 
indistinguishable from the Nazi press of the war years, a point that is 
made repeatedly in the national-patriotic literature.925 Zolotarev summed 
up what he described as the revisionist ‘paradigm’ thus: 
 
…everything is our fault. We, by ourselves, groomed and trained 
Hitler. We waited until he tore Europe apart so that we could attack 
the European states that were weakened by Hitler. We are not better 
than the Nazis. In fact, we are far worse. We brought death and 
slavery on the points of our bayonets. We would have conquered all 
of Europe to establish Communist totalitarianism, but the Allies 
prevented it. It is our fault, we are guilty in front of all of humanity, 
and we must beg for forgiveness and repent.926 
 
The “we” in this passage is the Russian people, who, in Zolotarev’s view, 
are the direct descendants of the Soviet population. Zolotarev’s tone is 
apocalyptic - Russia’s very existence is at stake: 
 
The kinds of conclusions are we going to make … will determine 
whether our children and grandchildren have a chance to be born and 
live in a country called Russia. Whether they will read and write in 
Russian, and whether they can make their own choices. Or whether 
they will disappear as the Romans did when the German barbarians 
came, as the Hellenistic Greeks did when the Turks came, whether 
they will degrade as Native Americans, or simply disappear with no 
trace as the once powerful Scythians and Sarmatians that once lived 
on our land did.927 
 
                                                 
924 Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 5; as noted, the work referred to as ‘Zolotarev’ is the product of a 
writer’s collective, of which for this volume, Zolotarev was the Chair of the Editorial Committee. 
Thus, citations ascribed to Zolotarev do not necessarily refer to that particular author, but work in 
which he was involved. 
925 ibid., p. 786.  
926 ibid., p. 782. 
927 ibid., p. 791.  
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According to Zolotarev, if Russia’s revisionists succeed, history will record 
that Russia was an evil totalitarian force that destroyed the international 
order with its aggression.928 While the “Western historical project” lays 
claim to “eternal moral principles”, its real agenda is much more 
practical.929 A victory for liberal “revisionism” will have devastating 
geopolitical consequences for Russia, which will lose its claim to 
“Kaliningrad, the Kuril’ Islands, Sakhalin, Kareliia, Vyborg, the Far East, 
and the Caucasus”. Russia’s defeat will come not on the battlefield but 
because of the attack on the memory of the Second World War, which has 
caused a loss of self-belief in Russia.930  
 
Zolotarev’s list of myths about 1941 that are peddled in the liberal press 
and have – according to him - no factual basis, was a long one; the false 
charges that Soviet conduct of the war produced an excessive cost; that 
Zhukov was a heartless butcher of his men; that Stalin made a huge 
mistake by not signing the Geneva convention; that Stalin had a nervous 
breakdown at the outset of the war; that the Red Army had only one rifle 
for every three soldiers; that the Red Army sent its out-dated cavalry into 
battle against the German panzers; that penal battalions won the Red 
victory; that blocking detachments shot countless retreating Red Army 
soldiers; that the achievements of Panfilov and Kosmodem’ianskaia were 
inventions of Soviet propaganda; that ten million Russians signed up to 
fight for Hitler; that Vlasov and Kaminskiĭ were genuine Russian patriots; 
that lend-lease played a decisive role in the Red victory.931  
 
Another eminent figure from the Russian military establishment, Makhmut 
Gareev, President of the Academy of Military Science, agreed that history 
                                                 
928 ibid., pp. 790-791. 
929 N. A. Narochnitskaia in Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 765; a similar argument regarding this 
Manichaean worldview can be seen in Iu. A. Nikiforov, ‘Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voĭna v Zerkale 
“Novoĭ” Istoriografii’, ‘“Vstavaĭ, strana ogromnaia...”, Materialy Mezhdunarodnoĭ naudoĭ 
konferentsii, nosviashchënnoĭ 70-letiiu nachala Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny 1941-1945 godov 
(Sevastopol’, 15-17 iiunia 2011 goda), (2011), p. 212.  
930 Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 791. 
931 ibid., pp. 786-787. 
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matters to Russia’s future. He has urged Russians to pull together and not 
criticise the Soviet past: “[w]e must abandon the recriminations over 
trifles and focus on the main thing - defending real truth about the 
war”.932 For Gareev, memory of the Second World War is the last 
“foothold” of Russia’s much eroded patriotic movement.933 Russia’s 
military history is in danger of falling victim to a foreign plot. Suvorov and 
his fellow “counterfeiters” were only able to publish books “in their 
millions” in Russia with the help of Western donations.934  
 
Other national-patriotic historians from Russia’s military establishment 
take a similar view. Boris Petrov, a retired colonel with many publications 
and a leading position in the Institute of Military History, has urged his 
fellow historians to achieve the objectives set down by the President of 
the Russian Federation, which were to defend genuine history from 
“falsification”.935 Alexeĭ Isaev, a prolific military historian who has devoted 
a career to debunking alleged revisionist mythmaking, has described 
Suvorov and his followers as dishonourable peddlers of historical 
untruths: “They pour forth filth instead of constructive criticism … Their 
pre-ordained answer to any question is simply that ‘the Stalinist regime is 
guilty in everything’”.936  
 
Where revisionist historians took their starting point as the Khrushchëv 
‘Thaw’, national-patriotic historians take their cue from the Brezhnev era, 
which attempted to reinsert Stalin into the narrative while still criticising 
the military purge and praising the resistance of the government, army 
and people. Ilievskiĭ described the twelve-volume Brezhnev-era Istoriia as 
                                                 
932 Makhmut Gareev, ‘Ob ob”ektivnom osveshchenii voennoĭ istorii Rossii’, Novaia i noveĭshaia 
istoriia, no. 5 (2006), p. 36. 
933 ibid., p. 30. 
934 ibid., p. 29. 
935 ibid., p. 24. 
936 Alekseĭ Isaev, Zhukov obolgannyĭ marshal pobedy (Moscow: Ėksmo, Iauza, 2012), p. 460. 
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a “significant, fundamental work that offered a wide panorama and 
convincingly showed the key significance of the Great Patriotic War”.937  
 
Unlike their Soviet forebears, national-patriotic historians do not avoid or 
skirt over the catastrophic beginning to the war. Petrov has described 
how the Red Army for five and half months retreated 850-1200 
kilometres; 1.5 million square kilometres of Soviet territory housing 78.5 
million Soviet citizens fell under occupation in 1941. The price according 
to Petrov was extraordinary – 124 Red Army divisions were smashed, 3.8 
million Red Army soldiers fell into German captivity, seventeen thousand 
aircraft, sixty thousand artillery pieces, twenty thousand tanks (including 
3000 T-34 and KV models) were lost to the enemy. A country of 200 
million found itself so desperately short of soldiers that one million 
eighteen and nineteen year-olds were called into service in 1941. More 
than 300,000 officers were killed, went missing in action or left the front 
wounded, so many that despite the accelerated training programs, the 
Red Army was still short 36,000 officers at the end of 1941. By the end of 
1941, the number of divisions grew one and half times to 314 infantry 
divisions but these were much reduced in size, that is, about half the size 
of the equivalent German divisions. One hundred and twenty four 
divisions had to be disbanded and 3.5 million Red Army soldiers sat in 
German prisoner-of-war camps. By September the much-vaunted 
mechanised corps had become five reduced tank divisions and scattered 
tank brigades and battalions: the tank arm as a component of the Red 
Army declined from twenty per cent to two per cent in the course of 1941 
because the massive losses could not be made up by Soviet industry, 
which produced only three thousand tanks in the second half of the year. 
By December, the number of aircraft available had decreased three and a 
half times. The Briansk and Kalinin ‘fronts’ (army groups) were only the 
size of a single pre-war ‘army’. The Western Front comprised six armies 
                                                 
937 See, for example, Ilievskiĭ, ‘Problemy i zadachi sovremennoĭ istoriografiĭ velikoĭ otechestvennoĭ 
voiny’, p. 4.  
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defending Moscow in October but had two and a half times fewer soldiers, 
six times less artillery and eight times less tanks and aircraft in 
comparison to the pre-war South-West Front.938  
 
There is no hiding the fact too that German encirclements netted huge 
numbers of Red Army soldiers, many of whom must have surrendered 
without putting up serious resistance. Oleg Rzheshevskiĭ, president of the 
Russian Association of Second World War Historians, acknowledged that 
the number of prisoners that the Germans reported to have captured at 
each of the major ‘cauldrons’ was close enough to the mark: 328,000 at 
Bialystok and Minsk; 310,000 at Smolensk; 103,000 at Uman’; 665,000 
at Kiev; 663,000 at Viaz’ma and Briansk. He did consider some of the 
figures as likely too high: the South-West Front at Kiev numbered only 
667,000 and up to 150,000 of its soldiers escaped the encirclement. 
Nonetheless, if the precise facts are in doubt, “it does not change the 
general picture”.939 According to Zolotarev, the irretrievable losses and 
hospitalised amounted to 4,473,820 individuals in the six months and 
nine days of 1941.940 Breaking down this figure, 465,400 died of their 
wounds on the battlefield; 101,500 died of their wounds in hospital; 
235,300 died of illness and accidents and 2,335,500 were taken prisoner. 
In other words fifty-two per cent of the Red Army’s losses were prisoners-
of-war. In 1941, the Red Army lost 142.4% of its serving individuals.941 
There is general recognition that this was a military catastrophe without 
precedent.  
 
What is also agreed upon is that the Soviet Union was not responsible for 
the outbreak of the war. The Nazi-Soviet Pact was both justified and 
necessary. The “myth” of the Nazi-Soviet Pact as “a shameful page” in 
                                                 
938 This paragraph is a summary of Boris Petrov, 1941 Rabota nad oshibkami: ot letneĭ katastrofa 
do “chuda pod Moskvoĭ” (Moscow: Ėksmo, Iauza, 2012), pp. 625-636. 
939 O. A. Rzheshevskiĭ, ‘Narod i voĭna’, in A. A. Kovalenia, V. A. Smoliĭ, and A. O. Chubar’ian (eds), 
1941 god. Strana v ogne: ocherki (Moscow: OLMA Media Grupp, 2011), p. 233. 
940 Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 609.  
941 ibid., p. 610. 
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Russian history had to be rejected. England and France actively sowed the 
seeds of a new war, hoping that Hitler would attack the U.S.S.R. In 1939-
1941, a global war was under way.942  As Petrov has put it, when Hitler’s 
invasion finally came, Western elites “finally achieved what they had so 
passionately strived for over the previous twenty years”.943  
 
Rzheshevskiĭ agreed that the Soviet leadership was right to be suspicious 
of Western intentions. The British and United States’ governments were 
clearly more sympathetic to Nazi Germany than to the Soviet Union. It 
was not just that the lack of credible commitments from Britain and 
France that made an anti-Hitler coalition impossible.944 Britain and France 
actively colluded with the Nazis in order to encourage war between 
Germany and the Soviet Union.945 The failure of the West to check Hitler’s 
aggression forced the Soviet Union to make a deal with Germany.946 As 
Medinskiĭ has put it, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was, “a homage to the 
cynicism of realpolitik”.947 Medinskiĭ has noted that the view that Stalin 
would have signed anything that would have given him more time to 
prepare for the coming war, just as the West had done at Munich. Stalin 
had just as much reason to be suspicious of Churchill as Hitler, and in 
later forming an alliance with the Soviet Union the staunch anti-
Communist Churchill was as much of a slave to Realpolitik as Stalin.948 
Had the Soviet Union not created the buffer zone of the Baltic States and 
Eastern Poland, Moscow and Leningrad would certainly have fallen in the 
                                                 
942 Petrov, 1941 Rabota nad Oshibkami, pp. 185-186; Iuriĭ Zhukov, ‘Na nas Napala Prakticheski 
vsia Evropa…’, in A. Iu. Bondarenko and N. N. Efrimov (eds), Gor’koe Leto 1941-go (Moscow: 
Veche, 2011), p. 24; Medinskiĭ, Voĭna, p. 394; Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 789. 
943 Petrov, 1941 Rabota nad Oshibkami, p. 91.  
944 Rzheshevskiĭ, ‘Sovetskie plany otrazheniia agressii i nezavershennost’ podgotovki strany k 
oborone’, in Kovalenia, Smoliĭ and Chubar’ian (eds), 1941 god. Strana v ogne, pp. 76-77. 
945 ibid., p. 27.  
946 O. A. Rzheshevskiĭ, ‘Mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie i osnovhye vektory sovetskoĭ vneshneĭ politiki 
nakanune Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny’, in Kovalenia, Smoliĭ and Chubar’ian (eds.), 1941 god. 
Strana v ogne, p. 12; Nikiforov, ‘Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voĭna v Zerkale “Novoĭ” Istoriografii’, p. 
209. 




subsequent German invasion.949 By proceeding cautiously, Stalin wisely 
avoided making the mistake of the poorly prepared Russian offensive of 
1914.950 Just as great an achievement was the signing of a treaty with 
Tokyo, ensuring that Japan eventually attacked the U.S., thus creating 
the geopolitical setting that made the wartime alliance possible.951  
 
According to Ilievskiĭ, Stalin should be thanked for a series of successes 
before and during the war that set up the eventual victory at Moscow. 
Stalin successfully delayed an invasion planned for May until late June 
1941, shrewdly avoided war on two fronts with his diplomatic successes 
with Japan and Germany, oversaw the evacuation carried out so that the 
Soviet Union lived to fight another day, along with his role in holding 
Leningrad and Moscow.952 Western writers have often noted that Hitler 
erred in not invading earlier in the spring of 1941. The delay in the 
German offensive was attributed to the distraction of the Balkan 
campaign and the swollen rivers of eastern Poland.953 National-patriotic 
historians suggest that the delay was caused by the fact that Stalin had 
taken dozens of countermeasures, including the mobilisation of reserves 
and the transfer of divisions closer to the frontier.954 
 
In fact, the victory of 1941 was only possible because of shrewd decisions 
taken long before the war. The national-patriots reject the revisionist 
claims that the Soviet regime foolishly helped to create the Nazi war 
machine in the 1920s. Stalin’s actions in the pre-war period enhanced 
rather than impeded the chances of the Soviet Union’s survival in the 
looming war. The revisionists claim that the secret German-Soviet 
                                                 
949 Rzheshevskiĭ, ‘Mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie i osnovhye vektory sovetskoĭ vneshneĭ politiki 
nakanune Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny’, p. 16. 
950 Igor’ Pykhalov, Velikaia Obolgannaia Voĭna: 4-e rasshivennoe izdanie (Moscow: Iauza, Ėksmo, 
2012), p. 128.  
951 ibid., pp. 124-125. 
952 Ilievskiĭ, ‘Problemy i zadachi sovremennoĭ istoriografiĭ velikoĭ otechestvennoĭ voiny’, p. 8. 
953 This argument has been common in Western histories for many years. In order to trace its 
persistent nature, see for example: Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, p. 175; Churchill, The 
Second World War. Vol. III, p. 316, and Nagorski, The Greatest Battle, pp. 24-25. 
954 R. Irinarkhov, Krasnaia armiia v 1941 godu (Moscow: Ėksmo, 2009), p. 396. 
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collaboration of the 1920s and early 1930s “forged the Nazi sword” - by 
training German pilots and tankists - is absurd. Collaboration with the 
capitalist West was vital to the modernisation of a backward peasant 
Russia and the collaboration clearly worked in favour of the Soviet Union. 
The Germans financed the tank park for the meagre return that thirty 
German tankists received training.955 
 
National-patriotic historians mostly scoff at suggestions that Stalin had a 
divided society on the eve of the war. Forced collectivisation and fast-
paced industrialisation were absolutely what was required for the survival 
of the Soviet state. Economic modernisation created the preconditions 
necessary for the Soviet Union to be able to withstand the German 
invasion.956 Soviet rule in the 1920s and 1930s created a physically fit 
and politically mobilised population able to perform well despite the 
hardships of war. As for the idea that the Soviet Union was a prison 
camp, the national-patriots counter that it was one of the few safe havens 
from Nazi genocide.957  
 
There is mostly agreement among the national-patriots with the 
Khrushchëv-era assertion that the purge harmed the Red Army, although 
it is usually qualified with the claim that Khrushchëv greatly exaggerated 
the impact. It is even possible that there were some “real or half-
formulated” military plot (or plots) against Stalin.958 For Rzheshevskiĭ, 
while the number ultimately repressed represented only seven per cent of 
the total command staff, these were the most experienced 
commanders.959 On the other hand, the Western/revisionist claim that the 
purges wiped out more than half of the officers, including the best and 
brightest, and left in their place an uneducated rump is mostly rejected. 
                                                 
955 Pykhalov, Velikaia Obolgannaia Voĭna, pp. 28-29.  
956 Ponomarev, Bitva za Moskvu bez Lozhnykh Mifov, pp. 147-148. 
957 Aleksandr Diukov, Za Srazhalis’ Sovetskie Liudi (Moscow: Iauza, Ėksmo, 2007), p. 263. 
958 Ilievskiĭ, ‘Problemy i zadachi sovremennoĭ istoriografiĭ velikoĭ otechestvennoĭ voiny’, p. 9. 
959 Rzheshevskiĭ, ‘Sovetskie plany otrazheniia agressii i nezavershennost’ podgotovki strany k 
oborone’, p. 65. 
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The widely quoted figure from the Khrushchëv era of forty thousand 
purged officers failed to take into account that the vast majority of the 
“purged” officers were not arrested and many found their way back into 
the army. The officer corps as a whole was huge, comprising 450,000 
individuals in June 1941.  
 
The national-patriotic accounts mostly reject the Khrushchëv-era 
accusation that Stalin surrounded himself with incompetent cronies from 
the Red cavalry who had fought alongside Stalin during the Russian Civil 
War of 1918-1920. While serving at Tsaritsyn in 1918, Stalin became the 
political patron of the First Cavalry Army, which produced many of Stalin’s 
favourite soldiers who took to the field in 1941. Isaev points out that the 
problem was not too much cavalry but too little and when war broke out. 
In 1939, the Red Army reduced its cavalry by two-thirds only to find that 
Zhukov had to rapidly increase the number of cavalry divisions as a 
temporary replacement for the destroyed mechanised corps in 1941.960  
 
There is not much sympathy for Poland, Finland or the Baltic States in the 
national-patriotic accounts. The Soviet Union had no alternative other 
than to occupy eastern Poland because to allow Germany to occupy 
eastern Poland would simply have brought the enemy closer to Soviet 
territory. It had long been obvious that Nazi Germany and Finland would 
become military allies, perhaps supported by Britain. The Finnish leader, 
General Mannerheim, was an expansionist who had demanded new 
conquests in eastern Karelia. The Western powers sent material and 
manpower help to the Finns during the 1939-1940 conflict despite the fact 
that Nazi Germany was supposedly the all-consuming enemy. In the end, 
the Finnish war was a crushing Soviet victory.961  
 
                                                 
960 Alekseĭ Isaev, Desiat’ Mifov Vtoroĭ Mirovoĭ (Moscow: Iauza, Ėksmo, 2004), pp. 46. 
961 Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 17. 
280 
 
On the other hand, the cost of the war against Finland and the ease with 
which Germany had overcome France in 1940 convinced Stalin that time 
was needed if the Red Army were to be ready for the looming war. The 
Soviet political and military leadership hoped for another year of peace 
while taking prudent precautions. Above all, it was important for Stalin to 
appear to be on the side of peace at all times because the anti-Russian 
West was likely to use any excuse to form a coalition against the Soviet 
Union. Stalin’s judgement was affected by justified concern about 
Western intentions; if Hitler could successfully claim that the U.S.S.R. was 
the aggressor in the war, the United States, Britain and Germany might 
reconcile their differences and unite against Soviet Communism.962 
Stalin’s nightmare was the German and British empires in alliance against 
an isolated Soviet Union.963  
 
At one level, Icebreaker was a story of Soviet agency and strength. Stalin 
and the Red Army were no longer the timid victims of an all-powerful 
Hitler, but instead took their fate into their own hands. Mikhail Mel’tiukhov 
is an example of an historian who is more sympathetic to Stalin and the 
Soviet system, but who also embraced a version of the Icebreaker 
hypothesis. For Mel’tiukhov, Stalin’s behaviour was the same as the 
behaviour of other world leaders whose focus was the self-interest of their 
country and regime in a hostile world. The Soviet leadership was 
understandably and bitterly resentful at the territorial losses that followed 
from the events of 1917. These losses put Russia back two hundred years 
in terms of its standing as a great power and relegated it to regional, 
rather than great power status. Combining the new ideology of “world 
revolution” and traditional Russian foreign policy, the Soviet government’s 
aim was a global reconfiguration of power in which the chief impediments 
were Britain, France and their allies.  
 





Mel’tiukhov rejected the supposition that a weak Soviet Union simply 
succumbed in the face of the German advance. From this perspective, 
Icebreaker was an opportunity to reposition Stalin and the Red Army as 
active players and not passive victims. Stalin had planned a crushing blow 
against Hitler but delayed it amid confusion as to the aims of Hess’s flight 
to Scotland. For Mel’tiukhov, if the Red Army had attacked on 12 June it 
would have achieved complete surprise. The blow carried out by the 
South-West and West Fronts acting in concert would have paralysed fifty-
five German divisions, more than half the total force, and made an 
effective German counter-attack unlikely. Mel’tiukhov’s evidence that an 
attack would have succeeded comes partly from the success of the Red 
Army against the Germans after it recovered from the initial shock of the 
early defeats. In the first half of October the Germans advanced at 
sixteen kilometres a day. In the second half of October 1941, it was five 
kilometres a day. By the end of November 1941, Germany was 
experiencing a full-blown political-economic crisis. Mel’tiukhov’s Soviet 
state was powerful enough to miss this opportunity and still defeat 
Hitler.964 
 
Mel’tiukhov’s position is eccentric among the national-patriots; they 
mostly reject the Icebreaker thesis as having no factual basis. The new 
weapons produced by the Soviet state were appropriate to the space and 
transport networks of the country and could be used defensively or 
aggressively as required. The tanks that were built in the Soviet Union 
followed a similar pattern to tanks built elsewhere and were not 
specifically designed to roll along the new German Autobahns. Similarly, 
the bombers that the Soviet air force possessed were no different to other 
military aircraft of the era and not specifically designed to attack 
Germany. It was not true, as Suvorov claimed, that the Soviet Union built 
its factories near the Western frontier; factories were also constructed in 
                                                 
964 These paragraphs are a summary of Mel’tiukhov, Upushchenyĭ shans Stalina. Available at: 
http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/13.html (accessed 2/2/16). 
282 
 
the Urals. The fact that the Soviet Union did not build long-range bombers 
was in itself evidence that Stalin had no desire to warn off Hitler from an 
attack.965 All the documentary evidence suggests that Hitler made his 
decision to invade Russia in late 1940 in the context of the stalemate in 
the war against Britain. While Stalin may have desired the expansion of 
Communism, his caution was evident in policies such as ‘Socialism in One 
Country’. The Red Army’s defeats in 1941 were brought about by an 
incomplete mobilisation and concentration of the necessary forces to repel 
an invasion. Stalin had rational reasons for believing, and not just hoping, 
that the Germans could be held off with political measures.966  
  
Stalin did not receive reliable and exact information regarding the German 
attack that he chose to ignore, as the revisionists claimed. In the months 
before 22 June 1941, numerous dates for the invasion emerged: 14 May, 
21 May, 15 June and 22 June. As each day came and went, Stalin was 
more confident that the invasion would not take place in 1941.967 In the 
face of so many conflicting reports it is unsurprising that he did not heed 
the advice that proved to be correct only with hindsight.968 Stalin shared 
the view of much of the intelligence reaching Moscow that the predicted 
attack would not come until Germany had concluded its campaigns in the 
west.969 Even in June 1941, the number of German divisions in Western 
and Eastern Europe was approximately the same; it was by no means 
clear in which direction Hitler would strike.970 French intelligence failed to 
adequately prepare democratic France for the May 1940 invasion and 
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283 
 
American intelligence failed to prevent Pearl Harbor.971 Why then, 
according to the national-patriots, should Stalin be singled out as the 
great fool of the Second World War? 
 
For Zolotarev, “the miscalculations and mistakes of the leadership of the 
country” were significant.972 The main problem was that the leadership 
assumed that there would be an initial period of the war when the Soviet 
state would have time to mobilise its resources as was the case in the 
First World War. There was also “weak professional preparation” of many 
commanders and of the reserves mobilised just as the war got under 
way.973 The Red Army had to learn strategic defence in the battles of 
1941. The opponent had an enormous superiority on the directions of his 
advance while the Red Army’s defence lacked depth, was weakly 
motorised and had poor intelligence about the enemy’s plans.974 
Nonetheless, the crisis was solved by plugging the gap with strategic 
reserves, the renovation of retreating units and the transfer of units from 
the interior of the country.975  
 
The Germans by contrast had the crucial advantage of knowing where it 
would mass its forces for an attack while the Red Army mistakenly 
assumed that the initial border battles would last two or three weeks as 
the Red Army prepared its own devastating counter-attack.976 The 
problem, according to Isaev, was that the Red Army “was only able to 
deploy 43% of its first-echelon divisions meaning that the Wehrmacht 
enjoyed a superiority of three and even five-to-one at the decisive points 
along the front”.977  
 
According to Rzheshevskiĭ, the deficit along the German invasion route 
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was seven to one, twelve Red Army divisions against eighty-four German 
divisions at the points at which the Germans broke through on 22 June. It 
was not the case that the Soviet state failed to mobilise; the problem was 
that the mobilisation was incomplete. In April and May under cover of 
training manoeuvres, the Red Army called up more than eight hundred 
thousand soldiers, about one quarter of what was required for the 
mobilisation plan.  
 
For Rzheshevskiĭ, the Soviet belief that the crucial fighting was not going 
to take place within the first two weeks of the war and that there would 
only be relatively minor border skirmishes before the main attack came 
was a grave error. As war approached, rapid mobilisation resulted in 
impressive numbers on paper. On the other hand, the large numbers of 
poorly trained and poorly armed men reaching the fast-moving front 
actually hindered operations. The covering armies were not fully mobilised 
because the Soviet leadership assumed that this could be done quickly in 
response to an emerging crisis or the actual outbreak of war. While one 
hundred and eight divisions were assigned to cover the frontier, only forty 
were in position to repel the invader and these were neither properly 
armed nor mobilised.978  
 
For Petrov, the Red Army was a half-formed, essentially peacetime army 
in 1941 and it showed. In the face of a well-organised and experienced 
Wehrmacht, local Red Army commanders showed little initiative.979 Only 
as the Germans advanced did front and army commanders turn their 
attention to crucial issues such as dwindling fuel and weapons supplies 
much too late. According to Zolotarev, most units had too few soldiers, 
not too few weapons. The ratio of guns to soldiers was more like three to 
two. It was standard practice to arm units that were already en route to 
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the front.980 The mistakes were that the Red Army had not trained for 
working their way out of envelopments and dealing with a fast-moving 
enemy operating deep inside Soviet territory in the opening weeks of the 
war. Strategic defence had not been theorised or practiced by the pre-war 
High Command. Up until September, every effort was made to counter-
attack because this was the only training that the Red Army had.981 Yet 
the Red Army lacked just about everything needed for an effective 
counter-attack; there was no radio network for communication. 
 
For the national-patriots, it is folly to underestimate the novelty and 
effectiveness of the blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg was effective everywhere against 
countries that were not preparing for war in the same way that the 
German military had done. The occupied territories gifted Germany 
incredible resources and a skilled workforce. According to Isaev, the 
Germans succeeded because they had strategic initiative and because 
they had the mechanised corps that the Red Army would lack until 
1943.982 In the opening battles, the Wehrmacht was simply too good for 
the Red Army. For Isaev, the Red Army mobilised in three echelons with 
poor communication between them and none of the echelons was strong 
enough to resist the panzer groups. Isaev defended Stalin’s supposed 
addiction to ordering ill-considered and costly counter-attacks by arguing 
that that these actions did much to interrupt German plans.983 The 
Germans kept moving forward, but the constant Soviet attacks severely 
reduced their overall capability: a death by a thousand cuts. For Isaev, 
the key was that there were formed or reformed the equivalent of 821 
divisions (483 rifle, 73 tank, 31 motorised and 101 cavalry divisions plus 
266 tank, rifle and ski brigades). This uninterrupted conveyor belt of new 
units meant that the Soviet state was in a state of “permanent 
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mobilisation”.984 It was just as well that the Red Army had more than 
twenty thousand tanks and the Germans less than three thousand 
because the Red Army simply lacked the capacity to repair them. Instead 
of patching up old tanks, the Red Army had to send in echelon after 
echelon of new mechanised units in the first few months of the war 
because the Red Army was simply not prepared for war of this type.985  
 
Even so, the Soviet state, army, and people resisted with a determination 
that was not evident in France. Crucial was the work of Stalin and the 
political and military elite who, through the State Committee of Defence 
and the Stavka effectively mobilised the country for war. The revisionist 
account emphasised massive Soviet numerical superiority in manpower, 
tanks, aircraft and artillery. Not so, according to the national-patriots. It 
was the Germans who had the advantage of numbers, battle experience 
and professional training. Nonetheless, the bravery and self-sacrifice of 
Soviet troops negated these hefty German advantages in the initial phase 
of the war.986 According to Miagkov:  
 
German numerical superiority and the professionalism of the German 
soldiers and officers was offset by the resilience of Soviet fighters, 
extraordinary measures undertaken by the Soviet government and 
its leadership and the mobilisation of resources.987 
 
By the end of July, the enemy had no choice but to transfer over to the 
defence on the main Moscow direction in order to focus on the threat 
posed to Bock’s flanks by the Red Army at Kiev.988 This was not a daft 
strategic choice on the part of Hitler, but a military necessity. The 
emphasis on Hitler’s blunders found in Western works is simply an 
invention of former German generals keen to rescue their reputations 
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post-war.989 Diverting forces to Kiev was a military necessity for the 
German military and not evidence of delay, indecision and poor strategy 
on the part of Hitler. Army Group Centre needed this time to recover.990 
Ultimately, the resistance of the South-West Front at Kiev played a key 
role in weakening the Germans and thus saving Moscow.991 Hitler had to 
divert south so as to neutralise an aggressive Soviet threat Bock’s 
vulnerable southern flank; Kiev was where the Red Army had stationed its 
best troops.992  
 
Zolotarev was of the view that Stalin had sound reasons for rejecting 
Zhukov’s advice to evacuate Kiev even though the failure to do so cost 
the Red Army dearly.993 Stalin knew that the majority of Soviet 
commanders were incapable of organising large scale retreats - the 6th 
and 12th armies were destroyed that way at Uman when bungling their 
retreat - and that there was no guarantee that the same thing would not 
have been repeated at Kiev. To abandon Kiev was to self-liquidate a 
threat to Army Group Centre’s flank, in which case the Germans would 
have been free to continue their advance on Moscow already in late 
August.994 Isaev agreed that the risk taken by Stalin that led to the 
eventual encirclement and disaster at Kiev was justified as it delayed the 
assault on Moscow, a city ultimately more important to the Soviet war 
effort.995  
 
Medinskiĭ agreed with Stahel and Luther that the Germans lost the war in 
August 1941.996 The Germans only had one plan, blitzkrieg, and had no 
plans for a war of attrition that lasted years rather than months. Already 
at Smolensk, there was a changing of the guard when the Germans, 
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according to Medinskiĭ, suffered nearly half a million casualties and their 
tank divisions had losses of around half their tanks and crews.997 While 
there would be many trials for the Soviet people and the war would only 
be won at a huge cost, there was only going to be one outcome to the 
war after the battles of Brest, Grodno, lida, El’nia, and Smolensk. These 
were in the end Pyrrhic victories for the Wehrmacht whose only chance of 
defeating the Red Army was the overwhelming surprise attack.  
 
Even when the Germans were winning battles they were losing the war. 
According to Zolotarev, between 22 June and the end of September, Army 
Group Centre lost 229,000 killed, wounded and missing in action. In 
October and November Army Group Centre lost more than 145,000 men. 
In December, it would lose 103,000 men and could replace only forty per 
cent of these.998 Zolotarev claims that Soviet and German losses were 
more and more comparable over time. The Battle of Moscow for Soviet 
and modern Russian authors extends up until April 1942, and for those 
203 days, according to Zolotarev, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army 
stood at 926,000 men compared to 615,000 killed wounded and missing 
in action German soldiers.999 The message is that once the Red Army 
rebalanced after the initial shock and awe, it was a match for the 
allegedly more professional Wehrmacht, a fact reflected in the evening up 
of the ratio of losses. 
 
The collapse of the Red Army at Viaz’ma was more difficult to explain or 
justify because the Red Army should not have been taken by surprise. For 
Miagkov it was the numerical superiority of the German forces, the battle 
experience of the German generals, the unexpectedness of the start of 
the operation and the mistakes of the Soviet command that led to the 
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tragedies at Viaz’ma and Briansk.1000 For Isaev, the Red Army’s 
commanders were still consistently guessing wrong about where the 
Germans were massing to attack. Petrov and Zolotarev directly attributed 
the encirclements at Viaz’ma and Briansk to poor Soviet intelligence.1001 
According to Zolotarev, Konev misread German plans in October and then 
misled Stalin and the Stavka. Konev came to the conclusion that Bock 
would drive at Moscow directly from the centre along the Viazma-Moscow 
highway when it fact the Germans planned to strike north through Kalinin 
and south through Briansk and Tula to effect yet another giant 
encirclement of the Red Army. As a consequence, the Red Army 
concentrated its forces directly to the west of Moscow only to find that its 
weak flanks were soon overrun.1002 Nonetheless, the troops encircled at 
Viaz’ma and Briansk were critical to the saving of Moscow. As Petrov has 
put it, while the losses of Soviet troops at Viaz’ma were staggering, “this 
catastrophic defeat did not break down their fighting spirit”.1003 When the 
Germans renewed the attack on Moscow, it was into the face of growing 
resistance. In November on the Tikhvin, Moscow and Rostov directions, 
the Germans could only penetrate between one hundred and two hundred 
kilometres. The constant factor in the turnaround in the war was the Red 
Army’s stubborn resistance and selfless sacrifice.1004  
 
There is general agreement that the Red Army learned from its mistakes. 
It got better at the timely injection of new troops, the competent 
management of those troops by increasingly battle-hardened 
commanders, the use of methodical and effective propaganda, and, for 
some, the inspirational leadership of Stalin.1005 The proof of Red Army 
effectiveness was that from mid-November to the beginning of December, 
the Germans lost 155,000 killed and wounded, 300 artillery pieces, 800 
                                                 
1000 M. Iu. Miagkov, ‘Pervaia reshaiushchaia bitva: ot oborony Moskvy k obshchemu kontrastuleniiu 
Krasnoĭ armii’ in Kovalenia, Smoliĭ and Chubar’ian (eds), 1941 god. Strana v ogne, p. 129. 
1001 Petrov, 1941 Rabota nad oshibkami, p. 369; Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 168. 
1002 Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 168. 
1003 Petrov, 1941 Rabota nad oshibkami, p. 359. 
1004 Gareev, ‘Ob ob”ektivnom osveshchenii voennoĭ istorii Rossii’, p. 28. 
1005 Petrov, 1941 Rabota nad Oshibkami, p. 385. 
290 
 
tanks and 1,500 aircraft.1006 For the national-patriots, the choices were 
complete military victory or defeat and submission to a barbarous and 
genocidal opponent. Relying upon the Krivosheev figures, Gareev noted 
that Red Army military losses were at a ratio of 1.3:1 with Germany over 
the whole war, and that Soviet losses appear so dramatically 
disproportionate in 1941 because of the murder of millions of Soviet 
prisoners of war by the Nazis.1007 The huge losses mostly occurred 
between June and September 1941.  
 
Zolotarev’s account of the Battle of Moscow attributed to Stalin only the 
role of approving plans drawn up by the military professionals. It is 
Zhukov who was the military genius who was able to concentrate in the 
rear of the Western, Kalinin, and South-Western Fronts fresh divisions 
arriving from the Far East, Siberia and Urals, which formed the First 
Shock, Twenty-Sixth, Tenth and Sixty-First Armies. Sensing that the 
enemy was retreating at the slightest pressure, Zhukov lured the 
Germans forward and did not allow them to consolidate along new 
defensive lines. It was a bold plan, “unique in world history”, because the 
outnumbered defenders successfully launched a counter-attack against a 
superior opponent. According to Zolotarev, the Red Army’s 1.1 million 
men, 7,652 artillery pieces, 774 tanks and 1,000 aircraft were pitted 
against Army Group Centre’s 1.7 million men, 13,500 artillery pieces, 
1,170 tanks and 615 aircraft.1008 
 
Zolotarev praised Zhukov for getting the logistics right: 5,500 railway 
wagons arrived each day in Moscow with the necessary equipment, fuel, 
ammunition, and food. Zhukov’s plan was, wisely, not to attempt deep 
thrusts, but simply to crush the most forward German units and force 
them back. Army Group Centre was stretched out over a front that 
extended for one thousand kilometres. Soviet aviation and partisans 
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attacked the German lines of communication. While the Germans froze to 
death, the Red Army was much better prepared for winter war.1009 
According to Miagkov, the tables were now turned on the Germans. In the 
days preceding the Soviet counter-attack, Bock’s forces were stretched 
too thinly in one echelon over one thousand kilometres.1010 German 
intelligence completely failed to recognise the offensive capabilities of 
Soviet forces and stubbornly held on to the belief that the collapse of the 
Soviet front was imminent.1011 The Germans were only saved by Hitler’s 
shrewd decision not to yield ground. Thanks to Hitler, the Wehrmacht 
avoided a repeat of the slaughter of Napoleon’s Grande Armée.1012 
 
According to the national-patriotic historians, this was not a war fought 
with unnecessary cruelty and callous disregard of human lives. Blocking 
detachments were not Stalin’s invention, and they were part of a Russian 
military tradition dating back to Peter the Great.1013 Soviet blocking 
detachments arrested only 3.7% of those they detained and an even 
smaller proportion were sentenced to death. Furthermore, in this war the 
Germans formed blocking detachments before the Soviets did.1014 The 
revisionist obsession with blocking detachments was simply a 
perpetuation of Nazi wartime propaganda, which claimed that Jewish 
commissars forced Soviet soldiers to stay at the front. For Zolotarev at 
least, there was no evidence at all that blocking detachments ever fired 
on retreating Red Army soldiers.1015  
 
For the national-patriots, there was no evidence that civilian opolchentsy 
were ruthlessly sent to their deaths due to their lack of training. 
                                                 
1009 ibid., pp. 204-05. 
1010 Miagkov, ‘Na grani katastrofy. 22 iiunia – sentiabr’ 1941 goda’, p. 156. 
1011 ibid., p. 154; the same argument is made in N. Ia. Komarov and G. A. Kumanev, Velikaia Bitva 
pod Moskvoĭ: Letopis’ vazhneĭshikh sobytiĭ. Kommentarii (Moscow: Institut Rossiĭskoĭ istorii RAN, 
2002), p. 112. 
1012 Zolotarov, VOV (2011), p. 216.  
1013 Pykhalov, Velikaia Obolgannaia Voĭna, p. 426; Nikiforov, ‘Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voĭna v 
Zerkale “Novoĭ” Istoriografii’, p. 219; Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 770. 
1014 Zolotarev, VOV (2011), p. 788. 
1015 ibid., p. 771.  
292 
 
According to Isaev, the “one-gun-per-five volunteers” charged with 
defending Moscow is a myth.1016 The majority of Moscow’s armed 
defenders comprised reformed military units with previous experience of 
the war.1017 Nor were Moscow’s defenders mainly prisoners of one kind or 
another. Less than half a million individuals served in penal battalions 
compared to more than thirty four million who served in the Red Army. 
The proportion in penal battalions was a mere 1.24 per cent.1018 The 
German armed forces also had penal battalions, and 120,000 Germans 
passed through them.1019  
 
The national-patriots do not avoid difficult and uncomfortable topics such 
as collaboration with the Germans and the Moscow panic. Rzheshevskiĭ 
acknowledged that, despite attempts by Soviet propagandists to 
whitewash history, it is now known that at least one million Soviet citizens 
actively collaborated with the Germans.1020 Disaffection with Stalinist rule 
in the years before the war and panic at the scale of the defeats of 1941 
were clearly factors.1021 Nonetheless, the actual numbers of active 
collaborators were relatively small when one considers the vast population 
of the Soviet Union. It has to be viewed in the context of a population of 
two hundred million, the vastly greater numbers of civilian partisans and 
Red Army soldiers who chose to fight to the death rather than become 
prisoners of the Nazis, and the level of coercion imposed on local Soviet 
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The national-patriots do not credit the frequently heard claim that it was 
only when knowledge of the brutality of Nazi occupation became 
widespread that Red Army soldiers were less likely to surrender or 
welcome the Germans.1023 According to Zolotarev, Nazi propaganda was 
of an order fundamentally different to Soviet propaganda, and the degree 
of untruthfulness would have made Soviet commissars blush.1024 The 
message of the Nazis was that Hitler was a liberator. The Germans hid 
their obnoxious policies and behaviour as best they could during 1941. 
Thus, the soldiers and civilians who fought back against the Nazis in 1941 
did so before the full horror of the occupation regime was known.  
 
Stalin remains a divisive figure for the national-patriots, just as he is a 
divisive figure for society more broadly. There is certainly no blanket 
rehabilitation of Stalin evident in the national-patriotic accounts studied 
here. Medinskiĭ was critical of Stalin’s leadership in 1941, arguing that 
given Stalin’s centralisation of power, Stalin alone must accept 
responsibility when explaining the early defeats. However, Medinskiĭ 
added that if Stalin’s conduct in 1941 is damned, so must the victories of 
1943-1945 be at least partially credited to Stalin.1025 Gareev was sceptical 
of the argument that the Red Army managed to win despite Stalin’s 
leadership. Russia after all had lost the Crimean, Russo-Japanese and 
First World Wars, so there was nothing obvious about Russian military 
superiority. It must have been Stalin’s leadership that brought victory in 
the Great Patriotic War.1026 Rzheshevskiĭ noted that at the centre of the 
entire system stood Stalin and that inevitably he was part of the decisions 
that led to the defeats and the victories.1027 According to Seniavskaia, the 
increasingly anti-German Soviet propaganda simply confirmed the general 
outlook of most ordinary soldiers and people: “The war immediately 
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became National and Patriotic … In these conditions, the interests of the 
people, country and state were fundamentally the same”.1028  
 
Petrov, by contrast, considered that too much power was concentrated in 
Stalin’s hands – the military professionals were paralysed.1029 Timoshenko 
and Zhukov were unable to impress upon Stalin the likelihood of a 
German attack.1030 It was Stalin who then interfered to order pointless 
counter-attacks and refused to allow the South-West Front to escape the 
cauldron at Kiev. For Petrov, a revival took place after the early defeats 
and “despite the deformities of Soviet society, the Red Army and the 
nation deeply adhered to the idea of the defence of the Fatherland”. 
Despite the heavy losses and forced retreat, the key to victory was that 
patriots preserved faith in the inevitable victory over the aggressor.1031 In 
other words, this was a victory primarily of professional soldiers and loyal 
civilians.  
On the other hand, it was clearly Soviet resistance and not a contingency 
such as the weather that exercised the greatest influence over the 
outcome of the Battle of Moscow.1032 According to Petrov, “[n]o matter 
what the defeated Hitlerite ‘ubermenschen’ concoct, they were defeated 
not by the mythical ‘General Mud’ and ‘General Frost’, but the generals of 
the Red Army”.1033 Petrov cited meteorological information from 
November to conclude that the average temperature for that month was 
four to six degrees below zero Celsius; cold, but not devastatingly so. The 
temperature did drop to minus twenty-eight from 5 to 6 December, but 
this was when German offensive capabilities were already spent.1034 
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Miagkov noted that while the Red Army recorded temperatures of minus 
four to minus six in November while German sources cited the average 
November temperature as minus fifteen to sixteen degrees. Furthermore, 
in mid-November, the cold, but not severe, weather allowed the Germans 
to move along the hardened ground and threaten the capital.1035 
Ultimately, “[t]he reason for the collapse of the advance of Army Group 
Centre was not the frost, but the growing resistance of the Red Army”.1036 
Miagkov argued that the only time that mud truly affected operations 
around Moscow was when the Soviet counter-attack was brought to a halt 
by the mud of spring 1942.1037  
During the second German offensive in mid-November 1941 the 
conditions were excellent for offensive operations: solid ground, clear 
skies and no snow.1038 With regard to the mud, Miagkov was happy to 
concede that the rasputitsa was a factor that adversely affected German 
plans, but argued that as a supposedly professional and modern army the 
Germans should have been aware of climactic conditions they would face 
in the field.1039 The Germans were delayed but the retreating Red Army 
suffered even more because it had to abandon and destroy equipment 
that could not be moved.1040 The mud was less of a factor than is usually 
considered because German troops simply marched at night when frosts 
hardened the soft ground.1041 The rasputitsa only served to complicate a 
situation already made difficult by increased Soviet resistance.1042 Primary 
documents from German sources make it clear that German troops were 
more concerned about Soviet resistance than the mud.1043 
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The national-patriotic accounts offered muted praise of the organisational 
capabilities of the Communist Party during the war. During the panic of 
October, the Moscow Central Committee continued to distribute warm 
clothes and blankets to the people.1044 Party members were the first to 
enter an engagement and the last to leave, “their gallantry inspired the 
warriors to heroic deeds, they were the example”.1045 Rzheshevskiĭ noted 
that enough warm clothing for ten million people was donated to the 
Soviet government in 1941; three hundred million roubles were donated 
to the war effort by the church despite religious persecution by Soviet 
authorities in the previous decades; money was even donated by Soviet 
citizens in areas occupied by the Germans and smuggled to the Soviet 
authorities.1046  
 
There was criticism from the national-patriots of Soviet hyperbole. The 
accounts argued that overblown Soviet descriptions of near superhuman 
feats by Red Army soldiers obscured the real and untold heroism of 
millions of ordinary soldiers and provide ample fodder for revisionist 
historians to discredit memory of the war as a whole.1047 For Isaev, the 
Soviet version of the invasion that overwhelmingly numerically superior 
well-trained, physically fit, young German soldiers, each armed with a 
sub-machine gun, attacked en masse is not supported by the evidence, 
and was a later invention to attempt to explain the enormous German 
gains of 1941.1048 Similarly, the lionising of Panfilov’s ‘Twenty-Eight’ by 
Soviet authorities constituted a distraction from the real bravery of 
thousands of other troops who fought alongside them.1049 Medinskiĭ noted 
that it was of no benefit to the patriotic cause when members of the 
‘Twenty-Eight’ thought to have been killed in the famous action were 
found alive and well after the war; one soldier coming home to find that 
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his wife had remarried after hearing propaganda reports that he had been 
killed in action.1050 The exaggerated achievement of the ‘Twenty-Eight’ 
resembled the hyperbole around the famous three hundred Spartans who 
stood against Xerxes at Thermopylae; this was in fact a victory of a much 
larger and diverse group of soldiers.1051  
 
What is needed according to Miagkov is more recognition of the fact that 
“the Russian land sent into battle genuine heroes” (istinnye bogatyri) who 
did not run from the enemy.1052 Miagkov cited the example of Sergeant 
Petr Stemasov who on 25 October 1941 at the village of Spass-
Rukhovskoe earned a Gold Star by risking his life to put out a fire on two 
transports loaded with ammunition and fuel, personally destroying two 
tanks and then rescuing seventeen members of his regiment from 
encirclement. The difference to the Soviet era is that archival references 
are supplied, giving an opportunity for verification by independent 
historians.1053 
 
Arguing that despite the desertion, self-harm, panic and surrender in the 
Red Army in 1941, Soviet soldiers for the most part fought bravely, 
slowed the German advance, and through their sacrifice ultimately saved 
Moscow, Gareev noted that: “It cannot be that Hitler's command and the 
German troops were doing everything right, that they fought superbly and 
suddenly failed. And that we did it all wrong, fought stupidly and suddenly 
miraculously won”.1054 Many revisionists by contrast would argue that it 
would be difficult to find a political and military leadership that could so 
badly bungle the management of a war.  
                                                 
1050 Medinskiĭ, Voĭna, p. 239. 
1051 ibid., p. 239; nonetheless, Medinskiĭ in his role as minister of culture has also recently 
vehemently attacked those that criticise the Panfilov story and label it a Communist propaganda 
myth. Medinskiĭ stated that even if the Panfilov story were a myth, it represented the bravery of 
millions of Red Army soldiers, and that people who question such time-honoured stories are “filthy 
scum”: See Harry Bone, ‘Putin backs WW2 myth in new Russian film’, BBC News. Available at:  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37595972 (accessed 16/10/17).  
1052 Miagkov, ‘Na grani katastrofy’, p. 142. 
1053 ibid. 





The national-patriotic accounts of the present day are different to the 
official Soviet view because it is no longer possible to hide from the 
massive scale of the defeats that took place in June 1941. Why the 
national-patriot view exists and is so strongly pushed in Russia can in part 
be explained by the strength of the revisionist accounts that largely 
preceded it. The national-patriotic view is reactionary in nature. The 
national-patriotic historians feel that their view, which for them 
corresponds with true Russian patriotism, is under siege from a hostile 
West and an even more dangerous phalanx of Western-inspired Russian 
revisionists. According to the national-patriots, the political climate in the 
years leading up to and immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
led to an increasingly polarised and acrimonious debate; revisionists were 
willing to pursue and support any arguments that defamed and 
delegitimised the Soviet government.  
   
The convenient, catch-all opponent for the national-patriots is the 
Icebreaker thesis, often personalised as the “anti-Suvorov” campaign. In 
Russia, Icebreaker attracted significant support. To take a metaphor from 
Operation Barbarossa, the revisionist blitzkrieg sent shockwaves through 
the crumbling Soviet Union and fledgling Russian Federation of the late 
1980s and 1990s.1055 National-patriots see themselves as the vanguard of 
truth blunting and slowly reversing the sizeable gains made in the 
revisionist attack. Importantly, the national-patriots also reject the 
“stolen victory” concept that unites many critics of the Soviet view of the 
war.  
 
In terms of the question set at the start of this thesis, the revisionist 
accounts mostly argue against the concept of a Red victory. For many 
                                                 
1055 To perhaps over-extend the metaphor, Suvorov and his Icebreaker can be seen as Guderian 
and his panzers leading the attack. 
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revisionists, Stalin was planning to attack Hitler and was then hoist on his 
own petard. Red Army leaders made countless errors and seemed no 
better at waging war in 1942 when the Germans once more stormed 
successfully across the southern steppe to Stalingrad. Support for the 
Soviet system more or less collapsed at the start of the war and it was 
only the unprecedented cruelty of a totalitarian regime that slowed the 
German advance at massive cost. The national-patriots, by contrast, 
emphasise the relative solidarity of the Soviet state in the face of the 
invaders. There may have been one million collaborators, but compared 
to the fighting elsewhere in Europe, the new element of 1941 was 
effective Soviet resistance against the Nazi invaders. While Stalin remains 
a controversial figure, the national-patriots describe a Soviet state and 
Red Army that functioned effectively in the face of an unprecedented 
military challenge. Ironically, the national-patriotic view seems closer to 
recent Western accounts described in Chapter Five than their revisionist 
rivals. 
 
The revisionist critique has not disappeared from the discourse in Russia 
under the weight of the national-patriot’s counter-attack. On the other 
hand, the revisionists may well lose this Russian historikerstreit with the 
national-patriots. The latter have the support of a political and military 
establishment with a vested interest in debunking Icebreaker, confirming 
Russia’s most notable achievement in world history, and using the Second 
World War as an example of what can be achieved when there is 
solidarity between the government and its people. It is clear that the 
Putin administration, like the Soviet state, will encourage a version of 
history based around the ideas that the Germans started the war, the 
Soviet state and the Red Army actively and ultimately successfully 
resisted, and that the vast majority of the population not only stayed 







The question asked at the start of this thesis was whether the changing 
historiography in the West and in Russia around the events of 1941 was 
now converging along the lines of the “Red victory” proposed by Citino. 
The conclusions reached can be summarised as follows. 
 
One: In the first half of the Cold War (1945-1965), very different 
accounts of the war constituted dominant paradigms in the West and in 
the Soviet Union. As nearly every account of the Western historiography 
maintains, the Halder school became the dominant voice. The view 
espoused by the German generals that dominated English-language 
accounts of the war in the first half of the Cold War centred on the idea 
that the Germans could have and should have captured Moscow before 
the onset of the autumn rain and winter snow. That this goal was not 
achieved reflected the fact that poor strategic choices were made by 
Hitler, a military amateur who was nonetheless convinced that he was a 
military genius. Hitler underestimated the importance of Moscow and 
diverted his panzer groups to Leningrad and Kiev in August. Only in 
October did the Wehrmacht move on Moscow and by then the combined 
forces of the weather and the endless hordes of cannon fodder available 
to Hitler stopped the Germans.  
 
The classic Western accounts of Liddell Hart, Seaton and Ziemke focused 
upon German mistakes, the weather and Russia’s geography, not the 
counter-attacks of the Red Army or the capacity of the Soviet state. 
Countless general and specialised accounts of the war left the reader with 
the impression that only one side was fighting during 1941. The Red Army 
slowed the progress of the Wehrmacht mainly by surrendering in huge 
numbers or offering up its soldiers as a sacrifice in hopeless acts of 
resistance. Underpinning the dominant German view were negative 
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cultural stereotypes about the incapacity of the Soviet state and Red 
Army.  
 
Meanwhile, the Soviet view of the war told a very different story. The 
Soviets argued that Hitler’s mistakes and the weather were used by 
Western historians as propaganda weapons to diminish the Soviet 
achievement at Moscow. The surprise attack, the battle-hardened 
Wehrmacht and the huge resources of Axis-dominated Europe created a 
“complex” military challenge for the Soviet state and Red Army. While 
different periods in Soviet historiography accorded different levels of 
blame and credit to Stalin and his generals, the outcome of the fight for 
Moscow was determined by the actions of the Soviet government, army 
and people. The Soviet view of the war was that 1941 was a hard-fought 
Red victory that laid the foundation for ultimate defeat of Hitler. 
 
Two: In the second half of the Cold War, the paradigms outlined above 
broke down, albeit at different speeds and for different reasons. Whereas 
early Cold War Western histories explicitly and implicitly prioritised Hitler’s 
blunders and the weather, the arguments of the German generals largely 
disappeared from the 1970s with very few historians following Liddell Hart 
and Seaton in arguing that the Germans almost won the war in 1941. 
Since Reinhardt and van Creveld, Western historians have mostly 
described a “mission impossible” for the German Army given their lack of 
resources and the geographical, meteorological and numerical challenges. 
It is likely that this gradual decline of the influence of the Halder school 
reflected broader contextual changes and not simply the new evidence 
from the German archives made available in the 1960s. The 1960s, with 
the war over for nearly two decades, was an era of historians revising the 
standard stories of the war. In the West, Cold War “revisionism” grew in 
importance among academic historians who questioned whether the 
Soviet state was solely responsible for the breakdown of the wartime 
alliance. The German generals came in for trenchant criticism from the 
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likes of Clark, Reinhardt and van Creveld. For these historians, the 
generals’ claim of a near miss at Moscow was not supported by the newly 
available archival material from the 1960s; given Germany’s lack of 
resources, the invasion of the Soviet Union was a fatal act of hubris on 
the part of Hitler and his generals. 
 
In the Soviet Union serious attacks on the Soviet view of the war were 
impossible before the Gorbachëv era. When in the late 1980s Gorbachëv 
did finally allow public criticism of Soviet historiography, it coincided with 
the publication of Icebreaker in the West. Independent historians 
challenged the monopoly of historians employed by the Soviet and later 
the Russian military establishment. The revisionist critique challenged the 
most basic assumption of the official Soviet view of the war: that this was 
an unprovoked attack on a peace-loving Soviet Union. The revisionist 
histories were equally brutal in their assessment of the competence of the 
Soviet political and military leadership and cast doubt on the Soviet 
shibboleth of a unified and uniformly patriotic Soviet state and Red Army. 
The opening of the Soviet archives produced in Russia great interest in 
the hitherto secret history, crimes and failings of the Soviet state and 
army. The revisionists told a story of an aggressive Stalin, a weak and 
incompetent Soviet state and army, and the saving of the capital thanks 
to the patriotism and sacrifice of ordinary Soviet citizens. It was not the 
case that revisionists in Russia simply adopted the story told by the 
Halder school. Hitler’s mistakes and the weather figured much less than 
the willingness of a cruel totalitarian regime to sacrifice its people. After 
Moscow was saved by the millions of “Uncle Vanyas”, the regime used its 
propaganda to steal the victory from the people and proclaim that the war 
proved the superiority of the Communist system.  
 
Three: Since the opening of the Soviet archives, Western historians have 
mostly – but by no means universally – explicitly rejected the view of the 
German generals and prioritised Soviet resistance in their accounts of 
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1941. Rather than emphasising the contingency of Hitler’s decisions and 
the influence of the weather, there is a trend towards an emphasis upon 
the capacity of the Soviet state to resist, the casualties inflicted upon the 
Germans in the forgotten battles, and the complexity of the motivations 
of ordinary Soviet citizens whose resistance surprised the Germans. This 
emphasis upon Soviet resistance as key is for the first time a feature of 
the Western military histories describing the war from the German and 
Soviet perspectives.  
 
Comparing the footnotes and source-base of, for example, Glantz or 
Stahel with Erickson or Seaton is a good guide to how much more 
information is available since the opening of the Soviet archives. The 
sheer volume of this information pointed to evidence of Soviet activity, 
even if the mistakes and defeats and military disasters told a very 
different story to Soviet propaganda. Archival material does not speak for 
itself and so it is likely that broader historiographical changes have 
influenced Western historians writing about 1941. Since the 1970s, the 
‘revisionist’ paradigm in Soviet studies argued that Soviet society was 
more complicated and multi-layered than a straightforward ‘totalitarian’ 
model might suggest. The Soviet system had strengths as well as 
weaknesses for its “acid test” of war. Meanwhile, negative stereotyping of 
Russians as servile hordes whose principal virtue was their mass rather 
than fighting skill has all but disappeared. Essentialising still occurs, but 
usually Russian resilience or some other positive quality is invoked to 
explain battlefield performance. The mass surrenders of the summer are 
more likely to be understood in terms of the loss of command and control 
under conditions of encirclement.  
 
In Russia, the quarter of a century that followed the collapse of the Soviet 
state has witnessed a war between the revisionist critics of the Soviet 
view of the war and the national-patriots who argue that the Soviet Union 
was the innocent party in the outbreak of the war, that mistakes were 
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made at the start of the war followed by a Red Army recovery, and that 
the Soviet state, army and people deserve credit for the victory at 
Moscow. The national-patriots rejected the Icebreaker thesis and any 
suggestion that the Red Army surrendered en masse, or fought only 
because of blocking detachments and commissars.  
 
Viewed in these terms, an alignment is discernible between new 
dominant, or at least emerging dominant, paradigms in the West and in 
Russia. Western historians are much more critical of the Soviet regime 
than the national-patriots. Nevertheless, there is considerable overlap 
between Glantz and Citino on the one hand and Zolotarev and Isaev on 
the other. Soviet resistance and not German error tipped the scales.  
 
Four: As has often been noted in this thesis, the growth of a new 
orthodoxy or consensus or the coming into existence of a new paradigm is 
not the same thing as the definitive answer to a question. For example, it 
is possible that a type of groupthink has been at work in the West over 
the past twenty years brought about by the towering influence of Glantz 
and Reinhardt, by perceptions that the history of 1941 was distorted by 
Cold War politics, by dissatisfaction with the totalitarian model, and 
declining admiration for the once “clean” Wehrmacht and its generals. If 
the Putin regime were to come to an end at some point soon, it is possible 
that there would be a burst of revisionist histories once more in Russia. It 
is also possible that perceptions of Russia will be adversely affected by 
Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 or Russia’s alleged interference in 
the 2016 U.S. election and that a new generation of Western historians 
will as a consequence look more negatively on Russia/the Soviet Union’s 
role in 1941. It is already the case that new nationalist histories of the 
war emerging in Ukraine are gaining in popularity and tell a different story 
of the war to that preferred by Russian national-patriots.1056 Evidence is 
                                                 
1056 Anthony Faiola, ‘A ghost of World War II history haunts Ukraine’s standoff with Russia’, The 
Washington Post, 25/3/2014. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/a-ghost-of-
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never complete and is always subject to interpretation. Revisionist 
historians accuse the Soviet military establishment and national-patriotic 
historians of deliberatly hiding the truth just as they did in the Stalin 
era.1057 The greatest controversy of them all – Icebreaker - is far from 
definitively resolved.  
 
Five: To a remarkable degree, Western and Russian historians are still 
arguing over paradigms that were established early in the Cold War. 
While it is certainly the case that conferences, books and articles on 1941 
now feature Russian-language and Western voices, it cannot really be 
said that this collaboration has produced agreement on what needs to be 
resolved about 1941. The Russian literature is still mainly debating the 
issues central to the Soviet view of the war – the innocence or not of the 
Soviet Union, the competence of the Soviet political and military 
leadership, and whether the regime had any real support during the war. 
Western historians writing after the opening of the Soviet archives dismiss 
the Icebreaker thesis, are striving to put to rest the legacy of the Halder 
school and to work out why the Soviet regime proved so resilient in the 
face of the hitherto invincible German invaders.  
 
What can be concluded is that a change has occurred from what was the 
case during the Cold War. Across the globe, the reader of military 
histories about 1941 is likely to get the impression that, while many 
factors were involved in the German failure to capture Moscow, Soviet 
resistance mattered the most. In the West, respect for the viewpoint of 
the German generals and the idea that Operations Barbarossa and 
Typhoon were military successes but political failures are no longer 
fashionable. In Russia, debate over the war has continued to rage, 
although the national-patriots have clearly strengthened their position 
during the Putin era.  
                                                                                                                                                        
world-war-ii-history-haunts-ukraines-standoff-with-russia/2014/03/25/18d4b1e0-a503-4f73-aaa7-
5dd5d6a1c665_story.html?utm_term=.1025e148532d (accessed 2/11/17). 




There was nothing inevitable about these developments. The end of the 
Cold War meant that new information and new interpretations were freely 
shared between scholars and popular writers in the West and in Russia. 
However, the new information was never in itself decisive. In Russia, the 
debate about 1941 still swirls around the truth or otherwise of the original 
Soviet paradigm. The issues that divide national-patriots and revisionists 
are who started the war, was it mainly brutal coercion that saved the 
Soviet state, and what was the true cost of the war. While the national-
patriots see a victory of the Soviet state and people working in unison, 
revisionists describe a stolen victory and a regime that survived in spite of 
its own incompetence and unpopularity.  
 
In the West, as we have seen, one of the distinct themes of the last two 
decades has been the attempt to kill off the Halder school once and for 
all. Rather than a missed opportunity, the trend in the West has been to 
view the German blitzkrieg as superficially impressive but clearly 
insufficient to overcome a resilient Soviet state and army. The new 
historiography has harnessed material from Soviet archives, together with 
German archives and other primary materials to paint a picture of a war 
that was essentially decided in the summer of 1941 when the German 
invasion was launched with what proved to be woefully insufficient 
resources. A minority of Western accounts consider that Hitler’s meddling 
or the mud and snow mattered most, but they are clearly outnumbered 
by accounts that insufficient German resources in the face of determined 
Soviet resistance mattered most.  
 
In the West, the Halder school has been attacked by the pincer 
movement of historians working on the Soviet and German sides of the 
war arguing that resources and Soviet resistance were the crucial factors. 
In Russia, a bitter debate continues, but a re-energised Russian military 
establishment with the backing of the Putin administration has fought 
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back against the Icebreaker and “Stolen Victory” concepts, whose 
popularity peaked in the 1990s. It is at the very least possible that, on 
present trends, an alignment is occurring between accounts of 1941 that 
predominate in the English and Russian-speaking worlds. In other words, 
1941 has metamorphosed, or is in the process of metamorphising, as 
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